

99-2-00947-9

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ARCHIVE RECORD

STATE OF WASHINGTON, County of Pierce: I, Kevin Stock, Clerk of the Pierce County Superior Court, do hereby certify that this instrument is a true and correct copy of the original taken under my direction and control on the date attached hereto. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand and the Seal of said. Court.

Kevin Stock, Pierce County Clerk

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR PIERCE COUNTY

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Pennsylvania corporation,

Plaintiff,)

v.


IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife; DONALD LEE BARNETT and BARBARA BARNETT, husband and wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL and BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a Washington corporation, JACK McDONALD and "JANE DOE" McDONALD, husband and wife,

Defendants.

NO. 88-2-00947-9

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

W.E. SEP 7-1988



American Casualty Company moves for reconsideration of the court's order denying American's motion for a continuance of plaintiff's Gabrielson's motion for summary judgment.

This motion is based upon the Motion and Affidavit to Shorten Time (filed in support of Motion for Continuance), Supplemental Affidavit of Bruce Winchell, the Affidavit of Bruce Winchell Opposing Gabrielson's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Employee Status), and American's Memorandum,

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 1

LANE POWELL MOSS & MILLER SEATTLE WASHINGTON 98101 2647



Opposing Gabrielson' Motion for Summary Judgment (Employee Status).

LANE POWELL MOSS & MILLER

Bruce Winchell

Attorneys for Defendant

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 2

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR PIERCE COUNTY

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Pennsylvania corporation,

NO. 88-2-00947-93EP 9 1988

Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING AMERICAN'S MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE

ν.

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife; DONALD LEE BARNETT and BARBARA BARNETT, husband and wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL and BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a Washington corporation, JACK McDONALD and "JANE DOE" McDONALD, husband and wife,

Defendants.

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FOR A CONTINUANCE

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The Court has heard the motion of American Casualty

Company for a continuance of Gabrielson's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of the employee status of Jack McDonald and the scope of the professional services exclusion which is an endorsement to American's policy insuring Community Chapel and Bible Training Center.

The court has considered the affidavit of Bruce Winchell and the supplemental affidavit of Bruce Winchell filed in support of American's motion. The court has also heard ORDER DENYING AMERICAN'S MOTION

LANE POWELL MOSS & MILLER ST 3800 RAINIER BANK TOWER SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101-2647 PH

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1 argument from counsel.

The court orders that American's motion is denied.

American may depose Jack Hicks and Jack McDonald prior
to the hearing of Gabrielson's motion for partial summary
judgment on the issue of employee status and the professional
services exclusion.

DATED this day of September, 1988.

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Presented by: LANE POWELL MOSS & MILLER

Bruce Winchell Attorneys for

Approved as to Form:


Daniel Hannula Attorney for Gabrielson

Rodney Hollenbeck Attorney for Barnetts

John Glassman Attorney for Community Chapel and Bible Training Center

ORDER DENYING AMERICAN'S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE

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COMPLAINT - 4

representation employment and/or agency for the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center and Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Tacoma.

x.

The plaintiffs, Carol and Ira Gabrielson, regularly attended services at both the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Tacoma and the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center in Burien for a number of years. As members of the congregation, Carol and Ira Gabrielson attended numerous functions and were active participants in the congregation. In addition, the Gabrielsons tithed a portion of their income to the congregation to help sustain it.

XI.

Defendant Jack McDonald, as pastor of the Tacoma Chapel, held himself out to the Gabrielsons as a qualified counselor. In this regard, Carol Gabrielson began counseling with defendant Jack McDonald on a regular basis.

XII.

As a result of the counseling sessions, defendant Jack McDonald became aware of the vulnerability of plaintiff Carol Gabrielson. Defendant Jack McDonald took advantage of her weakness and her need for support and manipulated her into leaving her husband, plaintiff Ira Gabrielson.

XIII.

Further, as a result of the manipulation by defendant

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Jack McDonald, plaintiff Carol Gabrielson was coerced and unduly influenced into a having sexual relationship with defendant Jack McDonald. This relationship continued from September through December of 1985.

XIV.

Defendant Donald Barnett encouraged the members of his congregation, including the Tacoma Chapel, to form intimate attachments with members of the opposite sex as part of the regular services at the Chapel. Defendant Donald Barnett expressly encouraged married members of the congregation to form intimate attachments with persons other than the spouses of the members.

XV.

Defendant Donald Barnett knew or should have known that these attachments would result in seductions, infidelity and the breakup of marriages. Further, defendant Donald Barnett knew or should have known that his agent in Tacoma, defendant Jack McDonald, was involved in the seduction of female members of the congregation and was abusing the pastoral privilege.

XVI.

In January, 1986, both plaintiffs Carol and Ira Gabrielson were disfellowshiped from Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Tacoma, as a consequence of Carol Gabrielson's refusal to participate in any further sexual activities with defendant Jack McDonald.

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COMPLAINT - 5

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Plaintiff Carol Gabrielson, in March of 1986, requested permission to attend services at defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center in Burien, and was told that she was welcome at that congregation.

XVIII.

On March 6, 1986, plaintiff Carol Gabrielson attended services at defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Burien. During her visit to that congregation, plaintiff Carol Gabrielson was physically assaulted by defendants John Does 1 through 4 who bodily dragged her from the chapel, causing the physical injuries which are complained of herein. Plaintiff Carol Gabrielson was also handcuffed and forced into a vehicle belonging to defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Burien. The actions of John Does 1 through 4 were at the direction and under the request of defendants Jack McDonald, Donald Barnett and Barbara Barnett.

XIX.

Defendants Jack McDonald, Donald Barnett and Barbara Barnett have further made disparaging statements regarding Carol and Ira Gabrielson to members of the congregation which tended to injure the Gabrielsons' reputation in the community.

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COMPLAINT - 6

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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

XX.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference as if set forth in full each and every allegation as set forth in paragraphs I through XIX.

XXI.

The acts of each of the defendants as stated above are so extreme as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency. The conduct of each of the above named defendants was outrageous and caused the plaintiffs to suffer severe emotional distress. Each of the above-named defendants acted intentionally or recklessly to cause severe emotional distress to the plaintiffs.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

XXII.

The plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if set forth in full each and every allegation as set forth in paragraphs I through XXI.

XXIII.

Defendant Jack McDonald did not exercise the degree of care, skill, diligence and knowledge commonly possessed and exercised by a reasonable, careful and prudent counselor in this jurisdiction by manipulating Carol Gabrielson into a sexual relationship. This intentional or reckless failure constituted the tort of counselor malpractice.

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COMPLAINT - 7

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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

XXIV.

The plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if set forth in full each and every allegation as set forth in paragraphs I through XXIII.

XXV.

Defendant Jack McDonald negligently violated his duty of care as a counselor by having sexual contact with plaintiff Carol Gabrielson with the knowledge that Carol Gabrielson was vulnerable. Defendant Jack McDonald was negligent in counseling plaintiff Carol Gabrielson and so created an unreasonable risk of physical and mental harm which caused the plaintiff Carol Gabrielson's injuries. This negligence constitute the tort of counselor malpratice.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

XXVI.

The plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if set forth in full each and every allegation as set forth in paragraphs I through XXV.

XXVII.

Defendants Jack McDonald and Donald Barnett intentionally, recklessly, or negligently failed to exercise that degree of care, skill, diligence and knowledge commonly possessed and exercised by a reasonable, careful and prudent pastor in this jurisdiction. This failure constitutes the

COMPLAINT - 8

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 tort of pastoral malpractice.

FIFTH THROUGH SEVENTH CAUSES OF ACTION

XXVIII.

The plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if set forth in full each and every allegation as set forth in paragraphs I through XXVII.

XXIX.

The acts of the defendants on March 6, 1986 which resulted in injuries to plaintiff Carol Gabrielson were negligent and/or constitute the torts of assault, battery and false imprisonment.

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION

XXX.

The plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if set forth in full each and every allegation as set forth in paragraphs I through XXIX.

XXXI.

The acts of defendants in making disparaging statements damaging the reputation of the plaintiff constitute the tort of defamation.

NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION

XXXII.

The plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if set forth in full each and every allegation as set forth in paragraphs I through XXXI.

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COMPLAINT - 9

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XXXIII.

As a further and proximate result of the acts of the defendants, plaintiff Ira Gabrielson has suffered a loss of consortium.

XXXIV.

As a direct and proximate result of the intentional, reckless and negligent wrongful acts of the defendants, and each of them, plaintiffs have been specially and generally damaged in an amount to be fully proven at the time of trial.

WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs pray for judgment against the defendants as follows:

- 1. For all general and special damages incurred by plaintiffs Ira and Carol Gabrielson in an amount to be proven at time of trial;
- 2. For plaintiffs' reasonable costs and attorneys' fees incurred in the prosecution of this action;
- 3. For such other and further relief as the court deems just and equitable.

DATED this _____ day of

1986.

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

By:

DANIEL /L://HANNULA

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COMPLAINT - 10

LAW OFFICES .

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

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TACOMA 383-5388 SEATTLE 838-4790 151





IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE VOL 369 PAGE 795

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife,) }
Plaintiffs ,	NO. 86-2-02792-6 IN OPEN COURT
-vs-	
JACK McDONALD and SHIRLEY McDONALD, husband and wife;	OCT 28 1988
COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE	By Pierce County Clerk
TRAINING CENTER OF TACOMA; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE	VERDICT FORM DEPUTY
TRAINING CENTER OF BURIEN,	

Defendants.

QUESTION NO. 1:

Was there negligence by the defendant, Jack McDonald, that was a proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff, Carol Gabrielson?

Answer: \sqrt{e} (Yes or No)

If you answered "yes" to question 1, answer question 2; if your answer to question 1 was "no," skip question 2 and answer question 3.

QUESTION NO. 2:

Were the negligent acts of defendant, Jack McDonald, committed while he was acting as the agent of Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Burien?

Answer: $\frac{\sqrt{e}}{\sqrt{e}}$ (Yes or No)

Answer Question 3.

QUESTION NO. 3:

Did the defendant, Jack McDonald, defame the plaintiff, Carol Gabrielson, which was a proximate cause of injury to her?

Answer: \sqrt{e} (Yes or No)

If you answered "yes" to question 3, answer

question 4; if you answered "no" to question 3, skip to question 5.

QUESTION NO. 4:

In defaming Carol Gabrielson, was defendant, Jack McDonald, acting as an agent for the defendant corporation of Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Burien?

Answer: Yes or No)

Answer question 5.

QUESTION NO. 5:

Did the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center assault, batter or falsely imprison plaintiff, Carol Gabrielson, proximately causing injury to her?

Answer: (Yes or No)

If all answers are no, stop here and notify court. Answer question 6 only if you answered "yes" to question 1.

QUESTION NO. 6:

As a result of the injuries suffered by Carol Gabrielson, did plaintiff, Ira Gabrielson, suffer a loss of consortium?

Answer: \underline{ye} (Yes or No)

Answer question 7.

QUESTION NO. 7:

If your answer to questions 1, 3, or 5 was "yes," what is the total amount of the plaintiff, Carol Gabrielson's damages?

\$ <u>200,000</u>.

If your answer to question 6 was "yes," answer question 8.

QUESTION NO. 8:

What is the total amount of plaintiff, Ira Gabrielson's, damages?

\$ <u>20,000</u>.

Answer Questions 9 and 10 only if you answered "yes" to Question 1.

QUESTION NO 9:

Was there any contributory negligence by Carol Gabrielson which was the proximate cause of injury or damage to her?

Answer: $\frac{1}{2}$ (Yes or No

Answer question 10 only if you answered "yes" to question 9. If "no," proceed to question 11.

QUESTION NO. 10:

Using 100% as the total combined negligence of all the parties which contributed to the injury or damage to the plaintiff, Carol Gabrielson, what percentage of such contributory negligence is attributable to her?

Answer:

Answer Questions 11 and 12 only if you answered "yes" to Question 6.

OUESTION NO. 11:

Was there contributory negligence by Ira Gabrielson which was a proximate cause of his own damages?

Yes or No) Answer:

Answer question 12 only if you answered "yes" to question 11.

QUESTION NO. 12:

Using 100% as the total combined negligence of all the parties which contributed to the injury or damage to the plaintiff, Ira Gabrielson, what percentage of such contributory negligence is attributable to him?


Answer:

STATE OF WASHINGTON, County of Pierce ss: I, Ted Rutt, Clerk of the above entitled Court, do hereby certify that this foregoing instrument is a true and correct copy of the original now on file in my

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand and the Seal of Said Court this TED WIT, Clerk

Deputy

EXHIBIT 3



VOL 378 FASE 155

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE

NOV 2 3 1386

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife,

Plaintiffs,

NO. 86-2-02792-6

vs.

JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT

JACK McDONALD and "JANE DOE" McDONALD, husband and wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER OF TACOMA; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER,

Defendants.

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THIS MATTER having come on regularly for trial commencing September 12, 1988 and concluding October 28,

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JUDGMENT JDGM 1

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1988, and it appearing to the court that a jury of twelve

motions and arguments during the course of trial, and the

court having duly and properly instructed the jury and the

jury having duly rendered its verdict by answering special

(12) having been duly selected and impaneled, evidence and

testimony having been presented, the court having considered

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interrogatories which are attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as if fully set forth, and the jury having returned its verdict into court and having found for plaintiff Carol Gabrielson and against defendants Jack McDonald, Shirley McDonald, the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Tacoma, and the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Burien on the issues of negligence and defamation in the sum of Two Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$200,000.00), and the jury having further decided that plaintiff Carol Gabrielson was thirty-five percent (35%) contributorily negligent, and the jury further having returned its verdict finding for plaintiff Ira Gabrielson and against defendant Jack McDonald, Shirley McDonald, Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Tacoma, and Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Burien on the issue of loss of consortium in the sum of Twenty Thousand Dollars (\$20,000.00), having further decided that plaintiff Ira Gabrielson was fifteen percent (15%) contributorily negligent, and the court having considered the records and files herein, and that no post-trial motions have heretofore been made in this matter, and the court being fully advised and considering the cost bill filed by plaintiff in the sum of \$ 988.9/ , the court finds that plaintiffs are entitled to costs in the sum of \$ 988.9/ It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment herein

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JUDGMENT - 2

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entered on behalf of the plaintiff Carol Gabrielson by the jury was duly regular and proper in the sum of Two Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$200,000.00), less Seventy-Thousand Dollars (\$70,000.00) for plaintiff Carol Gabrielson's contributory fault, and that the same is hereby entered and that a net judgment of the sum of One Hundred Thirty Thousand Dollars (\$130,000.00) in favor of plaintiff Carol Gabrielson be and the same is hereby entered, and it is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment herein entered on behalf of the plaintiff Ira Gabrielson by the jury was duly regular and proper in the sum of Twenty Thousand Dollars (\$20,000.00) less Three Thousand Dollars for plaintiff Ira Gabrielson's contributory fault, and that the same is hereby entered and that a net judgment of the sum of Seventeen Thousand Dollars (\$17,000.00) in favor of plaintiff Ira Gabrielson be and the same is hereby rendered and entered, and it is further,

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that costs in the amount of \$ 988.9/ are awarded to the plaintiffs and judgment for the same be and hereby is rendered and entered.

JUDGMENT SUMMARY

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JUDGMENT - 3

LAW OFFICES

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TACOMA 383-5388

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1988.

1 Jack McDonald, Community Chapel and Bible Judgment Debtors: Training Center of Tacoma, and Community 2 Chapel and Bible Training Center 3 Carol Gabrielson and Ira Gabrielson Judgment Creditors: 4 Daniel L. Hannula and Attorneys for Judgment Creditor: Harold T. Dodge, Jr. 5 86-2-02792-6 Cause No.: 6 23/d day/of DONE IN OPEN COURT this 7 8 MONORABLE THOMAS **JUDGE** 9 Presented by: 10 **DEPT. 4** RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS IN OPEN COURT 11 12 1988 WOV2 13 Mannula. Of Pierce County Clark Attorneys for Plaintiffs 14 DEPUTY 15 Approved as to form: 16 WILLIAMS, KASTNER & GIBBS 17 18 By: STATE OF WASHINGTON, County of Pierce Eileen Lawrence, Of Attorneys 19 ss: 1, Ted Rutt, Clerk of the chove for Jack McDonald, Shirley entitled Court, do hereby certify that this McDonald and the Community 20 foregoing instrument is a true and express Chapel and Bible Training copy of the original now on file it my Center of Tacoma 21 office. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set LEE, SMART, COOK, MARTIN & PATTERSON 22 hand and the Seal of Said Court 23 TED ∏. Clerk By: 24 Michael J. Bond, Of Attorneys for Community Chapel and Bible 25 Training Center of Burien 26 //// LAW OFFICES RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS JUDGMENT - 4

mv taic 868 E882/12/2 STOP

.Deputy

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TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98402 TACOMA 383-5388 SEATTLE 838-4790

EXHIBIT 4

1	they were forming down in Tacoma.
2	Q. As I recall, it was initially a Bible
3	study fellowship?
4	A. Yes.
5	Q. And that was from '79 to '82?
6	A. Yes.
7	Q. Tell me about how that got started?
8	A. Community Chapel in Burien sent down Bible
9	graduates to have a little Bible teaching, and then
10	a few people that were in Tacoma invited their
11	friends, and that's basically how it started.
12	Q. Tell me how you first heard about this
13 .	fellowship.
14	A. Well, I was attending Community Chapel, and
15	they had people from Tacoma get together at the
16	Burien group to discuss whether there were enough
17	people in Tacoma to, you know, start another little
18	group.
19	Q. How did the people from Tacoma that were
20	attending the Burien chapel get together to discuss
21	that?
22	A. Well, they had just had maybe a sign-up
23	sheet or something to notify all the people in
24	Tacoma that they were having a meeting at such and



such a house or something like that.

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I don't recall

T	just all the little details of it. But there
2	were families from Tacoma that were driving up. And
3	we, from Tacoma, knew the ones from Tacoma.
4	Q. Do you recall who organized it?
5	A. Danny O'Brien.
6	Q. Danny O'Brien.
7	What was his role at the Burien
8	church, if any?
9	A. He was a Bible college teacher.
10	Q. Now, am I correct, then, that there was
11	some sort of initial meeting of the people from
12	Tacoma at somebody's house which Danny O'Brien
13	helped to originate?
14	A. Yes.
15	Q. Do you recall whose house that was at?
16	A. No, I don't.
17	Q. Did you attend that initial meeting?
18	A. Yes, I did.
19	Q. Do you remember anybody else who attended
20	that initial meeting?
21	A. My wife; George Jewell, his wife, Ramona;
22	and then there were several Seattle I'll call them
23	Seattle people that were interested in going to
24	Tacoma, also there. So
25	Q. Why was that?



A. That they wanted to go down, like those
that wanted to sing songs. They were going out in
a ministerial capacity, just to support a
"support group," I guess would be a better word,
rather than ministerial.
Q. Do you know, were there others, but you
don't remember them, or was that pretty much it, the
four or five of you?
A. It seems like there was maybe 14 to 18
people, but I don't remember who they were.
Q. Your wife, George Jewell and his wife, and
Danny O'Brien are the ones you can remember today?
A. Yes. There was a fellow by the name of
David Floyd there, I believe.
Q. Do you recall what was discussed?
A. Just that the people in Tacoma would like
to get a Bible study going down in Tacoma, and have
it overseen by, you know, a Bible college teacher
or graduate, so it was on the mark.
Q. Were you a graduate?
A. Not at the time that this started.
Q. When did this start in relation to your
graduation?
A. Probably six months before my graduation.



What happened next?

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Q.

1	A. I don't understand.
2	Q. With respect to this fellowship.
.3	You had this meeting?
4	A. Then they began to have a meeting down
5	there on Friday nights.
6	Q. Was it decided to have weekly meetings
7	when you were at that organizational meeting?
8	A. Yes.
9	Q. Was there a particular location where
10	these weekly meetings were held?
11	A. Yes.
12	Q. Where was that?
13	A. At the Masonic Lodge.
14	Q. What happened at the meetings?
15	A. People singing songs, people testified
16.	about their experience walking with God, and the Bible
17	teacher would give a lesson, and then, afterwards,
18	some people would pray for people, and other people
19	would have coffee and cookies and visit with each
20	other, and then they'd go home.
21	Q. To your knowledge, did anybody receive any
22	money as a result of any participation in these
23	meetings?
24	A. No.
25	Q. There was no collection?





1	Q. Do you recall anybody else who was first
2	in command?
3	A. Greg Theil.
4	Q. What association did he have with the
5	Burien chapel?
6	A. Bible college teacher.
7	Q. Anyone else you can remember?
8	A. David Floyd was there for a short time.
9	Q. Do you recall what association he had with
10	the Burien chapel?
11	A. He was a Bible college graduate.
12	Q. Is that it?
13	A. Yes.
14	Q. Is this sort of like an apprentice period
15	for you, going through this and watching other
16	people lead, so that you can learn how to do it?
17	A. Not really, because I sat under Don
18	Barnett, and I watched him pastor the church from
19	1973. So, I mean, it was the same procedure.
20	Q. It was kind of a continuation of what
21	you'd been doing before?
22	A. Right, just a smaller group.
23	Q. By 1982, how many people were participating
24	in the fellowship?
25	A. Maybe 40 to 50.



How was it the decision was made to form

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Q.

the Tacoma church?





1	A. I think that we had a meeting with
2	Don Barnett and the various people from Tacoma, and
3	some from Seattle felt like they might want to be the
4	pastor, and he decided: Well, let the people vote on
5	who they want for the pastor.
6	Q. Did the people vote?
7	A. Yes.
8	Q. Did they vote for you?
9	A. Yes.
10	Q. Were you appointed?
11	A. Yes.
12	Q. Have you ever heard of any instance in
13	which the desire of a congregation of a satellite
14	institution for a particular pastor was overruled by
15	the Burien corporation?
16	A. No. But I might add that I was not privy
17	to what they did.
18	Q. What did you do after you were selected?
19	A. Taught them the Bible and became a pastor.
20	Q. Let's talk about the corporation a little
21	bit.
2 Ż	(Exhibit No. 1 was marked
23	for identification.)
24	Q. (By Mr. Winchell) Can you identify
25	Fyhihit 12





1	Tacoma corporation, what role did George Jewell and
2	Hal Price play in Tacoma?
3	A. They were elders of the Tacoma church.
4	Q. Which means they were on the board of
5	directors of the corporation?
6	A. Yes.
7	Q. And I take it you were the other director?
8	A. Yes; I was the other director.
9	Q. Do you recall who the officers were?
10	A. I was the president, and George was the
11	next in line, and Hal was the next in line, whatever
12	they were. I don't even remember what they were.
13	Q. The three of you were officers?
14	A. Yeah, right.
15	Q. Did someone from the Burien corporation
16	provide you with the form for these Articles of
17	Incorporation?
18	A. Yeah; they did the whole thing. They had
19	them printed up.
20	Q. Who handled that for you?
21	A. Jack Hicks.
22	Q. Have you ever been on the board of
23	directors of a corporation before?
24	A. No.
25	Q. Do you know whether George or Hal had?





Α.

Ţ	Hal Price.
2	Q. Did you read the Articles of Incorporation
3	during the time you were active in the church?
4	A. Probably when we first got them.
. 5	Q. Will you look at the third page, Item 9-B?
6	A. Third page.
7	Q. On the Articles of Incorporation, first
8	one.
9	Do you remember reading the part that
10	says, "All decision-making for this corporation shall
11	be here after vested in the board of directors,
12	except as specifically limited by the corporation
13	bylaws"?
14	A. What's the question?
15	Q. Do you remember reading that part of the
16	Articles of Incorporation?
17	A. I don't remember this very second reading
18	it, but I probably read it.
19	Q. Did you continue to meet at the Masonic
20	Lodge?
21	A. Yes, we did.
22	Q. What was your salary during the first year
23	as pastor?
24	A. None.
25	Q. You were not paid?





1	\$500 a month, and after the income came up, I went						
2	to \$1,000 a month.						
3	Q. So, it was you and Hal and George that set						
4	your salary?						
5	A. Yes.						
6	Q. Was anybody else involved in that process?						
7	A. No.						
8	Q. As a practical matter, was your salary						
9	dependent upon the amount of the collection?						
10	A. Yes, it was.						
11	Q. Did the Tacoma church keep financial						
12	records?						
13	A. They had some, but in my transition of						
14	moving, I lost all of my files and my diploma. I						
15	don't know we had some stuff from the church that						
16	we gave to Goodwill, and I think my box of stuff						
17	might have got						
18	Q. I think we have your diploma, don't we?						
19	Wasn't that in one of your earlier depositions?						
20	A. No, that was a yearly licensing thing.						
21	Q. Who kept the financial records?						
22	A. I did, my wife.						
23	Q. Can you describe them to me.						
24	A. The piece of paper with the offerings that						
25	each person gave on a monthly basis, and at the end						





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corporation?

it looks like he's the one to notarized it.

1	You don't remember that?
2	A. I don't remember that.
3	Q. Do you remember if you read these
4	interrogatories over before you signed them?
5	A. Okay, now I remember filling this out,
6	yes, and then I gave it to Mike Bugni, right.
7	Q. Don't tell me about your conversations with
8	Mr. Bugni unless somebody else was there, but I would
9	like to know, did he send these to you for you to
10	fill out some draft answers, and then he typed them
11	up?
12	A. Yes.
13	Q. Will you look at Interrogatory No. 6?
14	A. Yes, I see it.
15	Q. Interrogatory No. 6 says, "From 1980 to
16	1986, did you have in effect one or more policies of
17	insurance in which you were named insured or a
18	covered person and which in any manner or to any
19	extent provided or provides you liability coverage,
20	whether primary or excess, with respect to any of
21	the claims, causes of action, injuries or damages
22	claimed against you in this lawsuit?
23	"Answer: No."
24	Do you recall if the answer "no" is



what you wrote down on your draft answer?

1	A. I wrote down "no."
2	Q. Did you believe that to be true at the
3	time that you prepared that answer?
4	A. I knew the Community Chapel of Tacoma had no
5	insurance of any kind.
6	Q. Did Jack Hicks ever tell you that the
7	Burien chapel would provide insurance to the Tacoma
8	corporation, before this lawsuit?
9	A. Not to my recollection.
10	Q. Did any other member of the board of
11	directors of the Burien corporation ever tell you
12	that the Burien corporation would provide insurance
13	to the Tacoma corporation?
14	A. Not to my recollection.
15	Q. Did Don Barnett ever make that kind of
16	representation to you?
17	A. Not to my recollection.
18	Q. I'm going to use the word "employed," and I
19	don't mean to use it in the legal sense, but in the
20	sense you would understand the term to be meant, did
21	anyone else who was employed in any capacity by the
22	Burien corporation ever tell you that the Burien
23	corporation was providing you with insurance?
24	A. Not to my recollection.
2.5	O Have you since 1992 completed any gradit



1	applications?								
2	A. I don't recall, but I suppose I have, but,								
3	I mean								
4	Q. Car loan, anything?								
5	MR. MEIKLE: I'm going to object to								
6	this line of questioning.								
7	MR. WINCHELL: I'm looking for								
8	anything that would indicate what he has been								
9	reporting to other people as his place of employment.								
LO	MR. MEIKLE: Okay.								
11	MR. WINCHELL: I don't care what his								
12	salary was or anything like that.								
L3 .	MR. MEIKLE: Answer.								
l 4	A. Restate the question.								
L5	Q. (By Mr. Winchell) Have you had any car								
16	loans since 1982.								
17	A. Yes.								
18	Q. Where did you get those from?								
19	A. Puget Sound Bank.								
20	Q. Which branch?								
21	A. I don't recall. The car dealer. He put								
22	it in wherever he did it.								
23	Q. Who was the dealer?								
24	A. The Dodge dealer in Tacoma, but I don't								
25	even remember his name.								



1	Q. Do you know if it's still there?								
2	A. I'm sure it is. It's the one on South								
. 3	Tacoma Way.								
4	Q. What year did you purchase that car?								
5	A. Probably 1983.								
6	Q. Is that the only car loan you've gotten?								
7	A. Is that the only one that I've got?								
8	Q. Since 1982 that you obtained.								
9	A. I've got one in 1984, I think, or '85.								
10	Q. Where did you get that from?								
11	A. Through the Cadillac dealer up in								
12	Bellevue.								
13	Q. Do you remember the name of the Cadillac								
14	dealer?								
15	A. I don't remember the name, but it's the								
16	big one up there.								
17	Q. Are you still making payments on that								
18	loan?								
19	A. Yes.								
20	Q. Who is the bank, do you know?								
21	A. US Bank.								
22	If I don't make a couple payments,								
23	they're going to come and get it, I know that.								
24	Q. Have you sought or obtained any other								
25	credit since 1982; Visa applications?								



1	A. No.								
2	Q. Home improvement loans?								
3	A. No.								
4	Q. You didn't buy a house?								
5	A. No.								
6	Q. Have you filed tax returns every year								
7	since 1982?								
8	A. Up until last year.								
9	Q. Didn't file one last year?								
10	A. I got to make some money first.								
11	Are you going to turn me into the IRS?								
12	Q. No.								
13	A. I've got you on record. Put that down.								
14	(Off the record.)								
15	Q. (By Mr. Winchell) Do you recall any								
16	instance, including these two credit applications, in								
17	which you reported to anybody your place of								
18	employment during the period '82 to '87?								
19	A. You're making me go real deep.								
20	I don't really, you know I didn't								
21	do a lot of buying, you know. I had my well drilling								
22	business, and I just bought supplies and drilled								
23	wells, you know.								
24	Q. Do you happen to recall what you reported .								



as your place of employment for the 1984 loan?

1	A. Probably a Well driller and a pastor, I -
2	whatever I did.
3	Q. Do you recall any instance in which you
4	ever indicated that you were employed by the
5	Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of
6	Burien?
7	A. I never said that I was ever employed by
8	Community Chapel of Burien.
9	Q. Let's jump ahead to November, then, of
10	1987, if I have the right month. That's when you
11	stopped being the pastor of the Tacoma church?
12	A. Yes.
13	Q. We have met and talked before, right?
14	A. Yes.
15	Q. Now, what I recall from talking with you
16	earlier is, you were to a point where you felt the
17	practice of spiritual connections had kind of gone
18	beyond something you felt you could deal with as a
19	pastor of the Tacoma church?
20	A. That's correct.
21	Q. And that was the reason that you decided
22	to resign; is that correct?
23	A. That's correct.
24	Q. And you did resign for that reason?



Yes.

A.

1	Q. Any other reason that you recall?
2	A. I believe I stated in my deposition that I
3	was not willing to follow Don Barnett up the hill
4	any further, because I felt there was no direction as
5	far as the spiritual connections. Things were not
6	getting better, they were getting worse.
. 7	Q. Did anyone pressure you to resign?
8	A. No. I made the decision to resign because
9	of the oncoming lawsuit, because of the fact the
10	church had got to a place that it was not
11	financially in a place to where it could support a
12	pastor, and I just made it was time to terminate
13	it.
14	Q. When did you meet Carol Gabrielson?
15	A. I can't answer that question without my
16	notes. I mean
17	Q. It's not that critical.
18	Can you give me a rough time frame?
19	If you can't, you can't.
20	A. I can't. It's somewhere between '83 or '84
21	and '86, '85.
22	Q. Were you a counselor for Carol Gabrielson?
23	A. I was a pastor.



25

a counselor?

What's the difference between a pastor and

_	November, right in there. There was about a ou-day
2	period. I could have brought my records.
3	Q. I'm just trying to get just a general
4	feel.
5	You'd already stated earlier that you
6	never tried to manipulate anyone?
7	A. That's correct.
8	Q. During this period of time, did you ever
9	threaten force upon Carol Gabrielson to commit
10	adultery with you?
11	A. I never did.
12	Q. To your perception, did she consent to
13	these things, to this relationship between she and
14	you?
15	A. She certainly did.
16	Q. During the time that this relationship was
17	going on, did you ever tell Don Barnett about this
18	relationship?
19	A. I never did.
20	Q. Did you ever tell Barbara Barnett about
21	this relationship?
22	A. I never did.
23	Q. Did you ever discuss this relationship
24	while it was going on with anyone in the eldership
25	of the Burien church?



_	A. I did not disous this lelationship with
2	anybody, period.
3	Q. To your knowledge, did Carol Gabrielson
4	discuss this relationship with Don Barnett while it
5	was going on, just to your knowledge?
6	A. To my knowledge, I would say that she
7	didn't.
8	Q. During the time in which your relationship
9	was ongoing, did Carol ever mention to you that she
10	had told anyone about the relationship?
11	A. Not to my recollection.
12	Q. When was the first time that you did
13	discuss this relationship with Carol Gabrielson with
14	Don Barnett?
15	A. I never did.
16	Q. Did Don Barnett ever say anything to you
L 7	which you construed as approval for the relationship
L8	that you had with Carol Gabrielson?
L9	A. He never did.
20	Q. What was your understanding of the church's
21	position upon adultery?
22	A. It was wrong.
23	Q. Prior to your relationship with
24	Carol Gabrielson, did Don Barnett ever indicate
25	approval of a relationship of adultery?



PROPOSED

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Pennsylvania corporation, 88-2-00947-9 Plaintiff, No. ORDER GRANTING JOINT vs. MOTION RE: COVERAGE IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL FOR CHURCH ENTITY GABRIELSON, husband and wife; DONALD LEE BARNETT and BARBARA BARNETT, husband and wife: COMMUNITY CHAPEL and BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a Washington corporation, Defendants.

I. HEARING

- 1.1 <u>Date.</u> February 24, 1989.
- 1.2 <u>Purpose</u>. To consider DEFENDANTS JOINT MOTION RE: COVERAGE FOR CHURCH ENTITY.
- 1.3 Appearances. Defendants Barnett appeared through their attorneys Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S. by Tim Donaldson. Defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center appeared through its attorney John Glassman. Defendants Gabrielson appeared through their attorneys Rush, Hannula and Harkins by Daniel Hannula. Plaintiff appeared through its attorneys Lane, Powell, Moss & Miller by Bruce Winchell.
- 1.4 Evidence. The AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE WINCHELL filed herein on March 30, 1988; the AFFIDAVIT OF DON BARNETT filed herein on August 30, 1988; the deposition of Jack L. McDonald excerpts of which are attached to the affidavit of Tim Donaldson annexed

SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ORDER: 1
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hereto; the complaint, judgment on jury verdict, and verdict form in Pierce County cause number 86-2-02792-6 certified copies of which are attached to the affidavit of Tim Donaldson annexed hereto; the affidavits of Jack DuBois, E. Scott Hartley, Don Barnett, and Carol Gabrielson in support of this motion; the AFFIDAVIT OF TIM DONALDSON IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO REVISE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDERS and the records and files herein specifically including plaintiff's amended complaint filed herein on March 25, 1988 and defendants materials considered in connection with this court's Summary Judgment Orders entered herein on November 18, 1988, December 9, 1988, and February 3, 1989.

1.5 <u>Authorities Considered.</u> CR 56, CR 54(b), CR 11, RCW 4.84.185, Pierce County Local Rule 10, authorities contained in DEFENDANTS' JOINT BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF JOINT MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT UPON COVERAGE FOR CHURCH ENTITY, authorities contained in BARNETT SUPPLEMENTAL OPPOSITION BRIEF TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: BODILY INJURY, authorities considered in connection with this court's Summary Judgment Orders entered herein on November 18, 1988, December 9, 1988, and February 3, 1989.

II. FINDINGS

- 2.1 There is no genuine issue as to any material fact with respect to coverage for the Community Chapel & Bible Training Center of Burien upon claims made against it by Carol and Ira Gabrielson in Pierce County Cause number 86-2-02792-6 and the judgment awarded therein.
- 2.2 Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
- 2.3 Upon finding that coverage exists for the Community Chapel & Bible Training Center of Burien, it is not necessary for this court to make determinations with respect to coverage for other parties herein upon other claims herein, and there is no just SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ORDER :

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reason for delay upon entry of a final judgment.

- 2.4 Plaintiff's fourth cause of action herein is frivolous and advanced without reasonable cause.
- 2.5 Plaintiff brought the above-entitled cause of action seeking declaratory judgment to determine both the extent of the coverage under American Casualty policy number IP502144020 and its duty to defend the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Burien upon Pierce County cause number 86-2-02792-6.

III. ORDER

Based on the forgoing findings and summary judgment orders entered herein on November 18, 1988, December 9, 1988, February 3, 1988, it is declared and ordered:

- 3.1 American Casualty policy number IP502144020 separate coverage for each person and entity which qualifies as insured under the policy heading entitled "II. INSURED."
- 3.2 American Casualty policy number IP502144020 provides that an occurrence must be viewed from the standpoint of the insured for which coverage is sought.
- 3.3 The intent of one insured cannot imputedly disqualify the coverage of another insured under American Casualty policy number IP502144020.
- Damages resulting from an occurrence which arises continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general conditions cannot be segregated.
- 3.5 Defamation is a personal injury as defined by Casualty policy number IP502144020.
- 3.6 The application of exclusion (2)(d) under policy heading "B. PERSONAL INJURY AND ADVERTISING INJURY LIABILITY COVERAGE" must be viewed from the standpoint of the insured for which coverage SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER

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is sought.

- 3.7 Defendants motion for summary judgment is granted and this court expressly directs entry of judgment that American Casualty Company of Reading Pennsylvania has a duty to defend the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Burien in Pierce County Cause number 86-2-02792-6 and that American Casualty Company of Reading Pennsylvania has a duty to pay all sums that the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center is legally obligated to pay in Pierce County Cause number 86-2-02792-6.
- 3.8 Defendants motion to award Community Chapel & Bible Training Center its attorney fees in Pierce County Cause number 88-2-00947-9 is granted.
- 3.9 Defendants motion to assess terms against plaintiff upon plaintiff's fourth cause of action is granted, and plaintiff is ordered to pay terms to defendants in the sum of \S _____.

 DATED this _____ day of February, 1989

JUDGE	A R NOT D	

Presented by: EVANS CRAVEN & LACKIE, P.S.

By______TIM DONALDSON
Attorneys for Barnetts

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

Spokane Office
N. 1206 Lincoln St.
Spokane, Washington 99201
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FAX (206) 386-5587

Seattle

RESPOND TO:

January 26, 1989

James S. Craven Hugh O. Evans H. Terrence Lackie Jarold P. Cartwright Constance D. Gould Michael F. Connelly Rodney D. Hollenbeck Richard B. White Julie A. Twyford Patrick E. Pressentin Gregory M. Kane John C. Perry Timothy J. Donaldson Timothy P. Malarchick David A. Trieweiler Margaret C. McGinty Philip J. Van de Veer Thomas M. Roberts

Willard J. Sharpe of counsel * admitted in Washington and Idaho

FILED

DEPT. 9

IN OPEN COURT

JAN27 1989

Pierce County Clerk
By

DEPUTY

Bruce Winchell, Esq.
LANE POWELL MOSS & MILLER
3800 Rainier Tower
1301 Fifth Avenue
Seattle, WA 98101

RE: American Casualty v. Gabrielson, et al. Pierce County Cause No. 88-2-00947-9

Dear Bruce:

This will confirm our conversation regarding our proposed Order Denying Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment by Plaintiff Re: Bodily Injury, which was set for presentation this Friday, January 27, 1989. As we discussed, you have no problem with the form of the Order, although you want to check to see that all matters which were considered by the Court coincide with those listed in the Order. Please let us know if any have been left out and we will add them.

We have advised Judge Arnold's bailiff, Allyson, to continue presentation of the Order to Friday, February 3, 1989 and informed her that in all likelihood, an agreed Order will be presented for entry by mail.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

TIM DONALDSON

TJD/kmw

cc: Daniel Hannula, Esq.
John Glassman, Esq.
Ms. Allyson Smolic

472172863 88854

44.14

TO: BRUCE WINCHELL



DATE: OCTOBER 13, 1988

COPY

RE: Case Name: AVERICAN CASUALTY VS GABRIELSON

Venue and No.: PIERCE 88-2-00947-9

Deposition/Date Taken: DONALD J.BARNETT VOLUME III June 29, 1988

IN COUNTY CLERK'S OFFICE

ALL. OCT 1.4 1988 P.C.

NOTICE OF READINESS

The transcript of your deposition is ready for round reading and signing at 1800 Seattle Tower, Seattle, WA (3rd & University) Please call 623-6717 with the date you will be reading your deposition.

You must within ______days read and sign the deposition or state in writing your reason for refusal to sign or state in writing the fact that you waive your right to sign; failing to do so, signature will be deemed for all purposes waived and your deposition will be filed with the appropriate representative of the Court.

NOTICE OF READINESS WITH SIGNATURE PAGE
Enclosed is your copy of the deposition of the above-named deponent
plus a Change Sheet and Original Signature Page. Please instruct the
deponent to review the deposition, record any changes on the Change
Sheet, and sign (1) the Change Sheet and (2) the Original Signature
Page.

	Plea:	se	ret	turn b	oth fo	orms	to	this	office		·	
50	they ma	ay	bе	filed	with	the	or:	iginal	. transc	ript.		

NOTICE OF FILING DEPOSITION WITH SIGNATURE

____Change Sheet attached ____No change

XXX NOTICE OF FILING DEPOSITION WITHOUT SIGNATURE,

____Signature waived

XXX Deposition not signed within 15 days of Notice

of Readiness

Due to nearness of trial date of _______,

deposition is filed without signature, to be read at trial.

XXXX ORIGINAL DEPOSITION FILED WITH BRUCE WINCHELL

attorney for PLAINTIFF.

attorney for ______

cc:

HAROLD T. DODGE, JR. TIMOTHY J. DONALDSON / DAVID V. ANDERSEN

CLERK OF COURT
LARSEN, SMITH & ASSOCIATES
1800 Seattle Tower, Seattle, WA 98101

53 4/21/2863 88855

1988. This motion is based in part upon the facts set forth 1 below in the Affidavit of Bruce Winchell. 2 DATED this 19th day of August, 1988. 3 LANE POWELL MOSS & MILLER 4 5 Βv Bruce Winchell Attorneys for Plaintiff 7 8 STATE OF WASHINGTON) 9)ss COUNTY OF KING 10 BRUCE WINCHELL, being first duly sworn, on oath, deposes 11 and says: 12 My name is Bruce Winchell. I represent plaintiff 13 American Casualty in this declaratory action. 14 On August 19, 1988, I received a motion for summary 15 judgment on behalf of defendants Gabrielson. The Gabrielsons 16 are claimants in litigation against Pastor Don Barnett and 17 Community Chapel pertaining to alleged sexual improprieties by 18 a pastor for the Tacoma satellite of that church. 19 The motion papers, which were actually received on 3. 20 August 18 by our main office, were not served 16 days in 21 advance of the hearing date. 22 In a prior motion for partial summary judgment, Judge 23 Arnold indicated that he was very concerned about the timing of 24 the motion in light of an imminent trial date. Trial in this 25 matter is now set for September 12, 1988. 26

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT TO SHORTEN TIME - 2 01S:0509p

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5. The parties have stipulated to a stay of discovery until the conclusion of the trial in the underlying action. For that reason, plaintiff's discovery has been wholly inadequate to even begin to respond to a motion for partial summary judgment.

My present schedule makes it utterly impossible to properly respond to the issues raised by this motion which, with attachments, appears to exceed 100 pages. On August 22, I have an all-day deposition. On August 23, I must prepare a mediation brief in the morning and attend another deposition in the afternoon. On August 24, I must complete and file a mediation brief in a wrongful termination case in which claimed damages exceed \$2 million. On August 25, I have a deposition in the morning and a document production in the afternoon. On August 26, I have a long-scheduled and critically important witness interview in Bellingham. On August 29, I have the mediation in the above-referenced wrongful termination case. On August 30 and 31, I have depositions in a related declaratory action presently pending in King County. September 1, I have an arbitration in Everett which will take at least one day and may go into the following day. motion is noted for September 2.

7. This affidavit summarizes only in the briefest terms

some of the reasons for which American Casualty seeks a continuance of this motion. BRUCE WINCHELL SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 19th day of August, 1988. Washington, residing at: My commission expires:

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT TO SHORTEN TIME - 4 01S:0509p

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7	THE THE PARTY OF THE CHANGE OF WASHINGTON					
8	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR PIERCE COUNTY					
9	AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF) READING PENNSYLVANIA, a)					
10	Pennsylvania corporation,					
11	Plaintiff, No. 88-2-00947-9					
12	v. \$					
13	IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL) GABRIELSON, husband and wife;)					
14	DONALD LEE BARNETT and) BARBARA BARNETT, husband and) ORDER GRANTING MOTION					
15	wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL and) TO SHORTEN TIME BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a)					
16 17	Washington corporation, JACK) McDONALD and "JANE DOE") McDONALD, husband and wife,)					
18	Defendants.					
19	<u> </u>					
20	The court having heard the motion of American Casualty for					
21	an order shortening time hereby orders that American Casualty's					
22	motion for continuance shall be heard on, August,					
23	1988, at					
24						
25						
26						
	ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME - 1					

0IS:0510p

LANE POWELL MOSS & MILLER 3800 RAINIER BANK TOWER SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101-2647 223-7000

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4	DATED this day of	, 1988.
5		
6		
7		JUDGE/COURT COMMISSIONER
8		
9	Presented by:	
10	LANE POWELL MOSS & MILLER	
ا 11		
12	ByBruce Winchell	
13	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME - 2 015:0510p

LANE POWELL MOSS & MILLER
3600 RAINIER BANK TOWER
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98:01-2647

FILED DEPT. 9 IN OPEN COURT Pierce County Clerk S SEP1 6 idda DEPUTY

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SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR PIERCE COUNTY

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF) READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Pennsylvania corporation,

Plaintiff,

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife;) DONALD LEE BARNETT and BARBARA BARNETT, husband and) wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL and BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a Washington corporation, JACK McDONALD and "JANE DOE"

McDONALD, husband and wife,

Defendants.

No. 88-2-00947-9

MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE

Plaintiff American Casualty moves for a continuance of defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

DATED this $23 \sim 10^{-10}$ day of August, 1988.

LANE POWELL MOSS & MILLER

Bruce W. Winchell

Attorneys for Plaintiff

0IS:0514p

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE WINCHELL - 1 0IS:0515p

affidavit which I filed in connection our motion to shorten time for this motion for a continuance.

- 2. American Casualty initiated this declaratory action in February of 1988. In May of 1988, American moved for partial summary judgment with respect to a portion of the policy which appeared, as a matter of law, to provide no coverage for damages for emotional harm. Judge Arnold, in ruling upon that motion, admonished American Casualty because of the timing of the motion. It was his expressed view that with a trial date imminent, a motion for summary judgment was wholly improper. He denied the motion without prejudice.
- 3. At about the same time that Judge Arnold denied American's motion for partial summary judgment, the parties stipulated to a stay of discovery except that American would be permitted to depose Pastor Barnett. American's decision to so stipulate was heavily motivated by Judge Arnold's expressed concerns about American's level of activity shortly before trial. Thus, the only deposition which has been taken in this case by American is that of Pastor Barnett.
- 4. With respect to the particular issue addressed in this motion for summary judgment, which is whether Jack McDonald was an employee of Community Chapel, this lack of discovery is of critical importance. A bit of factual background is necessary to illustrate the necessity of discovery on this point.

The insurance policy at issue here was issued to the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center, located in Burien

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(Burien Chapel). Burien Chapel is a not-for-profit corporation. Jack McDonald was the pastor for the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center in Tacoma, a separate not-for-profit corporation. Neither that separate corporation nor Jack McDonald were named insureds under the policy.

The four factors which are typically identified as being relevant to determination of employment status are: (1) selection and engagement of the servant; (2) payment of wages; (3) power of dismissal; and (4) power to control the servant's conduct. 53 Am. Jur. 2d, Master and Servant, Section 2.

While I have not had an opportunity to depose Mr. McDonald, or the chief administrator of the Burien Chapel, Jack Hicks, I have briefly interviewed each of them. They each concede that there were no financial ties between the separate corporations. Mr. McDonald was paid entirely out of whatever he was able to collect from his parishioners. Moreover, no control was exercised over McDonald's day-to-day conduct of the church's affairs. Furthermore, it was the parishioners themselves who ultimately selected Jack McDonald to be their Thus, the factors which are relevant here appear to pastor. indicate that McDonald was not an employee of the Burien Chapel. While Gabrielson will understandably point to the by-laws as conferring some unexercised power upon the Burien Chapel to control McDonald, there clearly will be a sharp factual dispute which can only be properly illustrated following discovery. However, American Casualty is precluded

223-7000

from engaging in discovery prior to trial of this matter.

question of who controlled Jack McDonald, who selected him, who

properly brought to the court's attention after the depositions

American Casualty respectfully requests that

paid him, and who dismissed him are all issues on which there

is some dispute of fact. However, that dispute can only be

of all witnesses with knowledge are deposed.

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 8 FOR PIERCE COUNTY 9 AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF) READING PENNSYLVANIA, a 10 Pennsylvania corporation, 11 No. 88-2-00947-9 Plaintiff, 12 13 IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife;) 14 MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT TO DONALD LEE BARNETT and SHORTEN TIME BARBARA BARNETT, husband and) 15 wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL and BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a 16 Washington corporation, JACK) McDONALD and "JANE DOE" 17 McDONALD, husband and wife, 18 Defendants. 19 American Casualty moves for an order shortening time so 20 that it may move for a continuance of Defendants Gabrielson's 21 Motion for Summary Judgment. American Casualty requests that 22 the motion for a continuance be heard on Tuesday, August 23, 23

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT TO SHORTEN TIME - 1 015:0509p

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LANE POWELL MOSS & MILLER

3800 RAINIER BANK TOWER

SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101-2647

223-7000

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT, PIERCE COUNTY, WASHINGTON

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR PIERCE COUNTY

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Pennsylvania corporation,

v.

NO. 88-2-00947-9

Plaintiff,)

DECLARATION OF BRUCE WINCHELL WITH EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF JACK MCDONALD

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife; DONALD LEE BARNETT and BARBARA BARNETT, husband and wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL and

BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a Washington corporation, JACK McDONALD and "JANE DOE" McDONALD, husband and wife,

Defendants.

Attached are excerpts from the deposition of Jack McDonald which are relevant to the issue of employee status.

DATED this And day of September 1988.

LANE POWELL MOSS & MILLER

Bruce Winchell

Attorneys for Plaintiff

DECLARATION OF BRUCE WINCHELL WITH EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF JACK MCDONALD - 1

LANE POWELL MOSS & MILLER 3800 RAINIER BANK TOWER SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101 2647



SEATTLE, WASHINGTON; THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 1988

1:30 P.M.

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here, today?





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-	periou.				
2	A. Bachelor of theology.				
3	Q. Can you elaborate on what you studied a				
4	little bit for me?				
. 5	A. Well, they were the courses that you had				
6	to take to get the bachelor of theology degree. All				
7	the books of the Bible. Six of them, I believe.				
8	Q. Is that how the coursework broke down, is				
9	you'd have a course on each book of the Bible?				
10	A. Mostly. There were a few other different				
11	courses, like writing lab and speaking lab and things				
12	like that.				
13	Q. Did you study counseling?				
14	A. No.				
15	Q. Did you take any sort of a seminar in				
16	counseling?				
17	A. Yes, I did.				
18	Q. Tell me about that?				
19	A. It's called Ministers in Training.				
20	Q. When did you participate in the seminar,				
21	Ministers in Training?				
22	A. I really don't recall the exact year, but				
23	I would say '78, maybe. It might have been '77.				
24	Q. Did you receive written materials for the				
25	Ministers in Training?				



1	A. Yes; there were cases of situations, and
2	they had a large class, and they would all work to
3	solve the problem.
4	Q. Do you have any of those materials?
5	A. No.
6	Q. Did you receive grades in connection with
7	your study at the Bible college?
8	A. Yes.
9	Q. Do you have any of your grades?
10	A. No.
11	Q. Did you purchase textbooks or were you
12	supplied with textbooks?
13	A. Mainly, it was out of the Bible. We just
14	used the Bible, and they had a library at the school.
15	Q. So, you don't have any textbooks, other
16	than the Bible, in your possession now from your
17	study at the Bible college?
18	A. No, I don't have any.
19	Q. Do you recall anything about what you were
20	taught, in terms of counseling, during your
21	attendance at the Ministers in Training seminar?
22	A. No, I don't it was not that big of
23	emphasis. It was more like for me, I just sat
24	back and watched as they solved various cases, you
25	know. It was just pretty much a logical approach,



I don't recall

1	they were forming down in Tacoma.
2	Q. As I recall, it was initially a Bible
3	study fellowship?
4	A. Yes.
5	Q. And that was from '79 to '82?
6	A. Yes.
7	Q. Tell me about how that got started?
8	A. Community Chapel in Burien sent down Bible
9	graduates to have a little Bible teaching, and then
10	a few people that were in Tacoma invited their
11	friends, and that's basically how it started.
12	Q. Tell me how you first heard about this
13	fellowship.
14	A. Well, I was attending Community Chapel, and
15	they had people from Tacoma get together at the
16	Burien group to discuss whether there were enough
17	people in Tacoma to, you know, start another little
18	group.
19	Q. How did the people from Tacoma that were
20	attending the Burien chapel get together to discuss
21	that?
22	A. Well, they had just had maybe a sign-up
23	sheet or something to notify all the people in
24	Tacoma that they were having a meeting at such and



such a house or something like that.

1	A. That they wanted to go down, like those
2	that wanted to sing songs. They were going out in
3	a ministerial capacity, just to support a
4	"support group," I guess would be a better word,
5	rather than ministerial.
6	Q. Do you know, were there others, but you
7	don't remember them, or was that pretty much it, the
8	four or five of you?
9	A. It seems like there was maybe 14 to 18
10	people, but I don't remember who they were.
11	Q. Your wife, George Jewell and his wife, and
12	Danny O'Brien are the ones you can remember today?
13	A. Yes. There was a fellow by the name of
14	David Floyd there, I believe.
15	Q. Do you recall what was discussed?
16	A. Just that the people in Tacoma would like
17	to get a Bible study going down in Tacoma, and have
18	it overseen by, you know, a Bible college teacher
19	or graduate, so it was on the mark.
20	Q. Were you a graduate?
21	A. Not at the time that this started.
22	Q. When did this start in relation to your
23	graduation?
24	A. Probably six months before my graduation.



What happened next?

25

Q.

1	A. I don't understand.
2	Q. With respect to this fellowship.
3	You had this meeting?
4	A. Then they began to have a meeting down
5	there on Friday nights.
6	Q. Was it decided to have weekly meetings
7	when you were at that organizational meeting?
8	A. Yes.
9	Q. Was there a particular location where
10	these weekly meetings were held?
11	A. Yes.
12	Q. Where was that?
13	A. At the Masonic Lodge.
14	Q. What happened at the meetings?
15	A. People singing songs, people testified
16	about their experience walking with God, and the Bible
17	teacher would give a lesson, and then, afterwards,
18	some people would pray for people, and other people
19	would have coffee and cookies and visit with each
20	other, and then they'd go home.
21	Q. To your knowledge, did anybody receive any
22	money as a result of any participation in these
23	meetings?
24	A. No.
25	Q. There was no collection?



1	Q. How was it the decision was made to form
2	the Tacoma church?
3	A. First was a vote by the people to choose a
4	pastor, and we had to make
5	Q. I want to talk about that, but let's back
6	up.
7	Something happened before they decided
8	to pick a pastor, which is they decided to have a
9	church, probably?
10	A. Well, they incorporated after the pastor
11	was picked.
12	Q. Okay. But didn't a group of people somehow
13	decide: We've got this fellowship. We'd like to
14	have this arrangement more formalized. Let's have a
15	church.
16	What's the first step: Let's pick a
17	pastor?
18	A. Picking the pastor was the first step,
19	yes.
20	Q. I'm wondering about the the discussions
21	that occurred before picking the pastor, which is
22	making this decision about making a church rather
23	than a fellowship.
24	Do you have any knowledge about those
25	discussions?
	-



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1	A. I think that we had a meeting with
2	Don Barnett and the various people from Tacoma, and
3	some from Seattle felt like they might want to be the
4	pastor, and he decided: Well, let the people vote on
5	who they want for the pastor.
6	Q. Did the people vote?
7	A. Yes.
8	Q. Did they vote for you?
9	A. Yes.
LO	Q. Were you appointed?
11	A. Yes.
L2	Q. Have you ever heard of any instance in
13	which the desire of a congregation of a satellite
14	institution for a particular pastor was overruled by
15	the Burien corporation?
16	A. No. But I might add that I was not privy
17	to what they did.
18	Q. What did you do after you were selected?
19	A. Taught them the Bible and became a pastor.
20	Q. Let's talk about the corporation a little
21	bit.
2 2	(Exhibit No. 1 was marked
23	for identification.)
24	Q. (By Mr. Winchell) Can you identify
25	Exhibit 1?





1	Tacoma corporation, what role did George Jewell and
2	Hal Price play in Tacoma?
3	A. They were elders of the Tacoma church.
4	Q. Which means they were on the board of
5	directors of the corporation?
6	A. Yes.
7	Q. And I take it you were the other director?
8	A. Yes; I was the other director.
9	Q. Do you recall who the officers were?
10	A. I was the president, and George was the
11	next in line, and Hal was the next in line, whatever
12	they were. I don't even remember what they were.
13	Q. The three of you were officers?
14	A. Yeah, right.
15	Q. Did someone from the Burien corporation
16	provide you with the form for these Articles of
17	Incorporation?
18	A. Yeah; they did the whole thing. They had
19	them printed up.
20	Q. Who handled that for you?
21	A. Jack Hicks.
22	Q. Have you ever been on the board of
23	directors of a corporation before?
24	· A. No.
25	Q. Do you know whether George or Hal had?



-	nai filos.
2	Q. Did you read the Articles of Incorporation
3	during the time you were active in the church?
4	A. Probably when we first got them.
5	Q. Will you look at the third page, Item 9-B?
6	A. Third page.
7	Q. On the Articles of Incorporation, first
8	one.
9	Do you remember reading the part that
10	says, "All decision-making for this corporation shall
11	be here after vested in the board of directors,
12	except as specifically limited by the corporation
13	bylaws"?
14	A. What's the question?
15	Q. Do you remember reading that part of the
16	Articles of Incorporation?
17	A. I don't remember this very second reading
18	it, but I probably read it.
19	Q. Did you continue to meet at the Masonic
20	Lodge?
21	A. Yes, we did.
22	Q. What was your salary during the first year
23	as pastor?
24	A. None.
25	Q. You were not paid?



A. I had my own well drilling business.
Q. When did you begin to be paid?
A. I don't recall, but it was probably after
the church had been incorporated. Probably after
1982.
Q. 1982 is when you became a pastor?
A. Yes.
Q. Did the Burien corporation provide you
with any money when you started the Tacoma
corporation?
A. They provided no money.
Q. Did they provide any property to you?
A. They provided no property.
Q. Do you remember what your salary was
when you started drawing a salary?
A. Maybe \$500 a month.
Q. And that would have been during 1983, to
your best recollection?
A. Yes.
Q. Were you still drilling wells?
A. Yes.
Q. How was your salary determined?
A. The corporation board members.
Q. Tell me a little more.



(206) 682-1627



Α.

No.

1	You don't remember that?
2	A. I don't remember that.
3	Q. Do you remember if you read these
4	interrogatories over before you signed them?
5	A. Okay, now I remember filling this out,
6	yes, and then I gave it to Mike Bugni, right.
7	Q. Don't tell me about your conversations with
8	Mr. Bugni unless somebody else was there, but I would
9	like to know, did he send these to you for you to
10	fill out some draft answers, and then he typed them
11.	up?
12	A. Yes.
13	Q. Will you look at Interrogatory No. 6?
14	A. Yes, I see it.
15	Q. Interrogatory No. 6 says, "From 1980 to
16	1986, did you have in effect one or more policies of
17	insurance in which you were named insured or a
18	covered person and which in any manner or to any
19	extent provided or provides you liability coverage,
20	whether primary or excess, with respect to any of
21	the claims, causes of action, injuries or damages
22	claimed against you in this lawsuit?
23	"Answer: No."
24	Do you recall if the answer "no" is
25	what you wrote down on your draft answer?



1	A. I wrote down "no."
2	Q. Did you believe that to be true at the
3	time that you prepared that answer?
4	A. I knew the Community Chapel of Tacoma had no
5	insurance of any kind.
6	Q. Did Jack Hicks ever tell you that the
7	Burien chapel would provide insurance to the Tacoma
8	corporation, before this lawsuit?
9	A. Not to my recollection.
10	Q. Did any other member of the board of
11	directors of the Burien corporation ever tell you
12	that the Burien corporation would provide insurance
13	to the Tacoma corporation?
14	A. Not to my recollection.
15	Q. Did Don Barnett ever make that kind of
16	representation to you?
17	A. Not to my recollection.
18	Q. I'm going to use the word "employed," and I
19	don't mean to use it in the legal sense, but in the
20	sense you would understand the term to be meant, did
21	anyone else who was employed in any capacity by the
22	Burien corporation ever tell you that the Burien
23	corporation was providing you with insurance?
24	A. Not to my recollection.
25	Q. Have you, since 1982, completed any credit



1	applications?
2	A. I don't recall, but I suppose I have, but,
3	I mean
4	Q. Car loan, anything?
5	MR. MEIKLE: I'm going to object to
6	this line of questioning.
7	MR. WINCHELL: I'm looking for
8	anything that would indicate what he has been
9	reporting to other people as his place of employment.
LO	MR. MEIKLE: Okay.
11	MR. WINCHELL: I don't care what his
12	salary was or anything like that.
L3	MR. MEIKLE: Answer.
14	A. Restate the question.
15	Q. (By Mr. Winchell) Have you had any car
16	loans since 1982.
17	A. Yes.
18	Q. Where did you get those from?
19	A. Puget Sound Bank.
20	Q. Which branch?
21	A. I don't recall. The car dealer. He put
22	it in wherever he did it.
23	Q. Who was the dealer?
24	A. The Dodge dealer in Tacoma, but I don't
25	even remember his name.





credit since 1982; Visa applications?



as your place of employment for the 1984 loan?

-	A. Hobably a well diffice and a pascol, i
2	whatever I did.
3	Q. Do you recall any instance in which you
4	ever indicated that you were employed by the
5	Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of
6	Burien?
7	A. I never said that I was ever employed by
8	Community Chapel of Burien.
9	Q. Let's jump ahead to November, then, of
10	1987, if I have the right month. That's when you
11	stopped being the pastor of the Tacoma church?
12	A. Yes.
13	Q. We have met and talked before, right?
14	A. Yes.
15	Q. Now, what I recall from talking with you
16	earlier is, you were to a point where you felt the
17	practice of spiritual connections had kind of gone
18	beyond something you felt you could deal with as a
19	pastor of the Tacoma church?
20	A. That's correct.
21	Q. And that was the reason that you decided
22	to resign; is that correct?
23	A. That's correct.
24	Q. And you did resign for that reason?
25	A. Yes.





25

Q.

a counselor?

What's the difference between a pastor and

1	A. My explanation is that a pastor is
2	somebody that just talks to them on a common level,
3	and a counselor is somebody that gets in and does
4	all the nuts and bolts of trying to untangle
5	peoples' lives.
6	Q. Would you make a distinction between
7	theology and psychology?
8	A. Would I make a distinction between those?
9	Why don't you ask me that again.
10	Q. Well, you distinguished between being a
11	pastor and being a counselor, and I'm wondering if
12	one has more to do with theology and the other has
13	more to do with psychology.
14	If you can pick some better words, go
15	ahead and pick some better words.
16	A. I think a counselor might use more
17	psychology, but my reference as a pastor is more
18	just common sense, you know. Come in out of the rain
19	so you don't get wet, you know.
20	If you can't get along with someone,
21	you're going to have to sit down and find out what
22	the problem is, and work your problems out. They're
23	your problems. You got to be honest and open. You
24	know, just common sense. That was the extent of my

pastoring.



Carol Gabrielson believed?



I always

2	allowed people to make their own decisions.
3	Q. Did the anyone from the Burien church ever
4	tell you that they would pay for your defense in the
5	lawsuit brought by Carol Gabrielson?
6	A. Yes, they did.
7	Q. Who said that to you?
8	A. I recall being served with the papers, and
9	I believe it was Don Barnett who said that Mike Bugni
10	would take care of the lawsuit, that, you know, that
11	he'd been advised that it wasn't that particular
12	big a thing at that time, and
13	Q. Who said that?
14	A. Don Barnett.
15	Q. Said that Bugni would take care of it?
16	A. He said that Bugni would take care of it.
17	And later on, as I was giving details of information
18	to Wayne Snowy, he said that all the billing and
19	everything would be taken care of by Burien. I was
20	led to believe, up until the time of my deposition,
21	that, you know, that they were taking care of it, and
22	I went to Jack Hicks, and he said, "Guess what, we're
23	not. You need an attorney. Go find a good attorney,"
24	he said.
25	Q. Did you, prior to that time, refrain from

I never did, and I never would.

A.



1	seeking your own attorney because you were told that
2	one was going to be provided to you?
3	A. Yes. In fact, I signed papers with
4	Michael Bugni saying that he represented me. Then,
5	right before the deposition, he dismissed himself
6	from all four phases, Community Chapel of Burien,
7	Tacoma, Donald Barnett, and Jack McDonald, and he
8	disappeared.
9	Q. Who defends you now?
10	A. Eileen Lawrence.
11	Q. Do you have any complaints about the
12	defense that's being provided to you?
13	A. No, I don't.
14	Q. Do you have any complaints about anything
15	that I've done?
16	A. No, I don't.
17	Q. Do you have any complaints that anything
18	any representative of American Casualty Company has
19	done?
20	A. Only one, if we don't settle this.
21	Q. You would like to see this settled?
22	A. Yes.
23	Q. Let's take a break.
24	(A short break was taken.)
25	* *



1	EXAMINATION
2	BY MR. DODGE:
3	Q. Did you feel, as pastor of the Tacoma
4	satellite, that you were required to follow
5	Donald Barnett's dictates?
6	A. Yes.
7	Q. Was there any area in which you, as pastor
8	of the Tacoma satellite, did not feel obligated to
9	follow Don Barnett's lead?
10	MR. WINCHELL: Object to the form of
11	the question.
12	Q. (By Mr. Dodge) You can answer if you
13	understand the question.
14	A. I don't understand the question. I would
15	say that if he was going to jump off a building, I
16	wouldn't follow him that way.
17	Q. Certainly.
18	As far as corporate affairs in your
19	church.
20	MR. WINCHELL: Same objection.
21	A. Well, as a president of my corporation,
22	there would be differences. I would make my own
23	decisions, but as long as I agreed to the direction
24	that he was going. I'm not totally going to follow



him over a bluff, you know.

1	Q. (By Mr. Dodge) Are you aware that he had
2	power to remove you at any time?
3	A. Yes.
4	MR. WINCHELL: Objection. That
5	misstates what the law is in this state.
6	A. Yes.
7	Q. (By Mr. Dodge) Were you under that
8	impression?
9	A. Yes.
10	Q. Were you under the impression that he
11	could remove any of the officers of your corporation
12	at any time?
13	A. Well, I assumed if he could remove me, he
14	could remove the officers.
15	Q. And were you under the impression, or did
16	you understand from your bylaws, that if he chose to
17	remove you and the officers, he could appoint
18	whomever he pleased?
19	A. That's correct.
20	Q. Did you feel that you had to follow
21	Donald Barnett's lead in corporate affairs in order
22	to remain as pastor of your church?
23	MR. WINCHELL: I'm going to object.
24	The reference to corporate affairs really is vague.



A.

I want you to explain "corporate affairs."



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1	Q. (By Mr. Dodge) Is this before or after you
2	were served with papers in the Gabrielson lawsuit?
3	A. Before.
4	Q. You understand that the ultimate decision
5	as to your appointment as pastor of the Tacoma
6	satellite was up to Donald Barnett to decide?
7	A. I understood that it was the senior board
8	of elders.
9	Q. Of the Burien church?
10	A. Of the Burien church.
11	Q. You understand that in maintaining your
12	financial records that your bylaws required you to
13	maintain those records in accordance with whatever
14	bylaws the main corporate church had regarding
15	financial books?
16	MR. WINCHELL: Objection. That's
17	totally incomprehensible, whatever you just said.
18	A. Say it again.
19	Q. (By Mr. Dodge) Do you understand that, in
20	keeping financial records for the Tacoma satellite,
21	you were required by your bylaws to maintain those
22	records up to the standards of whatever rules the
23	main corporation in Burien set forth for keeping
24	those kind of records?
25	MR. WINCHELL: Same objection.



1	A. I don't know what you're saying, but we
2	kept some records.
3	Q. (By Mr. Dodge) In the Articles of Faith
4	and Bylaws by the way, these Articles of Faith and
5	Bylaws, they were prepared in full and given to you
6	as your Articles of Faith and Bylaws by the main
·7	Burien corporation; is that correct?
8	A. That's correct.
9	Q. You had no choice in the matter?
10	A. We just took them and ran with them.
11	Q. Are any of the rules contained within
12	this document and bylaws proposed and generated by
13	the Tacoma satellite church?
14	A. No; they were just standard for starting
15	satellite churches.
16	Q. I guess the easiest way to find it would
17	be Page 2010007, Article 5, Finances. Would you
18	read the first sentence of that, of A, under
19	Finances.
20	A. Yes.
21	Q. Read it out loud, please.
22	A. "The financial organization of this
23	satellite church shall be established and ministered
24	to in such a way that it meets all corporation



church, satellite church, and governmental laws and





1198 5887/17/5

1	November, right in there. There was about a 60-day
2	period. I could have brought my records.
3	Q. I'm just trying to get just a general
4	feel.
5	You'd already stated earlier that you
6	never tried to manipulate anyone?
7	A. That's correct.
8	Q. During this period of time, did you ever
9	threaten force upon Carol Gabrielson to commit
10	adultery with you?
11	A. I never did.
12	Q. To your perception, did she consent to
13	these things, to this relationship between she and
14	you?
15	A. She certainly did.
16	Q. During the time that this relationship was
17	going on, did you ever tell Don Barnett about this
18	relationship?
19	A. I never did.
20	Q. Did you ever tell Barbara Barnett about
21	this relationship?
22	A. I never did.
23	Q. Did you ever discuss this relationship
24	while it was going on with anyone in the eldership
25	of the Burien church?



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1	A. Not to my knowledge.
2	Q. Generally, is there anything that you can
3	think of that Don Barnett said in his teachings,
4	prior to your relationship with Carol Gabrielson,
5	that led you to believe that the church or
6	Don Barnett would approve of such relationship?
7	A. I don't know of anything in his teachings
8	where he approved of adultery.
9	Q. With the understanding, Jack, that we may
10	call you back if this goes on, I don't have any
11	other questions for you right now.
12	* *
13	<u>FURTHER EXAMINATION</u>
14	BY MR. DODGE:
15	Q. I'm going to hand you a document and ask
16	if you've ever seen it before. I think it was
17	Exhibit 14 to the deposition of Donald Barnett.
18	A. Have I seen this before?
19	Q. Yes.
20	A. No, I have not.
21	Q. Does that appear to you to be a report by
22	Ralph Alskog on certain occurrences that occurred
23	in the church?
24	MR. WINCHELL: Objection; the document




speaks for itself. If he's never seen it before, he

	VOL 30 / PAGE ZUZO
1	FILED IN COUNTY CLERK'S OFFICE
3	OCT 27 1988 AM OCT 2 7 1089 8M
4	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 2 7 1988 P.M. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE PERCE
5	TED RIPTT COORTY CLERK BY DEPUTY
6	Ancerican Casually Co. 3 No. 88-2-00947-9
7	Plaintiff/Petitioner, No. 88-2-00947-9
	vs.) ORDER PERMITTING) REMOVAL OF FILE FROM
8 9	Sobriebon, et al. ; COUNTY-CITY BUILDING
10	Defendant/Respondent.
11	Λ
12	Permission is hereby granted to allowey Don Sullibo
13	Interesting of the contract of
14	(address) 2200 -112th NE Bellevie , Washington, 98007, to
15	remove the above captioned file from the County City Building to
16	their offices to be returned to the Pierce County Clerk's Office
17	no later than 10 NOVEMBER, 1988.
18	Dated this 27th day of OCTOBER, 1988.
19	
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21	Jaul Mely
22	COURT COMMISSIONER
23	Presented by:
24	Im m Gulliford
25	LUSBA-H
26	Attorneys at Law
27	
28	

ORDER PERMITTING REMOVAL OF CLERK'S FILE





S SEP1 6 1988

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR PIERCE COUNTY

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF)
READING PENNSYLVANIA, a)
Pennsylvania corporation,)

Plaintiff,

No. 88-2-00947-9

V.

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL)
GABRIELSON, husband and wife;)
DONALD LEE BARNETT and)
BARBARA BARNETT, husband and)
wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL and)
BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a)
Washington corporation, JACK)
MCDONALD and "JANE DOE")
MCDONALD, husband and wife,)

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT TO SHORTEN TIME

Defendants.

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American Casualty moves for an order shortening time so that it may move for a continuance of Defendants Gabrielson's Motion for Summary Judgment. American Casualty requests that the motion for a continuance be heard on Tuesday, August 23,

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/ / /

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MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT TO SHORTEN TIME - 1 01S:0509p

1 below in the Affidavit of Bruce Winchell. 2 DATED this 19th day of August, 1988. 3 LANE POWELL MOSS & MILLER 4 5 6 Attorneys for Plaintiff 7 8 STATE OF WASHINGTON) 9)ss COUNTY OF KING 10 BRUCE WINCHELL, being first duly sworn, on oath, deposes 11 and says: 12 1. My name is Bruce Winchell. I represent plaintiff 13 American Casualty in this declaratory action. 14 2. On August 19, 1988, I received a motion for summary 15 judgment on behalf of defendants Gabrielson. The Gabrielsons 16 are claimants in litigation against Pastor Don Barnett and 17 Community Chapel pertaining to alleged sexual improprieties by 18 a pastor for the Tacoma satellite of that church. 19 The motion papers, which were actually received on 20 August 18 by our main office, were not served 16 days in 21 advance of the hearing date. 22 4. In a prior motion for partial summary judgment, Judge 23 Arnold indicated that he was very concerned about the timing of 24 the motion in light of an imminent trial date. Trial in this 25 matter is now set for September 12, 1988.

This motion is based in part upon the facts set forth

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT TO SHORTEN TIME - 2 0IS:0509p

5	•	The	part:	ies	have	e st	ipula	ted	to a	a sta	ay c	of di	scove	ry
until	the	con	clus	ion	of t	he	trial	in	the	unde	erly	ying	actio	n.
For th	hat	reas	on, j	plai	ntif	f's	disc	over	y h	as be	een	who	ll y	
inade	quat	e to	eve	n be	gin	to	respon	nd t	o a	mot:	ion	for	parti	al
summaı	ry j	udgn	ent.											

- 6. My present schedule makes it utterly impossible to properly respond to the issues raised by this motion which, with attachments, appears to exceed 100 pages. On August 22, I have an all-day deposition. On August 23, I must prepare a mediation brief in the morning and attend another deposition in the afternoon. On August 24, I must complete and file a mediation brief in a wrongful termination case in which claimed damages exceed \$2 million. On August 25, I have a deposition in the morning and a document production in the afternoon. August 26, I have a long-scheduled and critically important witness interview in Bellingham. On August 29, I have the mediation in the above-referenced wrongful termination case. On August 30 and 31, I have depositions in a related declaratory action presently pending in King County. September 1, I have an arbitration in Everett which will take at least one day and may go into the following day. motion is noted for September 2.
 - 7. This affidavit summarizes only in the briefest terms

FILED DEPT. 5 IN OPEN COURT AUG2 2 1988 Pierce County Clerk DEPUTY

> IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR PIERCE COUNTY

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Pennsylvania corporation,

Plaintiff,

No. 88-2-00947-9

v.

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife;) DONALD LEE BARNETT and BARBARA BARNETT, husband and wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL and BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a Washington corporation, JACK McDONALD and "JANE DOE" McDONALD, husband and wife,

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME

18 Defendants.

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The court having heard the motion of American Casualty for an order shortening time hereby orders that American Casualty's motion for continuance shall be heard on 234 of August 1988, at 9:00 O'Clock AM. before the Honorable Dudge

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME - 1 0IS:0510p

LANE POWELL MOSS & MILLER 3800 RAINIER BANK TOWER SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101-2647

223-7000

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME - 2 01S:0510p

223-7000

AEES

11/87

NOTICE OF PRESENTATION (NTPRES)

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5	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR PIERCE COUNTY
6	AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF)
7	READING PENNSYLVANIA, a)
8)
9	Plaintiff,) ORDER
10	v.)
11	IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL) GABRIELSON, husband and wife;)
12	DONALD LEE BARNETT and) BARBARA BARNETT, husband and)
13	wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL and) BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a)
14	Washington corporation,) JACK McDONALD and "JANE DOE")
15	McDONALD, husband and wife,)
16	Defendants.)
17	
18	The court has heard the following motions:
19	1. Gabrielson's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
20	2. American Casualty's Motion for Reconsideration
21	of the Court's Order Denying a Continuance of
4 1	or the court a order behiving a continuance of

- t;
- Gabrielson's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;
- American's Motion to Exclude the Affidavit of 3. William Hickman;
- American's Motion to Exclude Exhibit I to the Affidavit of Daniel Hannula.

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The court has considered Gabrielson's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, the Affidavit of Daniel L. Hannula and attachments thereto, American's Motion and Affidavit to Shorten Time; Supplemental Affidavit of Bruce Winchell; American's Motion for Reconsideration of the Order Denying Continuance; American's Motion to Exclude the Affidavit of William Hickman; Motion to Exclude Exhibit I to the Affidavit of Daniel Hannula filed in connection with Gabrielson's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; Declaration of Bruce Winchell (Exhibit I); American's Memorandum Opposing Gabrielson's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; Affidavit of Bruce Winchell Opposing Gabrielson's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Issue of Employee Status and attachments thereto; Barnett's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Community Chapel's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; and Declaration of Bruce Winchell and attached Deposition of Jack McDonald. The court has heard argument from counsel for the parties.

The Court orders:

- American's motion for reconsideration of the order denying American's motion for a continuance is denied.
- 2. American's motion to exclude from the court's consideration the Affidavit of William Hickman is denied.
- 3. American's motion to exclude from the court's consideration Exhibit I to the Affidavit of Daniel L.

LANE POWELL MOSS & MILLER 3800 RAINIER BANK TOWER SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101-2647

Hannula is granted in part. The court will not consider

portions of Exhibit I which discuss communications from

attorney Jim Leach to Community Chapel & Bible Training

is granted on the issue of negligent counseling. Negligent

counseling by an employee acting within the scope of his

Gabrielson's motion for partial summary judgment

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ORDER - 3

Center.

Tim Donaldson Attorney for Barnetts John Glassman Attorney for Community Chapel and Bible Training Center 0

NOV 1 8 1988

i VOL 374 PAGE 1431

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Pennsylvania corporation,

Plaintiff.

vs.

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IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife; DONALD LEE BARNETT and BARBARA) BARNETT, husband and wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a Washington corporation; JACK McDONALD and "JANE DOE" McDONALD, husband and wife.

Defendants.

NO.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY DEFENDANTS GABRIELSON

THIS MATTER having come on for hearing on September 9, 1988, on the motion of the defendants Gabrielson for summary judgment and the Court having considered all material in the file of record as of the date September 9, 1988, and in particular having considered the memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment submitted by the defendants Gabrielson, the affidavit of William Hickman submitted in

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY DEFENDANTS GARBRIELSON - 1

LAW OFFICES RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

> 715 TACOMA AVENUE SOUTH TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98402

TACOMA 383-5388

support thereof, and the affidavit of Daniel L. Hannula as

thereto and further having particularly considered the brief

in support of the Gabrielsons' motion for summary judgment

Barbara Barnett and Donald L. Barnett submitted in support

considered the plaintiff's memorandum opposing the motion

motion for summary judgment; and the Court further having

for summary judgment by defendants Gabrielson and the

effected by the order of this court affecting Exhibit I

submitted by defendants Barnett and the affidavits of

thereof; and the Court having further particularly

affidavit of Bruce Winchell submitted in opposition to the

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY DEFENDANTS GARBRIELSON - 2

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN

PART MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY

DEFENDANTS GARBRIELSON - 3

issues of material fact and cannot be determined on summary

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DEPT. 9 IN OPEN COURT NOV 18 1988 Pierce County Clerk Ву -DEPUTY

LAW OFFICES

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

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
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J.V. NOV 1 8 1988



IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Pennsylvania corporation,

Plaintiff,

vs.

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL)
GABRIELSON, husband and wife;)
DONALD LEE BARNETT and BARBARA)
BARNETT, husband and wife;)
COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE)
TRAINING CENTER, a Washington)
corporation; JACK McDONALD)
and "JANE DOE" McDONALD,)
husband and wife,)

Defendants.

: VOL 374 PAGE 214

NO. 88-2-00947-9

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

THIS MATTER having come before the Court on September 9, 1988, upon the motion of the plaintiff to reconsider the Court's prior order denying plaintiff's motion for a continuance of defendants Gabrielson's motion for summary judgment and the Court having considered the plaintiff's motion and affidavit to shorten time filed in support of its motion for continuance, the supplemental

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ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 1

LAW OFFICES

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

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affidavit of Bruce Winchell, the affidavit of Bruce Winchell opposing Gabrielsons' motion for partial summary judgment (employee status) and the plaintiff's memorandum opposing the Gabrielsons' motion for partial summary judgment (employee status); and the Court having considered the oral arguments presented by any of the counsel present for the motion: Bruce Winchell on behalf of the plaintiff, Daniel L. Hannula on behalf of the defendants Gabrielson, Tim Donaldson on behalf of defendants Barnett, and John Glassman on behalf of the defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center; and the Court being in all things fully advised, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is denied.

DONE IN OPEN COURT this / day of November, 1988.

HONORABLE JUDGE J. KELLEY ARNOLD

Presented by:

RUSH, HAMNULA & HARKINS

By: *| | | Au*

DANIEĽ L. HANNULA

Of Attorneys for Defendants

Gabrielson

DEPT. 9
IN OPEN COURT

NOV 1 8 1988

Pierce County Clerk

By

DEPUTY

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ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 2

LAW OFFICES

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS


1	
2	APPROVED AS TO FORM, NOTICE OF PRESENTATION WAIVED:
3	LANE, POWELL, MOSS & MILLER
4	
5	Bruce Winchell
6	Of Attorneys for Plaintiff
7	EVANS, CRAVEN & LACKIE
8	, strate, orange a missing
9	By: RODNEY D. HOLLENBECK
10	Of Attorneys for Defendants Barnett
11	Darnett
12	
13	By:
14	Of Attorneys for Defendant Community Chapel
15	Community chaper
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ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 3

LAW OFFICES

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS



NOV 18 1988

Pierce County Clerk

By

DEPUTY

J.V. NOV 1 8 1988

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Pennsylvania corporation,

Plaintiff,

vs.

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IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL)
GABRIELSON, husband and wife;)
DONALD LEE BARNETT and BARBARA)
BARNETT, husband and wife;)
COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE)
TRAINING CENTER, a Washington)
corporation; JACK McDONALD)
and "JANE DOE" McDONALD,)
husband and wife,)

Defendants.

. VOL 374 PAGE 217

NO. 88-2-00947-9

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM HICKMAN

THIS MATTER having come before the Court on

September 9, 1988, upon the plaintiff's motion to exclude
the affidavit of William Hickman submitted by defendants Ira

Gabrielson and Carol Gabrielson in support of their motion
for summary judgment in the above-entitled case and the

Court having considered the briefing contained within
plaintiff's memorandum opposing Gabrielsons' motion for

LAW OFFICES

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

715 TACOMA AVENUE SOUTH
TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98402
TACOMA 383-5388
SEATTLE 834-4790

///

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE AFF. OF WILLIAM HICKMAN - 1

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Winchell on behalf of the plaintiffs, Daniel L. Hannula on behalf of defendants Carol and Ira Gabrielson, John Glassman on behalf of defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center, and Tim Donaldson on behalf of the defendants

Barnett; and the Court being in all things fully advised, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the plaintiff's

partial summary judgment (employee status); and the Court

having heard oral argument on the motion by attorneys Bruce

motion to exclude the affidavit of William Hickman is denied.

DONE IN OPEN COURT this __// day of November, 1988.

HONORABLE JUDGE J. KELLEY ARNOLD

Presented by:

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

By: Namy L. Ham

DANIEL(Z). HANNULA Of Attorneys for Defendants

Gabrielson

APPROVED AS TO FORM, NOTICE OF PRESENTATION WAIVED:

LANE, POWELL, MOSS & MILLER

BY:
BRUCE WINCHELL

25 Of Attorneys for Plaintiff

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
TO EXCLUDE AFF. OF WILLIAM HICKMAN - 2

LAW OFFICES

DEPT. 9

IN OPEN COURT

NOV18 1988

Pierce County Clerk

DEPUT

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

715 TACOMA AVENUE SOUTH
TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98402
TACOMA 383-5388

153 4/21/2883 88134

APPROVED AS TO FORM, NOTICE OF PRESENTATION WAIVED:

EVANS, CRAVEN & LACKIE

By:

RODNEY D. HOLLENBECK

Of Attorneys for Defendants

Barnett

JOHN GLASSMAN

JOHN GLASSMAN
Of Attorneys for Defendant
Community Chapel

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE AFF. OF WILLIAM HICKMAN - 3

LAW OFFICES

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

N THE SUBERIOR OF	/		11 7
, 6/		TATE OF WASHINGTON FOR PIERO	E COUNTY
AMERICAN CASUALTY COM		- \ \	^
PENNSYLVANIA, a Penns	ylvania corp Plaintif	90_2_00047_0	
vs. IRA GABRIELSON and CA	DOI CADDIRIC	ON (,
DONALD LEE BARNETT, e		NOTE OF ISSUE AND ST	
DOWNED BEE BRICKETT, C		,) i	
	Defendan	t. /	
NATURE OF CAUSE Pres	entation of	Orders	
JURY TRIAL: YES/N	0[]	IF YES, 6 JURORS []	12 JURORS [
ESTIMATED TIME TO TRY C	AUSE		
DATE REQUESTED FOR DOO	CKET MOTION/A	ASSIGNMENT NOVEMBER 18,	1988
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY:	NAME	BRUCE WINCHELL	
	ADDRESS	3800 Rainier Bank Tower	
		Seattle, WA 98101	
	TELEPHONE	223-7380	
DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY:	NAME	DANIEL L. HANNULA, Atty f	or Gabrielson
	ADDRESS	715 Tacoma Avenue South	
			7 LED NTY CLERK'S OFFICE
	TELEPHONE	383-5388 A.C. A.C.	OV 1 () 1888 P.M.
(NOTE: If additional attorneys in	volved, please note	on reverse side)	UT, COLLET CLERK
•	- ,	Defendants Gabrielson	DEPUTY
		BITRATION	
[] This case is subject to arbitration twenty-five thousand dollars ex-	on because the sole r	eliëf sought is a money judgment and involve	es no claim in excess o
[] This case is not subject to manda	atory arbitration bec	ause:	
 Plaintiff's claim exceeds twe Plaintiff seeks relief other the Defendant's counter or cros Defendant's counter or cros 	nan a money judgme s claim exceeds twen	nt. ty-five thousand dollars.	
[] The undersigned contends that twenty-five thousand dollars for		enty-five thousand dollars but hereby waives ion.	any claim in excess of
A	BOVE INFORMAT	TION MUST BE COMPLETED	
	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	•••••	
	TO BE CO	MPLETED BY CLERK	
Assigned To:			<u>. </u>
		By:	

List Additional Attorneys

Name:

RODNEY D. HOLLENBECK, Attorney for Defendant Barnett

Address:

3100 Columbia Center, 701 5th Avenue, Seattle, WA 98104

Phone:

386-5555

Attorney For:

Defendant Barnett

Name:

JOHN GLASSMAN

Address:

625 Commerce, Old City Hall, Suite 420, Tacoma, WA

Phone:

572-2746

Attorney For:

Defendant Community Chapel

Name:

Address:

Phone:

Attorney For:

Name:

Address:

Phone:

Attorney For:

Name:

Address:

Phone:

Attorney For:

The undersigned, being first duly

to the attorneys of record of

Name:

Address:

Phone:

Attorney For:

¹ Ту ооттогоне ехрита.

vsIRA_GABRIELSON, et	Plaintif	_ NOTE OF ISSUE AND STATEMENT OF
IRA GABRIELSON, et	al.	
		ARBITRABIL TEAR'S OFFICE
	Defendan	MERICE COUNTY CLERK
NATURE OF CAUSENot	ice of Prese	II DEDILLA
		IF YES, 6 JURORS [] 12 JURORS [
ESTIMATED TIME TO TRY C		ACCUCALATIVE Profile November 40 1000
-	•	ASSIGNMENT Friday , November 18, 1988
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY:	NAME	Bruce Winchell LANE POWELL MOSS & MILLER
	ADDRESS	3800 Rainier Bank Tower 1301 Fifth Avenue
		Seattle, WA 98101
	TELEPHONE	(206) 223-7000
DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY:	NAME	Daniel L. Hannula
		Rush, Hannula & Harkins 715 Tacoma Avenue South
	ADDRESS	Tacoma, WA 98402
	TELEBIIONE	(200) 202 5200
	TELEPHONE	(206) 383-5388
(NOTE: If additional attorneys in	• •	, and the second
NAME OF PARTY BRINGING	MOTION: Pla	intiff
	AR	BITRATION
This case is subject to arbitration twenty-five thousand dollars ex		elief sought is a money judgment and involves no claim in excess ones, interests and costs.
] This case is not subject to manda	atory arbitration beca	ause:
[] Plaintiff's claim exceeds two [] Plaintiff seeks relief other th [] Defendant's counter or cros [] Defendant's counter or cros	nan a money judgmer is claim exceeds twen	nt.
		enty-five thousand dollars but hereby waives any claim in excess of
		gon,
The undersigned contends that twenty-five thousand dollars for	r purposes of arbitrat	TION MUST BE COMPLETED
The undersigned contends that twenty-five thousand dollars for	r purposes of arbitrat	

List Additional Attorneys

Address:

Attorney For:

Phone:

Name: Rodney D. Hollenbeck Evans, Craven & Lackie Address: 34th Floor, Columbia Center 701 - 5th Avenue Phone: Seattle, WA 98402 (206) 386-5555 Attorney For: Defendnats Barnetts John Glassman 625 Commerce Address: Old City Hall, Suite 420 Tacoma, WA 98402 Phone: (206) 572-2746 Attorney For: Defendants Community Chapel & Bible Training Center Name: Address: Phone: Attorney For: Name: Address: Phone: Attorney Por: Name: Address: Phone: Attorney For: Name:

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Pennsylvania corporation,

Plaintiff,

vs.

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL (GABRIELSON, husband and wife;) DONALD LEE BARNETT and BARBARA) BARNETT, husband and wife; (COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE (COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE (CORPORATION; JACK McDONALD (CORPORATION; JACK McDONALD (CORPORATION; JACK McDONALD (CORPORATION) AND MCDONALD, (CORPORATION) HUSBAND AND WIFE, (CORPORATION)

Defendants.

NO. 88-2-00947-9

PROPOSED

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY DEFENDANTS GABRIELSON

THIS MATTER having come on for hearing on September 9, 1988, on the motion of the defendants Gabrielson for summary judgment and the Court having considered all material in the file of record as of the date September 9, 1988, and in particular having considered the memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment submitted by the defendants Gabrielson, the affidavit of William Hickman submitted in

LAW OFFICES

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

715 TACOMA AVENUE SOUTH
TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98402
TACOMA 383-5388
SEATTLE 838-4799

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY DEFENDANTS GARBRIELSON - 1

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support thereof, and the affidavit of Daniel L. Hannula as effected by the order of this court affecting Exhibit I thereto and further having particularly considered the brief in support of the Gabrielsons' motion for summary judgment submitted by defendants Barnett and the affidavits of Barbara Barnett and Donald L. Barnett submitted in support thereof; and the Court having further particularly considered the plaintiff's memorandum opposing the motion for summary judgment by defendants Gabrielson and the affidavit of Bruce Winchell submitted in opposition to the motion for summary judgment; and the Court further having heard oral argument presented by counsel for all parties: Daniel L. Hannula on behalf of the movants, Carol and Ira Gabrielson, Tim Donaldson on behalf of the defendants Barnett, John Glassman on behalf of the defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center and Bruce Winchell on behalf of the plaintiff; and the Court being in all things fully advised, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that negligent counseling in connection with church related activity is a covered act within the policy of insurance at issue in this declaratory action, and it is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the issue of whether Jack McDonald was a covered individual under the terms of the policy at issue in the above-entitled case involves

LAW OFFICES

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

715 TACOMA AVENUE SOUTH TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98402

> TACOMA 383-5388 SEATTLE 838-4790

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY DEFENDANTS GARBRIELSON - 2

1	issues of material fact and cannot be determined on summary
2	judgment.
3	DONE IN OPEN COURT this day of November, 1988.
4	DONE IN OPEN COORT CHIS day of Movember, 1988.
5	
6	HONORABLE JUDGE J. KELLEY ARNOLD
7	Presented by:
8	RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS
9	Dev.
10	By: DANIEL L. HANNULA
11	Of Attorneys for Defendants Gabrielson
12	APPROVED AS TO FORM, NOTICE
13	OF PRESENTATION WAIVED:
14	LANE, POWELL, MOSS & MILLER
15	By:
16	BRUCE WINCHELL Of Attorneys for Plaintiff
17	EVANS, CRAVEN & LACKIE
18	
19	By: RODNEY D. HOLLENBECK
20	Of Attorneys for Defendants Barnett
21	
22	Ву:
23	JOHN GLASSMAN Of Attorneys for Defendant
24	Community Chapel
25	
26	
	///

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN

PART MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY

DEFENDANTS GARBRIELSON - 3

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

2 3 4 5 6 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 7 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE 8 AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF 9 READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Pennsylvania corporation, 10 Plaintiff. 88-2-00947-9 NO. 11 PROPOSED vs. ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 12 MOTION TO EXCLUDE AFFIDAVIT IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL OF WILLIAM HICKMAN 13 GABRIELSON, husband and wife; DONALD LEE BARNETT and BARBARA) 14 BARNETT, husband and wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE 15 TRAINING CENTER, a Washington corporation; JACK McDONALD 16 and "JANE DOE" McDONALD, husband and wife. 17 Defendants. 18 19 20

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THIS MATTER having come before the Court on

September 9, 1988, upon the plaintiff's motion to exclude

the affidavit of William Hickman submitted by defendants Ira

Gabrielson and Carol Gabrielson in support of their motion

for summary judgment in the above-entitled case and the

Court having considered the briefing contained within

plaintiff's memorandum opposing Gabrielsons' motion for

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE AFF. OF WILLIAM HICKMAN - 1 RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

partial summary judgment (employee status); and the Court having heard oral argument on the motion by attorneys Bruce Winchell on behalf of the plaintiffs, Daniel L. Hannula on behalf of defendants Carol and Ira Gabrielson, John Glassman on behalf of defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center, and Tim Donaldson on behalf of the defendants

Barnett; and the Court being in all things fully advised, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the plaintiff's motion to exclude the affidavit of William Hickman is denied.

DONE IN OPEN COURT this _____ day of November, 1988.

HONORABLE JUDGE J. KELLEY ARNOLD

Presented by:

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

DANIEL L. HANNULA
Of Attorneys for De

Of Attorneys for Defendants Gabrielson

APPROVED AS TO FORM, NOTICE OF PRESENTATION WAIVED:

LANE, POWELL, MOSS & MILLER

By:

BRUCE WINCHELL
Of Attorneys for Plaintiff

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE AFF. OF WILLIAM HICKMAN - 2 LAW OFFICES

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

ı	
2	APPROVED AS TO FORM, NOTICE OF PRESENTATION WAIVED:
3	EVANS, CRAVEN & LACKIE
4	
∙5	By: RODNEY D. HOLLENBECK
6	Of Attorneys for Defendants Barnett
7	Darnecc
8	
9	By:
10	Of Attorneys for Defendant
11	Community Chapel
12	
13	
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ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION

TO EXCLUDE AFF. OF WILLIAM HICKMAN - 3

///

LAW OFFICES

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

715 TACOMA AVENUE SOUTH TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98402

TACOMA 383-5388 SEATTLE 838-4790

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE

READING PENNSYLVANIA,

a Pennsylvania corporation,

Plaintiff,

vs.

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL

GABRIELSON, husband and wife;

DONALD LEE BARNETT and BARBARA)

BARNETT, husband and wife;

COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE

TRAINING CENTER, a Washington)

corporation; JACK McDONALD

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF

NO. 88-2-00947-9
PROPOSED

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
TO EXCLUDE EXHIBIT I TO THE
AFFIDAVIT OF DANIEL HANNULA
FILED IN CONNECTION WITH
GABRIELSONS' MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

THIS MATTER having con

Defendants.

and "JANE DOE" McDONALD.

husband and wife,

THIS MATTER having come on for hearing September 9, 1988, on the motion of the plaintiff to exclude Exhibit I to the affidavit of Daniel L. Hannula filed in connection with the defendants Gabrielsons' motion for partial summary judgment and the Court having considered briefing upon the subject contained within plaintiff's memorandum opposing

ORDER ON PLTF'S MTN TO EXCLUDE EXHIBIT I TO AFF. OF DANIEL HANNULA FILED RE: GABRIELSON'S MTN FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1

LAW OFFICES

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

715 TACOMA AVENUE SOUTH
TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98402
TACOMA 383-5388
SEATTLE 538-4790

Gabrielsons' motion for partial summary judgment (employee status) and the declaration of Bruce Winchell submitted in support of plaintiff's motion, which contains a letter of Harold T. Dodge, Jr. to all counsel in the case explaining how Exhibit I was obtained; and the Court having further heard the arguments of attorneys Bruce Winchell on behalf of the plaintiff, Daniel L. Hannula on behalf of the defendants Gabrielson, Tim Donaldson on behalf of the defendants Barnett, and John Glassman on behalf of the defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center; and the Court being in all things fully advised, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Court will consider the portions of Exhibit I that purport to the factual references generated by members of the Board of Directors of the defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center regarding whether or not Jack McDonald was the agent of the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center; and it is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Court will not consider those portions of Exhibit I that purport to be relations to communications made between the defendant

,,,,

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26 ////

ORDER ON PLTF'S MTN TO EXCLUDE EXHIBIT I TO AFF. OF DANIEL HANNULA FILED RE: GABRIELSON'S MTN FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2

LAW OFFICES

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

715 TACOMA AVENUE SOUTH
TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98402
TACOMA 383-5388
SEATTLE 338-4790

715 TACOMA AVENUE SOUTH

TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98402 TACOMA 383-5388 SEATTLE 838-4790

1	Community Changl and Rible Excision Control of
2	Community Chapel and Bible Training Center and its
3	attorneys.
4	DONE IN OPEN COURT this day of November, 1988.
5	
6	HONORABLE JUDGE J. KELLEY ARNOLD
7	Presented by:
8	RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS
9	
10	By:
ıı	Of Attorneys for Defendants Gabrielson
12	APPROVED AS TO FORM, NOTICE
13	OF PRESENTATION WAIVED:
14	LANE, POWELL, MOSS & MILLER
15	By:
16	BRUCE WINCHELL: Of Attorneys for Plaintiff
17	
18	EVANS, CRAVEN & LACKIE
19	By:
20	RODNEY D. HOLLENBECK Of Attorneys for Defendants
ยา	Barnett
22	
23	By:
24	JOHN GLASSMAN Of Attorneys for Defendant
25	Community Chapel
26	
	/// ORDER ON PLTF'S MTN TO EXCLUDE RISH HANNING & HAPKING
	EXHIBIT I TO AFF. OF DANIEL RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

HANNULA FILED RE: GABRIELSON'S MTN FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Pennsylvania corporation,

Plaintiff,

NO. 88-2-00947-9 **PROPOSED**

vs.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife; DONALD LEE BARNETT and BARBARA) BARNETT, husband and wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a Washington corporation; JACK McDONALD and "JANE DOE" McDONALD. husband and wife,

Defendants.

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THIS MATTER having come before the Court on September 9, 1988, upon the motion of the plaintiff to reconsider the Court's prior order denying plaintiff's motion for a continuance of defendants Gabrielson's motion for summary judgment and the Court having considered the plaintiff's motion and affidavit to shorten time filed in support of its motion for continuance, the supplemental

26 111

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

715 TACOMA AVENUE SOUTH TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98402 TACOMA 383-5388 SEATTLE 838-4790

LAW OFFICES

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 1

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 2

affidavit of Bruce Winchell, the affidavit of Bruce Winchell

1

2

#/21/2883 88157 #

LAW OFFICES

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

1 APPROVED AS TO FORM, NOTICE 2 OF PRESENTATION WAIVED: 3 LANE, POWELL, MOSS & MILLER 4 By: 5 BRUCE WINCHELL Of Attorneys for Plaintiff 6 7 EVANS, CRAVEN & LACKIE 8 By: 9 RODNEY D. HOLLENBECK 10 Of Attorneys for Defendants Barnett 11 12 By: 13 JOHN GLASSMAN 14 Of Attorneys for Defendant Community Chapel 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 111

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 3

LAW OFFICES

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

715 TACOMA AVENUE SOUTH
TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98402
TACOMA 383 5388
SEATTLE 338-4790

0219BAW

LANE POWELL MOSS & MILLER
3800 RAINIER BANK TOWER
1301 FIFTH AVENUE
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101-2647
(206) 223-7000

- 2. As the court will recall, American originally moved for partial summary judgment on the question of whether damages for emotional distress were compensible under the bodily injury provision in American's policy. The court denied that motion without prejudice and did not grant Barnett's cross-motion on that same issue. For the court's convenience, American has assembled and enclosed all of the pleadings which were submitted to the court in connection with that motion.
- 3. Trial has now taken place in the underlying action. The jury awarded plaintiffs in the underlying action \$147,000. A copy of the jury instructions and completed verdict form are attached to this affidavit as Exhibits A and B.
- 4. The jury ruled in favor of defendants on Gabrielson's assault, battery and false imprisonment claim which arose out of a March 6 incident in which Gabrielson was ejected from the Burien Chapel. That claim was the basis for a bodily injury claim asserted in Gabrielson's complaint. The court will note that the jury was not instructed that in order to make an award of damages for emotional distress, it must find some physical manifestation of that distress.
- 5. On the basis of the jury's rejection of Gabrielson's assault, battery and false imprisonment claim, and resultant rejection of any claim for physical injury, American renews its motion for partial summary judgment and requests an order

declaring that to the extent that Gabrielson's award represents compensation for emotional distress, that award is not covered under American's general liability policy.

DATED this 22nd day of November 1988.

LANE POWELL	MOSS & MITTIER
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By / //	Windell
DY V CCC	1 - 0 0,00 4)

Bruce Winchell Attorneys for Plaintiff

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me: Nov. 22, 1988

NOTARY PUBLIC in and for the State of Washington, residing at Unnwool.

My appointment expires: $\frac{9}{\sqrt{ab}}$.

NOV 18 1988

Pierce County Clerk

By

DEPUTY

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE

VOL 374 PAGE 1434

NOV 1 8 1988

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Pennsylvania corporation,

Plaintiff,

NO. 88-2-00947-9

VS.

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IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL)
GABRIELSON, husband and wife;)
DONALD LEE BARNETT and BARBARA)
BARNETT, husband and wife;)
COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE)
TRAINING CENTER, a Washington)
corporation; JACK McDONALD)
and "JANE DOE" McDONALD,)
husband and wife,)

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXHIBIT I TO THE AFFIDAVIT OF DANIEL HANNULA FILED IN CONNECTION WITH GABRIELSONS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.

THIS MATTER having come on for hearing September 9, 1988, on the motion of the plaintiff to exclude Exhibit I to the affidavit of Daniel L. Hannula filed in connection with the defendants Gabrielsons' motion for partial summary judgment and the Court having considered briefing upon the subject contained within plaintiff's memorandum opposing

ORDER ON PLTF'S MTN TO EXCLUDE EXHIBIT I TO AFF. OF DANIEL HANNULA FILED RE: GABRIELSON'S MTN FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1

LAW OFFICES

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

715 TACOMA AVENUE SOUTH
TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98402
TACOMA 383-5388
SEATTLE 838-4790



Gabrielsons' motion for partial summary judgment (employee status) and the declaration of Bruce Winchell submitted in support of plaintiff's motion, which contains a letter of Harold T. Dodge, Jr. to all counsel in the case explaining how Exhibit I was obtained; and the Court having further heard the arguments of attorneys Bruce Winchell on behalf of the plaintiff, Daniel L. Hannula on behalf of the defendants Gabrielson, Tim Donaldson on behalf of the defendants Barnett, and John Glassman on behalf of the defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center; and the Court being in all things fully advised, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Court will consider the portions of Exhibit I that purport to the factual references generated by members of the Board of Directors of the defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center regarding whether or not Jack McDonald was the agent of the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center; and it is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Court will not consider those portions of Exhibit I that purport to be relations to communications made between the defendant

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25 ////

///
ORDER ON PLTF'S MTN TO EXCLUDE
EXHIBIT I TO AFF. OF DANIEL
HANNULA FILED RE: GABRIELSON'S
MTN FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2

LAW OFFICES

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

715 TACOMA AVENUE SOUTH
TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98402
TACOMA 383-5388
SEATTLE 838-4790

715 TACOMA AVENUE SOUTH

TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98402

TACOMA 383-5388 SEATTLE 838-4790

1 Community Chapel and Bible Training Center and its 2 attorneys. 3 DONE IN OPEN COURT this ____/8 day of November, 1988. 4 5 6 7 Presented by: 8 RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS PILED DEPT. 9 9 IN OPEN COURT 10 Of Attorneys for Defendants NOV18 1988 Gabrielson 11 Pierce County Clark APPROVED AS TO FORM, NOTICE 12 OF PRESENTATION WAIVED: DEPUTY 13 LANE, POWELL, MOSS & MILLER 14 15 By: BRUCE WINCHELL 16 Of Attorneys for Plaintiff 17 EVANS, CRAVEN & LACKIE 18 19 By: RODNEY D. HOLLENBECK 20 Of Attorneys for Defendants Barnett 21 22 23 By:_ JOHN GLASSMAN 24 Of Attorneys for Defendant Community Chapel 25 26 /// LAW OFFICES ORDER ON PLTF'S MTN TO EXCLUDE **RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS** EXHIBIT I TO AFF. OF DANIEL

HANNULA FILED RE: GABRIELSON'S

MTN FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3

Do Phron		the three th
PENNSYLVANIA vs. IRA GABRIELSON, et al. NATURE OF CAUSE Motion	Plainti	NO. 88 2 00947 9 NOTE OF ISSUE AND STATEMENT OF ARBITRABILITY IN COUNTY CLERK'S OFFICE IN COUNTY CLERK'S OFFICE AM. NOV 2 3 1889 P.M.
ESTIMATED TIME TO TRY CA		JAN 6 89
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY:	NAME ADDRESS	ASSIGNMENT December F6, 1988 Bruce Winchell LANE POWELL MOSS & MILLER 3800 Rainier Bank Tower 1301 Fifth Avenue Seattle, WA 98101
DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY:	TELEPHONE NAME ADDRESS	Daniel L. Hannula Rush, Hannula & Hawkins 715 Tacoma Avenue South Tacoma, WA 98402
(NOTE: If additional attorneys inv	•	
		BITRATION
twenty-five thousand dollars exc	n because the sole relationships for the sole re	relief sought is a money judgment and involves no claim in excess cees, interests and costs.
[] This case is not subject to manda [] Plaintiff's claim exceeds twen [] Plaintiff seeks relief other th [] Defendant's counter or cross [] Defendant's counter or cross	nty-five thousand do an a money judgme claim exceeds twer	ollars. nt, nty-five thousand dollars.
twenty-five thousand dollars for	purposes of arbitra	renty-five thousand dollars but hereby waives any claim in excess of tion. FION MUST BE COMPLETED
		MPLETED BY CLERK
Assigned To:		

.

List Additional Attorneys					
Name:	Rodney D. Hollenbeck				
Address:	Evans, Craven & Lackie 34th Floor Columbia Center				
Phone:	701 Fifth Avenue Seattle, WA 98402				
Attorney For:	(206) 386-5555 Defendants Barnetts				
Name:	John Glassman				
Address:	625 Commerce Old City Hall, Suite 420 Tacoma, WA 98402				
Phone:	(206) 572-2746				
Attorney For:	Defendants Community Chapel & Bible Training Center				
Name:					
Address:					
Phone:					
Attorney For:					
Name:	-				
Address:					
Phone:					
Attorney For:					
Name:					
Address:	•				
Phone:					
Attorney For:					
Name:					
Address:					

Phone:

Attorney For:

15153 4/21/2883 88159

ORIGINAL **

LANE POWELL MOSS & MILLER 3800 RAINIER BANK TOWER SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101-2647 223-7000 (D)

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10110

	STATE OF WASHINGTON COUNTY OF KING SS OF MAILING The undersigned, being first duly sworn, on eath, states: That on this day affant deposited in the mails of the United States of America a properly stamped
1	and acidrossed environe directed to the attorneys of record of plauntinf, defandant, containing a possibility the document to which this affective attached.
2	Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3 day of
3	November 1988
4	Notal Public in and for the State of
5	Washington, residing at Gentle. Lykn wood 9(1/90
6	
7	
8	SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR PIERCE COUNTY
9	AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF) READING PENNSYLVANIA, a) Pennsylvania corporation,)
11) Plaintiff,) No. 88-2-00947-9
12	v.) AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE WINCHELL
13) IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL) GABRIELSON, husband and wife;)
14	DONALD LEE BARNETT and) BARBARA BARNETT, husband and) wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND) BIBLE TRAINING CENTER a)
15 16	Washington corporation, JACK)
17	McDONALD, husband and wife,
18	Defendants.
19	STATE OF WASHINGTON)
20	COUNTY OF KING)
21	PRICE WINCHELL boing finet dule grown or only decided a
22	BRUCE WINCHELL, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and
23	 I represent plaintiff American Casualty in this action.
24	 On Wednesday, November 23, 1988, it is expected that
25	plaintiffs in the underlying action, Ira and Carol Gabrielson,
26	re in the amostrating decion, it a and call dabite15011,
	AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE WINCHELL - 1 01S:0886p
	ORIGINAL 3800 RAINIER BANK TOWER SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101-2647 229-7000

will obtain a judgment in the amount of \$147,000.00 against Community Chapel and Bible Training Center and Jack McDonald. It is further anticipated that execution on that judgment may be delayed by virtue of post-trial motions and/or an appeal.

3. In order to resolve the questions of coverage prior to any attempts by Gabrielson to execute upon its judgment,
American requests that trial in this matter be set prior to
April 1, 1989. At the same time, American requests that this court impose a stay upon Gabrielson's execution of the judgment in question.

Bruce Winchell

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me: November 23, 1988.

NOTARY PUBLIC in and for the State of Washington, residing at

My appointment expires: 3-9-90

LAW OFFICES

LANE POWELL MOSS & MILLER

A PARTNERSHIP INCLUDING PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS

3800 RAINIER BANK TOWER SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101-2647 (206) 223-7000

November 21, 1988

IN COUNTY CLERK'S OFFICE

A.M. NOV 30 1233 P.M.

The Honorable J. Kelley Arnold Pierce County Superior Court Department 9, Room 217 930 Tacoma Avenue S. Tacoma, Washington 98402 PIERO RUTT, COUNTY CLERG

Re: American Casualty v. Ira Gabrielson, et al.

Dear Judge Arnold:

Enclosed is American Casualty's motion for an early trial date and a stay of execution on the judgment obtained by Gabrielson. American is also requesting that this matter be heard by a jury.

Very truly yours,

LANE POWELL MOSS & MILLER

Bruce Winchell

BW:egw Enclosures

OIS:18241

Daniel L. Hannula Rodney D. Hollenbeck

John Glassman

List Additional Attorneys

Attorney For:

Rodney D. Hollenbeck Name: Evans, Craven & Lackie 34th Floor Columbia Center Address: 701 Fifth Avenue Seattle, WA 98402 Phone: (206) 386-5555 Defendants Barnetts Attorney For: Name: John Glassman 625 Commerce Address: Old City Hall, Suite 420 Tacoma, WA 98402 Phone: (206) 572-2746 Attorney For: Defendant Community Chapel & Bible Training Center Name: Address: Phone: Attorney For: Name: Address: Phone: Attorney For: Name: # Address: STATE OF WASHINGTON **AFFIDAVIT** Phone: COUNTY OF KING OF MAILING The undersigned, being first duly sworn, on oath, states: That on this day in the mails of the United States of America a properly stamped Attorney For: elope directed to the atterneys of record of plan.Lift, defendant. and address offidavit is attached. Name: Address: Phone: Public in and for the State of

53 4/Z1/2883 88165

Z-271a

3 4/21/2883 88166

COTO.

List Additional Attorneys			
Name:	TIMOTHY DONALDSON EVANS, CRAVEN & LACKIE		
Address:	3100 Columbia Center 701 Fifth Avenue		
Phone:	Seattle, WA 98104 386-5555		
Attorney For:			
Name:	JOHN GLASSMAN		
Address:	Post Office Box 1703 Tacoma, WA 98401		
Phone:	572-2746		
Attorney For:	Defendants COMMUNITY CHAPEL		
Name:			
Address:	STATE OF WASHINGTON SS		
Phone:	The undersigned, being first duly sworn, on oath,		
Attorney For:	to the attorneys of record of AMATTER STATES AND ASSESSED OF THE CONTROL OF THE STATES AND ASSESSED OF		
Name:	Subspribed and sworn to before me this 21 day of		
Address:	Notary Public in and for the		
Phone:	State of Washington My commission expires 3F/90		
Attorney For:	•		
Name:			
Address:			
Phone:			
Attorney For:			

Phone: Attorney For:

Name:

Address:

	The undersigned, being first duly sworn, on cath, states: That on this day, affiant HAD DELIVERED to the attorneys of record of PANN DEFEND.
	a copy of the document to which this affidavit is
1	Straignest Cereffer IN COURT IN COURT
2	Subscribed and sworn to before me thisday of IN COUNTY CLERK'S OFFIC.
3	Notary Public in and for the State of Washington
4	My commission expires 319190.
5	DEPLITY
6	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
7	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE
8	
9	AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF) READING PENNSYLVANIA, a) Pennsylvania corporation,)
10) NO. 88-2-00947-9
11	Plaintiff,) AFFIDAVIT OF HAROLD T.
	vs.) DODGE, JR. IN OPPOSITION) TO PLAINTIFF'S JURY DEMAND
12	IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL) AND REQUEST FOR STAY OF
13	GABRIELSON, husband and wife;) EXECUTION DONALD LEE BARNETT and)
14	BARBARA BARNETT, husband and)
15	wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND) BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a)
10	Washington corporation, JACK)
16	McDONALD and "JANE DOE") McDONALD, husband and wife,)
17)
18	Defendants.)
	,
19	STATE OF WASHINGTON)
20) SS.
21	COUNTY OF PIERCE)
	HAROLD T. DODGE, JR., being first duly sworn, upon oath,
22	deposes and says:
23	I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of
24	
25	Washington and I am one of the attorneys of record for the
	defendants Gabrielson in the above-entitled action. I make the
26	

STATE OF WASHINGTO

AFFIDAVIT OF HAROLD T. DODGE, JR. - 1

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following affidavit of my own personal knowledge of the files and records in both the declaratory action and the underlying action and I am competent to testify thereto for the purposes of this motion.

Exhibit A to this Affidavit, incorporated herein by reference, is Trial Brief of the plaintiffs in the underlying action;

Exhibit B to this Affidavit, incorporated herein by reference, is Community Chapel and Bible Training Center's Trial Brief in the underlying action;

Exhibit C to this Affidavit, incorporated herein by reference, is the court's instructions to the jury in the underlying action:

Exhibit D to this Affidavit, incorporated herein by reference, is the special verdict form submitted to the jury in the underlying action along with answers to the interrogatories as provided by the jury;

Exhibit E to this Affidavit, incorporated herein by reference, is a true and correct copy of the judgment on jury verdict entered in the underlying action by Honorable Thomas A. Swayze, Jr., Judge, on November 23, 1988.

HAROLD

SIGNED AND SWORN to before me this

1988.

AFFIDAVIT OF HAROLD T. DODGE, JR. - 2

State of Washington

My appointment expires //

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EXHIBIT

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EXHIBIT

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE

GABRIELSON, husband and wife,

Plaintiffs,

NO. 86-2-02792-6

VS.

TRIAL BRIEF

JACK McDONALD and "JANE DOE" McDONALD, husband and wife: DONALD LEE BARNETT and BARBARA) BARNETT, husband and wife, and) "JOHN DOES" NOS. 1-4 and "JANE DOES" NOS. 1-4, husbands) and wives; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER OF TACOMA; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER,

Defendants.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Α. INTRODUCTION.

The plaintiffs in this case are Carol and Ira Gabrielson. The Gabrielsons claim that defendant Jack McDonald was negligent in counseling Carol Gabrielson at a time when defendant McDonald was her counselor and pastor at the defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center ////

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TRIAL BRIEF - 1

TRIAL BRIEF - 2

of Tacoma. The plaintiffs are suing defendant Donald L.

Barnett and the main corporation of the Community Chapel and
Bible Training Center on the theory that Jack McDonald was
an agent of the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center
(hereafter "corporation"), or the agent of Donald L.

Barnett, or both, all during the time he negligently
counseled Carol Gabrielson.

The plaintiffs are also suing the corporation for an assault committed by corporation security personnel against Carol Gabrielson.

As a proximate result of the negligence of the defendants, Carol Gabrielson has suffered serious psychological, physical, and emotional injuries, which have necessitated past therapy and treatment and which may necessitate future therapy and treatment.

Ira Gabrielson claims that the injuries caused Carol Gabrielson by the defendants resulted in a loss to him of his wife's companionship, services, and society during the duration of the marriage.

B. FACTS EXPECTED TO BE PROVEN AT TIME OF TRIAL.

At trial, the plaintiffs intend to introduce evidence proving the following facts:

Carol and Ira Gabrielson were married in 1965. During the majority of their life together, Carol and Ira had a relatively stable marriage in which they raised two

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daughters and during which they remained productive and responsible citizens. The Gabrielson household was run along traditional lines; Ira was the breadwinner and Carol the homemaker. In addition, Carol had a hobby, which she had pursued throughout childhood and as an adult, of raising animals.

The marriage was not trouble-free, but it worked for

The marriage was not trouble-free, but it worked for Carol and Ira by providing each with the type of emotional support that allowed them to function in and cope with society. Carol, especially, was deeply religious and was brought up, religiously, as a Pentecostal.

Carol Gabrielson's first contact with the Community
Chapel and Bible Training Center was in 1974. At that time,
she attended services at the Burien headquarters of
Community Chapel. Initially, her participation was limited
to one night per week because of the distance from Tacoma to
Burien and because she was also attending another church.
Between 1974 and 1983 there were extended periods when Carol
did not attend the chapel. In 1983, Ms. Gabrielson learned
of a Community Chapel satellite church in Tacoma and she
began attending that satellite church in 1983.

Except for a period from about March through about December, 1984, Carol Gabrielson regularly attended the Tacoma satellite church. Jack McDonald was pastor of the Tacoma satellite.

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Carol Gabrielson first sought Jack McDonald's counsel in the summer of 1983. During these early sessions, Jack McDonald spent a great deal of time merely listening to Carol's problems and assuring her that he would pray for her.

In May of 1985, Carol sought marital counseling from Jack McDonald. Initially, this counseling progressed much as her previous counseling had, until about September, when the nature of Jack McDonald's counseling began to change, dramatically.

The first instance of this change occurred in September, 1985 when, during a counseling session in his office, Jack McDonald turned on music, turned down the lights and asked Ms. Gabrielson to sit with him on a small couch. Pastor McDonald instructed Ms. Gabrielson that she needed to know that she was loved and began talking to her, in detail, about sexual matters. McDonald unbuttoned Ms. Gabrielson's blouse and began to kiss her breasts. Ms. Gabrielson became so visibly shaken that McDonald was forced to stop.

Jack McDonald assured Ms. Gabrielson that there would be no repeated impropriety and Ms. Gabrielson continued to receive counseling from Jack McDonald. Jack McDonald thereafter began a program of counseling wholly inappropriate to Ms. Gabrielson's case. He began to isolate

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Ms. Gabrielson from all support structures and systems outside of the society of the church while, at the same time, increasing Carol's dependence solely upon him for all temporal as well as spiritual needs. He counseled her to give up her hobby of raising animals, which she did. He counseled her not to talk to her husband, Ira, because he insisted that Ira was possessed by demons. He eventually counseled Carol to leave Ira, altogether.

In late September of 1985, Carol did leave Ira. Jack McDonald assisted Carol in moving out of the family home.

The first place into which Jack McDonald moved Carol Gabrielson was his own home. Thereafter, Jack McDonald moved Ms. Gabrielson into a series of different places to live, mostly the homes of congregation members who were away from town for periods of time. During this interval, Jack McDonald visited Carol wherever she was residing at the time and continued his counseling of Carol's ever increasing problems. In these counseling sessions, Jack McDonald was increasingly adamant in his sexual overtures toward Carol.

During this time, Jack McDonald manipulated Carol Gabrielson into a sexual relationship that lasted through about the beginning of January, 1986. Carol lost all ability to resist Jack McDonald and at the height of his influence over her, she would engage in any sexual act that Jack McDonald demanded. Throughout the period, Jack McDonald

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justified the entanglement by claiming he would help Carol by showing her how God had intended her to use her body. When Carol would protest that their sexual involvement was sin, Jack McDonald would justify their "fallen" state with biblical reference. Eventually, Carol realized that she was being used merely for Jack McDonald's sexual gratification.

As Carol began to resist Jack McDonald's actions, he became very negative toward her and was, on occasion, violent. On several occasions, McDonald shook Ms. Gabrielson violently. At least once, when Carol indicated her diminishing faith in his counseling, he threw her to the floor. As Ms. Gabrielson began to protest more and more, Jack McDonald began to assert that she was controlled by demons.

Once Carol was able to break away from McDonald, she wanted to confess the sins which she was convinced she and McDonald had committed to Donald L. Barnett of the main corporation in Burien in order to clear her conscience.

Jack McDonald insisted that they keep the affair a secret between them. Because Carol insisted on involving the senior members of the corporate church, McDonald disfellowshipped her. By disfellowshipping Carol, Jack McDonald effectively cut her off, entirely, from the society of the only friends that she had left.

In an attempt to remain a part of the Community Chapel, Ms. Gabrielson went to the main chapel in Burien on the

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evening of March 6, 1986, hoping to obtain the counsel of some senior church official. Jack McDonald also attended the Burien chapel on the evening of March 6, 1986. When he spotted Carol at the chapel, he reported her to the security officers in attendance as a disfellowshipped person who should not be allowed to remain on the premises.

The security personnel literally dragged Carol Gabrielson from the chapel and threw her, handcuffed, into a car outside where the King County Police interceded. Carol Gabrielson suffered a compression fracture as a result of her ejection from the chapel.

This incident at the Burien chapel marked the end of a destructive chain of events wherein Carol Gabrielson's vulnerability was used against her by her pastor and counselor, Jack McDonald, under the guise of religious and emotional guidance. Pastor McDonald took advantage of Carol's weakness, vulnerability, and her need for support by manipulating her into leaving her husband, Ira Gabrielson. Pastor McDonald coerced Carol Gabrielson into having a sexual relationship with him.

Attempting to continue her long-standing pattern of worship, Ms. Gabrielson attempted to participate with the congregation at the Burien Community Chapel, where she endured physical assault and resulting injury. Both Carol and Ira Gabrielson suffered injuries to their reputation,

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severe emotional distress and, in the case of Ira Gabrielson, a loss of consortium due to the negligent and reckless acts of Jack McDonald and other officials of the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center during the latter period of her worship with that church.

C. AGENCY.

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From a review of the corporate by-laws, it is readily apparent that the main corporation of the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center has retained so much power to control its satellites and the satellite pastors that the satellite pastors can only be regarded as agents for the Among the dictates of the by-laws reserving corporation. control to the main corporation are the following: corporation by-laws state that the satellite churches are a "division" of the main corporation; that the corporation "does not and cannot exist independently from the various divisions"; that as a division of the corporation, the satellites are under the jurisdiction of the steering committee of the main corporation; that pastors of satellite churches are subject to admonishment, discipline and removal by the main corporation's steering committee; that each satellite church is an extension of the main corporation; that each satellite, along with its pastor, is subject to the by-laws of the main corporation and that each satellite church is affiliated with and subject to the main //// LAW OFFICES

TRIAL BRIEF - 8

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corporation's disciplines.

As other indicia of the single identity of the main corporation and its satellites, satellite pastors are officially listed with the main corporation as "current officers and major appointees" of the main corporation; the main corporation dictates the by-laws of each satellite and no satellite may alter its by-laws without Pastor Donald Lee Barnett's personal approval; no satellite may make any regulation not dictated in the main corporation's by-laws without the approval of the main corporation; the articles of incorporation and the by-laws of the Tacoma satellite were dictated to Jack Mcdonald in their entirety by the corporation.

These represent only a few of the examples evident in the by-laws of the complete power to control the satellites and satellite pastors reserved by the main corporation.

Jack McDonald was pastor of the Tacoma satellite church, appointed and ordained by the main corporation. As such, Jack McDonald served not only as pastor and religious leader of the Tacoma chapel but as an agent of the defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center corporation.

C. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR.

Jack McDonald, as pastor of the Tacoma satellite chapel of the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center, was held out to Carol and Ira Gabrielson as a qualified pastor and

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counselor by the corporate church. Carol Gabrielson began counseling with defendant Jack McDonald on a regular basis due to his position as a pastor and counselor.

As is evident in the by-laws dictated to the satellites by the main corporation, counseling, both spiritual and, for example, marital, is a legitimate activity, expected of pastors, and encouraged to the point that it is controlled by the by-laws in its "Statement on Counseling."

As a result of what began as legitimate marital counseling, Pastor Jack McDonald became aware of the vulnerability of Carol Gabrielson. Pastor Jack McDonald influenced and manipulated Carol Gabrielson into leaving her husband, Ira Gabrielson, and further, he coerced her into having sexual relations with him. This relationship continued from September of 1985 through early January of 1986.

Due to his position as pastor and counselor at the Community Chapel of Tacoma, Jack McDonald was able to gain the trust, confidence and eventual submission of Carol Gabrielson. Acting within the course and scope of his employment with the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center, Pastor McDonald, under the guise of counseling method, initiated a course of emotional manipulation and sexual gratification at the expense of Carol Gabrielson based upon his intimate knowledge of her particular vulnerabilities.

TRIAL BRIEF - 10

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715 TACOMA AVENUE SOUTH TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98402 TACOMA JAJ-5388 SEATTLE AJB-4790 D. NEGLIGENCE OF DONALD L. BARNETT AND THE CORPORATE HIERARCHY.

Donald L. Barnett introduced an activity to the congregation of the corporation known as "spiritual connecting." This activity usually involved couples, men and women from different marriages. Donald Barnett explained that this activity was supposed to manifest the love of God passing through the individuals resulting in a powerful union—a spiritual connection—between the two individuals involved. In theory, married couples were too involved, socially and physically, to receive a purely spiritual connection and, so, the rhetoric encouraged these unions between persons from different marriages.

Although the connection could arise, and on occasion supposedly did arise, between men, between women, or among groups of more than two, the connection most frequently occurred between one man and one woman, either of whom might be married, but not to each other.

The connection manifested in an intense attraction between the affected individuals. It involved extended periods of close contact, intense gazing into each other's eyes, close embracing, caressing, and prolonged dancing to music, which was chosen especially to enhance the experience. Kissing, and even french kissing, was allowed. Judgment on the apparent intimacy of any couple's physical

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contact was specifically withheld because Donald L. Barnett taught that nothing done in the "spirit" was wrong.

Everyone involved in the hierarchy of the corporation was wary of the destructive potential of encouraging such intimate physical and emotional relationships between couples of different marital circumstances. Evidence of the damage done in implementing the practice was apparent in the inordinate amount of time these connected couples began to spend with each other at the expense of the couples' marriages, the jealousies that developed, and the inappropriate physical intimacy being justified as spiritual. These misgivings were never voiced to Donald Barnett because of the widespread feeling that it would do no good. Jack DuBois and especially Scott Hartley had these misgivings. Jack McDonald was also extremely wary when first introduced to this practice, although he felt bound by the church's laws to follow Donald Barnett's example and to implement the activity at the Tacoma satellite.

Eventually, a spiritual connection formed between Carol Gabrielson and Jack McDonald. This, in addition to McDonald's position as Carol's pastor and counselor, resulted in Carol's extreme trust in, and dependence upon, Jack McDonald. The result was that Carol was convinced to spend more and more time with McDonald at the expense of her family. The final result was the sexual coercion described earlier.

TRIAL BRIEF - 12

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Donald L. Barnett was allowed to introduce and encourage the activity known as spiritual connections despite knowledge by the church hierarchy that Donald L. Barnett had abused his position in the church on prior occasions to take sexual advantage of female parishioners and despite the knowledge that the program was being used to justify inappropriate sexual contact among members of the congregation.

II. LAW AND ARGUMENT

A. JACK McDONALD'S NEGLIGENCE CONSISTED OF ENGAGING IN A SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP WITH CAROL GABRIELSON WHO WAS BOTH A MEMBER OF HIS CONGREGATION AND HIS COUNSELEE.

There is ample precedent that it is negligence on the part of a health care professional to have sexual contact with a client whom he is counseling.

The federal case, <u>Simmons v. United States</u>, 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1968) was a case applying Washington law that discussed the negligence of a psychiatrist who engaged in sexual conduct with a client:

There is no question that a mental health professional's sexual involvement with a client is a breach of duty and malpractice under Washington law.

Simmons, supra, 805 F.2d at 1368.

Likewise, Washington statutes provide that it is unethical for any psychologist to engage "in any act

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MA, WASHINGTON 9840 TACOMA 183-5188 SEATTLE 838-4790 involving moral turpitude" and, more particularly,
"physically abusing or having sexual contact with a patient
or client" is defined as unethical. RCW 18.83.120(1), (18).

Carol Gabrielson's relationship to Jack McDonald was that of a congregant/counselee to a pastor/counselor. Washington state law clothes this relationship with all the indicia of utmost respect. The law clothes both the priest-penitent relationship and the counselor-counselee relationship with testimonial privileges. See RCW 5.60.060(2), (3). Such privileges are born of the sanctity with which the relationships are regarded. It may be assumed that the relationships protected by testimonial privileges meet the requirements recognized at common law for the existence of a testimonial privilege:

- (1) The communication must originate in confidence that it will not be disclosed;
- (2) The element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties;
- (3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered; and
- (4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communication must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.

Senear v. Daily Journal American, 97 Wn.2d 148, 153, 641 P.2d
1180 (1982).

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The relationship between a person and her God is so sacrosanct that the protection of a person's religious beliefs is written into both the United States and the Washington state constitutions. Jack McDonald represented God's anointed shepherd to Carol Gabrielson; the person upon whom God had laid His hand to lead her in her pursuit of a righteous life and the ultimate reward promised by God in the Bible that is reserved for His followers. If anyone ever stood in a fiduciary relationship to Carol Gabrielson, it was Jack McDonald.

A fiduciary relation is one founded on trust or confidence reposed by one person in another. State of Montana W

A fiduciary relation is one founded on trust or confidence reposed by one person in another. State of Montana v. Hooser, 227 P. 819, 821, 71 Montana 1 (1924). It exists where there is special confidence reposed in one who in equity and good conscience is bound to act in good faith and with due regard for the interests of the one reposing the confidence. Neagle v. McMullen, 165 N.E. 605, 608, 334 Ill. 168 (1929). The origin of the confidence and the source of the influence are immaterial. Quinn v. Phipps, 1132 So. 419, 420, 93 Fla. 805 (1927).

The gravamen of Carol Gabrielson's complaint lies in the malpractice, deceit, assault and coercion by Jack McDonald; a person who was in a position of overpowering influence over her and in whom she placed trust, not only for her temporal well being, but for the salvation of her soul.

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Washington courts have commented upon the sexual abuse by one in such a powerful position of confidence and trust of the one reposing such trust and confidence. In the case <u>Omer v. Edgren</u>, 38 Wn.App. 376, 685 P.2d 635 (1984), the Washington Court of Appeals discussed the New York case <u>Roy v. Hartogs</u>, 81 Misc.2d 350, 366 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1975) in deciding that sexual abuse of a patient by a health care provider was malpractice:

In Roy v. Hartogs, 81 Misc.2d 350, 366 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1975), a patient sued her psychiatrist alleging the doctor had sexual relations with her as part of the treatment program. The court analyzed this type of case and found it involved a fiduciary relationship between psychiatrist and patient and was analogous to a guardian-ward relationship. The gravamen of the plaintiff's complaint lay in the malpractice, deceit, assault and coercion by a person in a position of overpowering influence and trust.

This case involves a fiduciary relationship between psychiatrist and patient and is analogous to the guardian-ward relationship in Graham v. Wallace (50 App.Div. 101, 108) wherein the court stated: "The ward cannot waive performance of this duty or surrender these rights of protection. When the guardian thus betrays his trust and ruins the morals, the character and reputation of his ward, he should not be heard to say in a court of justice, by way of legal excuse or justification for the seduction, that the ward was capable of consenting. obtained under such circumstances is no consent and should stand for naught. essential to the preservation and enforcement of the ward's right of protection in her chastity and virtue that a violation of this right by her guardian should not pass with impunity, but that it should be vindicated and the seducer punished on the civil as well as on the criminal side of the court".

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patient from the deliberate and malicious abuse of power and breach of trust by a psychiatrist when that patient entrusts to him her body and mind in the hope that he will use his best efforts to effect a cure. That right is best protected by permitting the victim to pursue civil remedies, not only to vindicate a wrong against her but to vindicate the public interest as well.

Omer, supra, 38 Wn.App. at 378-79, quoting, Roy v. Hartogs, supra, 81 Misc.2d at 352-54.

The court approved of the reasoning quoted in the Roy case reciting that the physician-patient relationship in Washington is also considered fiduciary in character:

Washington has also characterized the relationship between physician and patient as fiduciary: "The physician-patient relationship is of a fiduciary character. The inherent necessity for trust and confidence requires scrupulous good faith on the part of the physician."

Omer, supra, 38 Wn.App. at 379.

The reasoning evident in the <u>Omer</u> case for finding a fiduciary relationship between a physician and a patient and the negligence inherent in violation of that relation by coercing sexual contact applies with even greater force to the present situation in which Carol Gabrielson went to Jack McDonald as both her pastor and as her counselor and had her ultimate trust and confidence violated by his sexual abuse.

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B. JACK McDONALD WAS THE AGENT OF THE DEFENDANT CORPORATION, COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER.

Jack McDonald was the agent of the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center in accordance with the definition of an agent approved in the Washington Pattern Jury Instructions:

An agent is a person employed under an express or implied agreement to perform services for another called the principle, and who is subject to the principle's control or right to control the manner and means of performing the services. One may be an agent even though he or she receives no payment for services. The agency agreements may be oral or in writing.

WPI 50.01.

The right of the corporate church to control Jack
McDonald is evident in the by-laws of the corporate church
and in the by-laws of the Tacoma satellite, which the
corporate church dictated to the Tacoma satellite.
Instances of this right of control are recited in the
Statement of Facts, supra, and are set forth in detail in
the by-laws of both the corporate church and the satellite,
which will be introduced into evidence.

The actual exercise of control over the Tacoma church by the corporate church is evident in an investigation. conducted by the corporate church into the daily affairs of the satellite church entitled "Failure of Jack McDonald to Comply with By-laws." This investigation recites the failures of Jack McDonald to ensure that the internal

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operation of the Tacoma satellite was conducted as demanded by the main corporation.

Counseling was a legitimate service and was a duty imposed upon Jack McDonald by the by-laws dictated to him by the corporate church. The standards for legitimate counseling activity are contained in those by-laws as a "Statement on Counseling" which, along with the remainder of the by-laws, was dictated to the Tacoma satellite by the main corporation.

Ø. THE COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, AS PRINCIPLE, IS LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE HARM INFLICTED UPON CAROL AND IRA GABRIELSON BY ITS AGENT, JACK MCDONALD.

The corporate church is liable for Jack McDonald's conduct because his conduct was within the scope of his agency. Washington agency law has long held that a master cannot excuse himself when any "authorized act was improperly or unlawfully performed." DeLeon v. Doyhof Fish Products Co., 104 Wash. 337, 343, 176 P. 355 (1918), nor can he excuse himself when an unauthorized act is done in conjunction with other acts which are within the scope of duties the employee is instructed to perform. Pearson v. United States, 522 F.2d 459, 464 (9th Cir. 1975); Smith v. Leber, 34 Wn.2d 611, 623, 209 P.2d 297 (1949).

In a recent case discussing scope of employment, the Washington Supreme Court reiterated the test for determining

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whether an employee was within the course of his employment as:

Whether the employee was, at the time, engaged in the performance of the duties required of him by his contract of employment; or by specific direction of his employer; or, as sometimes stated, whether he was engaged at the time in the furtherance of the employer's interest."

Dickinson v. Edwards, 105 Wn.2d 457, 467, 716 P.2d 814 (1986) (quoting Elder v. Cisco Construction Co., 52 Wn.2d 241, 245, 324 P.2d 1082 (1958)) (emphasis in original). Washington court has emphasized the importance of the benefit to the employer in applying this test. Dickinson, supra, 105 Wn.2d at 467. In Dickinson, the court applied respondeat superior to allow a plaintiff injured by a drunk employee to recover from a banquet-hosting employer who required the employee's attendance at a party furthering the employer's interest. Id. at 468. In so holding, the court noted that acts in violation of company policy, negligent acts performed contrary to instructions, and acts "forbidden, or done in a forbidden manner," may create employer liability. Id. at 470 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 230 (1958)).

D. IRA GABRIELSON HAS A VALID CLAIM FOR LOSS OF CONSORTIUM.

A claim of loss of consortium is the independent cause of action of a "deprived" spouse for the loss of the love,

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affection, care, services, and society of the injured or "impaired" spouse. Lund v. Caple, 100 Wn.2d 739, 742 n.1, 744, 675 P.2d 1272 (1984).

In Lund, the court addressed the question whether one spouse may sue alone for loss of consortium and if so, whether the allegation of loss of consortium is so similar to alienation of affections that it is barred as a matter of policy. Lund, supra, 100 Wn.2d at 742.

In Lund, Mr. Lund sued Alan Caple, pastor of the Westgate Chapel, for negligent impairment of consortium. Mrs. Lund refused to join in the lawsuit.

The Washington Supreme Court held that where the allegation of the "deprived" spouse is that the tortfeasor interfered with his or her marriage because of sexual misconduct with the "impaired" spouse, the allegation is too similar to alienation of affections to be maintained, unless the "impaired" spouse joins as a plaintiff in the lawsuit asserting his or her own injury leading to the "impairment":

> Here, John Lund is suing because of alleged sexual misconduct that interfered with his marriage. His wife did not join the lawsuit, which alone would not bar the action, but does indicate at least the possibility of a vengeful motive or a so-called "forced sale" on the part of a wronged husband. this lawsuit is so similar to an alienation of affections action that as a matter of policy it falls within the prohibitions of Wyman v. Wallace, supra.

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TRIAL BRIEF - 21

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This opinion, however, should not be read as precluding an action against a counselor, pastoral or otherwise, in which a counselor is negligent in treating either a husband or It is conceivable that a malpractice action would be appropriate where a counselor fails to conform to an appropriate standard of care, injures the patient/spouse which in turn results in loss of consortium damages to the other spouse. Where, however, the alleged underlying tort is based upon an extramarital relationship with the "impaired" spouse and the "impaired" spouse does not desire to assert á claim, such an action becomes in essence a suit for alienation of affections. Absent the "impaired" spouse's claims, remaining allegations amount to an alienation of affections action. . . "

Lund, supra, 100 Wn.2d at 747.

In the present action, Carol Gabrielson has joined Ira Gabrielson in the lawsuit asserting claims of negligence on the part of Jack McDonald resulting in severe mental and. emotional harm. The mental and emotional harm is the impairment upon which Ira Gabrielson's claim hinges. Ira Gabrielson seeks damages for the loss of love, affection, services, society and consortium during the duration of his marriage to Carol.

E. NEGLIGENCE OF DONALD L. BARNETT AND THE COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER.

Neither the Washington State nor the Federal Constitutions may be used as a front to excuse licentious conduct:

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TRIAL BRIEF - 22

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Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief and worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one shall be molested or disturbed in person or property on the count of religion; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state.

Washington State Constitution, Article I, Section 11, Amendment 34.

Thus, the amendment embraces two concepts, freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 110 U.S. 296, 203, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 213 (1940) (discussing the free exercise clause of the United States Constitution).

As may be seen from the above quotes, the freedom to act is not absolute, even when embellished with a religious veneer. The Washington Supreme Court has indicated that it will not hesitate to use state action to prevent abuse of an individual or of the family by unscrupulous individuals attempting to shield themselves behind the freedom of religion clauses of our constitutions. Carrieri v. Bush, 69 Wn.2d 536, 419 P.2d 132 (1966) was an action for alienation of affections brought by a husband against the pastor of a religious sect. The plaintiff's marriage began to suffer

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due to the pastor's increasing influence over her. plaintiff was told by the pastor that he was "full of the devil" and eventually the wife was persuaded to leave the family home and her whereabouts were concealed by the The wife eventually filed for, and was granted, defendant. a divorce. The plaintiff filed suit against the pastor and elders of the church, for alienation of affection. trial, the court granted the defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and the plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision

and held as follows:

Respondents, however, impliedly urge, and the trial court in effect conferred upon them, an absolute privilege to interfere in appellant's marriage and upon religious grounds.

There is no question that our state constitution protects the free exercise of religious beliefs, and neither a religious belief nor the lack of such belief is, of itself, grounds for a divorce. But, one does not, under the guise of exercising religious belief, acquire a license to wrongfully interfere with familial relationships. Good faith and reasonable conduct are the necessary touchstones to any qualified privilege that may arise from any invited and religiously directed family counseling, assistance, or advice. Ill will. intimidation, threats, or reckless recommendation of family separation directed toward inalienating the spouses, where found to exist nullify the privilege and project liability.

69 Wn.2d at 544-45 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

While the tort of alienation of affections has been

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TRIAL BRIEF - 24

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abolished in this state, the principles of <u>Carrieri</u> remain. A religious leader does not by merely shouting "free exercise" acquire a right to encourage or practice seduction and adultery among his or her parishioners. The "good faith and reasonable conduct" which activates the privilege must be present.

Donald L. Barnett instituted a program that encouraged the practice of seduction and adultery among the various congregations of the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center. The practice of spiritual connections was, in practice as exemplified by Donald L. Barnett's conduct, nothing more than an excuse to practice the seduction and adultery with vulnerable members of his congregation. This licentious conduct was known to the hierarchy of the corporation. Far from discouraging this, the majority of the board of directors willingly participated in seduction and adultery while attempting to justify their actions under the rubric of the spiritual connection.

III. <u>CONCLUS</u>ION

Jack McDonald, Carol Gabrielson's pastor and counselor, was negligent in that he coerced Carol Gabrielson into a sexual relationship in the guise of legitimate counseling.

Jack McDonald was the agent of the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center due to the right of control retained by the corporation over the satellite church at which Jack

TRIAL BRIEF - 25

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McDonald was pastor.

Counseling was an activity encouraged by the corporation, which outlined the parameters of legitimate counseling and dictated those parameters to its satellite churches and pastors in the by-laws it provided for incorporation of its satellites.

The main corporation is responsible for the harm done to Carol and Ira Gabrielson because that harm is the result of legitimate corporate activities carried out by Jack McDonald in an inappropriate manner.

Donald L. Barnett and the hierarchy of the Community
Chapel and Bible Training Center were negligent in that they
abused their fiduciary position of trust and power by
encouraging the practice of seduction and adultery among the
congregations of the corporation in the guise of legitimate
religious activity.

DATED this _____ day of _____, 1988.

·	RUSH,	HANNULA	&	HARKINS
	By:			

DANIEL L. HANNULA, Of Attorneys for Plaintiffs

TRIAL BRIEF - 26

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EXHIBIT

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EXHIBIT

В

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR PIERCE COUNTY

GABRIELSON, husband and wife,

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL

NO. 86-2-02792-6

Plaintiffs,

ν.

TRIAL BRIEF

JACK McDONALD and "JANE DOE"
McDONALD, husband and wife;
COMMUNITY CHAPEL & BIBLE TRAINING
CENTER; et al.,

Defendants.

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The defendant Community Chapel & Bible Training Center of Burien submits this trial brief for the assistance of the court. A brief recitation of the facts relevant to the trial of the issues is followed by a discussion of the applicable law.

I. FACTS

The Community Chapel & Bible Training Center of Burien (hereinafter referred to as "the Burien church") was established in the late 1960's. It is a Christian, evangelic, pentecostal church. The Bible is the basis for all of the beliefs held by the Burien church. Don Barnett was the founder, original pastor, and spiritual leader of the church. He is still the pastor and spiritual leader of the church.

The Burien church is a corporation incorporated under the TRIAL BRIEF - 1

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laws of the State of Washington. The corporation includes a chapel, a Bible college, and a Christian school.

The Community Chapel & Bible Training Center at Tacoma (hereinafter referred to as "the Tacoma church") was affiliated with the Burien church. It is referred to as a "satellite church"; however, the Tacoma church is a separate corporation with no financial releationship to the Burien church. The Tacoma church started as a Bible fellowship and grew into a full church.

Jack McDonald was the original pastor of the Tacoma church. Jack McDonald is an ordained minister and he received his training at the Community Chapel & Bible College at Burien. Jack McDonald is a graduate of the Bible college.

The duties of any pastor of any Community Chapel which is affiliated with the Burien church include the typical sacraments of all ordained ministers. That is the pastor has the right and obligation to marry members of the church, preside at funerals, and assist members of the church with spiritual matters. Adultery, fornication, and other sexual relations outside of marriage are strictly forbidden.

"Spiritual connections" is a religious doctrine which arose in the Burien church. The doctrine is based on the belief that those who have accepted Jesus Christ as their personal savior are capable of personally experiencing God's love. "Spiritual connections" is an form of worship.

TRIAL BRIEF - 2

The of worship which became known as "spiritual connections" was not created by Pastor Barnett. Spiritual connections accounts, all spontaneous phenomena which arose among by а Throughout members of the church at Burien. Pastor Barnett's preachings regarding spiritual connections, he warned against the temptation to succumb physical, romantic and/or to sexual relationships. Although one was encouraged to "love thy neighbor", love which became physical, romantic and/or sexual was specifically prohibited.

Carol Gabrielson was raised in a pentecostal family.

Pentecostals believe in many supernatural events, including "speaking in tongues". Carol Gabrielson had the gift of speaking in tongues.

Carol Gabrielson was severely abused as a child.

These facts form the basis of a conflict between religion and psychiatric medicine. Carol Gabrielson and other witnesses will describe Gabrielson's reports of hearing voices, speaking in tongues, experiencing out of body experiences, and intense religious feelings. The non-medical witnesses will describe these experiences as manifestations of her deep and profound religious faith. Plaintiff's expert, Dr. Philip Lindsay, psychiatrist, will testify that these reports of Carol Gabrielson are all symptoms of psychiatric illness.

DOES THIS COURT INTEND TO PERMIT A JURY TO DECIDE WHETHER CAROL GABRIELSON HAD A RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE OR IS MERELY MENTALLY ILL?

TRIAL BRIEF - 3

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Carol Gabrielson left her parent's home at age 15 or 16, while in the tenth grade, to marry Ira who was about 23 years old at the time. The Gabrielsons raised a family of two daughters. Carol Gabrielson, in addition to raising a family, raised animals. Ira was a mechanic and worked hard to support his family.

Carol Gabrielson advises her therapists that she was sexually unhappy with Ira. She was apparently incapable of orgasm for the first fifteen years of her marriage. She began to read books and articles about sexual relations. She began to complain about Ira's sexual performance. Carol asked Ira to visit a sexual therapist and he refused.

Carol Gabrielson attended church in Puyallup called "The Upper Room". It was a pentecostal church. Carol would occasionally attend services at the Burien church. By 1985, the Burien church had grown substantially.

Carol began to attend services at the Tacoma church. She did not agree with some doctrines preached at the Tacoma church specifically related to "demon deliverance" and she left and returned to The Upper Room. It appears that, in 1985, notwithstanding her disagreement with certain of the theology preached at the Tacoma church she in any event returned to full time membership at the Tacoma church.

In mid-1985, the spiritual connection theology was developing. The spiritual connections form of worship included and dance and intense prayer. Carol was at first reductant to participate.

TRIAL BRIEF - 4

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because she felt inhibited. At first, she danced by herself alone, and then she began to dance with others. Ira did not like this form of worship at all. Carol began to dance with Pastor Jack McDonald.

Carol became increasingly rebellious to Ira's wishes. According to Ira, she stopped keeping house and cooking the meals to his satisfaction. Carol spent increasing amounts of time at church. Ira became jealous. Carol got mad. Carol moved out of Ira's house in October, 1985, and their legal separation commenced.

Carol Gabrielson fell in love with Jack McDonald. He apparently became infatuated with her also. Their relationship left the spiritual realm and became physical and sexual. Carol and Jack will testify they both knew it was sin and wrong and they both prayed for forgiveness. They told each other they had to stop. However, love conquers all.

Carol claims that, between October and December 1985, they had sexual intercourse fifty to sixty times. Jack McDonald says it was more like twenty. In any event, there is no dispute that their physical relationship was consummated in various places, including Carol's home, Jack's home, their friends' home, church and, at least one time, in a motel.

Carol Gabrielson says Jack McDonald tricked her into having sex during the course of a counselling relationship. Jack McDonald says she seduced him and that there was no counselling relationship between the two of them.

TRIAL BRIEF - 5

The facts appear to demonstrate a middle aged man having a sexual affair with a woman who had been unhappy in her marriage.

Around December 1985, Jack McDonaid broke off the relationship and Carol Gabrielson really got mag. She asked him to go with her and confess to Pastor Barnett. McDonald refused. Carol began threaten to expose him to his church. Jack McDonald disfellowshipped Carol Gabrielson from the Tacoma Community Chapel.

On March 6, 1986, Carol went to the Burien church for services. Somebody from the Tacoma church observed her and advised the Burien ushers that she had been disfellowshipped. Carol was asked to leave and she refused. She began to speak in a loud, vulgar, and obscene manner. She refused repeated requests to leave. Security guards were called and, when they approached her, she ran to the front of the church screaming. She was seized and forcibly removed. Carol was dragged kicking and screaming from the church premises:

Carol Gabrielson is now divorced and remarried and living in San Diego, California.

II. DISCUSSION

1. THE BURIEN CHURCH IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR JACK McDONALD'S ACTIVITIES.

Under the doctrine of respondent superior, the employer may only be held vacariously liable for acts of misconduct within they scope of the employment. Kyreacos v. Smith, 89 Wn.2d 425, 572 P.2d 723 (1977). John Does v. Comp Care, Inc., 51 Wn. App. 923 (1988) Under negligent supervision, the employer may be held liable for acts TRIAL BRIEF - 6

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beyond the scope of employment if the employer has prior knowledge of the dangerous tendencies of its employee. <u>LaLone v. Smith</u>, 39 Wn.2d 167, 234 P.2d 893, <u>John Does v. Comp Care</u>, <u>Inc.</u>, <u>Supra.</u> See also, <u>Doe</u> v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238, 60 A.L.R. 4th 225 (1986).

First, there is no evidence that Jack McDonald was an the Burien employee of church. Indeed, financial there is no relationship between the Burien church and the Tacoma church. Jack McDonald was employed only. Second, by the Tacoma church the undisputed evidence will be that the sexual relationship between Jack McDonald and Carol Gabrielson was specifically prohibited by the doctrines of the Burien church and these activities were, therefore, not within Jack McDonald's scope of duties as pastor of the Tacoma church. Third, there will be no evidence that Jack McDonald had any dangerous tendency and further, and more importantly, no evidence whatsoever that anybody at the Burien church had any prior knowledge indicating Jack McDonald may engage in sexual relations with a member of his church.

There is no factual basis to support plaintiff's claim of respondeat superior and it must, therefore be dismissed.

2. THE BURIEN CHURCH IS NOT LIABLE FOR CAROL GABRIELSON'S PERSONAL INJURIES, IF ANY, WHICH WERE CAUSED BY HER EJECTION FROM THE CHURCH ON MARCH 6, 1986.

Church services at the Burien church are not open to the public and, further, the services are held on private property. The Burien church is entitled to exclude from its premises any person it.

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so wishes to be excluded. The Burien church is free to associate or disassociate itself with and from any person it so desires.

The law is well settled that the proprietor of a place to which a person was invited may request one making a disturbance to leave and, upon non-compliance, the proprietor may use such force as is necessary to eject the disturber. Crouch v. Ringer, 110 Wash. 612 (1920), Austin v. Metropolitan Life, 106 Wash. 371, Huret v. Teufel, 62 Wn. 2d 761 (1963).

Once the ushers requested that Carol Gabrielson leave the church services, she had no right to be present. At the moment Carol Gabrielson refused to leave the premises when requested, the Burien church ushers were entitled to use as much force as was reasonably necessary to eject her from the premises.

Carol Gabrielson was not about to be removed from the premises and the security guards' exercise of force to effect the ejection was, under all circumstances, reasonable. Carol Gabrielson's claim for personal injuries arising out of her ejection from the Burien church on March 6, 1986 must be dismissed.

3. IRA GABRIELSON'S CLAIM FOR LOSS OF CONSORTIUM MUST BE DISMISSED.

In their ninth cause of action for loss of consortium, the Gabrielsons alleged that Pastor McDonald "took advantage of [Carol Carol Carol

This allegation is nearly identical to the plaintiff's TRIAL BRIEF - 8

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1 claim in Lund v. Caple, 100 Wn.2d 739, 675 P.2d 226 (1984), in which 2 3 4 5 6 7

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a husband asserted that the defendant pastor, during his counselling sessions with Mrs. Lund, had seduced her, causing the breakup of the Lunds' marriage. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed an order granting summary judgment in favor of the pastor on the ground that plaintiffs' cause of action was, in fact, a claim for alienation of, affections, a tort which had been abclished in Wyman v. Wallace, 94 Wn.2d 99, 615 P.2d 452 (1980).

Just as in Lund v. Caple, Supra., the Gabrielsons' cause of action for loss of consortium is, in fact, a claim for alienation of affections. The complaint alleges that "plaintiff Carol Gabrielson was coerced and unduly influenced into having a sexual relationship with defendant Jack McDonald." The claim rests upon (1) the fact of marriage, (2) adulterous intercourse, and (3) consequent breakup of the marriage. These are the essential elements of the abolished tort of alientation of affections. Lund v. Caple, Supra.

The Gabrielsons' cause of action for loss of consortium should be dismissed because it is, in essence, a claim for alienation of affections which is no longer a tort in the state of Washington.

4. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, THERE IS NO TORT "CREATING AN ATMOSPHERE" BECAUSE PASTOR BARNETT'S PREACHINGS AND THE RELIGIOUS DOCTRINE OF THE BURIEN CHURCH ARE ABSOLUTELY PROTECTED N BY CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE.

The free exercise clause the United States Constitution's First Amendment prohibits State from unduly

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TRIAL BRIEF - 9

burdening the free exercise of religion. Thus, the United States' Supreme Court has asserted that "in every case, the power to regulate [religious conduct must be exercised as not in attaining permissible end, in unduly to infringe the protected freedom [of the exercise of religion.]" Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). More recently, in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the court emphasized that "only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation."

There is no doubt that State tort law, whether statutory of common law, constitutes State action. The test, said the Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), "is not the form in which State power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised." In Paul v. Watch Tower Bible & Track Society of New York, No. 85-4012, Slip Opinion at 8 (9th Cir., June 10, 1987), the court stated:

Clearly, the application of tort law to activities of a church or its adherence in their furtherance of their religious belief is an exercise of State power. When imposition of liability would result in the abridgement of the right to free exercise of religious beliefs, recovery in tort is barred.

It is undisputed that the Community Chapel is a church and that Pastor Barnett's spiritual preachings were offered as a part of, and in furtherance of, the church's religious doctrine. Thus, by virtue of the First Amendment to both the State and Federals Constitutions, the Community Chapel is presumptively immune from tors suits with regard to the activitties challenged by the Gabrielsons.

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In Paul Watch Tower Bible & Track Society, the ν. appellant, a former member of the Jehovahs Witness Church, brought an action against the church, claiming the common law torts defamation, invasion of privacy, fraud and outrageous conduct. After her parents were "disfellowshipped" from the church, the plaintiff withdrew her membership and was "shunned" by church members.

The Court of Appeals affirmed an order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the ground that the church's "shunning activity", even if tortious, subject was constitutionally derived privilege which rendered it immune from most tort actions. In particular, the free exercise clause rendered the church immune from suits alleging intangible, emotional "Intangible or emotional harms cannot ordinarily serve as a basis for maintaining a tort cause of action against a church for its practices its members ... offence to someone's sensibility against resulting from religious conduct is simply not actionable in tort." Paul, at p. 11.

Society's interest in compensating persons for intangible harm is not sufficient to overcome the constitutional values embodied in the First Amendment. "Without society's tolerance of offences to sensibility, the protection of religious differences mandated by the First Amendment would be meaningless." Id.

Just as in the <u>Paul</u> decision, the Gabrielsons' claim of damage is not based upon allegations of physical assault. It is based upon allegations that the Community Chapel's practice of spiritual TRIAL BRIEF - 11

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amounted to the intentional infliction of emotional counselling distress. Gabrielson has not alleged sexual assault.

In Christofferson v. Church of Scientology of Portland, 57 Or. App. 203, 644 P.2d 577, 40 A.L.R. 4th 1017 (1982), the plaintiff was a former member of the defendant church, who sued the church for making allegedly fraudulent claims concerning the benefits The plaintiff argued that, because membership. these claims were offered to her on the secular basis of self-improvement, the First Amendment was not a bar to judicial inquiry into the validity of the claims.

The court rejected this argument, stressing that the free exercise clause required that the religious character of each of the allegedly fraudulent statements be evaluated in the context of the church's religious doctrine whole, rather isolation. as a than "Statements made by religious bodies must be viewed in the light of the doctrines of that religion. Courts may not sift through the teachings of a religion and pick out individual statements for scrutiny, deciding whether each standing alone is religious." Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, Id. In order to overcome the presumption of constitutional privileges, the plaintiff had to prove that the vocabulary of religion was merely "tacked on" to conceal wholly secular purpose. Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, Id.

The Gabrielsons' causes of action against the Burien church, should be dismissed because the courts are constitutionally barred from inquiring into the validity of the Burien church's theology.

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This court does not have jurisdiction to determine whether the Burien church and its doctrines are true religion.

DATED this 19 day of September, 1988.

LEE, SMART, COOK, MARTIN & PATTERSON, P.S., INC.

By Michael J. Bond

of Attorneys for Defendant Community Chapel & Bible Training Center of Burien

TRIAL BRIEF - 13

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EXHIBIT C

1988 S. 404 - 5 1988

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife,

VOL 369 PAGE 1245

Plaintiffs,

NO. 86-2-02792-6

-vs-

JACK McDONALD and SHIRLEY McDONALD, husband and wife;) COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE) TRAINING CENTER OF TACOMA; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRANING CENTER OF BURIEN,

Defendant



COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY

DATED:

INSTRUCTION NO. ____

It is your duty to determine the facts in this case from the evidence produced in court. It also is your duty to accept the law from the court, regardless of what you personally believe the law is or ought to be. You are to apply the law to the facts and in this way decide the case.

The order in which these instructions are given is not important. The attorneys may properly discuss any specific instructions they think are significant, but you should consider the instructions as a whole.

The evidence you are to consider consists of the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits offered and received. Disregard any evidence which was not admitted or which was stricken by the court.

In determining whether any matter has been proved, you should consider all of the evidence introduced on the question. Each party is entitled to the benefit of the evidence whether produced by him or another.

You are the sole judges of the believability of the witnesses and of what weight is to be given to the testimony of each. Take into account the opportunity and ability of the witness to observe, the witness' memory and manner while testifying, any interest, bias or prejudice the witness may have, the reasonableness of the testimony in light of all the

evidence, and any other factors that bear on believability and weight.

Lawyers' remarks, statements and arguments are intended to help you understand the evidence and apply the law. They are not evidence, however, and you should disregard any remark, statement or argument which is not supported by the evidence or the law being given to you.

The lawyers have the right and the duty to make objections. These should not influence you.

The law does not permit me to comment on the evidence, in any way, and I have not intentionally done so. If it appears to you that I have, disregard the comment.

Jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching a verdict. Each of you must decide the case for yourself after an impartial consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors. You should not hesitate to re-examine your views and change your opinion if you are convinced it is wrong. You should not surrender your honest belief solely because of the opinions of other jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.

You are officers of the court and must act impartially and with a sincere desire to determine the proper verdict.

Throughout your deliberations permit neither sympathy nor prejudice to influence you.

A witness who has special training, education or experience in a particular science or profession may be allowed to express an opinion in addition to giving testimony as to facts. He is called an expert witness. You are not bound by his opinion. In determining the weight to be given such opinion, you may consider the education, training, experience, knowledge and ability of that witness, the reasons given for his opinion, the sources of his information, and the factors already given you for evaluating the testimony of any other witness.

Evidence is of two kinds -- direct and circumstantial.

Direct evidence is that given by a witness who testified directly of his own knowledge concerning facts to be proved.

Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of facts or circumstances which according to common experience tends to indicate the truth of the fact sought to be proved.

One kind of evidence is not necessarily more valuable than the other.

You should decide the case of each defendant separately as if it were a separate lawsuit. Unless a specific instruction states that it applies to a specific defendant, the instructions apply to each defendant.

All parties are equal before the law whether they be a corporation, partnership or individual. Each is entitled to the same fair and unprejudiced treatment as any individual would be under like circumstances.

The plaintiffs in this case are Carol Gabrielson and Ira Gabrielson. The plaintiffs claim that defendant Jack McDonald, while in his capacity as pastor of the defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Tacoma and, at the same time as an agent of the defendant corporation, Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Burien was negligent as Carol Gabrielson's pastor, or counselor, or both, in his actions towards Carol Gabrielson.

The plaintiffs claim that Jack McDonald's negligence was a proximate cause of psychological and emotional injuries, resulting in medical and psychiatric treatment and which may require medical and psychiatric treatment in the future.

The plaintiff Carol Gabrielson claims that Jack McDonald defamed her and that such defamation was a proximate cause of psychological and emotional injuries, resulting in medical and psychiatric treatment and which may require medical and psychiatric treatment in the future.

The plaintiff Carol Gabrielson claims that she was assaulted, battered and falsely imprisoned by agents of the defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Burien, proximately causing physical, psychological and emotional injuries resulting in medial and psychiatric treatment and which may require medical and psychiatric treatment in the future.

Ira Gabrielson claims that the injuries caused Carol

Gabrielson by the defendant resulted in a loss of his wife's companionship, services, and society during their marriage.

The plaintiffs claim that defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center corporation of Burien is legally responsible for the assault, battery and false imprisonment, and for Jack McDonald's acts toward Carol Gabrielson and the damage claimed to have been the result.

Defendan't Jack and Shirley McDonald deny plaintiff's factual allegations and claims of negligence. Defendants McDonald and the Community Chapel of Tacoma also deny the nature and extent of plaintiff's damages and allege plaintiff's claims for damages bear no relationship to her association with the defendants. Defendant McDonald denies he was acting as agent for the Community Chapel of Burien.

Defendant Community Chapel of Burien denies all of plaintiff's claims. Community Chapel of Burien also denies the nature and extent of plaintiff's damages.

Defendants McDonald, The Community Chapel of Tacoma and defendant Community Chapel of Burien raise as affirmative defenses the following claims:

Plaintiffs' contributory negligence was a proximate cause of damages to Carol and Ira Gabrielson.

That Carol Gabrielson assumed the risk of emotional harm by entering into a sexual relationship with Jack McDonald.

Community Chapel of Burien also raises as an affirmative defense the following claim with respect to the events of

March 6, 1986:

That the Community Chapel was entitled to use and did use as much force as was reasonably necessary to remove Carol Gabrielson from the premises.

The plaintiffs deny these claims.

Each party has the burden of proof of each of their claims by a preponderance of the evidence, and that damage, if any, was a proximate cause of such conduct.

instruction no. \$\frac{1}{2}

The foregoing is merely a summary of the claims of the parties. You are not to take the same as proof of the matters claimed; and you are to consider only those matters which are established by the evidence. These claims have been outlined solely to aid you in understanding the issues.

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When it is said that a party has the burden of proof on any proposition, or that any proposition must be proved by a "preponderance" of the evidence, or the expression "if you find" is used, it means that you must be persuaded, considering all the evidence in the case, that the proposition on which that party has the burden of proof is more probably true than not true.

The term "proximate cause" means a cause which in a direct sequence, unbroken by any new independent cause, produces the injury complained of and without which such injury would not have happened.

There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury.

Negligence is the failure to exercise ordinary care. It is the doing of some act which a reasonably careful person would not do under the same or similar circumstances or the failure to do something which a reasonably careful person would have done under the same or similar circumstances.

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INSTRUCTION NO. 11

Ordinary care means the care a reasonably careful person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances.

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instruction no. $\bot 2$

Counselor negligence or malpractice is the failure to exercise that degree of care, skill or learning expected of a reasonably prudent counselor at that time in the State of Washington acting in the same or similar circumstances.

instruction no. 3

Pastoral negligence or malpractice is the failure to exercise that degree of care, skill or learning expected of a reasonably prudent pastor at that time in the State of Washington in the same or similar circumstances.

An assault is an attempt, with unprivileged force, to inflict bodily injuries on another, accompanied with the apparent present ability to effectuate the attempt if not prevented, the apprehension created in the mind of the assaulted person being more important in determining whether there was an assault than the undisclosed intention of the assaulter.

One commits a battery if he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of another, or imminent apprehension of such a contact and such harmful contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results.

A bodily contact is offensive if it offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity.

INSTRUCTION NO. _\(\lambda_\)

False imprisonment is the unprivileged intentional violation of a person's right of personal liberty or unprivileged intentional restraint of that person.

A person is imprisoned or restrained when he is deprived of either liberty of movement or freedom to remain in a place of her lawful choice and such imprisonment or restraint may be accomplished by physical force alone, or by threat of force, or by conduct reasonably implying that force will be used. Ira Gabrielson has sued Jack McDonald and the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center claiming loss of consortium. Loss of consortium is the separate cause of action of one spouse for the separate injury to that spouse suffered as a consequence of injuries inflicted upon the other spouse, resulting in a loss of love, affection, care, services, companionship and society during their marriage.

An agent is acting within the scope of authority if the agent is engaged in the performance of duties which were expressly or impliedly assigned to the agent by the principal or which were expressly or impliedly required by the contract of employment. Likewise, an agent is acting within the scope of authority if the agent is engaged in the furtherance of the principal's interests.

The proprietor of a place to which a person was invited may request one making a disturbance to leave and, upon non-compliance, may use such force as is reasonably necessary to eject the disturber.

The proprietor of a place to which a person was not invited may request such person to leave and, upon non-compliance, may use such force as is reasonably necessary to accomplish removal.

instruction no. 21

Members of the security department of the Community
Chapel and Bible Training Center, and those acting at their
direction, were agents of the defendant Community Chapel and
Bible Training Center and, therefore, any act or omission of
any member of the security department, and those acting at
their direction, was the act or omission of the defendant
Community Chapel and Bible Training Center.

instruction no. 28

The Washington State Constitution, Article One, Section 11, states in part:

Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief and worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one shall be molested or disturbed in person or property on account of religion; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state.

VOL 369 PAGE 1276

instruction no. 29

You are instructed that plaintiff may not recover any damages from either Community Chapel for any emotional distress caused to Carol Gabrielson as a result of being disfellowshiped from the Community Chapel.

instruction no. 3/

It is the duty of the court to instruct you as to the measure of damages. By instructing you on damages, the court does not mean to suggest for which party your verdict should be rendered.

If your verdict is for the plaintiff Carol Gabrielson, you must determine the amount of money required to reasonably and fairly compensate her for the total amount of damages. If you find for the plaintiff Carol Gabrielson, you should consider the following elements:

- The nature and extent of the injuries;
- 2. The disability experienced and with reasonable probability to be experienced in the future;
- 3. The pain and suffering, both mental and physical, experienced and with reasonable probability to be experienced in the future;
- 4. The reasonable value of necessary treatment and services received and those with reasonable probability to be required in the future;
 - 5. The loss of enjoyment of life.

If you find for the plaintiff Ira Gabrielson, you must determine the amount of money required to reasonably and fairly compensate the plaintiff Ira Gabrielson for the total amount of damages. If you find for the plaintiff Ira Gabrielson, you should consider the following elements:

Loss to plaintiff Ira Gabrielson of love, affection, care,

· services, companionship, society and consortium of his wife, during their marriage.

The total amount of damages so determined is the figure which will be reduced by the percentage of plaintiff's contributory negligence, if any.

The burden of proving damages rests with the plaintiff and it is for you to determine whether any particular element has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence.

Your award must be based upon evidence and not upon speculation, guess or conjecture.

Your decision should not be influenced by sympathy or by prejudice.

The law has not furnished us with any fixed standards by which to measure pain, suffering, or disability. With reference to these matters, you must be governed by your own judgment, by the evidence in the case, and by these instructions.

According to mortality tables, the average expectancy of life of a female aged thirty-eight (38) years is 40.20 years. This one factor is not controlling, but should be considered in connection with all the other evidence bearing on the same question, such as that pertaining to the health, habits, and activity of the person whose life expectancy is in question.

If you find that before this occurrence the plaintiff had a pre-existing bodily condition which was causing pain or disability, and further find that because of this occurrence the condition or the pain or the disability was aggravated, then if your verdict is in favor of the plaintiff, you should consider the aggravation of the condition or the pain or disability proximately due to such aggravation, but you should not consider any condition or disability which may have existed prior to the occurrence or from which plaintiff may now be suffering which was not caused or contributed to by reason of the occurrence.

instruction no. 34

Upon retiring to the jury room for your deliberation of this case, your first duty is to select a foreman to act as chairman. It is his or her duty to see that discussion is carried on in a sensible and orderly fashion, that the issues submitted for your decision are fully and fairly discussed, and that every juror has a chance to be heard and to participate in the deliberations upon each question before the jury.

You will be furnished with all of the exhibits admitted in evidence, these instructions and a special verdict form which consists of several questions for you to answer. It is necessary that you answer each of the questions unless the questions themselves specifically provide otherwise. You should answer the questions in the order in which they are asked as your answers to some of them will determine whether you are to answer all, or only some, or none of the others. Accordingly, it is important that you read the questions carefully and that you follow the directions set forth.

This being a civil case, ten of your number may agree upon the answer to a question. Any ten jurors may agree

upon the answer to any question. The same ten jurors must agree upon the answers to all questions. Whether the foreman is one of the ten or not, the foreman will sign the verdict and announce your agreement to the bailiff who will conduct you into the court to declare your verdict.

JUDGE

Defamation is the utterance of false statements of fact, rather than opinion, about another person, knowing that the statements are false, or in reckless disregard of the truth, or when the exercise of reasonable care would have produced knowledge of the falsity.

Contributory negligence is negligence or fault on the part of a person claiming injury or damage which is a proximate cause of the injury or damage complained of.

If you find contributory negligence, you must determine the degree of such negligence, expressed as a percentage, attributable to the person claiming such injury or damage. The court will furnish you a special verdict form for this purpose. Your answers to the questions in the special verdict form will furnish the basis by which the court will reduce the amount of any damages you find to have been sustained by a party who was contributorily negligent, by the percentage of such contributory negligence. Using 100% as the total combined negligence of the parties which contributed to the injury or damage to the plaintiff, you must determine what percentage of such negligence is attributable to the plaintiff.

This instruction does not apply to plaintiff's claims for defamation, assault, battery or false imprisonment.

A person who fully understands a risk of harm to herself and who voluntarily submits to such risk under circumstances which manifest her willingness to assume the risk is not entitled to recover for harm within that risk.

This affirmative defense and instruction is not applicable to the claim of defamation.

Regarding the allegations against Jack McDonald, the defendant Corporation of Community Chapel and Bible Training Center is sued as the principal and the defendant Jack McDonald as the agent.

If you find that the defendant Jack McDonald was the agent of the defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center and was acting within the scope of authority, and if you find Jack McDonald is liable, then both are liable. If you do not find that Jack McDonald is liable, then neither defendant is liable.

If you find that the defendant Jack McDonald is liable but do not find that he was acting as an agent of the defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center, or if you find that he was acting outside the scope of his authority as an agent of the defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center then the defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center is not liable.

 $\mathsf{VOL}\,369\,\,\mathsf{PAGE}\,1270$

INSTRUCTION NO. 23

Any act or omission of an agent within the scope of authority is the act or omission of the principal, and both are responsible and liable for damage, if any.

An agent is a person employed under an express or implied agreement to perform services for another called the principal, and who is subject to the principal's control or right to control the manner and means of performing the services.

EXHIBIT

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE,

IRA GABRIELSON and GABRIELSON, husband	CAROL and wife,))	
	Plaintiffs ,) NO.	86-2-02792-6
-vs-			
JACK McDONALD and S McDONALD, husband a COMMUNITY CHAPEL AN TRAINING CENTER OF COMMUNITY CHAPEL AN TRAINING CENTER OF	nd wife; D BIBLE TACOMA; D BIBLE	VERD	ICT FORM
QUESTION NO. 1:	McDonard, fr	nat wa plain	ce by the defendant, Jack s a proximate cause of tiff, Carol Gabrielson? (Yes or No)
	question 2;	red "ye if vour	es" to question 1, answer answer to question 1 was 2 and answer question 3.
QUESTION NO. 2:	MCDONAIG, CO	mmitted of Comi	acts of defendant, Jack while he was acting as munity Chapel and Bible Burien?
	Answer: \sqrt{e}	<u>.</u>	(Yes or No)
	Answer Questi	on 3.	

QUESTION NO. 3:

Did the defendant, Jack McDonald, defame the plaintiff, Carol Gabrielson, which was a proximate cause of injury to her?

Answer: $\frac{\sqrt{e}}{\sqrt{1 + e}}$ (Yes or No)

If you answered "yes" to question 3, answer

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question 4; if you answered "no" to question 3, skip to question 5.

QUESTION NO. 4:

In defaming Carol Gabrielson, was defendant, Jack McDonald, acting as an agent for the defendant corporation of Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Burien?

Answer: <u>es</u> (Yes or No)

Answer question 5.

QUESTION NO. 5:

Did the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center assault, batter or falsely imprison plaintiff, Carol Gabrielson, proximately causing injury to her?

Answer: $\frac{100}{100}$ (Yes or No)

If all answers are no, stop here and notify court. Answer question 6 only if you answered "yes" to question 1.

QUESTION NO. 6:

As a result of the injuries suffered by Carol Gabrielson, did plaintiff, Ira Gabrielson, suffer a loss of consortium?

Answer: $\frac{\sqrt{e_5}}{\sqrt{e_5}}$ (Yes or No)

Answer question 7.

QUESTION NO. 7:

If your answer to questions 1, 3, or 5 was "yes," what is the total amount of the plaintiff, Carol Gabrielson's damages?

\$ 200,000,00

If your answer to question 6 was "yes," answer question 8.

QUESTION NO. 8:

What is the total amount of plaintiff, Ira Gabrielson's, damages?

\$<u>20,000</u>.

Answer Questions 9 and 10 only if you answered "yes" to Question 1.

QUESTION NO 9:

Was there any contributory negligence by Carol Gabrielson which was the proximate cause of injury or damage to her?

	Answer: /es (Yes or No)
	Answer question 10 only if you answered "yes" to question 9. If "no," proceed to question 11.
QUESTION NO. 10:	Using 100% as the total combined negligence of all the parties which contributed to the injury or damage to the plaintiff, Carol Gabrielson, what percentage of such contributory negligence is attributable to her?
	Answer: <u>35</u> %
	Answer Questions 11 and 12 only if you answered "yes" to Question 6.
QUESTION NO. 11:	Was there contributory negligence by Ira Gabrielson which was a proximate cause of his own damages?
	Answer: Yes or No)
	Answer question 12 only if you answered "yes" to question 11.
QUESTION NO. 12:	Using 100% as the total combined negligence of all the parties which contributed to the injury or damage to the plaintiff, Ira Gabrielson, what percentage of such contributory negligence is attributable to him?
	Answer:%

F O R E M A N

EXHIBIT

E

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife,

Plaintiffs.

NO. 86-2-02792-6

vs.

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JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT

JACK McDONALD and "JANE DOE" McDONALD, husband and wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER OF TACOMA; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER.

Defendants.

THIS MATTER having come on regularly for trial

commencing September 12, 1988 and concluding October 28, 1988, and it appearing to the court that a jury of twelve (12) having been duly selected and impaneled, evidence and testimony having been presented, the court having considered motions and arguments during the course of trial, and the court having duly and properly instructed the jury and the jury having duly rendered its verdict by answering special

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LAW OFFICES

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

715 TACOMA AVENUE SOUTH

TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98402

TACOMA 383-5388 **SEATTLE 838-4790**

JUDGMENT - 1

herein by reference as if fully set forth, and the jury having returned its verdict into court and having found for plaintiff Carol Gabrielson and against defendants Jack McDonald, Shirley McDonald, the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Tacoma, and the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Burien on the issues of negligence and defamation in the sum of Two Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$200,000.00), and the jury having further decided that plaintiff Carol Gabrielson was thirty-five percent (35%) contributorily negligent, and the jury further having returned its verdict finding for plaintiff Ira Gabrielson and against defendant Jack McDonald, Shirley McDonald, Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Tacoma, and Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Burien on the issue of loss of consortium in the sum of Twenty Thousand Dollars (\$20,000.00), having further decided that plaintiff Ira Gabrielson was fifteen percent (15%) contributorily negligent, and the court having considered the records and files herein, and that no post-trial motions have heretofore been made in this matter, and the court being fully advised and considering the cost bill filed by plaintiff in the sum ___, the court finds that plaintiffs are entitled to costs in the sum of \$988.91. It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment herein

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JUDGMENT - 3

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entered on behalf of the plaintiff Carol Gabrielson by the jury was duly regular and proper in the sum of Two Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$200,000.00), less Seventy-Thousand Dollars (\$70,000.00) for plaintiff Carol Gabrielson's contributory fault, and that the same is hereby entered and that a net judgment of the sum of One Hundred Thirty Thousand Dollars (\$130,000.00) in favor of plaintiff Carol Gabrielson be and the same is hereby entered, and it is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment herein entered on behalf of the plaintiff Ira Gabrielson by the jury was duly regular and proper in the sum of Twenty Thousand Dollars (\$20,000.00) less Three Thousand Dollars for plaintiff Ira Gabrielson's contributory fault, and that the same is hereby entered and that a net judgment of the sum of Seventeen Thousand Dollars (\$17,000.00) in favor of plaintiff Ira Gabrielson be and the same is hereby rendered and entered, and it is further,

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that costs in the amount of $\frac{988.91}{}$ are awarded to the plaintiffs and judgment for the same be and hereby is rendered and entered.

JUDGMENT SUMMARY

Judgment for plaintiff Carol Gabrielson:

\$<u> 130,000.06</u>

Judgment for plaintiff Ira Gabrielson:

\$ 17,000.00

Costs:

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JUDGMENT - 4

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715 TACOMA AVENUE SOUTH TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98402 TACOMA 383-5388 SEATTLE 838-4790

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL

GABRIELSON, husband and wife,

Plaintiffs,

NO. 86-2-02792-6

VS.

COST BILL

JACK McDONALD and "JANE DOE"

McDONALD, husband and wife;

COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE

TRAINING CENTER OF TACOMA;

COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE

TRAINING CENTER,

Defendants.

STATE OF WASHINGTON)
COUNTY OF PIERCE)

DANIEL L. HANNULA, being first duly sworn, upon oath, deposes and says:

I am one of the attorneys representing the plaintiffs Carol Gabrielson and Ira Gabrielson in the above-entitled cause of action. The following is a true and accurate bill of costs and disbursements incurred herein:

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COST BILL - 1

LAW OFFICES

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

715 TACOMA AVENUE SOUTH

TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98402

TACOMA 383-5388 SEATTLE 435 4790

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_	Filing fee	\$	70.00	
. 2	Service fees:	*	, , ,	
3	Jack McDonald and Shirley McDonald		27.00	
4	Community Chapel and Bible Training Center		27.00	
5	or racoma		12.00	
6	of Burien		62.50	
7	Jury fee			
8	Statutory attorney fee		50.00	
9	Medical records submitted as exhibits at trial		125.00	
10	Good Samaritan Mental Health records	:		
11	Deposition costs:		45.00	
12	Dr. Cutner			
13	Dr. Wedgewood		61.05	
14	Shirley McDonald		37.95	
15	Jack McDonald		89.25	
16		_	409.16	
17	TOTAL COSTS	\$	988.91	
18				
19	DANIEL L. HANNU	ILA		
I	STOVED AND COLORS			
20	<u> </u>	y o	£	
20	SIGNED AND SWORN to before me this 23 da 1988.	y o	Ē	
	November, 1988.			
21	November, 1988. NOTARY/PUBLIC in and State of Washington	110 for	Podge Os	•
21	November, 1988. [5] Harold.	110 for	Podge Os	•

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COST BILL - 2

LAW OFFICES

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

715 TACOMA AVENUE SOUTH
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TACOMA 383-5388
SEATTLE 838-4790

·1 [STATE OF WASHINGT SS	
	The undersigned, being first duly sworn, on eath,	or A
	states: That on this day, affiant HAD DELIVER	ED 'a.
	to the attorneys of record of PIRIN DEEFNO a copy of the document to which this affidavit is attached.	J.V. DEC 0
1	Bleature markan	FILED
2	Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of	IN COUNTY CLERK'S OFFICE
	K. Rowley	am. DEC 1 1269 p.m.
3	Notary Public in and for the State of Washington	PIENL RUTT COUNTY CLASS
4	My commission expires 3/9/90.	BYOEPUTY
5		/
6		
7	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF	THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
-	IN AND FOR THE C	OUNTY OF PIERCE
8	•	
9	AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF)	
, ,	READING PENNSYLVANIA, a)	
10	Pennsylvania corporation,)	
11)	NO. 88-2-00947-9
	Plaintiff,)	
12	<u>)</u>	DEFENDANTS GABRIELSON'S
ŀ	, vs.	MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
13	(TD) GIPPIEI GOV and GIPOI	TO PLAINTIFF'S JURY DEMAND AND MOTION FOR STAY OF
	IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL) GABRIELSON, husband and wife;)	EXECUTION
14	DONALD LEE BARNETT and	EXECUTION
15	BARBARA BARNETT, husband and)	
10	wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND)	
16	BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a)	
_ `	Washington corporation, JACK)	
17	McDONALD and "JANE DOE")	
	McDONALD, husband and wife,)	
18	Defendants.)	
19	Defendancs:)	
os	I. F	ACTS
21	<u>- · · -</u>	
H	The Gabrielsons have enter	ed a judgment on jury verdic
22	in their favor in the underlyin	ng action, <u>Gabrielson et ux.</u>

ury verdict on et ux. v. Community Chapel and Bible Training Center, Jack McDonald, Shirley McDonald, and the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Tacoma, in the amount of

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MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION - 1



J.V. DEC 0 2 1003

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\$147,998.91. See Exhibit E to the Affidavit of Harold T. Dodge, Jr. submitted herewith.

American Casualty, plaintiff in this declaratory action, has filed a demand for a jury in the declaratory action and a request to stay the Gabrielsons from executing on their judgment in the underlying action.

Defendants Gabrielson oppose both plaintiff's jury demand and its request for a stay of execution in the underlying action.

II. LAW AND LEGAL ARGUMENT

A. JURY TRIAL IS INAPPROPRIATE IN THIS
DECLARATORY ACTION BECAUSE PLAINTIFF IS
COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED FROM RETRYING FACTUAL
ISSUES DECIDED BY THE JURY IN THE UNDERLYING
ACTION.

Where an insurer's interests are in harmony with its insured's interests, collateral estoppel binds an insurer to factual determinations made in a prior liability action against the insured:

Collateral estoppel can bind an insurer to factual determinations made in a prior liability action against the insured in a subsequent declaratory judgment action to The court in determine coverage issues. Finney v. Farmers Insurance Company, 21 Wn.App. 601, 586 P.2d 519 (1978), aff'd, 92 Wn.2d 748, 600 P.2d 1272 (1979) state the general rule that when an insurer has notice of an action and an opportunity to participate, it is bound by any judgment against its insured on liability questions, and barred by any material finding of fact that is essential to the liability judgment and also is decisive of coverage under an insurance policy. Finney, 21 Wn.App. at 716.

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TACOMA 383-5388

Application of the aforementioned principles of collateral estoppel against a liability insurer is justifiable, however, only when the insurer's interests are in harmony with the insured's interests. When the insurer has the same interests as the insured in disputing liability and damage issues, it is fair to treat the insurer as a party for collateral estoppel purposes.

Wear v. Farmers Insurance Company, 49 Wn. App. 655, 659-60.

The plaintiff's interests and the interests of its insured were in harmony in the underlying case on the only coverage issue left for consideration in this declaratory action--agency.

This court has previously decided in a summary judgment motion brought by the plaintiff that plaintiff's bodily injury coverage includes coverage for the emotional and psychological damages resulting from any unauthorized invasion of Carol Gabrielson's person.

Also, this court has previously decided, in a summary judgment motion brought by the Gabrielsons, that acts of professional negligence by plaintiff's insured or its agents are covered under the policy of insurance in question in this declaratory action.

The court did not rule on whether or not Jack McDonald was an agent of the Community Chapel an Bible Training Center.

In the underlying action, the issue whether plaintiff's

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION - 3

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

715 TACOMA AVENUE SOUTH
TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98402
TACOMA 383-5388
SEATTLE 838-4790

insured was liable for damages to Carol Gabrielson depended entirely upon whether Jack McDonald was found to be the Community Chapel's agent. Plaintiff's interests and those of its insured were in complete harmony on the issue of If Jack McDonald had been found not to be the Community Chapel's agent, then the Community Chapel would have borne no liability and the plaintiffs would have no There could be no liability and no coverage coverage. unless agency was shown to exist.

At Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Harold T. Dodge, Jr. submitted in conjunction with this Memorandum, is the Trial Brief of the plaintiffs in the underlying action demonstrating plaintiffs' agency theory. At Exhibit B to the Affidavit of Harold T. Dodge, Jr. submitted in conjunction with this Memorandum is the Trial Brief of Community Chapel and Bible Training Center submitted in the underlying action showing its position that Jack McDonald was not an agent of the Community Chapel and Bible Training At Exhibit C to the Affidavit of Harold T. Dodge, Center. Jr. submitted in conjunction with this Memorandum are the court's instructions to the jury in the underlying action, which include instructions on agency. At Exhibit D to the Affidavit of Harold T. Dodge, Jr. submitted in conjunction with this Memorandum is the special verdict form submitted to the jury in the underlying action, along with the answers //// LAW OFFICES

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION - 4

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as provided by the jury.

As may be gathered from a review of the exhibits to the Affidavit of Harold T. Dodge, Jr., the issue whether Jack McDonald was Community Chapel and Bible Training Center's agent was squarely at issue and hotly contested at trail. The precise issue was submitted to the jury and the jury answered unequivocally, that Jack McDonald was Community Chapel and Bible Training Center's agent. Because the precise issue of agency was determined by the jury in the underlying action, plaintiff in this declaratory action is collaterally estopped from relitigating the question of agency in this declaratory action.

Because no questions of fact remain to be determined in this declaratory matter, the plaintiff is not entitled to a jury trial on any issue.

At the very least, if the plaintiff is to have a jury trial, he should demonstrate to the court and to the other parties to this action what, if any, issues of fact it believes exist to be tried in the declaratory action.

B. THE COURT SHOULD NOT GRANT A STAY OF EXECUTION.

The defendants Gabrielson have entered a judgment on the jury's verdict in their favor in the underlying action. The Community Chapel and Bible Training Center, a defendant found to be liable in the underlying action, has assets in excess of \$12

LAW OFFICES

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TACOMA 383-5388

Million Dollars. Community Chapel and Bible Training Center's

the court stay the Gabrielson's execution on their judgment in

the underlying action. No stay is appropriate in this case.

Bible Training Center has assets in excess of \$12 Million

forces its client to pay is a matter for dispute between the

plaintiff insurance company and its insured, Community Chapel

insurer, the plaintiff in this declaratory action, proposes that

The defendants Gabrielson believe that Community Chapel and

It is immaterial to the Gabrielsons who pays their

Whether the insurance company pays or whether it

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MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION - 6

and Bible Training Center.

715 TACOMA AVENUE SOUTH TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98402 TACOMA 383-5388

SEATTLE 838-4790

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is not the Gabrielsons' concern and the extra delay and harassment inherent in a stay of execution should not be visited upon the Gabrielsons merely because the insurance company wants to argue about who should pay the judgment.

If the court is inclined to grant a stay of execution, then the Gabrielsons request that the court order that plaintiff post a cash bond for the amount of the Gabrielsons' judgment in the underlying action (\$147,998.91) plus interest at 12% per annum for a period of twelve months (\$17,759.86) in accordance with RCW 7.24.190.

III. CONCLUSION

The insurance company's request for jury trial should be denied because it has not demonstrated any issue of fact for which a jury trial is available in accordance with RCW 7.24.

The insurance company's request for a stay of execution in the underlying action should be denied, but if granted, the insurance company should be ordered to post a cash bond in the amount of \$165,758.77 in accordance with RCW 7.24.190 to secure the Gabrielsons' judgment in the underlying action during the pendency of this declaratory action.

DATED this 3 Ohday of November 1988.

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

е вл:

ANIEL L. HARKINS

Attorneys for Defendants

Gabrielson

LAW OFFICES

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

715 TACOMA AVENUE SOUTH
TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98402

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MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION - 7

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FILED IN COUNTY CLERK'S OFFICE

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PIEROE TED RUTY, COUNTY CLERK \angle DEPUTY

SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR PIERCE COUNTY

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Pennsylvania corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife; DONALD LEE BARNETT, husband and wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a Washington Corporation, JACK McDONALD and "JANE DOE" McDONALD. husband and wife,

Defendants.

88-2-00947-9 No.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STAY EXECUTION

American Casualty has requested that this court grant an order staying execution on the judgment obtained by Gabrielson on the underlying action pending resolution of the declaratory American Casualty presumes that the church will join action. in this motion although it has been unsuccessful in its attempts to contact the church's counsel to discuss this point.

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The court has an inherent equitable power to stay execution on a judgment "when the demands of justice to all parties can be reasonably satisfied" only by such a stay. Paglia v. Breskovich, 11 Wn.App. 142 522 P.2d 511 (1974). The reason it would be unjust to permit execution on Gabrielson's judgment at this time is that it would place American CAsualty and the church in an untenable position. If American Casualty obtains a supersedeas bond in order to permit the church to pursue an appeal, and that appeal is unsuccessful, then American may be placed in a position of conceding coverage if it is forced to collateralize that bond with its own quarantee. American would in effect be denied the right to a trial on the coverage issue in the event of an appeal. American does have a right at some point to have its declaratory action heard before undertaking defense obligations. Tank v. State Farm, 105 Wn.2d 381, 391, 715 P.2d 1123 (1986).

Accordingly, American requests that the court issue an order staying execution on Gabrielson's judgment until such time as related coverage questions are resolved.

DATED this $\sqrt{27}$ day of December, 1988.

LANE POWELL MOSS & MILLER

Bruce Winchell

Attorneys for Plaintiff

		■.	IN OPEN COURT
SUPERIOR COURT OF WA	ASHINGTON - C	OUNTY OF PIERC	DEC - 2 1988 Pierce County Clerk
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anciean Casualty		_	
Plaintiff/Petitioner	, CASE N	10. <u>88-2-</u>	00947-9
vs. Sabuelon Defendant/Respondent	Assignm Trial Da	ent of Trial Date (Nent of Hearing Date te Continuance (OR Date Continuance ((NTHG) [] (CTD)
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Assignment/Continuance of Trial/Hearing Date (LPCR 10) Z-2378		AL ASSISTANT	
in person)			

SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON - COUNTY OF PIERCE

American Casualty Plaintiff/Petitioner,	CASE NO.	88-2-	00947-9
vs. Sabuelaore Defendant/Respondent.	Assignment Trial Date (t of Trial Date (t of Hearing Dat Continuance (O te Continuance	te (NTHG) RCTD)
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Assignment/Continuance of Trial/Hearing Date (LPCR 10) 2-2378 Coursel - Lea Belson		ASSISTANT	

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY of READING, PENNSYLVANIA,

Plaintiff,

VS

IRA GABRIELSON, et ux, et al,

Defendants.

ORIGINAL

No: 88-2-00947-9

ORAL DECISION ED

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BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 15th day of April, 1988, the following proceedings were held before the Honorable J. KELLY ARNOLD, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Washington, in and for the County of Pierce, sitting in Department 9.

The Plaintiff was represented by their attorney, BRUCE WINCHELL;

The Defendants were represented by their attorneys, DANIEL HANNULA, TIMOTHY DONALDSON;

WHEREUPON, the following proceedings were had, to wit:

CATHERINE M. VERNON & ASSOCIATES

COURT REPORTERS 318-19TH AVENUE S.E. PUYALLUP, WASHINGTON 98371

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PROCEEDINGS

(April 15, 1988)

with the Easy Loader case and, Mr. Winchell, I disagree with your position that that stands for the proposition to support your motion in this case. It is a case where there was no physical contact, and I believe that language that I just cited presupposes from the other language in the case that that's inferentially part of that language.

With regard to the question of whether or not the Court should grant-- whether we call it a partial summary judgment or 12(b) motion-- the Court is going to deny it. I'm denying it on the basis that I don't believe the cases cited by the plaintiff insurance company support the proposition that consequential damages arising out of the kind of conduct alleged are not covered. And secondly but certainly not primarily, and my decision doesn't turn on this, and I perhaps don't even need to say this because I suppose my ruling would be the same either way, but if I had any doubt about my position that I have already expressed, which I don't, I would be concerned about the fact that the motion comes on a Monday before trial I think that flies in the face in the underlying case.

of the orderly processing of litigation and the rights of all parties to have their cases disposed of.

It may well be, and I certainly don't take issue,
Mr. Winchell, with the fact there was a long dry spell.
I don't know about that. But I will accept that in
terms of discovery, but the issues that you have asked
the Court to consider are those that were set forth
in the pleadings. The pleadings have been available
from the outset. The Court, although there perhaps
have been some amendments along the way, the Court
on that basis will deny the motion.

I'm sure you are going to ask, because I haven't specifically addressed the issue of Mr. Gabrielson's claim and how that fits into all of this. I frankly think that's a closer question, but I'm not satisfied that the Buchannon case and the Easy Loader case, when read in conjunction with one another, really address this situation. I think the facts were different. I think the context in which the issue arose, given the nature of the coverage, was different. On that basis the Court will deny both prongs of the motion.

MR. WINCHELL: Your Honor, just a clarification on your ruling. I take it the denial of the motion at this stage is without prejudice for us to go conduct our discovery and come back, at least as to sexual

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activity claim, and to then address the question of whether those sexual activities, absent some other discernable injury, constitutes a bodily injury to the policy? THE COURT: Well, certainly it's not appropriate for the Court to make factual determinations about what happened in ruling on a motion such as this. If we do that, the Court literally would have to try the underlying case in this case, and that's not why we are here. The ruling would be without prejudice to have the Court recover your position as discovery progresses. MR. WINCHELL: Thank you, your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you all, counsel. (Motion concluded)



FILED IN COUNTY CLERK'S OFFICE

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BY______DEPUTY

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SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR PIERCE COUNTY

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Pennsylvania corporation,

Plaintiff,

NO. 88-2-00947-9

v.

MOTION TO STRIKE NOVEMBER 22, 1988 AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE WINCHELL

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife; DONALD LEE BARNETT, husband and wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a Washington corporation, JACK McDONALD and "JANE DOE" McDONALD, husband and wife,

Defendants.

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Comes Now the Defendant, Community Chapel and Bible Training Center ("Community Chapel"), and moves the court for an Order striking the November 22, 1988 Affidavit of Bruce Winchell. That Affidavit is submitted in support of a Motion for Summary Judgment, and does not comply with Civil Rule 56(e).

This motion is based upon the November 22, 1988 Affidavit of Bruce Winchell, CR 56(e), and the Memorandum submitted herewith.

MOTION TO STRIKE NOVEMBER 22, 1988 AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE WINCHELL - 1

ORIGINAL

JOHN S. GLASSMAN
625 COMMERCE STREET

625 COMMERCE STREET TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98402 (206) 572-2746

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DATED this _____ day of December, 1988.

LAW OFFICES OF JOHN, S. GLASSMAN

By: John S. Glassman,

Attorney for Defendant, Community Chapel and Bible

Training Center

MOTION TO STRIKE NOVEMBER 22, 1988 AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE WINCHELL - 2

Z-271a (Rev. 9-1-88)

List Additional Attorneys

Name: Harold T. Dodge Address: 715 Tacoma Avenue S. Tacoma, WA 98402 Phone: 383-5388 Attorney For: Defendant, Gabrielson Name: John S. Glassman Address: P. O. Box 1703 Tacoma, WA 98401 Phone: 572-2746 Attorney For: Defendant, Community Chapel Name: Address: Phone: Attorney For: Name: Address: Phone: Attorney For: Name: Address: Phone: Attorney For: Name: Address:

Phone:

Attorney For:



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IN COUNTY CLERK'S OFFICE

SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR PTERGE COUNTY

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Pennsylvania corporation,

Plaintiff,

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IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife; DONALD LEE BARNETT, husband and wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a

Washington corporation, JACK McDONALD and "JANE DOE" McDONALD, husband and wife,

Defendants.

PIERCE COUNTY WASHINGTON
BY DEPUTY

NO. 88-2-00947-9

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE NOVEMBER 22, 1988 AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE WINCHELL

I. FACTS RELEVANT TO MOTION

Attached hereto is a copy of the Affidavit of Bruce Winchell as served upon Defendant, Community Chapel. Although Mr. Winchell did not serve any of the attachments with the Affidavit itself, he subsequently provided materials referred to therein. His failure to comply with CR 56(e) (requiring attachment of copies is not a basis for this motion to strike). However, it is indicative of the plaintiff's attitude in this case.

Nowhere does the Affidavit state that it is made upon personal knowledge, as required under Washington law, and it

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE NOVEMBER 22, 1988 AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE WINCHELL - 1

JOHN S. GLASSMAN

625 Commerce Street Tacoma, Washington 98402 (206) 572-2746 contains inadmissible hearsay throughout. The substance of the Affidavit does not provide any facts within which the court can verify the assertions made therein. For example, paragraph 4 states as follows:

4. The jury ruled in favor of defendants on Gabrielson's assault, battery and false imprisonment claim which arose out of a March 6 incident in which Gabrielson was ejected from the Burien Chapel. That claim was the basis for a bodily injury claim asserted in Gabrielson's complaint. The court will note that the jury was not instructed that in order to make an award of damages for emotional distress, it must find some physical manifestation of that distress.

Nowhere in the remainder of the Affidavit is any evidence or fact which verifies the assertions made by Mr. Winchell. The text of the jury instructions themselves negate the statements contained in Mr. Winchell's Affidavit. Specifically, plaintiff claimed the negligent causation of injuries, and the jury awarded money to the plaintiff based upon negligently inflicted damages.

Paragraph 4 contains argument and hearsay, not fact, as well as Mr. Winchell's supposition as to what the jury did or did not do.

Similarly, paragraph 5 fails for the same reasons. There is no objective way to verify the subjective, legal reasoning stated by Mr. Winchell within that paragraph, nor are there any facts set forth within which to assess or verify the claims made therein.

At best, if the Affidavit is allowed to stand, at all, it should be for the proposition that it attaches documents,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE NOVEMBER 22, 1988 AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE WINCHELL - 2

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although the documents attached are not sworn to or certified as required by CR 56(e). Further, Mr. Winchell is not competent to attest to the correctness of the attached documents. He was not a party to the underlying lawsuit, nor was he counsel of record in the underlying lawsuit. However, to the extent one of Gabrielson's attorneys, Harold Dodge, attached true and correct copies of certain of these documents in his Affidavit in Opposition to Plaintiff's Jury Demand and Request for Stay of Execution, dated December 1, 1988, the failure of counsel to comply with the rule is somewhat mitigated.

II. LAW AND ARGUMENT

The basic guidelines and principles underlining Civil Rule 56(e) are set forth in <u>Meadows v. Grant's Auto Brokers</u>, 71 Wn.2d 874, 431 P.2d 216 (1967) as follows:

Is it once apparent from the rule that affidavits submitted in a summary judgment proceeding must (1) be made on personal knowledge (2) set forth admissible evidentiary facts (3) affirmatively show that the affiant is competent to testify as to his or her averments, and (4) have appended or served therewith or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to the body of the affidavit. further authorizes the court to permit supplementation of or opposition to affidavits by way of depositions or further affidavits.

One of the reasons for the requirments of the rule is that an affidavit - not being subject to cross-examination - is a poor substitute for a live witness-whose tone or inflection of voice, movement of head, hand or eye, and general conduct or demeanor are discernable and sometimes determinative - coupled with the proposition that the summary judgment procedure was not designed to deprive a litigant of a trial on disputed issues of fact. Thus it is that affidavits submitted should comply with the requirements of the

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE NOVEMBER 22, 1988 AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE WINCHELL - 3

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rule and conform, as nearly as possible, to what the affiant would be permitted to testify to in court. rule, this respect, makes Although the in distinction between affidavits of the moving and nonmoving party, it is almost the universal practicebecause of the drastic potentials of the motion - to scrutinize with care and particularity the affidavits of the moving party while indulging in some leniency presented by the the affidavits respect to (Citations omitted). In this line of opposing party. respect, it should be added, however, that the leniency spoken of does not permit of overtraining upon the indulgence of the court, for it is still necessary for the non-moving to satisfy the court that there exists a genuine issue of material fact, particularly in the face of a strong showing to the contrary. omitted).

Suffice it to say, the Affidavit of Bruce Winchell does not comply with Washington law and should be stricken.

Respectfully submitted this 5th day of December, 1988.

LAW OFFICES OF JOHN S. GLASSMAN

By:

John S. Glassman,

At/to/ney for Defendant, Community Chapel and Bible

Training Center

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE NOVEMBER 22, 1988 AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE WINCHELL - 4

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR PIERCE COUNTY 8 AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF 9 READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Pennsylvania corporation, 10 88-2-00947-9 Plaintiff, ra No. 11 AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE ٧. 12 WINCHELL IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL 13 GABRIELSON, husband and wife; DONALD LEE BARNETT, husband and 14 wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a 15 Washington Corporation, JACK McDONALD and "JANE DOE" McDONALD, 16 husband and wife, 17 Defendants. 18 19 STATE OF WASHINGTON 20 SS. COUNTY OF KING 21 BRUCE WINCHELL, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and 22 says: 23 I am one of the attorneys for plaintiff American 24 Casualty Company. 25 26 AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE WINCHELL - 1

0219BAW

LANE POWELL MOSS & MILLERLIT

3800 RAINIER BANK TOWER

1301 FIFTH AVENUE

SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101-2647

- 2. As the court will recall, American originally moved for partial summary judgment on the question of whether damages for emotional distress were compensible under the bodily injury provision in American's policy. The court denied that motion without prejudice and did not grant Barnett's cross-motion on that same issue. For the court's convenience, American has assembled and enclosed all of the pleadings which were submitted to the court in connection with that motion.
- 3. Trial has now taken place in the underlying action. The jury awarded plaintiffs in the underlying action \$147,000. A copy of the jury instructions and completed verdict form are attached to this affidavit as Exhibits A and B.
- 4. The jury ruled in favor of defendants on Gabrielson's assault, battery and false imprisonment claim which arose out of a March 6 incident in which Gabrielson was ejected from the Burien Chapel. That claim was the basis for a bodily injury claim asserted in Gabrielson's complaint. The court will note that the jury was not instructed that in order to make an award of damages for emotional distress, it must find some physical manifestation of that distress.
- 5. On the basis of the jury's rejection of Gabrielson's assault, battery and false imprisonment claim, and resultant rejection of any claim for physical injury, American renews its motion for partial summary judgment and requests an order

AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE WINCHELL - 2 0219BAW

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declaring that to the extent that Gabrielson's award represents compensation for emotional distress, that award is not covered under American's general liability policy.

DATED this 22nd day of November 1988.

LANE POWELL MOSS & MILLER

Bruce Winchell
Attorneys for Plaintiff

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me: Nov. 22, 1988

NOTARY PUBLIC in and for the State of Washington, residing at Unnwool.

My appointment expires: $\frac{q}{\sqrt{ab}}$.

AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE WINCHELL - 3 0219BAW

LANE POWELL MOSS & MILLER (1)

3800 RAINIER BANK TOWER

1301 FIFTH AVENUE

SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101-2647

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DEC 0 6 1988

SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR PIERCE COUNTY

IN COUNTY CLERK'S OFFICE

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Pennsylvania corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife; DONALD LEE BARNETT, husband and wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a Washington corporation, JACK McDONALD and "JANE DOE" McDONALD, husband and wife,

Defendants.

AM. DEC 6 1889 P.M.

NO. 88-2-00947-9

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO RENEW MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference is a true and correct copy of "Defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment," which was filed in April, 1988, in response to the same motion brought by American Casualty April 15, 1988.

Rather than restate the cases and analysis previously provided to the court, for purposes of American Casualty's renewed motion, this brief well states the position of the Chapel in opposition to the motion. Further, Community Chapel is moving

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO RENEW MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1

ORIGINAL

JOHN S. GLASSMAN
625 COMMERCE STREET

TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98402 (206) 572-2746

to strike the affidavit upon which the motion is based, the November 22, 1988 Affidavit of Bruce Winchell, and those pleadings are adopted herein by reference. The motion to strike Mr. Winchell's Affidavit will be heard December 16, 1988, at the same time the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment will be heard.

Respectfully submitted this _____ day of December, 1988.

LAW OFFICES OF JOHN S. GLASSMAN

By: Jøhn S. Glassman,

Attorney for Defendant, Community Chapel and Bible

Training Center

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EVANS, CRAVEN & LACKIE, P.S.

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON IN LAW OFFICES OF PIERCE COUNTY

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Pennsylvania corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife; DONALD LEE BARNETT and BARBARA BARNETT, husband and wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a Washington corporation,

Defendants.

NO. 88-2-00947-9

DEFENDANT COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. REQUESTED RELIEF

American Casualty Company (American) has requested that this court grant a partial summary judgment declaring that it is not liable for damages under any cause of action brought against Community Chapel for any mental or emotional upset or lost earnings for which plaintiffs recover a judgment. American also seeks a declaration of non-coverage as to a cause of action for loss of consortium.

Community Chapel and Bible Training Center (Community Chapel) requests that American's motion for partial summary judgment be denied because certain claims for emotional distress are covered as "bodily injury," as that term is used in American's

DEFENDANT COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 LEACH, BROWN & ANDERSEN
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DEFENDANT COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:

II. FACTS

policy, and because American has not proven the absence of genuine

In Pierce County Cause No. 86-2-02792-6, Ira Gabrielson and Carol Gabrielson, as plaintiffs therein, alleged that Jack McDonald, the pastor of the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Tacoma, manipulated Carol Gabrielson into leaving her husband and coerced and unduly influenced her into having a sexual relationship with himself; that the defendant Donald Barnett knew or should have known that McDonald was involved in the seduction of female members of the Tacoma congregation; that on March 6, 1986, Carol Gabrielson was physically assaulted, was handcuffed and forced into a vehicle at the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Burien; that she sustained physical injuries as a result of such assault; and that McDonald and Barnett made disparaging statements regarding the Gabrielsons to members of the congregation.

Based upon these allegations, the plaintiffs brought nine causes of action, which, respectively, include the following allegations:

named defendants was outrageous and caused the plaintiffs to suffer severe emotional distress".

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"The conduct of each of the above

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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION: "McDonald negligently violated his duty of care as a counselor by having sexual contact with plaintiff, Carol Gabrielson.....McDonald was negligent in counseling plaintiff Carol Gabrielson and so created an unreasonable risk of physical and mental harm which caused the plaintiff Carol Gabrielson's injuries."

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION: McDonald and Barnett "intentionally, recklessly or negligently failed to exercise that degree of care, skill, diligence and knowledge commonly possessed and exercised by a reasonable, careful, and prudent pastor in this jurisdiction."

FIFTH THROUGH SEVENTH CAUSES OF ACTION: "The acts of the defendants on March 6, 1986, which resulted in injuries to plaintiff Carol Gabrielson, were negligent and/or constitute the torts of assault, battery, and false imprisonment."

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION: "The acts of defendants in making disparaging statements damaging the reputation of the plaintiff constitute the tort of defamation."

NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION: "As a further and proximate result of the acts of the defendants, plaintiff Ira Gabrielson has suffered a loss of consortium."

DEFENDANT COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3

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Community Chapel is the insured under a comprehensive general liability insurance policy it has with American. Relevant portions of this policy language are now quoted:

The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of

- a. Bodily injury; or
- b. Property damage.

To which this insurance applies, caused by an Occurrence, and the company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured seeking damages on account of such bodily injury or property damage, even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent, and may make such investigation and settlement of any claim or suit, as it deems expedient..." (Page 1 of 1)

The definition section of the policy states, in part, as follows:

"Bodily Injury means bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by any person which occurs during the policy period, including death at any time resulting therefrom or Incidental Medical Malpractice Injury."

"Occurrence means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which result in Bodily Injury or Property Damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the Insured."

This includes any intentional act by or at the direction of the insured which results in bodily injury, if such injury arises solely from the use of reasonable force for the purpose of protecting persons or property." (Page 10 of 11)

DEFENDANT COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4

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Community Chapel had "Personal Injury and Advertising Injury Liability Coverage" which provided the following:

The company will pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which the Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of Personal Injury or Advertising Injury to which this insurance applies,..." (page 4 of 8)

"Personal Injury means injury arising out of one or more of the following offenses committed during the policy period:

- (a) false arrest, detention, imprisonment or malicious prosecution;
- (b) wrongful entry or eviction or other invasion of the right of private occupancy;
- (c) a publication or utterance
 - (1) of liable or slander or other defamatory or disparaging material.... (page 5 of 8).

III. LEGAL AUTHORITY

A. Gabrielson's allegations are sufficient to bring her claim for emotional distress within the definition of "bodily injury."

Beyond the allegations in the Gabrielson Complaint, there is no description of the kind of physical and emotional injuries suffered, nor are there supporting affidavits as to any attendant symptoms either of the Gabrielsons have had as a result of such injuries. American, as the moving party, has the burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Preston v. Duncan, 55 Wn.2d 678, 3439 P.2d 605 (1960). In other words

DEFENDANT COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 5 American must prove that there is no genuine issue of fact and that the matter can be resolved as an issue of law.

American only argues that a claim for emotional distress, in the abstract, is not covered as a "bodily injury" under its policy language. As is argued below, certain claims for emotional distress fall within the scope and meaning of the term "bodily injury," and, because no genuine issue of fact has been proven by American, the issue of American's liability cannot be decided as a matter of law.

American are The Washington cases relied upon by E-Z Loader v. Travelers Indem. Co., 106 Wn.2d distinguishable. 901, 726 P.2d 439 (1986), involved a sex and age discrimination case in which the injured parties suffered no physical contact of any kind but were laid off from their employment. The injured parties recovered an award against their employer for loss of prospective earnings, humiliation, mental anguish and emotional the appeal of the employer's suit On distress. indemnification, the court stated that the coverage for "bodily injury" contemplated actual bodily injury, sickness or disease By contrast, Gabrielson's resulting in physical impairment. allegations can be understood to mean that McDonald's sexual contacts with her were actual bodily injuries which, in turn, resulted in her emotional distress and physical injuries. 12 E DEFENDANT COMMUNITY CHAPEL

DEFENDANT COMMUNITY CHAPEL
AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER'S
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 6

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West Am. Ins. v. Buchanan, 11 Wn. App. 823, 525 P.2d 831 (1974), the parents of a boy hurt in an automobile accident sought recovery for their own mental anguish and grief under an uninsured motorist endorsement. They argued that they had a "bodily injury" under the terms of the policy. The court held that the parents could not recover for their own consequential injuries as a result of the bodily injury sustained by another At page 827, they stated the following:

Grief, mental anguish and suffering are arguably more similar to the "pain and suffering" element of direct injury" for a "bodily than consequential damages as medical expenses and loss of But we are persuaded that grief and mental wages. anguish are also consequential damages rather than direct damages because their recovery is necessarily dependant upon the injury to another person - the child. (Emphasis added.)

Carol Gabrielson's recovery is not dependant upon injury to another person because she was the injured party.

A recent line of cases support the proposition that a claim for emotional distress, which results from some physical contact, is encompassed under the "bodily injury" coverage of an insurance policy. Perhaps the case closest to the present factual setting is NPS Corporation v. Insurance Company of North America, 213 N.J.Supp. 547, 517 A.2d 1211 (1986), which involved a claim for sexual harassment. An executive secretary alleged that a plant manager had committed repeated acts of sexual harassment Бy DEFENDANT COMMUNITY CHAPEL 21/288

AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 7

offensively touching her "rear end" and "breast." And as a result of such actions, she claimed that she suffered "serious emotional distress and disruption of her personal life." The trial judge granted the insurance company's summary judgment motion and dismissed the complaint, concluding the term "bodily injury," as used in the policy, contemplated physical harm or damage to the and did not include mental anguish or emotional human body On appeal, the court reversed the dismissal and held included the emotional 'bodily injury' term "the psychological sequelae allegedly resulting from the unauthorized invasion of the complainant's person. " Id. at 1212. The court stated as follows:

(0)ur "courts have come to recognize that mental and emotional distress is just as 'real' as physical pain, and its valuation is no more difficult." Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 4433, 404 A.2d 8 (1979). Consequently, damages for such distress have been ruled allowable in an increasing number of contexts. (Citations admitted)

Within that framework, we disagree with INA's argument that bodily injury necessarily entails some physical or corporeal harm caused by the application of external violence. We are unable to separate a person's nerves and tensions from his body. Clearly, emotional trauma can be as disabling to the body as a visible physical wound. Moreover, it is common knowledge that emotional distress can and often does have a direct effect on other bodily functions.

NPS Corporation v. Insurance Co. of No. America. 517 A.2d at 1213-14.

DEFENDANT COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 8

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The NPS court went on to hold that the term "bodily injury" encompassed claims for emotional distress caused by nonconsensual touching.

A case that apparently creates even greater coverage than NPS is Loewenthal v. Security Ins., Co., 50 Md. App. 112, 436 A.2d 493 (1981), wherein a claim was made that negligent excavation caused inter alia, a breach of contract, loss of rent, and pain, suffering, and mental anquish. The defendant's insurance company's motion for summary judgment, requesting there was no duty to defend, was granted. The appellate court reversed: "Bodily injury," defined in the policy as "bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by any persons.... encompasses the claim of pain, suffering, and mental anguish. Id. at 499.

In <u>Levy v. Duclaux</u>, 324 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1976), a customer accused of shoplifting brought a claim for false imprisonment. It was undisputed that the customer had been grabbed and held by one of the store employees, in front of other shoppers. The insurance company, however, refused to defend against her claim of emotional distress because it argued that such claim was not a bodily injury. In holding that the policy's term "bodily injury" included plaintiff's alleged injuries, the court noted that the plaintiff was "personally exposed to some minimal physical abuse as well as the external force of being accused a shoplifter in the court noted that the court noted that the plaintiff was "personally exposed to some minimal physical abuse as well as the external force of being accused a shoplifter in the court noted that the court noted that the plaintiff was "personally exposed to some minimal physical abuse as well as the external force of being accused a shoplifter in the court noted that the court noted that the plaintiff was "personally exposed to some minimal physical abuse as well as the external force of being accused a shoplifter in the court noted that the co

DEFENDANT COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 9

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front of many witnesses." Levy v. Duclaux, 324 So.2d at 9.

The <u>Levy</u> court also stated, at page 10, that

(W)e are unable to separate a person's nerves and tensions from his body. It is common knowledge that worry and anxiety can and often do have a direct effect on other bodily functions.

.-- --

The court also commented that the plaintiff's humiliation brought on various physical manifestations.

Holcomb v. Kincaid, 406 So.2d 646 (La.App. 1981), involved a claim by a punitive wife against her husband for alleged fraud in marrying her when had not divorced his former wife. The husband's insurance company was dismissed on summary judgment, and the appellate court was asked to determine whether the wife's allegations of humiliation, embarrassment, and mental anguish were covered under the definition of "bodily injury". The policy defined bodily injury as meaning "bodily injury, sickness or disease." The court noted that the circumstances before it were controlled by the Levy case, "in which mental anguish and humiliation were found to be within the definition of bodily injury."

Although the <u>Holcomb</u> court does not state a major source of the alleged mental anguish, there can be no doubt that it was the fact that the "husband" had lived with the plaintiff, as his wife, for 12 years. The wife in <u>Holcomb</u> also alleged various physical

DEFENDANT COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 10

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The allegations of Carol Gabrielson can be fairly stated as as a result of being coerced and unduly influenced by follows: McDonald, she had sexual intercourse with McDonald numerous times, which acts of sexual contact have created great emotional and physical injuries for her. If this court rules that emotional distress, caused by some physical contact, and accompanied by some physical symptoms, is within the coverage provided by the term "bodily injury," as defined by the American policy, this court cannot grant American's motion.

of the various also arguable that because is Ιt interpretations by the courts of the term "bodily injury," the term is inherently ambiguous. Ambiguities in insurance policies are construed in a manner most favorable to the insured. Neer v. Fireman's Fund, 36 Wn.App. 834, 677 P.2d 796 (1984). Although the NPS policy did not expressly define "bodily injury," the court stated that it "presented substantial ambiguities which must be construed against the insurer." NPS Corporation v. Insurance Co. of North America, 517 A.2d at 1213. In Employers Co. Ins. Co. v. Foust, 29 Cal. App. 3d 382, 105 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972), the mother of a young boy who drowned in a neighbor's pool sued for "severe shock, emotional distress and resulting physical fright, The insurance policy stated it would be liable for injuries." 4/21/2663

DEFENDANT COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 11

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damages because of "Bodily injury, sickness or disease, included death resulting therefrom, hereinafter called 'bodily injury,' sustained by any person." The court found this definition to be ambiguous in light of a claim for emotional distress and resulting physical injury. And, in Levy v. Declaux, supra, the court specifically held that the definition of "bodily injury" meaning "bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by any person" was ambiguous. Id, at 10.

Further, neither American's general exclusion section (Page 1 and 2 of 8) nor the section defining "bodily injury," exclude emotional distress or mental anguish. An inclusionary clause in an insurance contract should be liberally construed to provide coverage whenever possible. Riley v. Viking Ins. Co., 46 Wn.App. 828, 733 P.2d 556 (1987). And exclusionary clauses are construed against the insurer. Eurick v. Pemco Ins. Co., 108 Wn.2d 338, 738 P.2d 251 (1987).

It is also well established that the term "personal injury" is more encompassing than is the term "bodily injury." Community Chapel's policy provides coverage for injury arising out of, interalia, false arrest, imprisonment or defamation. (Page 5 of 8). Gabrielson clearly alleged that her claims for false imprisonment arose directly out of the March 6th alleged assault on her person; however, it is unclear from the complaint whether or not the DEFENDANT COMMUNITY CHAPEL

DEFENDANT COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 12

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alleged defamatory statements were also made that same time. Based upon the arguments and cases referred to above, with respect to "bodily injury," American should not be allowed to escape liability for claims of emotional distress which arose out of the alleged false imprisonment and defamation.

B. It is a breach of faith by American to bring this partial summary judgment.

Tank v. State Fram, 105 Wn.2d 381, 715 P.2d 1133 (1986), stands for the proposition that when an insurance company is defending under a reservation of rights, it has an enhanced fiduciary duty to the insured. Here, American is defending Community Chapel in the underlying case under a reservation of American's first obligation, then, is to "thoroughly rights. investigate the cause of the insured's accident and the nature and severity of the plaintiff's injuries." See Tank v. State Farm, There is absolutely no evidence, however, that supra at 388. American has made such investigation into the nature and severity of the Gabrielson's injuries; certainly it has the opportunity to do so in this Declaratory Judgment action. It is found evidence that brought the claim for emotional distress into the policy's definition of "bodily injury," it would quite obviously have no right to bring this partial summary judgment action.

If American prevails in this motion, one possible result
DEFENDANT COMMUNITY CHAPEL
AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER'S
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 13

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that Community Chapel would more likely reach a result in the underlying case, which result would not be to their best financial advantage.

Without some more investigation by American, their motion for partial summary judgment is an act of bad faith on its part.

CONCLUSION

American has brought this summary judgment motion based solely on the allegations contained the Gabrielson Complaint and on its policy language. A Complaint, however, is not required to spell out every element of a cause of action; it only has to put the defendant on notice of the claim being asserted. Thus, if there is any way in which additional facts or circumstances could bring Gabrielson's claims for emotional distress within the ambit of a "bodily injury," it is premature for the court to grant American's motion as it has failed to prove the absence of a genuine issue of fact. Furthermore, it is an act of bad faith for it to bring this motion at this time without further investigation of the Gabrielson injuries.

DATED this 7th day of April, 1988.

LEACH, BROWN & ANDERSEN

By DAVID V. ANDERSEN Attorney for Defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center

DEFENDANT COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 14

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AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF

a Pennsylvania corporation,

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL

BARNETT, husband and wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE

GABRIELSON, husband and wife;)
DONALD LEE BARNETT and BARBARA)

TRAINING CENTER, a Washington

Plaintiff,

Defendants.

READING PENNSYLVANIA,

vs.

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corporation; JACK McDONALD)
and "JANE DOE" McDONALD,)
husband and wife,)

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE

DECOG MAN

NO. 88-2-00947-9

MOTION TO STRIKE NOVEMBER 22, 1988, AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE WINCHELL

COME NOW the defendants, Ira Gabrielson and Carol Gabrielson and join in the motion of defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center moving the Court for an order striking the November 22, 1988, Affidavit of Bruce Winchell.

DATED this 6th day of December, 1988.

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

By: Maralet I Show

HAROLD T. DODGE, JR Of Attorneys for Defendants

Gabrielson

III

LAW OFFICES

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

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MOTION TO STRIKE NOVEMBER 22, 1988, AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE WINCHELL - 1

AFFIDAVIT OF HAROLD T. DODGE, JR. IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ETCO TT

IN COUNTY CLERK'S OFFICE

1988 P.M.

DEPUTY

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING PENNSYLVANIA. a Pennsylvania corporation,

Plaintiff,

NO. 88-2-00947-9

vs.

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IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife;) DONALD LEE BARNETT and BARBARA) BARNETT, husband and wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a Washington corporation; JACK McDONALD and "JANE DOE" McDONALD,

Defendants.

STATE OF WASHINGTON ss. County of Pierce

husband and wife,

HAROLD T. DODGE, JR., being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:

I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Washington and I am one of the attorneys of record for the defendants Gabrielson in the above-entitled action.

///

LAW OFFICES

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

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AFFIDAVIT OF HAROLD T. DODGE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1

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make the following affidavit from my own personal knowledge of the records and proceedings to date in the above-entitled action and I am competent to testify thereto for the purposes of this motion.

Once before, plaintiff has brought a partial motion for summary judgment in an attempt to have the Court rule that its policy of insurance insuring the defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center does not cover emotional injuries that may be parasitic to violation of an individual's bodily integrity. These defendants have ordered a transcript of the Court's oral ruling on that previous motion and as soon as these defendants receive that transcript, it will be incorporated into this affidavit by reference as if fully set forth.

These defendants believe that it is clear from the Court's previous oral ruling that the emotional damages that the Gabrielsons' suffered as a result of tortious interference with Carol Gabrielson's bodily integrity are items of damages that are covered by plaintiff's policy of insurance insuring the defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 6th day of December, 1988.

> TARY PUBLIC in and for the

State of Washington.

My Commission Expires: 10-4-

LAW OFFICES RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

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AFFIDAVIT OF HAROLD T. DODGE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2

DEC 8 DET

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON USH, HARNULA & HARKINS

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY of READING, PENNSYLVANIA,

Plaintiff.

vs

IRA GABRIELSON, et ux, et al,

Defendants.

ORIGINAL

No: 88-2-00947-9

Excerpt of Proceedings

ORAL DECISION LED

AM. DEC 6 1988 P.M.

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BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 15th day of April, 1988, the following proceedings were held before the Honorable J. KELLY ARNOLD, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Washington, in and for the County of Pierce, sitting in Department 9.

The Plaintiff was represented by their attorney, BRUCE WINCHELL;

The Defendants were represented by their attorneys, DANIEL HANNULA, TIMOTHY DONALDSON;

WHEREUPON, the following proceedings were had, to wit:

CATHERINE M. VERNON & ASSOCIATES

COURT REPORTERS 318-19TH AVENUE S.E. PUYALLUP, WASHINGTON 98371

PROCEEDINGS

(April 15, 1988)

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. I'm familiar with the Easy Loader case and, Mr. Winchell, I disagree with your position that that stands for the proposition to support your motion in this case. It is a case where there was no physical contact, and I believe that language that I just cited presupposes from the other language in the case that that's inferentially part of that language.

With regard to the question of whether or not the Court should grant-- whether we call it a partial summary judgment or 12(b) motion-- the Court is going to deny it. I'm denying it on the basis that I don't believe the cases cited by the plaintiff insurance company support the proposition that consequential damages arising out of the kind of conduct alleged are not covered. And secondly but certainly not primarily, and my decision doesn't turn on this, and I perhaps don't even need to say this because I suppose my ruling would be the same either way, but if I had any doubt about my position that I have already expressed, which I don't, I would be concerned about the fact that the motion comes on a Monday before trial in the underlying case. I think that flies in the face

of the orderly processing of litigation and the rights of all parties to have their cases disposed of.

It may well be, and I certainly don't take issue, Mr. Winchell, with the fact there was a long dry spell. I don't know about that. But I will accept that in terms of discovery, but the issues that you have asked the Court to consider are those that were set forth in the pleadings. The pleadings have been available from the outset. The Court, although there perhaps have been some amendments along the way, the Court on that basis will deny the motion.

I'm sure you are going to ask, because I haven't specifically addressed the issue of Mr. Gabrielson's claim and how that fits into all of this. I frankly think that's a closer question, but I'm not satisfied that the Buchannon case and the Easy Loader case, when read in conjunction with one another, really address this situation. I think the facts were different. I think the context in which the issue arose, given the nature of the coverage, was different. On that basis the Court will deny both prongs of the motion.

MR. WINCHELL: Your Honor, just a clarification on your ruling. I take it the denial of the motion at this stage is without prejudice for us to go conduct our discovery and come back, at least as to sexual

whether those sexual activities, absent some other 2 discernable injury, constitutes a bodily injury to the 3 policy? THE COURT: Well, certainly it's not 5 appropriate for the Court to make factual determinations 6 about what happened in ruling on a motion such as this. 7 If we do that, the Court literally would have to try 8 the underlying case in this case, and that's not why 9 we are here. 10 The ruling would be without prejudice to have 11 the Court recover your position as discovery progresses. 12 MR. WINCHELL: Thank you, your Honor. 13 THE COURT: Thank you all, counsel. 14 15 (Motion concluded) 16 111 17 111 18 /// /// 20 /// 21 /// STATE OF WASHINGTON, County of Pierce 22 111 ss: I, Ted Ruth Clark of the above entified Court do neveus celluly that this 23 /// foregoing deformers as range one correct copy of the onlymumber on the in my 24 /// office. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my 25 /// and and the Seal of Said Court this day of Dec 19 20 Deputy *يب*.. 6y -4-

activity claim, and to then address the question of

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DEC OF 1999

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Pennsylvania corporation,

Plaintiff,

NO. 88-2-00947-9

vs.

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IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife; DONALD LEE BARNETT and BARBARA) BARNETT, husband and wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a Washington corporation; JACK McDONALD and "JANE DOE" McDONALD, husband and wife,

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.



ATTACHED HERETO and incorporated herein by reference is a true and correct copy of "Defendants Gabrielson's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment" which was filed in April, 1988, in response to the initial motion brought by the plaintiff, American Casualty, on April 15, 1988. The supporting Affidavit of Harold T. Dodge, Jr. has not been reproduced, however, it is on file

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MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO RENEWED

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1

with the Court and is incorporated herein by reference as if fully set forth.

Rather than restate the cases and analysis previously provided to the Court, the Gabrielsons' brief in opposition to the initial motion for summary judgment states the position of the Gabrielsons in opposition to plaintiff's motion.

Respectfully submitted this 6th day of December 1988.

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

By:

HAROLD T. DODGE, JR

f Attorneys for Defendants

Gabrielsons

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Pennsylvania corporation,

Plaintiff.

vs.

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife; DONALD LEE BARNETT and BARBARA BARNETT, husband and wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a Washington corporation,

Defendants.

NO. 88-2-00947-9

DEFENDANTS GABRIELSONS'
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. BACKGROUND AND POSTURE

Carol and Ira Gabrielson, defendants in this declaratory action, are plaintiffs in a separate lawsuit pending in Pierce County under case number 86-2-02792-6 seeking damages against American Casualty's insureds, Jack and "Jane Doe" McDonald, Donald Lee and Barbara Barnett, "John Does" No. 1-4 and "Jane Does" No. 1-4, Community

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1

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Chapel and Bible Training Center of Tacoma, and Community Chapel and Bible Training Center.

American Casualty, insurer of the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center, filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment on about February 1, 1988. On about March 25, 1988, American Casualty filed an Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment. In conjunction with the filings of the Complaint and Amended Complaint, American Casualty noted this Summary Judgment Motion to be heard on April 15, 1988. Only 21 days have lapsed between the date of the Amended Complaint and the hearing of this Summary Judgment. The defendants Gabrielson have not had an opportunity to engage in discovery.

In this declaratory action, plaintiff seeks to resolve the coverage issues "through a series of motions for partial summary judgment." Plaintiffs Memorandum, page 4, lines 11 through 12. This initial Summary Judgment Motion asks: (1) the court to declare that the plaintiff is not liable for damages under any cause of action for any mental or emotional upset or lost earnings for which the Gabrielsons might recover a judgment against plaintiff's insured, the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center, and (2) for a declaration of non-coverage for Ira Gabrielson's claims for loss of consortium. Plaintiff's Memorandum, page 7, line 25 through page 8, line 4.

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MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2

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Carol and Ira Gabrielson have filed a Motion in Pierce County case number 86-2-02792-6 seeking to amend their complaint to conform to evidence. The amendment would add a false imprisonment cause of action against Jack McDonald, the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center, and the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Tacoma. outcome of that Motion to Amend the Complaint is important to the posture of this Motion because, if granted, American Casualty's policy of insurance, by its terms, provides coverage not only for "bodily injury," but also for "personal injury" under section VB, the Personal Injury and Advertising Injury Liability Coverage, provided under "Optional Liability Extensions" as more fully discussed below.

To a great extent, the method proposed by American Casualty to resolve the coverage issues in this declaratory action is impractical and is fraught with perils. importantly, the issue of whether Jack McDonald is an employee, executive officer, or director within the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center must be resolved. Such a determination will involve a very in-depth examination of the corporate structure of the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center and the relationship of satellite churches to the main corporation in accordance with the corporate by-laws and the extensive control of the 1111 LAW OFFICES

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3

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corporation over satellites and satellite pastors as outlined in those by-laws.

II. APPLICABLE POLICY SECTIONS

There are two separate and distinct types of injury for which American Casualty's comprehensive general liability insurance policy provides:

- Bodily injury in case of an occurrence; and 1.
- Personal injury in case of false arrest, false 2. imprisonment, false detention, and non-malicious defamation.

Under coverage A--Bodily Injury Liability, Section I on page 1 of 8 of the policy, the policy provides:

> The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of

Bodily injury

TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4

to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence.

Under Section II of the policy, under the heading "Persons Insured" the policy provides:

> If the named insured is designated in the declarations as other than an individual, partnership or joint venture, the organization so designated and any executive officer, director, or stockholder thereof while acting within the scope of his duties as such,

> > (f) Other than executive officers, any employee of the named insured while acting within the scope of their duties as such.

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MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION

An occurrence is defined on page 10 of 11:

Occurrence means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.

This includes any intentional act by or at the direction of the insured which results in bodily injury, if such injury arises solely from the use of reasonable force for the purpose of protecting persons or property.

By the terms of the policy, there is no definition for "bodily injury" as that term is used under Section I of the policy describing coverage for bodily injury. A definition of bodily injury is given on page 9 of 11 stated by the policy to apply to part 2 of the policy which deals with persons insured:

Bodily injury means bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by any person which occurs during the policy period, including death at any time resulting therefrom or incidental medical malpractice injury.

Section V of the policy is entitled "Optional Liability Extensions." Under that section, subparagraph B is entitled "Personal Injury and Advertising Injury Liability Coverage." The declaration page of the policy indicates that the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center elected to pay for coverage under Section V B, Personal Injury. The personal injury portion of the policy under Liability Extensions provides the following coverage:

(1) The company will pay on behalf of the

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MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 5

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insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of personal injury . . . to which this insurance applies, sustained by any person or organization and arising out of the conduct of the named insured's business within the policy territory.

On page 5 of 8 of the policy, under the "Additional Definitions" section, the policy defines the personal injuries for which it will indemnify the insured:

Personal injury means injury arising out of one or more of the following offenses committed during the policy period

- (a) false arrest, detention, imprisonment, or malicious prosecution;
 - (c) a publication or utterance
 - (1) of a libel slander or other defamatory or disparaging material.

The personal injury protection provided in the policy for defamatory material is limited in that it does not include "libel or slander" or the publication or utterance of defamatory or disparaging material concerning any person or organization . . . made by or at the direction of the insured with knowledge of the falsity thereof.

From the language quoted above, it is seen that the policy provides "bodily injury" protection for "occurrences" and expands the coverage to include "personal injury" arising from false arrest, detention, imprisonment, malicious prosecution and as a result of nonmalicious defamation.

One other area germaine to this argument is the

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MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 6

coverage provided by the policy for negligent professional services rendered on behalf of the corporation. The policy does not exclude professional services rendered on behalf of certain divisions of the corporation. American Casualty asserts in its memorandum that professional services are excluded from the coverage offered by the policy. The policy language does not support this claim. The exclusion to which American Casualty refers states as follows:

It is agreed that with reference to any operation described below or designated in the policy as subject to this endorsement, the insurance does not apply to bodily injury or property damage due to:

The rendering or failure to render

(b) Any service or treatment conducive to health or of a professional nature.

The operations to which this exclusion applies are described on the exclusion as "schools -- colleges, universities or college preparatory."

LAW AND LEGAL ARGUMENT

1. JACK McDONALD IS AN EMPLOYEE, EXECUTIVE OFFICER, DIRECTOR, OR AGENT OF THE DEFENDANT CORPORATION COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER.

Before the court can decide whether or not certain acts asserted against the plaintiff's insureds are covered by the policy, it will be necessary to determine whether Jack

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 7

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McDonald is an agent, executive officer, director, or employee of the insured. Submitted as an exhibit to the Affidavit of Harold T. Dodge, Jr. in opposition to the summary judgment in Pierce County Cause Number 86-2-02792-6 are excerpts of the By-Laws of the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center which detail the control that the corporation exerts over its satellites. The following are some salient features of the By-Laws demonstrating the degree of control exercised by the main corporation over satellites:

All satellite churches are a part of the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center corporation, Division 1, Section II, Articles 2, 3E; Division 6, Section I, Article 1;

All satellite churches are governed by the main corporation's Board of Directors, Division 1, Section II, Article 2;

Pastors of satellite churches are subject to "admonishment, discipline, and ultimate removal" by the corporate Board of Directors, Division 1, Section II, Article 6;

A satellite pastor can only be appointed by the main corporation, Division 6, Section II, Article 1 a 1;

All satellite pastors are listed with the main corporation as "current officers and major appointees of the corporation," Division 1, Section X, Article 3;

Satellite churches are but mere "extension[s]" of the main corporation, Division 6, Section I, Article 2.

Included as an exhibit to the Affidavit of Harold T.

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MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 8

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Dodge, Jr. in opposition to this Motion for Summary Judgment, is a communication from Jack Hicks, then a member of the Board of Directors of the plaintiff's insured, to the other members of the Board of Directors, which further emphasizes the degree to which the corporation is responsible for the acts of satellite churches and satellite pastors.

As is evident from the By-Laws and from the communication to the Board of Directors by Jack Hicks, great questions of fact exist as to whether or not Jack McDonald is an executive officer, director, or employee of the plaintiff's insured.

THE COVERAGE EXTENDS TO INJURIES SUFFERED BY 2. CAROL AND IRA GABRIELSON AS THE RESULT OF JACK McDONALD'S NEGLIGENT COUNSELING.

As detailed above, the insurance policy provides coverage for harms proximately resulting from negligent professional services rendered on behalf of divisions of the corporation other than its schools. The policy does not exclude coverage for malpractice actions against any insured individual involving negligent professional services performed by personnel of the corporation except as they might be rendered in conjunction with the Bible College Division and the Church School Division of the Corporation. Community Chapel and Bible Training College, the named insured, consists of five divisions: The Church of Community Chapel and Bible Training Center; Community Chapel and Bible Training College; Community Chapel Christian School; Community ////

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 9 LAW OFFICES

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Chapel Publications; and Satellite Churches. See 1978
By-Laws, Exhibit A to Affidavit of Harold T. Dodge, Jr. Of
the professional services capable of being rendered by the
corporation, only those rendered by the Bible College and
the Christian School are excluded. See Exclusion, Exhibit B
to Affidavit of Bruce Winchell in support of this motion.
Any bodily injury proximately resulting from the negligent
professional services rendered in conjunction with the
furtherance of the goals, objectives, and business of the
church, publication, and satellite divisions of the
corporation would be a covered injury under the policy.

3. COVERAGE EXTENDS TO ALL OF THE INJURIES CLAIMED BY CAROL AND IRA GABRIELSON UNDER THE PERSONAL INJURY AND ADVERTISING INJURY LIABILITY COVERAGE PROVIDED BY THE POLICY UNDER SECTION V OF THE POLICY "OPTIONAL LIABILITY EXTENSIONS".

The plaintiffs have filed a motion in Pierce County Cause Number 86-2-02792-6 seeking to amend their Complaint to include a cause of action against Jack McDonald and, through his agency, against the Corporation, for the tort of false imprisonment as a result of Jack McDonald's negligently counseling Carol Gabrielson, depriving her of her free will, exercising ultimate control over her, depriving her of her ability to make her own decisions, and depriving her of her ability to resist his suggestion and direction, and ultimately

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MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 10

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coercing her into sexual acts which she had no power or will to resist.

Under the personal injury coverage of the extended liability section of the policy, plaintiff has contracted to pay on the behalf of the insured all sums which the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of personal injury. Personal injury is defined as injury arising out of false imprisonment. The personal injury protection provided by the extended liability section of the policy is not limited in any way to "bodily injury," it provides coverage for "personal injury."

This section of the policy would provide coverage for all of the physical suffering as well as related mental suffering experienced by Carol Gabrielson as a proximate result of the tortious acts of Jack McDonald and the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center proximately resulting from acts constituting false imprisonment.

Ira Gabrielson's claim for loss of consortium is also a "personal injury" and coverage is available to him for his damages under the extended liability section of the policy.

See Bruner v. Little, 97 Wash. 319, 166 P. 1166 (1917).

4. COVERAGE UNDER THE PLAINTIFF'S POLICY EXTENDS TO PROVIDE COVERAGE FOR CAROL AND IRA GABRIELSON'S SECOND, THIRD, AND FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTION IN PIERCE COUNTY CAUSE NUMBER 86-2-02792-6.

The Second, Third and Fourth Causes of Action against

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MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 11

the plaintiffs' insureds in Pierce County Cause Number 86-2-02792-6 involve professional malpractice, either as counselor malpractice or pastoral malpractice. As argued earlier, plaintiff's insurance policy does not exclude coverage for negligent professional services rendered on behalf of the plaintiff's insured in conjunction with the church or satellite divisions of the corporation.

Under the bodily injury portion of plaintiff's insurance policy, plaintiff's insureds are covered for negligent professional services if, as a proximate result thereof, Carol Gabrielson incurred "bodily injury." The ultimate result of plaintiff's insureds' negligence was that Jack McDonald coerced Carol Gabrielson into a sexual relationship.

The sexual relationship and the sexual acts making up that relationship are an occurrence within the definitions of plaintiff's insurance policy. The plaintiff's insurance policy defines an "occurrence" as an "accident." With reference to the exclusion for which the plaintiff argues, the Washington courts have adopted the following test which must be applied before it can be determined as a matter of law that a sexual act is or is not an occurrence:

- (1) The insured must intend both the act and the injury;
- (2) The intent may be actual or may be inferred by the nature of the act and the

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MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 12

accompanying reasonable foreseeability of harm;

(3) Once intent to cause injury is found, it is immaterial that the actual injury caused is of a different character or magnitude than that intended.

Western National Assurance Company v. Hecker, 43 Wn.App. 816, 825, 719 P.2d 954 (1986).

No discovery has been conducted in this case to date to ascertain Jack McDonald's intent. Without discovery on that issue, summary judgment is not appropriate on the issue of whether or not Jack McDonald's sexual activity with Carol Gabrielson was or was not an "occurrence".

5. COVERAGE EXTENDS TO CAROL AND IRA GABRIELSON'S FIFTH, SIXTH AND SEVENTH CAUSES OF ACTION IN PIERCE COUNTY CAUSE NUMBER 86-2-02792-6.

Carol and Ira Gabrielson's Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Causes of Action against plaintiff's insureds in Pierce County Cause Number 86-2-02792-6 allege the tort of false imprisonment. As discussed in detail above, plaintiff's insurance policy extends coverage to all personal injuries resulting from false imprisonment under the personal injury protection provided in the optional liability extensions of its policy.

6. COVERAGE EXTENDS TO CAROL AND IRA GABRIELSON'S EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION IN PIERCE COUNTY CAUSE NUMBER 86-2-02792-6.

The plaintiff's insurance policy provides coverage to

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MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 13

its insureds for nonmalicious defamation under the personal injury portion of the optional liability extensions. Under that section, plaintiff excludes coverage if the defamation was made with knowledge of the falsity of the statements. No discovery has been done to date to determine whether or not the defamatory statements made by Jack McDonald concerning Carol Gabrielson's disfellowshipment were made maliciously.

Carol Gabrielson has given testimony in Pierce County

Cause Number 86-2-02792-6 that Jack McDonald made statements

that she was disfellowshipped and that she should be shunned

and that she was possessed with a myriad of demons when, in

fact, Carol Gabrielson had not been disfellowshipped. See

Exhibit D.

Affidavit of Harold T. Dodge, Jr. at pages 19 through 23 (affidavit)

7. COVERAGE EXTENDS TO CAROL AND IRA GABRIELSON'S NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION IN PIERCE COUNTY CAUSE NUMBER 86-2-02792-6.

Ira Gabrielson asserts, in the Ninth Cause of Action in Pierce County Cause Number 86-2-02792-6 that, as a result of the negligent acts of plaintiff's insureds, he suffered a loss of consortium. If Carol and Ira Gabrielson's Motion to Amend their Complaint is granted, they will have stated a cause of action against plaintiff's insureds for false imprisonment consisting of plaintiff's insureds' depriving Carol Gabrielson of her free will and in the process injuring Ira Gabrielson's marital relationship with Carol

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 14

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Gabrielson. Under the personal injury protection provided by the optional liability extensions in plaintiff's insurance policy, Ira Gabrielson's consortium claim would be covered as a personal injury.

8. THE INJURIES SUFFERED BY CAROL GABRIELSON AS THE PROXIMATE RESULT OF ACTS COMPLAINED OF IN PIERCE COUNTY CAUSE NUMBER 86-2-02792-6 ARE BODILY INJURIES FOR COVERAGE PURPOSES IN PLAINTIFF'S INSURANCE POLICY.

Carol Gabrielson's injuries are the direct result if the physical, as well as mental, violation worked upon her by plaintiff's insureds. See Affidavit of Philip Lindsay, M.D. Because Carol Gabrielson's mental and emotional suffering is a direct result of plaintiff's insureds' nonconsentual physical violation of her, coverage must extend to cover Carol Gabrielson's emotional and psychological injuries. This position is well supported by decisions bearing on the precise question from other jurisdictions.

In the New Jersey case, NPS Coporation v. Insurance Company of North America, 517 A.2d 1211 (N.J. App. 1986), the court ruled that emotional and psychological injuries directly resulting from nonconsentual violation of a plaintiff's bodily integrity, in the form of sexual harassment involving touching of parts of the plaintiff's body, was a covered "bodily injury":

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We hold that the term "bodily injury," as used in the policy, includes the emotional and psychological sequelae allegedly resulting from the unauthorized invasion of the complainant's person.

517 A.2d at 1212.

In support of its holding, the court reasoned that emotional and mental harms are real bodily injuries that may result from physical violation:

[O]ur "courts have come to recognize that mental and emotional distress is just as 'real' as physical pain, and that its valuation is no more difficult."

Within that framework, we disagree with INA's argument that bodily injury necessarily entails some physical or corporeal harm caused by the application of external violence. We are unable to separate a person's nerves and tensions from his body. Clearly, emotional trauma can be as disabling to the body as a visible physical wound. Moreover, it is common knowledge that emotional distress can and often does have a

517 A.2d at 1213-14.

When mental and psychological injury directly flows from a physical violation, those injuries are "bodily injuries":

direct effect on other bodily functions.

Accordingly, we are convinced that the term "bodily injury," as used in the policy, encompasses claims for emotional distress caused by an assault and battery.

517 A.2d at 1214.

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Likewise, the Louisiana case of Levy v. Duclaux, 324 S.2d 1 (La.App. 1975) demonstrates that coverage exists under the "bodily injury" insurance policy language for mental and psychological injuries which result from physical violation. In Levy, the plaintiff was minimally physically abused and suffered emotional and psychological injuries as a direct result:

When this language [bodily injury] is analyzed particularly in the light of the facts of the Nickens case as opposed to the instant case, we reach the conclusion that the term bodily injury in the policy of our insurer does include plaintiff's injuries. In the Nickens case there is absence of any contact between an external force or violence and distress plaintiffs sustained over the loss of their personal effects. plaintiffs were not at the premises at the time of the fire. In the instant case, the plaintiff was personally exposed to some minimal physical abuse as well as the external force of being accused a shoplifter in front of many witnesses. The damage instantly resulted from the application of that force. This situation is entirely different from when where a hypothetical plaintiff might hear that a hypothetical defendant had some weeks previously said that plaintiff was a thief, because the sudden humiliation, embarrassment and mental anguish did not set in immediately upon the direct application of the accusation. Perhaps the distinction being drawn can be made clearer by framing the Nickens case in a hypothetical variation of its facts. Suppose they made they exit from the premises without any physical injury but suffered such shock that sometime thereafter they experience nightmares and deep mental anguish as the result of the experience. Query: Would the results of the Nickens case have been the The facts of our case show that same?

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plaintiff's mental distress was accompanied by immediate external physical manifestations of crying and hysteria and her functions were outwardly affected for some time after the incident. Therefore, this case is distinguishable from the <u>Nickens</u> case and there is coverage.

324 S.2d 9-10.

The cases just discussed point out the distinction between the cases cited by the plaintiff and Carol Gabrielson's situation. The plaintiff cites the Washington case E-Z Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. The Travelers Indemnity Company, 106 Wn.2d 901, 726 P.2d 439 (1986) for the proposition that mental suffering is not a "bodily injury." In the E-Z Loader case, there was absolutely no physical violation of the plaintiff by the defendant. The plaintiff's injuries were purely emotional as the result of suffering discrimination.

Carol Gabrielson, on the other hand, suffered repeated physical violations, which directly resulted in emotional and psychological injuries. These sequelae are just as much direct injuries as pain and suffering from a broken leg, and the plaintiff's insurance must extend to Carol Gabrielson's injuries in like fashion.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied in all respects. As outlined in this memorandum, coverage is available for all acts complained of by Carol and Ira

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MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 18

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"Harold T. Dodge, Of Attorneys for

Defendants Ira and Carol Gabrielson

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PIENT COUNTY WASHINGTON

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AN. DECETT : "

The Honorable J. Kelly Arnold

SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR PIERCE COUNTY

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Pennsylvania Corporation,

Plaintiff,

No. 88-2-00947-9

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31 32 IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife, DONALD LEE BARNETT and BARBARA BARNETT, husband and wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a Washington Corporation,

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE WINCHELL

Defendants.

Defendants incorporate and refer this court to DEFENDANT BARNETTS' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' COUNTERMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT filed herein on April 7, 1988.

Defendants incorporate and refer this court to Its oral decision of April 15, 1988 denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, a transcription of which was filed herein on December 6, 1988.

Additionally, defendants move this court to strike the Affidavit of Bruce Winchell pursuant to CR 56 (e).

LAW AND ARGUMENT

This Court's oral decision of April 15, 1988 previously denied this same motion without prejudice in regard to factual issues regarding whether a bodily injury had been suffered. This BRIEF IN OPP TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT: 1 als15004857.80

Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S.

LAWYERS

 Court held that consequential damages for emotional distress are covered under the American Casualty policy.

American Casualty has re-noted the motion for summary judgment simply upon the basis that the jury in Pierce County cause number 86-2-02792-6 was not instructed with respect to physical injury. The jury made no finding of any kind with respect to this issue.

Summary judgment may be granted only when there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact. CR 56 (c). Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden in showing that summary judgment is proper. It has shown only that a factual issue relevant in this declaratory action was not determined in the underlying action. It does not follow that such lack of a determination establishes the factual issue which is in dispute.

Further, plaintiff submits materials with respect to the findings of the jury in the underlying case through the affidavit of Bruce Winchell. Mr. Winchell was not on the jury in the underlying case, and he was neither a party nor counsel to a party in that case. Consequently, he has no personal knowledge of the findings made by the jury in that case. Without such personal knowledge, he is not competent to testify by affidavit with respect to those proceedings. CR 56 (e).

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff submits only unresolved factual issues to this court for summary judgment, and plaintiff has submitted such issues improperly by a defective affidavit.

Therefore, defendants respectfully ask that this court strike the affidavit of Bruce Winchell and deny plaintiff's

BRIEF IN OPP TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT: 2 als15004857.80



 motion for summary judgment.

DATED this 6th day of December, 1988.

EVANS, CRAVEN & LACKIE, P.S.

TIMOTHY DONALDSON

Attorney for defendants

Barnett

BRIEF IN OPP TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT : 3 als15004857.80

Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S.

LAWYERS

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY PENNSYLVANIA, vs. IRA GABRIELSON, et al.		- 	RECEIVED SHINGTON FOR PIERCE COUNTY DEC 0 7 1988 AT LAW LAW OFFICES OF JOHN S. GLASSMAN A RE-NOTE OTE OF ISSUE AND STATEMENT OF ARBITRABILITY
,	Defendant	,	
NATURE OF CAUSEMotion	n for Partial S	- ummary Judgm	ment .
NATURE OF CAUSE		1	
JURY TRIAL: YES/No	0[]	IF YES,	6 JURORS[] 12 JURORS[]
ESTIMATED TIME TO TRY CA		,	
DATE REQUESTED FOR DOC		SSIGNMENT	Change from December 16, 1988 to January 6, 1989
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY:	NAME	Bruce Wi	
LAMITH SATIONNET.		Lane Powe	ll Moss & Miller
	ADDRESS	1301 Fift	
		<u>Seattle</u> ,	WA 98101
	TELEPHONE	(206) 223	-7000
DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY:	NAME	Daniel H	annula nula & Harkins
	ADDRESS	715 Tacom	a Avenue South
		Tacoma, W	A 98402
	TELEPHONE	(206) 838	-4790 ·
(NOTE: If additional attorneys in	volved, please note	on reverse side	·)
NAME OF PARTY BRINGING			
		BITRATION	
[] This case is subject to arbitratio twenty-five thousand dollars exc	n because the sole re	lief sought is a n	noney judgment and involves no claim in excess of costs.
[] This case is not subject to manda	tory arbitration beca	use:	
 Plaintiff's claim exceeds twen Plaintiff seeks relief other the Defendant's counter or cross Defendant's counter or cross 	an a money judgmen claim exceeds twent	t. y-five thousand o	
[] The undersigned contends that i twenty-five thousand dollars for			d dollars but hereby waives any claim in excess of
Al	BOVE INFORMATI	ION MUST BE	
•••••			·
	то ве сом	PLETED BY CLI	
Assigned To:			
Date:		By:	

List Additional Attorneys

Name: Rodney D. Hollenbeck Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S. Address: 34th Floor Columbia Center 702 5th Avenue Phone: Seattle, WA 98104 (206) 386-5555 Attorney For: Defendants Barnetts Name: John Glassman 625 Commerce Address: Old City Hall, Suite 420 Tacoma, WA 98402 Phone: (206) 572-2746 Attorney For: Defendant Community Chapel Name: Brian L. Meikle Girolamai, Wood & Meyers Address: Norton Clapp Law 949 Market, Suite 560 TAcoma, WA 98402 Phone: (206) 272-4205 Attorney For: Defendant McDonald Name: Address: Phone: Attorney For: Name: Address: Phone: Attorney For: Name:

Address:

Phone:

Attorney For:

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FILED IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERGECOUNTY CLERK'S OFFICE

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Pennsylvania corporation,

Plaintiff,

vs.

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife; DONALD LEE BARNETT and BARBARA) BARNETT, husband and wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a Washington corporation; JACK McDONALD and "JANE DOE" McDONALD. husband and wife,

Defendants.

A.M. DEC PIENUL JUJ TED RUTT

NO. 88-2-0094 PROPOSED ORDER DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

THIS MATTER having come before this Court on the 15th day of April, 1988, on motion of the plaintiff seeking summary judgment that the plaintiff's policy of insurance at issue in the above-entitled action does not cover emotional damages stemming from bodily injury; and the Court having considered the plaintiff's memoranda and affidavits in support of its motion, the memoranda and affidavit of

LAW OFFICES

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

715 TACOMA AVENUE SOUTH

TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98402

TACOMA 383-5388 SEATTLE 838-4790

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ORDER DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1

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defendants' in opposition to the motion; and the Court having heard oral argument of counsel both in support of and in opposition to the motion; and the Court being in all things fully advised, it is, therefore,

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the plaintiff's motion is denied, and it is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the consequential damages, including emotional damages suffered as a consequence of inappropriate invasion of Carol Gabrielson's bodily integrity as alleged in Gabrielson, et ux, vs. Community Chapel and Bible Training Center, et al, Pierce County Superior Court Cause No. 86-2-02792-6, are covered items of damages within the terms of plaintiff's policy of insurance at issue herein.

DONE IN OPEN COURT this _____ day of December, 1988.

HONORABLE J. KELLEY ARNOLD

Presented by: RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

By:_

DANIEL L. HANNULA Of Attorneys for Defendants

Gabrielson

///

ORDER DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2

LAW OFFICES

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

715 TACOMA AVENUE SOUTH

TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98402

TACOMA 383-5388 SEATTLE 838-4790

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3	APPROVED AS TO FORM:
4	LANE, POWELL, MOSS & MILLER
5	By:
6	BRUCE WINCHELL Attorney for Plaintiff
7	EVANS, CRAVEN & LACKIE
8	
9	By:TIMOTHY DONALDSON
10	Attorney for Defendant Barnett
ונו	
12	By:
13	JOHN GLASSMAN Attorney for Defendant
14	Community Chapel
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ORDER DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3

LAW OFFICES

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

715 TACOMA AVENUE SOUTH
TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98402
TACOMA 383-5388
SEATTLE 838-4790

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
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IN COUNTY CLERK'S OFFICE

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Pennsylvania corporation,

Plaintiff,

No. 88-2-00947-9

vs.

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife; DONALD LEE BARNETT and BARBARA BARNETT, husband and wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL and BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a Washington corporation,

Defendants.

NOTICE OF PRESENTATION

TO: BRUCE WINCHELL, DANIEL HANNULA AND JOHN GLASSMAN;

YOU AND EACH OF YOU PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will present for entry in the above-entitled matter as follows:

DOCUMENT: ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY PLAINTIFF

RE: BODILY INJURY;

BEFORE HONORABLE: J. Kelley Arnold;

LOCATION: ROOM: 217 OF THE Pierce County Courthouse;

AT THE FOLLOWING DATE AND TIME: Friday, December 16, 1988 at 9:30 a.m.

DATED this 7th day of December, 1988.

EVANS, CRAVEN & LACKIE, P.S.

TIM DONALDSON

Attorneys for defendants Barnett

NOTICE OF PRESENTATION : 1 als15004857.NOP

Evans. Craven & Lackie, P.S.

LAWYERS

PROPOSED

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Pennsylvania corporation,

Plaintiff,

vs.

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IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife; DONALD LEE BARNETT and BARBARA BARNETT, husband and wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL and BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a Washington corporation,

Defendants.

88-2-00947-9 No.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY PLAINTIFF RE: BODILY INJURY

Ι. HEARING

- April 15, 1988. 1.1 <u>Date.</u>
- Plaintiff appeared through its counsel Lane, 1.2 Appearances. Powell, Moss & Miller by Bruce Winchell. Defendants, Ira and Carol Gabrielson, appeared through their attorneys Rush, Hannula & Harkins by Dan Hannula. Defendants, Donald Lee Barnett and Barbara Barnett, appeared through their attorneys Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S. by Tim Donaldson. Defendant, Community Chapel and Bible Training Center, appeared through their attorneys Leach, Brown & Andersen by David Andersen.
- 1.3 Purpose. To consider MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT of American Casualty Company filed herein on March 30, 1988.
- 1.4 Evidence. AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE WINCHELL filed herein on March

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER:

Evans, Craven & Lackie P.S.

LAWYERS

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30, 1988. AFFIDAVIT OF HAROLD T. DODGE, JR. IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT filed herein on April 8, 1988. AFFIDAVIT OF PHILIP G. LINDSAY, M.D. filed herein on April 8, 1988.

1.5 Authorities Considered. Authorities contained in MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF AMERICAN'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT filed herein on March 30, 1988, DEFENDANT GABRIELSONS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT filed herein on April 8, 1988, DEFENDANT COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT filed herein on April 8, 1988, DEFENDANT BARNETTS' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' COUNTERMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT filed herein on April 7, 1988, and REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (BODILY INJURY) filed herein on April 13, 1988.

II. FINDINGS

2.1 <u>Decision</u>. This Court's oral decision which was transcribed and filed herein on December 6, 1988 is adopted and incorporated herein.

III. ORDER

On the basis of the forgoing findings, it is ordered and declared:

3.1 American Casualty Company of Reading Pennsylvania policy number IP502144020 provides coverage for emotional distress and mental suffering which is consequential to bodily injury.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER: 2



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3.2 The MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT of American Casualty
Company is denied without prejudice to the respect that this
court does not presently determine whether a bodily injury has
occurred.
DATED this day of December, 1988.
HONODADLE T VELLEY ADNOLD
HONORABLE J. KELLEY ARNOLD
Presented by
EVANS, CRAVEN & LACKIE P.S.
TIM DONALDSON

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER: 3

Evans. Craven & Lackie. P.S.

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\ \		
AMERICAN CASUALTY CO		- \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \
Pennsylvania corpora		, \
vs.	·	
IRA GABRIELSON and C	AROL GABRIELS	NOTE OF ISSUE AND STATEMENT OF ARBITRABILITY
et al,		,
	Defendan	t. /
NATURE OF CAUSEPre	sentation of	Order Denying Summary Judgment
JURY TRIAL: YES/N	10[IF YES, 6 JURORS[] 12 JURORS[]
ESTIMATED TIME TO TRY C	CAUSE	
DATE REQUESTED FOR DO	CKET MOTION/A	V ASSIGNMENT <u>DECEMBER 1-6, 1988</u>
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY:	NAME	BRUCE WINCHELL
	ADDRESS	3800 Rainier Bank Tower
		Seattle, WA 98101
	TELEPHONE	
DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY:		Seattle, WA 98101
DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY:	TELEPHONE	Seattle, WA 98101 223-7380
DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY:	TELEPHONE NAME	Seattle, WA 98101 223-7380 DANIEL L. HANNULA, Attorney for Gabrielson
DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY:	TELEPHONE NAME	Seattle, WA 98101 223-7380 DANIEL L. HANNULA, Attorney for Gabrielson 715 Tacoma Avenue South
	TELEPHONE NAME ADDRESS TELEPHONE	Seattle, WA 98101 223-7380 DANIEL L. HANNULA, Attorney for Gabrielso 715 Tacoma Avenue South Tacoma, WA 98402 383-5388
(NOTE: If additional attorneys in	TELEPHONE NAME ADDRESS TELEPHONE nvolved, please note	Seattle, WA 98101 223-7380 DANIEL L. HANNULA, Attorney for Gabrielso 715 Tacoma Avenue South Tacoma, WA 98402 383-5388 e on reverse side)
(NOTE: If additional attorneys in	TELEPHONE NAME ADDRESS TELEPHONE nvolved, please note MOTION:	Seattle, WA 98101 223-7380 DANIEL L. HANNULA, Attorney for Gabrielso 715 Tacoma Avenue South Tacoma, WA 98402 383-5388
(NOTE: If additional attorneys in NAME OF PARTY BRINGING	TELEPHONE NAME ADDRESS TELEPHONE nvolved, please note MOTION: AR on because the sole r	Seattle, WA 98101 223-7380 DANIEL L. HANNULA, Attorney for Gabriels of Tacoma Avenue South Tacoma, WA 98402 383-5388 e on reverse side) Defendants Gabrielson RBITRATION relief sought is a money judgment and involves no claim in excess of
(NOTE: If additional attorneys in NAME OF PARTY BRINGING	TELEPHONE NAME ADDRESS TELEPHONE nvolved, please note MOTION: AR on because the sole reclusive of attorney fee	Seattle, WA 98101 223-7380 DANIEL L. HANNULA, Attorney for Gabriels of Tacoma Avenue South Tacoma, WA 98402 383-5388 e on reverse side) Defendants Gabrielson RBITRATION relief sought is a money judgment and involves no claim in excess of ees, interests and costs.
(NOTE: If additional attorneys in NAME OF PARTY BRINGING [] This case is subject to arbitrati twenty-five thousand dollars ex [] This case is not subject to mand [] Plaintiff's claim exceeds tw [] Plaintiff seeks relief other to the counter or crooled and	TELEPHONE NAME ADDRESS TELEPHONE nvolved, please note MOTION: AR on because the sole reclusive of attorney feel attorney feel attorney feel attorney feel attorney arbitration become the sole of the sole of attorney feel attorney arbitration become seed at the sole of the sol	Seattle, WA 98101 223-7380 DANIEL L. HANNULA, Attorney for Gabriels of Tist Tacoma Avenue South Tacoma, WA 98402 383-5388 e on reverse side) Defendants Gabrielson BITRATION relief sought is a money judgment and involves no claim in excess of ees, interests and costs. rause: other than a money judgment. set Tist Tist Tist Tist Tist Tist Tist Tis
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List Additional	Attorneys
Name:	TIMOTHY DONALDSON
Address:	3100 Columbia Center, 701 Fifth Avenue, Seattle, WA
Phone:	386-5555
Attorney For:	Defendant Barnett
Name:	JOHN S. GLASSMAN
Address:	625 Commerce, Old City Hall, #240, Tacoma, WA 98402
Phone:	572-2746
Attorney For:	Defendant Community Chapel
Name:	
Address:	;
Phone:	
Attorney For:	
Name:	,
Address:	•
Phone:	
Attorney For:	
Name:	
Address:	•
Phone:	-
Attorney For:	
Name:	
Address:	
Phone:	

WA 98104

STATE OF WASHINGTON SS COUNTY OF PIERCE
The undersigned, being first Notary Public in and for the State of Washington
My commission expires

Z-271b

Attorney For:



IN COUNTY CLERK'S OFFICE

A.M. DEC 1 5 1988 P.M.

"J.R. DEC 15 1988

TED RUTT COUNTY CLERK
BY______DEPUTY

No.

WINCHELL

88-2-00947-9

AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE

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SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR PIERCE COUNTY

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Pennsylvania corporation,

Plaintiff,

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL
GABRIELSON, husband and wife;
DONALD LEE BARNETT, husband and
wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND
BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a
Washington Corporation, JACK
McDONALD and "JANE DOE" McDONALD,

Defendants.

STATE OF WASHINGTON

husband and wife,

, ss.

COUNTY OF KING

BRUCE WINCHELL, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:

I am one of the attorneys for plaintiff American
 Casualty Company.

AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE WINCHELL - 1 0301BAW

ORIGINAL

LANE POWELL MOSS & MILLER 3800 RAINIER BANK TOWER 1301 FIFTH AVENUE SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101-2647 (206) 223-7000

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- 3. The only issues that were before the court on April 15, were American Casualty's motion for partial summary judgment in which it asked for a declaration that damages for emotional distress were not covered bodily injuries and defendant Barnett's counter-motion for partial summary judgment "on the basis that the American policy covers consequential damages to bodily injury, including emotional distress and loss of consortium." Defendant Barnetts' Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendant's Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment, page 2. court denied American's motion and did not grant Barnett's counter-motion. Accordingly, the only order which ought to be entered is one denying American's motion without prejudice. No other ruling was made on April 15, 1988. No motion for reconsideration was brought by Barnett or any other party.
- 4. Accordingly, American Casualty submits that the court ought to enter the order proposed by Barnett except that paragraphs 2.1 and 3.1 ought to be deleted. If Barnett wishes

AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE WINCHELL - 2

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to renew its motion which was first heard by this court on April 15, it must do so on 21 days notice as provided in the civil rules. It should not be permitted to skirt those notice requirements through what is in effect is a belated motion for reconsideration. The reason paragraph 2.1 which is denominated findings should be deleted is because Civil Rule 52(a)(5)(B) expressly states that findings of fact and conclusions of law are not necessary with respect to a decision on a motion for summary judgment.

DATED this day of December 1988.

LANE POWELL MOSS & MILLER

Bruce Winchell
Attorneys for Plaintiff

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me: 12/14/88

NOTARY PUBLIC in and for the State of Washington, residing at

My appointment expires: 5/8/89

AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE WINCHELL - 0301BAW

J.R. DEC 19 1988



IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE IN COUNTY CLERKS OFFICE

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING, PENNSYLVANIA,

Plaintiff,

vs

IRA GABRIELSON, et ux, et al,

Defendants.

PHEROLEGIOUNTY WASHINGTON TED ADTT, COUNTY CLERK

No: 88-2-00947-9

ORIGINAL

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 15th day of April, 1988, the following proceedings were held before the Honorable J. KELLY ARNOLD, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Washington, in and for the County of Pierce, sitting in Department 9.

The Plaintiff was represented by their attorney, BRUCE WINCHELL;

The Defendants were represented by their respective attorneys, DANIEL HANNULA, TIMOTHY DONALDSON, DAVID ANDERSON;

WHEREUPON, the following proceedings were had, to wit:

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PROCEEDINGS

(April 15, 1988)

THE COURT: This is cause number 88-2-00947-9.

American Casualty versus Gabrielson, Barnett, Community

Chapel and Bible Training Center. It is here on the plaintiff's motion.

Counsel, for the record, I have reviewed the materials submitted to the Court in support of and in response to the motion and I am ready to hear from you.

MR. WINCHELL: Your Honor, my name is Bruce Winchell, I represent American Casualty. Although the relief we are seeking this morning is quite narrow in terms of legal issue. I suppose broadly what is at issue in the declaratory action in total is more of a policy question as to the extent which comprehensive general liability policy ought to indemnify an insurer for damages arising out of allegations of sexual misconduct.

Here today however we are only asking the Court to rule upon the question of whether coverage for bodily injury includes coverage for emotional harm that arises out of, primarily, allegations of sexual misconduct on behalf of an employee of the insured corporation.

We are not asking the Court today to in any way rule upon the personal injury coverage which is provided to Community Chapel and their employees for acts which occur

within the scope of their duties. That is not affected by anything the Court will do here today.

We also are not asking the Court to in any way rule upon any physical injuries, any pain and suffering of any sort that Carol Gabrielson may have sustained as a result of any of these allegations.

I recognize the Court has reviewed the materials.

They are voluminous. I think it probably is helpful to very briefly take a look at some of the allegations of the complaint because we are here just on the record as it's set forth in the complaint, and the coverage as set forth in the policy. It breaks down into several categories.

First of all, Carol Gabrielson alleges that Jack McDonald held himself out as a qualified counselor, became aware of her vulnerability and then, quoting from paragraph 12, "Defendant Jack McDonald took advantage of her weakness and her need for support and manipulated her into leaving her husband." And then in the following paragraph, "Further, as a result of the manipulation by Defendant Jack McDonald, Plaintiff Carol Gabrielson was coerced and unduly influenced into having a sexual relationship with Defendant Jack McDonald. This relationship continued from September through December of 1985."

Now, apparently sometime after that Carol Gabrielson

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had what is called disfellowship from the Tacoma Chapel. She then later requested apparently to come up to the Burien Chapel. And when she was at the Burien Chapel it's alleged in the complaint, on March 6 of 1986, the following year, she stated that she was physically assaulted by Defendants John Doe's 1 through 4.

Now, the connection to Donald Barnett and the Community Chapel up in Burien, which is a separate corporation from the Tacoma corporation, as set forth in paragraph 14, where it said that "Donald Barnett expressly encouraged married members of the congregation to form intimate attachments with persons other than spouses."

And finally, your Honor, there is an allegation of defamation relating to disparaging remarks that were supposedly made by Jack McDonald and Donald Barnett. And her ex-husband, Ira Gabrielson, asserts a claim for loss of consortium.

Now, as I mentioned, there are two basic coverages at issue. The first is coverage for personal injury that relates generally to coverage for damages arising out of things such as false imprisonment and defamation. Those are probably the two that are particularly at issue here. That will not be affected in any way. We are not asking the Court to rule in any way upon the extended coverage under the personal injury protection.

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We are asking the Court to rule upon the bodily injury provision. And I have written the relevant clause up on the board there. The provision states that coverage is provided for sums which the insurer shall be legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury caused by an occurrence.

An occurrence is subsequently defined as an accident which results in unexpected harm. I would emphasize the words "caused by an occurrence" because that's where you see the causation link in this policy.

First we say what kind of damages are covered, and then in the words "caused by an occurrence," it is set forth what type of activities may give rise to bodily injury which will result in coverage.

This is confirmed, your Honor, because when you go down to the definition of bodily injury, it doesn't talk in any way about something that arises in a particular way. It defines bodily injury as a type of damage, and it's bodily injury meaning bodily injury, sickness or disease. It's clearly a type of damage.

Now, this issue came before the Supreme Court less than two years ago. It was an Easy Loader case which is at 106 Wn 2d 901, and a particular holding is at page 908. That was a sex discrimination—sex and employment discrimination case and there was a jury verdict in favor

of the Plaintiffs in the amount of \$148,000. It was for lost earnings and mental anguish. And the Court said the policies— and these are the exact same provisions, your Honor, we have the same definition of bodily injury, the same definition of occurrence, so really exactly the same words. "The policies were never intended to cover any mental or emotional upset, mental anguish and illness and emotional distress are not covered by the express terms of travelers policy."

Now, the defendants in this action purport to draw a distinction with the travelers case by saying well there you don't have some physical contact, and they make reference to this three months of sexual activity and the ejectment from the Burien Chapel on March 6. But that distinction is disposed of, your Honor, in the Buchannon case, because that case, which is at 11 Wn App 823, and holdings are at 824 to 825, is that was a case in which a daughter was undisputably injured in a car accident.

A claim was made under an uninsured motorist provision and the policy provided coverage for bodily injury, \$15,000 per person and \$30,000 per occurrence.

No doubt that the daughter gets her \$15,000. Parents come along and say we were injured too as a result of her bodily injury and therefore we are making a claim for our mental anguish under her bodily injury coverage. And the

Court says no, that is not an item of damage which is covered under a bodily injury policy.

Again, there we have the exact same words, "coverage is provided for damages because of bodily injury." That case really deals with the distinction that the defendants are purporting to draw here. It's a distinction that makes no sense because we are talking about damages, and not damages which arise in a particular manner.

Regardless of what the Court rules today the ninth cause of action for Mr. Gabrielson's loss of consortium claim ought to be disposed of. Coverage cannot be provided under the bodily injury provisions for Mr. Gabrielson because there is no allegation in the complaint as to him that there was any physical contact. So even if the Court should disregard the Buchannon case and the clear language of Easy Loader, the ninth cause of action with respect to bodily injury coverage is not covered. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Hannula?

MR. HANNULA: My name is Dan Hannula and I am representing Carol and Ira Gabrielson. Since we are the first named defendants we will proceed.

Your Honor, the issue in this partial summary judgment motion is very, very narrow and I think that is extremely significant for this Court. The Plaintiff

American is asking for two things, and he says that very clearly in his memorandum. He states that he wants this Court to declare that the insurance company is not liable for damages under any cause of action for any mental or emotional upset or lost earnings which plaintiff recovers in judgment. The second is a declaration of non-coverage for loss of consortium.

Your Honor, what counsel fails to advise this Court is that bodily injury, as defined in this policy, clearly covers emotional injury which arises from a physical injury. I think that's the real significance in this motion, your Honor.

In essence in a bodily injury claim any consequential damages, any damages that flow from that bodily injury, are recoverable under this particular part of the policy. The two cases that he has cited I think are totally misrepresentative of the facts in our case.

In our case, your Honor, in essence, in every one of the causes of action, including that of loss of consortium, they arise as a consequence of induced physical sexual contact between one of the defendants in the main action and my client, Carol Gabrielson. And second, the emotional injuries arise out of a false imprisonment and assault and battery which occurred at the church in Burien on March 6 of 1986.

The two cases he cites are Easy Loader and Buchannon versus Western American. In Easy Loader, your Honor, there was absolutely no physical injury. It was merely a case where the plaintiff was complaining of mental and emotional suffering and there was absolutely no physical contact or physical injury of any kind. It clearly does not apply in this case.

Second, the Buchannon versus Western American case I think has been totally misrepresented by the plaintiff. Your Honor, that was a case in which a child was injured in a car accident. Obviously her injuries exceeded the policy limit, you know, as well as policy like 25/50, that is one person can recover no more than let's say 25. I don't know if that was the amount, but this is in essence what the case was about. The girl obviously had injuries and damages in excess of \$25,000, so she recovered that \$25,000.

Well, the parents-- the lawyer, you know, I think in somewhat novel argument said, well, the parents also have a claim because they suffered because they had to watch their daughter experience this physical pain and suffering. So they wanted to go for the other \$25,000 as a separate cause of action. What the court said was you can't do that because you didn't suffer physical injury. But very clearly the court indicated that with respect to

that first \$25,000 the plaintiff's had a cause of action which was recoverable under that policy for their consequential damages.

In other words their loss of— it's not loss of consortium, but let's say the impact that the affect of the destruction or at least the partial destruction of parent—child relationship was a recoverable item under the policy but only as a consequential damage of the bodily injury and therefore it came within that first \$25,000. Again, very significantly in that case the parents were not physically injured as we have in this case.

We have cited several cases and the other defendants have cited several cases which clearly set forth—and Yakima Cement versus Great American is one, but clearly set forth the proposition that under a bodily injury policy any emotional suffering, any consequential damages of any kind that arise out of a physical injury are recoverable under the bodily injury portion of the policy.

Now, Mr. Winchell says we are here only on the bodily injury coverage. We are not here on the personal injury coverage. He makes that distinction. That's arguably somewhat seductive, but what is very important, and the Court should be aware, is that the bodily injury coverage is very broad coverage.

The personal injury coverage which he says is not at

issue here, and I agree with him on that, is very limited coverage. And your Honor, under the circumstances— and this is in essence a 12(b) motion, that's all it is. He's done no discovery whatsoever. He's presented no facts to this Court about this case. All he is saying is that if you look at the pleadings under all those causes of action, under bodily injury coverage, you are not entitled to emotional pain and suffering, you are not entitled to recover.

But if you look at our pleadings, and that's all the Court can do at this stage, you look at the pleadings and it's clear that the emotional suffering that we are seeking damages for arises out of the physical injuries that we discussed and the elicited sexual contact, the coercive sexual contact, and the false imprisonment and assault and battery which occurred on church property. And therefore, your Honor, this motion for summary judgment, which is really not a motion for summary judgment, should fail.

I want to add one more thing, your Honor. I think it's very important for the Court to be aware of because I think that this proceeding ought to be held in abeyance until the other main case is tried. And I think the Court should be aware of this.

We have been involved in an incredible amount of

discovery over the past five or six months. There has been no issue of insurance coverage until about 30 days ago. That's the first-- really in essence that's when the issue of coverage became an issue in this case. A concern obviously for the plaintiff because if there is insurance money it's always easier to recover a judgment. But when we were involved in discovery we were not taking depositions specific with reference to whether or not there was insurance coverage or focusing on the issue of whether or not these acts were going to be considered covered under the policy.

Now, within 30 days they bring this motion, in essence a motion on the pleadings, when in the complaint in the case we as plaintiffs and the rest of these defendants are taking depositions this week-- we took depositions every day, ten hours a day, and each one of these defendants is an insured under this particular policy.

All of their resourses and all of our resources are focused on a case which is being tried on May 18 of this year. And the way it's going it could conceivably take two months for this insurance company to make us as plaintiff's, and probably even more of significance the defendants which they insure, now redirect their attention to a declaratory judgment action, which materially affects

them, one month before trial when we are engaged in night and day discovery, literally night and day discovery. I think is outrageous and is one of the strongest cases of bad faith that I personally have ever seen, your Honor, and I say that with a lot of conviction.

What I am really asking this Court to do is to hold off-- and another thing is he suggests he's going to take this piecemeal. In other words, he's going to break down coverage a piece at a time. In other words, we have to go through this. We have a volume like this for one motion and apparently he is going to keep bringing us back into court little by little and continue to make us focus our energy on this case when we have a trial a month from now.

What I'm asking the Court is obviously depending on what the Court rules here today, but I am asking this Court to hold this in abeyance until the other case is tried— until the energies which are being focused 100 percent of the time can continue to be focused. And I think then they may speak to it, but I think there is a strong issue of bad faith in this circumstance, your Honor.

THE COURT: When was the other case filed?

MR. HANNULA: The other case was filed

approximately 18 months ago. I may be not completely

accurate but it's at least 18 months ago. We had a trial

date in November and it was-- well, yeah, we had a trial date in November. It was continued to April and now it's been continued to May, but this case last been ongoing for at least 18 months, if not longer.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. DONALDSON: Your Honor, my name is Tim

Donaldson. I am here on behalf of Don and Barbara

Barnett. And this is a very limited issue and I have a very limited argument.

Before I start though I want to make a correction.

What Mr. Winchell has said the policy reads, it does not say it pays sums. It says "all sums which arise because of bodily injury."

The issue here is not whether or not it covers a separate claim for emotional distress. The issue here is whether or not this policy covers emotional distress damages which arise from a bodily injury.

The situation is totally distinguishable from the Easy Loader case in which there was no physical injury at all. There was no bodily injury.

In this case there have been allegations of sexual assault. There have been allegations of physical assault. And the question is does the policy-- does it just cover bodily injury or does it cover all the "all sums" arising out of that bodily injury? And the question is whether

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consequential damages are covered.

Mr. Winchell has cited Western American, and I'm not going to belabor Western American except to the point that all that that case said was that the consortium damages did not constitute a separate bodily injury. They were covered under the single limit of liability as a consequential damage.

There is other authority in the State of Washington, and I have cited in my brief Zoda versus Mutual of Enumclaw, United Pacific versus Edgecomb, which holds the same thing. Consortium damages which arise out of a spouse's bodily injury are covered under that limit of liability as a consequential damage.

Now, Yakima Cement versus Great American Insurance Company set down the rule on consequential damages. there is something -- if there is some allegation which triggers coverage under the policy, in this instance a bodily injury, all consequential damages which resulted from that bodily injury are covered.

In that case it was the similar policy but a different provision. It was injury to tangible property. In that case they said you have shown an injury to tangible property all consequential damages to that are also covered.

I'm not going to belabor it anymore except to say

that the issue here is not whether or not this policy covers separate claims for emotional distress. The question here is whether or not it covers consequential damages for an allegation of bodily injury. The policy itself and the case law in the state makes it very clear that consequential damages, including the emotional distress and including the loss of consortium are covered.

THE COURT: Thank you. Counsel?

MR. ANDERSON: My name is David Anderson, for the record. Very briefly and very simply the plaintiff has not met the burden of proof in a summary judgment motion. It has not shown there is an absence of factual issues with respect to the claim for emotional distress. Particularly it has not shown that sexual activity is not a bodily injury.

Mr. Hannula said this is really a 12(b) motion and there was an allegation in the third cause of action that McDonald negligent counseling created unreasonable risk of physical and mental harm. There is that allegation of physical harm certainly. We have cited cases from other jurisdictions which have no trouble finding coverage for emotional distress which comes up under the term bodily injury, especially if there is physical contact which initiated or started that emotional distress, and especially a physical symptom manifests such distress.

Lastly without repeating, going over all the other points that we have made, I just say personal policy defines bodily injury in part by the term bodily injury. I think that's inherently ambiguous. Other courts that we have cited said the same. There is no specific exclusion for injuries regarding mental distress. I believe there is coverage. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Graffe?

MR. GRAFFE: Your Honor, if I can be heard real briefly. I don't represent a party to this case, as the Court probably is aware. I do represent the Alskog family in a case that's been brought in King County. There were three underlying cases that have been consolidated. A similar declaratory action was recently filed in King County and I represent Mr. Alskog in that declaratory action. It was filed last month. Not all the defendants have appeared.

I have forwarded my initial discovery to the plaintiff insurance company and we haven't heard a response yet. There are different plaintiffs in the underlying action so there are different defendants in the declaratory. There are some different defendants in the declaratory, and there are some common defendants in the declaratory.

I am here because I am very concerned about the

practical impact of a ruling here on a judge in King
County. And I was also down here for the discovery
motion, but that was heard another day. Although it's
probably not legally res judicata or collateral estoppel
because we are not a party, because of the notoriety of
the case and ability of this department I am very
concerned that there will be a practical impact in King
County. If Mr. Winchell gets this motion here, that will
be the order which will be, I'm sure, appended to his
motion for summary judgment in the King County cases
without having the party an opportunity to object to the
motion down here.

So I concur with Mr. Hannula that this case should be set over, at a very minimum until the King County defendants have at least appeared. They haven't all appeared. At a very minimum until the plaintiff insurance company responds to the discovery so that we can see if there is something to be concerned about.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Winchell, response?

MR. WINCHELL: I'll try to be brief and I'll try
to address the points I think are probably relevant to
you, your Honor. I will not respond to the allegation of
bad faith because Mr. Hannula has had this case for 18
months. He took only one deposition apparently in the
first 14 months. And we have been caught by surprise, as

probably many people were, by the way this thing broke in the press and that's the reason for the timing of this.

The key, however, to your Honor's ruling this morning is in the Easy Loader case. It does come down to the question, your Honor, of whether the Easy Loader case directed it's ruling and it's holding.

We ask you to sign an order which quotes verbatim from that case whether it's holding was directed to a particular type of damage or to damage which arose in a particular type of way.

The court in the Easy Loader case said the plaintiff's sued Easy Loader for loss of earnings, humiliation, mental anguish and emotional distress. There is no discussion there about the plaintiff sued for employment discrimination. The court is talking about the items of damage that were sued for. And then right after saying these are the items of damage that were sued for the court, talking about the bodily injury provision, says the policies at issue were never intended to cover loss of earnings for any mental or emotional upset. That's what we are asking you to hold today.

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. I'm familiar with the Easy Loader case and Mr. Winchell, I disagree with your position that that stands for the proposition to support your motion in this case. It is a case where

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there was no physical contact, and I believe that language that you just cited presupposes from the other language in the case that that's inferentially part of that language.

With regard to the question of whether or not the Court should grant-- whether we call it a partial summary judgment or 12(b) motion -- the Court is going to deny it. I am denying it on the basis that I don't believe the cases cited by the plaintiff insurance company support the proposition that consequential damages arising out of the kind of conduct alleged are not covered. And secondly, but certainly not primarily, and my decision doesn't turn on this and I perhaps don't even need to say this because I suppose my ruling would be the same either way, but if I had any doubt about my position that I have already expressed, which I don't, I would be concerned about the fact that the motion comes on a Monday before trial in the underlying case. I think that flies in the face of the orderly processing of litigation and the rights of all parties to have their cases disposed of.

And it may well be, and I certainly don't take issue, Mr. Winchell, with the fact that there was a long dry spell. I don't know about that, but I will accept that in terms of discovery, but the issues that you have asked the Court to consider are those that were set forth in the pleadings, and the pleadings have been available from the

outset.

The Court, although perhaps there have been some amendments along the way, the Court on that basis will deny the motion. And I'm sure you are going to ask because I haven't specifically addressed the issue of Mr. Gabrielson's claim and how that fits into all of this. I frankly think that's a closer question. But I'm not satisfied that the Buchannon case and the Easy Loader case when read in conjunction with one another really address this situation. I think the facts were different. I think the context in which the issues arose, given the nature of coverage, was different, and on that basis the Court will deny both prongs of the motion.

MR. WINCHELL: Your Honor, just a clarification on your ruling. I take it the denial of the motion at this stage is without prejudice for us to go conduct our discovery and come back at least as to the sexual activities claimed and to then address the question of whether those sexual activities, absent some other discernible injury constitutes a bodily injury to the policy.

THE COURT: Well, certainly it's not appropriate for the Court to make factual determinations about what happened in ruling on a motion such as this. If we do that, the Court literally would have to try the underlying

case in this case, and that's not why we are here.

The ruling would be without prejudice to have the Court reconsider your position as discovery progresses.

MR. WINCHELL: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you all, counsel.

(End of motion)

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Pennsylvania corporation,

VOL 383 PAGE

Plaintiff,

No. 88-2-00947-9

vs.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY PLAINTIFF RE: BODILY INJURY

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife; DONALD LEE BARNETT and BARBARA BARNETT, husband and wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL and BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a Washington corporation,

Defendants.



I. HEARING

- 1.1 <u>Date.</u> April 15, 1988.
- 1.2 Appearances. Plaintiff appeared through its counsel Lane, Powell, Moss & Miller by Bruce Winchell. Defendants, Ira and Carol Gabrielson, appeared through their attorneys Rush, Hannula & Harkins by Dan Hannula. Defendants, Donald Lee Barnett and Barbara Barnett, appeared through their attorneys Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S. by Tim Donaldson. Defendant, Community Chapel and Bible Training Center, appeared through their attorneys Leach, Brown & Andersen by David Andersen.
- 1.3 <u>Purpose.</u> To consider MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT of American Casualty Company filed herein on March 30, 1988.
- 1.4 Evidence, AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE WINCHELL filed herein on March

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER: 1

Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S.

LAWYERS

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1.5 Authorities Considered. Authorities contained in MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF AMERICAN'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT filed herein on March 30, 1988, DEFENDANT GABRIELSONS' TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION MOTION FOR JUDGMENT filed herein on April 8, 1988, DEFENDANT COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT filed herein on April 8, DEFENDANT BARNETTS' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND COUNTERMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT filed herein on April 7, 1988, and REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (BODILY INJURY) filed herein on April 13, 1988.

II. FINDINGS

2.1 <u>Decision</u>. This Court's oral decision which was transcribed and filed herein on December 6, 1988 is adopted and incorporated herein.

III. ORDER

On the basis of the forgoing findings, it is ordered and declared:

3.1 American Casualty Company of Reading Pennsylvania policy number IP502144020 provides coverage for emotional distress, mental suffering, and loss of consortium which is consequential SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER: 2

Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S.

to bodily injury.

3.2 The MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT of American Casualty Company is denied without prejudice to the respect that this court does not presently determine whether a bodily injury has occurred.

DATED this ______ day of December, 1988.

HONORABLE J. KELLEY ARNOLD

Presented by

EVANS, CRAVEN & LACKIE P.S.

TIM DONALDSON

TIM DONALDSON

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DEPT. 9
IN OPEN COURT

DEC 16 1988

Pierce County Clerk

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SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER:

Evans, Craven & Lachie, P.S.

LAWYERS

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY of READING, PENNSYLVANIA,

Plaintiff,

VS

IRA GABRIELSON, et ux, et al,

Defendants.

COPY RECEIVED

No: 88-2-00947-9 1823

Excerpt AP For Box 200

ORAL DESTINOPEN COURT

DEC 16 1988

Pierce County Clerk

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The Plaintiff was represented by their attorney, BRUCE WINCHELL;

The Defendants were represented by their attorneys, DANIEL HANNULA, TIMOTHY DONALDSON;

WHEREUPON, the following proceedings were had, to wit:

CATHERINE M. VERNON & ASSOCIATES

COURT REPORTERS
318-19TH AVENUE S.E.
PUYALLUP, WASHINGTON 98371

PROCEEDINGS

(April 15, 1988)

with the Easy Loader case and, Mr. Winchell, I disagree with your position that that stands for the proposition to support your motion in this case. It is a case where there was no physical contact, and I believe that language that I just cited presupposes from the other language in the case that that's inferentially part of that language.

With regard to the question of whether or not the Court should grant— whether we call it a partial summary judgment or 12(b) motion— the Court is going to deny it. I'm denying it on the basis that I don't believe the cases cited by the plaintiff insurance company support the proposition that consequential damages arising out of the kind of conduct alleged are not covered. And secondly but certainly not primarily, and my decision doesn't turn on this, and I perhaps don't even need to say this because I suppose my ruling would be the same either way, but if I had any doubt about my position that I have already expressed, which I don't, I would be concerned about the fact that the motion comes on a Monday before trial in the underlying case. I think that flies in the face

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MR. WINCHELL: Your Honor, just a clarification on your ruling. I take it the denial of the motion at this stage is without prejudice for us to go conduct our discovery and come back, at least as to sexual

activity claim, and to then address the question of whether those sexual activities, absent some other discernable injury, constitutes a bodily injury to the policy? THE COURT: Well, certainly it's not appropriate for the Court to make factual determinations about what happened in ruling on a motion such as this. If we do that, the Court literally would have to try the underlying case in this case, and that's not why we are here. The ruling would be without prejudice to have the Court recover your position as discovery progresses. MR. WINCHELL: Thank you, your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you all, counsel. (Motion concluded)

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GUUS OU KEE

AM. DEC 30 1988

SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR PIERCE COUNTY

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF)
READING PENNSYLVANIA, a)
Pennsylvania corporation,)

Plaintiff,

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL)
GABRIELSON, husband and wife;)
DONALD LEE BARNETT and)
BARBARA BARNETT, husband and)
wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL and)
BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a)
Washington corporation,)

Defendants.

NO. 88-2-00947-9

AMERICAN CASUALTY'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I.

INTRODUCTION

Since this motion was originally renoted, the court has entered an order on the original motion, which was heard on May 15, 1988. That order provides that damages for emotional distress which are consequential to a bodily injury are covered under American's policy. The issue thus presented is narrowed to the question of whether the jury found that there was a

AMERICAN CASUALTY'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF - 1
01S:0984p

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covered bodily injury for which Carol and Ira Gabrielson received judgment.

II.

COMPLAINT

Gabrielsons' complaint in the underlying action is attached to the supplemental affidavit of Bruce Winchell as Exhibit A.

The substantive allegations against defendant Jack McDonald are contained in paragraph nos. XI, XII and XIII.

XI. Defendant Jack McDonald, as pastor of the Tacoma Chapel, held himself out to the Gabrielsons as a qualified counselor. In this regard, Carol Gabrielson began counseling with defendant Jack McDonald on a regular basis.

XII. As a result of the counseling sessions, defendant Jack McDonald became aware of the vulner-ability of plaintiff Carol Gabrielson. Defendant Jack McDonald took advantage of her weakness and her need for support and manipulated her into leaving her husband, plaintiff Ira Gabrielson.

XIII. Further, as a result of the manipulation by defendant Jack McDonald, plaintiff Carol Gabrielson was coerced and unduly influenced into a having sexual relationship with defendant Jack McDonald. This relationship continued from September through December of 1985.

The other substantive factual allegations are contained in paragraphs 18 and 19. Paragraph 18 sets forth the allegation that on March 6, 1986:

Plaintiff Carol Gabrielson was physically assaulted by defendants John Does 1-4, who bodily dragged her from the chapel, causing the physical injuries which are complained of herein.

Paragraph 19 contains the factual allegation supporting the cause of action for defamation.

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The causes of action which were asserted in the complaint

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JURY INSTRUCTIONS

At the end of the case, the court gave Jury Instruction
No. 6, which is attached as Exhibit C to the Affidavit of
Harold Dodge. That instruction states in part:

Plaintiffs claim that defendant Jack McDonald . . . was negligent as Carol Gabrielson's pastor, or counselor, or both, in his actions towards Carol Gabrielson.

The plaintiffs claim that Jack McDonald's negligence was a proximate cause of <u>psychological and emotional injuries</u>, resulting in medical and psychiatric treatment and which may require medical and psychiatric treatment in the future.

The plaintiff, Carol Gabrielson, claims that Jack McDonald defamed her and that such defamation was a proximate cause of <u>psychological and emotional</u> <u>injuries</u> . . .

The plaintiff, Carol Gabrielson, claims she was assaulted, battered and falsely imprisoned by agents of the defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Burien, proximately causing physical, psychological and emotional injuries resulting in medial and psychiatric treatment which may require medical and psychiatric treatment in the future.

(Emphasis added.) Instruction No. 12 contained the instruction with respect to negligent counseling. Instruction No. 13 contained the instruction with respect to pastoral malpractice. Instruction No. 14 contained the instruction with respect to assault. Instruction No. 15 contained the instruction with respect to battery. Instruction No. 16 contained the instruction with respect to false imprisonment.

There can be no legitimate contention that the case which went to the jury was anything other than one of emotional harm

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arising from counselor malpractice and pastor malpractice and that the claim for actual physical injury (compression fracture) was based upon the March 6th assault, battery and false imprisonment claim. Defendants, in the declaratory action, have come forward with no evidence to the contrary.

Exhibit D to the Affidavit of Harold Dodge contains the jury verdict form. In answering Question No. 1, the jury found that Jack McDonald's negligence did injure Carol Gabrielson. In answering Question No. 3, the jury found that Jack McDonald injured Carol Gabrielson by defaming her. Damages arising from defamation are not at issue in this motion. In Question No. 5, the jury considered the assault, battery and false imprisonment claim.

- Q. Did the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center assault, batter or falsely imprison plaintiff Carol Gabrielson, proximately causing injury to her?
- A. No. (Yes or No)

Thus, the only evidence which is before the court is that plaintiff's claim for a physical injury resulting from an assault, battery or a false imprisonment was rejected by the jury. Again, defendants have come forward with no evidence to create a factual issue to contradict this evidence. A party resisting a motion for summary judgment may not rest on mere allegations or assertions that factual issues exist.

LEGAL ISSUE

The legal issue before the court is whether emotional harm arising from counselor malpractice, including sexual misconduct, is harm which is consequential to a bodily injury. The authorities discussed previously clearly demonstrate that when an act causes emotional harm, rather than physical harm, there is no covered bodily injury.

Since first briefing the issue, American has noted that this question was recently addressed in the Eastern District of Virginia. American and Foreign Insurance v. Church School and Diocese of Virginia, 645 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Va. 1986). Claims were asserted against a teacher, supervisory personnel, and a church school in connection with sexual abuse of an 11-year-old student. Causes of action were asserted for assault, battery, and infliction of emotional distress. Coverage was provided for bodily injury caused by an occurrence. The court stated:

The insurance policy defines "bodily injury" as "bodily injury, sickness or disease." American contends that this term connotes physical injuries to the body, as opposed to emotional injuries to the person, and that the Johnsons' claims are not covered because they allege purely emotional harm. In response, Church Schools argues that it is the type of claim alleged and not the basis of the damages sought that should determine coverage. Because the Johnsons allege a battery, which requires some type of body contact, such claim, so church schools contends, fits within the definition of "bodily injury." The policy makes no reference to "body contact."

While the Virginia courts have not interpreted the term "bodily injury," courts that have interpreted this language have determined that it limits policy coverage to physical injury to the body and does not include claims for purely nonphysical or emotional harm. (Citation omitted.)

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[Church school's] argument appears to ignore the distinction between physical or bodily contact and injury.

Id. at 632. A copy of the <u>Church Schools</u> case is attached to this memorandum.

VI.

CONCLUSION

It is not disputed that there was bodily contact between Carol Gabrielson and Jack McDonald. However, there is no evidence that the jury made any award for bodily injury. To the contrary, the jury rejected Gabrielson's physical injury claim, as described in Instruction No. 6, when it rejected her assault, battery and false imprisonment claim. Accordingly, American respectfully requests that an order granting it partial summary judgment be entered by this court.

DATED this 30th day of December, 1988.

LANE POWELL MOSS & MILLER

Bruce Winchell

Attorneys for American

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defendant's "wrongful act" was not the failure to adequately mark or remove the wreck, but was rather the *decision* not to better mark or remove the wreck, which decision was made ashore....

Id. at 64. The court rejected this line of reasoning, declaring that "'the foundation of the right to recover [under DOHSA] is a wrongful act or omission taking effect on the high seas." Id., quoting Lacey v. L.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc., 95 F.Supp. 916, 918 (D.Mass.1951). In Lacey, defendant's alleged failure to inspect a plane properly on land was held to be grounds for a DOHSA claim based on the plane's subsequent crash into the high seas. Lacey, 593 F.Supp. at 917-918. See also Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 593 F.Supp. 1066 (S.D.Fla.1984), aff'd, 778 F.2d 736 (11th Cir.1985) (DOHSA deemed applicable in suit against aircraft manufacturer seeking recovery for a death caused by the sudden crash of a carrier-launched plane which allegedly malfunctioned because of design defects).

In light of existing authority, the Court finds that DOHSA is applicable to the facts here. Plaintiff's allegations that Defendants acted negligently both before and after the snorkeling expedition do not defeat admiralty jurisdiction. The key operative fact, disputed by none of the parties, is that the decedent's illness commenced while he was participating in the snorkeling expedition; i.e., while he was on the high seas, as defined by DOHSA, in connection with an activity bearing a substantial relationship to a traditional maritime activity—the operation of a cruise ship on the high seas.

This Court further finds, pursuant to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Offshore Logistics Inc. v. Tallentire, — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 91 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986), that Plaintiff here shall be barred from seeking recovery under the Florida Wrongful Death Act or any other state wrongful death statute. The Supreme Court's ruling in Tallentire states unequivocally that state wrongful death statutes are pre-empted by DOHSA where it applies. Id. at —, 106 S.Ct. at 2500. As DOHSA only

allows recovery for pecuniary damages, Plaintiff shall be barred from seeking nonpecuniary damages in this cause of action.

The Court having carefully reviewed the record in this cause, having considered the memoranda submitted by the parties, and being otherwise fully advised in the matter, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Issue of the Applicability of the Death on the High Seas Act be and the same is hereby GRANTED.



AMERICAN AND FOREIGN INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff,

V.

CHURCH SCHOOLS IN the DIOCESE OF VIRGINIA, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 86-0297-R.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Richmond Division.

Sept. 29, 1986.

Insurer brought action seeking declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend or indemnify private school, teachers and staff members against suit brought by 11-year-old student and her mother for alleged assault and battery, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and negligent improper sexual conduct arising out of teacher's allegedly touching student in a sexual manner. The District Court, Merhige, J., held that: (1) claims were not covered by school's liability policy, and thus, insurer had no duty to defend,

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pecuniary damages, ed from seeking nonthis cause of action.

arefully reviewed the naving considered the l by the parties, and advised in the matter,

DJUDGED that Der Partial Summary e of the Applicability ligh Seas Act be and RANTED.

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JD FOREIGN COMPANY, tiff,

IN the DIOCESE al., Defendants.

36-0297-R.

district Court, ginia, Division.

1986.

ction seeking declarhad no duty to deate school, teachers inst suit brought by d her mother for alery, intentional and emotional distress er sexual conduct 3 allegedly touching nner. The District eld that: (1) claims chool's liability poli-.d no duty to defend,

and (2) insurer was not estopped from denying coverage.

Ordered accordingly.

1. Insurance ←435.38, 514.9(1)

Claims against private school, teachers and staff members brought by 11-year-old student and her mother for alleged assault and battery, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress arising out of teacher's allegedly touching student in a sexual manner were claims for purely emotional injury and as such were excluded from coverage under policy, which insured school, teachers and staff and which obligated insurer to pay all sums insured might become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury caused by an occurrence; therefore, insurer had no duty to defend school, teachers, and staff.

2. Insurance \$\infty 435.38, 514.9(1)

Claims against private school, teachers, and staff members by 11-year-old student and her mother for alleged negligent improper sexual conduct arising out of teacher's allegedly touching student in a sexual manner were occurrences under policy which covered school, teachers, and staff members; however, due to fact that no bodily injury was alleged, negligence claim fell outside scope of policy's comprehensive general liability coverage and insurer had no duty to defend school, teachers, and staff.

3. Insurance 435.38, 514.9(1)

Claims against private school, teachers, and staff members brought by 11year-old student and her mother for alleged assault and battery, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and negligent improper sexual conduct arising out of teacher's allegedly touching student in a sexual manner were not covered under broad-form comprehensive liability coverage for school, teachers, and staff members under which personal injury was covered and defined as injury arising out of publication or utterance of libel or slander or other defamatory or disparaging materi-

al or in violation of individual's right of privacy; there was no claim asserted for libel, slander, defamation, or disparagement, and thus, insurer had no duty to defend school, teachers, and staff.

Claims against private school, teachers, and staff members brought by 11year-old student and her mother for alleged assault and battery, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and negligent improper sexual conduct arising out of teacher's allegedly touching student in a sexual manner did not fall within broad-form comprehensive liability coverage which covered personal injury and defined the injury as arising out of violation of individual's right of privacy; alleged remarks of teachers and staff members at certain meetings were not claimed to have involved matters held private by student and mother, and thus, insurer had no duty to defend school, teachers, and staff.

5. Insurance €390

Insurer was not estopped from denying coverage for private school, teachers, and staff members where insurer filed declaratory judgment suit to have liability under policy determined and insurer provided adequate notice to insured of intent to contest coverage in its reservation of rights letter; it was not necessary for insurer to specifically enumerate each factual element of claims in its letter.

Henry H. McVey, III, John M. Oakey, Jr., Christopher C. Spencer, McGuire, Woods & Battle, Richmond, Va., for plain-

Sa'ad El-Amin, Richmond, Va., for defendants Loree Anitra Johnson and Judy Johnson.

Samuel W. Hixon, III, A. Peter Brodell, Williams, Mullen & Christian, Richmond, Va., Margaret L. Bacigal, for defendants Church Schools in the Diocese of Virginia, Allen W. Becker, Peggy Ross, Susan E. Goff and Amy Archinal.

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MEMORANDUM

MERHIGE, District Judge.

Plaintiff is a New York corporation engaged in the business of insurance, whose principal place of business is in Charlotte, North Carolina.

Defendant Church Schools in the Diocese of Virginia is a Virginia corporation whose principal place of business is in Virginia.

The individually named defendants are each citizens of the Commonwealth of Virginia.

Jurisdiction is premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.

The matter comes before the Court on the plaintiff insurance company's motion for summary judgment. Having been fully briefed and argued, the motion is ripe for disposition.

Facts

This suit brought by the American and Foreign Insurance Company ("American") seeks a declaration that it has no duty to defend or indemnify Church Schools in the Diocese of Virginia ("Church Schools") and several of its teachers and staff members against a suit brought by a student, Loree Anitra Johnson, and her mother, Judy Johnson, against St. Catherine's School and the individually named defendants in the instant suit. Church Schools is a corporation operating several schools in Virginia, including St. Catherine's School. Church Schools carries a liability insurance policy issued by plaintiff which insures the schools, their teachers and staff members, under certain circumstances.

For convenience, the Court's reference to Church Schools in this memorandum is intended to include each of the named defendants.

The Johnsons' suit arises from an incident which allegedly occurred at St. Catherine's on September 27, 1985. Loree Johnson, a St. Catherine's student then age 11, alleges that she fell off of her stool in art class. In the course of getting up, her art teacher, defendant Archinal, squeezed her buttocks in a sexually suggestive manner.

The Johnsons allege that when they reported the incident to the Director of the Middle School, defendant Ross, and the Headmaster, defendant Becker, these individuals engaged in a cover-up and failed to fully and fairly investigate the incident. They claim that a meeting was held at which Loree was humiliated and Mrs. Johnson was harassed. The Johnsons further allege that Becker and Ross, along with the school chaplain, defendant Goff, humiliated Loree at a schoolwide assembly by giving a sermon about how a jealous little school girl had ruined the life of a schoolteacher by falsely claiming sexual abuse.

Loree and her mother filed a Motion for Judgment in Richmond Circuit Court on March 1, 1986. In their suit against St. Catherine's and the individual defendants, they alleged counts of assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress and sought compensatory and punitive damages for Loree's and Mrs. Johnson's mental anguish and humiliation.

On March 19, 1986, Church Schools notified its local insurance agent of the lawsuit, who conveyed this information to American on March 21, 1986. In a letter dated March 25, 1986, American informed Church Schools that it "reserve(d) the right to set up any and all defense(s) of non-coverage" with respect to "a claim being presented on behalf of Loree Anitra Johnson for (1) assault and battery, (2) intentional emotional harm occurring as a result of an occurrence on or about 9/25/85." It based its reservation of rights on claims of untimely notice of the claim and non-coverage of intentional acts.

The Johnsons filed an Amended Motion for Judgment in the Richmond Circuit Court on September 16, 1986. While adding no new counts to their previously alleged assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, the Johnsons did add allegations of negligent "improper sexual contact" and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The amended motion for judgment was brought to the Court's attention for the first time in

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AMERICAN & FOR. INS. v. CHURCH SCH., DIOCESE OF VA. Cite 22 645 F.Supp. 628 (E.D.Va. 1986)

the hearing on the instant motion for summary judgment on September 17, 1986. Procedural Background

American filed its declaratory judgment action in this Court on May 9, 1986, asking for a declaration that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify Church Schools or its employees against the Johnsons' lawsuit. American provided three grounds for its proposed declaration: (1) failure of a condition precedent to coverage under the policy, claiming Church Schools had failed to provide notice of the occurrence "as soon as practicable"; (2) lack of coverage under the policy provision covering "bodily injury ... caused by an occurrence"; (3) lack of coverage under the provision covering "personal injury" arising out of "a publication or utterance ... of a libel or slander or other defamatory or disparaging material, or ... in violation of an individual's right of privacy."

In its answer, in addition to denying American's claims of untimely notice and lack of coverage, Church Schools raised the affirmative defenses of waiver and estoppel, claiming that the reservation of rights letter failed to reserve the right to contest coverage of the sermon incident, but raised only the sexual assault incident itself.

American filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment on August 29, 1986, seeking judgment in its favor on the grounds of non-coverage under both the bodily injury and personal injury policy provisions. Church Schools, in opposition to the motion, claims coverage under both provisions and waiver of non-coverage of at least the sermon incident.

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The parties raise no factual dispute as to the literal content of the Johnsons' Motion for Judgment, Amended Motion for Judg-

 Plaintiff has argued that the Court should look beyond the allegations in the motion for judgment to the underlying facts disclosed by the depositions and incorrectly cites Reisen v. Aetna Life and Casualty Co., 225 Va. 327, 302 S.E.2d 529 (1983) as support for its position. In fact, Reisen does not deviate from the Virginia Supreme Court's traditional position established in Travelers, supra, that the duty to defend is determent, or the insurance policy covering Church Schools. Therefore, the Court is presented solely with the legal issue of the proper interpretation to be given the bodily injury and personal injury coverages under the policy and whether the scope of either or both of these provisions encompasses the Johnsons' claims, creating a duty on American to defend the lawsuit. A finding that such claims were not covered does not, however, end the matter, for the Court must determine whether American is estopped from raising non-coverage as a defense.

Because this action is before the Court pursuant to its diversity jurisdiction, state law applies. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). Since the insurance policy was issued and delivered in Virginia and all relevant acts and omissions occurred in Virginia, Virginia law applies to this dispute. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Burley, 345 F.2d 138 (4th Cir.1965).

I. Coverage of the Claims

Under Virginia law, coverage is determined by examining whether the allegations of the motion for judgment fall within the scope of the policy's coverage. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Obenshain, 219 Va. 44, 46, 245 S.E.2d 247, 249 (1978).1 Only if it clearly appears that the claims set forth in the motion for judgment are not covered is the insured relieved of its duty to defend. If coverage is in doubt, the insurance company must defend. Travelers, supra, 219 Va. at 46, 245 S.E.2d at 249 (citing London Guar. Co. v. C.B. White & Bros., 188 Va. 195, 198-200, 49 S.E.2d 254, 255-56 (1948)). Further, the Court must examine the allegations of the Amended Motion for Judgment, as any new or different causes of

mined solely from the allegations in the motion for judgment. Reisen, supra, 302 S.E.2d at 531. The Court held that the insurer had a duty to defend based on a motion for judgment alleging both negligence and intentional torts despite the trial court's determination based on the underlying facts in the declaratory judgment suit that the injury was caused by non-covered intentional acts. Reisen, supra, 302 S.E.2d at 531.

action raised therein also could create a duty to defend. See Bernard v. Gulf Ins. Co., 542 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tex.Civ.App. 1976). As the insurance policy in the instant case specifically provides, as long as the allegations in the Motion for Judgment present potentially covered claims, the insurer must defend even if the allegations in fact are groundless, false or fraudulent.

Thus, in the instant case, the Court must examine the allegations of the Johnsons' Motion for Judgment and Amended Motion for Judgment to determine whether they present claims within the scope of the policy's coverage. The parties agree that, if coverage exists, it is found under either the Comprehensive General Liability Insurance provisions covering "bodily injury" or the Broad Form Comprehensive General Liability provisions covering "personal injury" arising from the commission of certain enumerated torts.²

A. Bodily Injury Coverage

The Comprehensive General Liability coverage obligates American to pay "all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of ... bodily injury ... caused by an occurrence." The parties' dispute concerns whether the Johnsons allege: (1) a bodily injury, (2) caused by an occurrence.

1. Bodily Injury

injury" as "bodily injury, sickness or disease." American contends that this term connotes physical injuries to the body, as opposed to emotional injuries to the person, and that the Johnsons' claims are not covered because they allege purely emotional harm. In response, Church Schools argues that it is the type of claim alleged and not the basis of the damages sought that should determine coverage. Because the Johnsons allege a battery, which requires some type of body contact, such claim, so Church Schools contends, fits within the

 See Exhibits B & C to Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judg-

definition of "bodily injury." The policy makes no references to "body contact."

While the Virginia courts have not interpreted the term "bodily injury," courts that have interpreted this language have determined that it limits policy coverage to physical injury to the body and does not include claims for purely nonphysical or emotional harm. See, e.g., Rolette County v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 452 F.Supp. 125, 130 (D.N.D.1978). In Rolette, the court held that "bodily injury" coverage did not extend to "nonphysical harm to the person." While the claim was denominated an "injury to the person," the court held that the insurer was under no duty to defend where only damages for humiliation and emotional distress were sought. Rolette, supra, 452 F.Supp. at 130; see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Campbell County School Dist., 612 F.Supp. 285, 287-88 (D.Wyo.1985) (no duty to defend under "bodily injury" coverage "where party not suing for physical injury or disease").

While Church Schools argues that a claim for assault and battery is covered, its sole support for this claim is the Black's Law Dictionary definition of "battery." Their argument appears to ignore the distinction between physical or bodily contact and injury. While it is true that Johnson alleges a bodily contact, the harm alleged is purely emotional. Defendant argues that Loree may "more forcefully prove her claim for bodily injury at trial." However, in ruling on the duty to defend, the Court looks only at the allegations in the Motion for Judgment and not at what may be proven at a subsequent trial. In giving the "bodily injury" coverage its plain meaning, it simply does not cover the Johnsons' claim for purely emotional injury.

While the plaintiff raises additional allegations of negligence in the Amended Motion for Judgment, it adds no allegations which even arguably claim physical or bodily injury. Thus, the result remains that

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the Johnsons' claims are not for covered bodily injuries.

2. Occurrence

[2] Even if the Johnsons' claim were construed as alleging a "bodily injury," such injury also must arise out of an "occurrence" in order to be covered. Under the policy and Virginia law, the term "occurrence" is defined as an "accident ... which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured." Travelers, supra. 219 Va. at 47, 245 S.E.2d at 248. Under such a provision, allegations of intentional torts are not covered and impose no duty to defend. Travelers, supra, 219 Va. at 47, 245 S.E.2d at 249. While Virginia courts have not decided whether an alleged assault and battery would be covered under such a clause, courts which have considered this precise issue generally have held that coverage is not afforded. See Annot., 72 A.L.R. 3d 1090, 1103-04 (1976).

The Johnsons' original Motion for Judgment alleges only intentional acts by the insured-assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Therefore, their claims, as originally asserted, are not for covered "occurrences" under the bodily injury coverage.

The Johnsons' Amended Motion for Judgment, however makes new allegations that Archinal "negligently ... made improper sexual contact with Loree" and that the defendants "engaged in specific conduct which was negligently ... designed to frighten, intimidate and embarrass plaintiffs." In the prayer for relief, plaintiff further seeks compensatory damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress. While the plaintiff questions the validity of these allegations.4 the merit of plaintiff's contentions is immaterial in determining the insurer's liability to defend. See, e.g., Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 407-08, 347 A.2d 842, 850 (Insurer

- 3. Amended Motion for Judgment ¶¶ 13, 42.
- 4. Plaintiff's counsel argues that the added allegations are invalid because Virginia law does 645 F.Supp.—16

must defend any suit stating covered claim even though it "cannot possibly succeed because either in law or in fact there is no basis for a plaintiff's judgment.") (quoting Burd v. Sussex Mutual Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 383, 389, 267 A.2d 7, 10 (1970)). The Court is limited to ascertaining from the motion for judgment itself whether its allegations "state a case which may be covered by the policy." Travelers, supra, 219 Va. at 46, 245 S.W.2d at 249.

Under this broad standard, the plaintiff's allegations of negligence state a claim for an "occurrence" under the policy. However, because the plaintiff has not alleged any bodily injury, the negligence claim still falls outside the scope of the policy's Comprehensive General Liability coverage.

B. Broad Form Comprehensive Liability Coverage

Church Schools further contends that the Johnsons' claims fall under American's Broad Form coverage. Under this section, "personal injury" is covered and is defined as "injury arising out of one or more of the following offenses ... (3) a publication or utterance (a) of a libel or slander or other defamatory or disparaging material, or (b) in violation of an individual's right of privacy."

1. Libel, Slander, Defamation or Disparagement Claim

[3] American quite properly claims that the Johnsons' Motion for Judgment alleges no claim for libel, slander, defamation, or disparagement, and therefore is not covered. In fact, the motion for judgment makes no allegations that any false statements were made—an essential element in torts of this nature.

The cases cited by plaintiff support their contention that the personal injury coverage applies only to claims for personal injuries actually arising out of the enumerated torts, and not to claims which merely make

not recognize causes of action for negligent assault and battery or negligent infliction of emotional distress.

100ls argues that a battery is covered, its claim is the Black's inition of "battery." ears to ignore the dissical or bodily contact it is true that Johnson ect, the harm alleged is Defendant argues that forcefully prove her ry at trial." However, ty to defend, the Court legations in the Motion not at what may be ient trial. In giving the erage its plain meaning, it cover the Johnsons' notional injury.

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reference to allegedly libelous or disparaging statements as factual background. In C.O. Morgan Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Vigilant Ins. Co., the Yancys sued a car dealer for conversion. 521 S.W.2d 318 (Tex.Civ.App.1975). In pleading the facts of their conversion claim, the Yancys alleged that Morgan "did willfully, maliciously, unlawfully, speak and utter libelous remarks which were calculated to, and did, Morgan, supra, 521 defame Plaintiff." S.W.2d at 319. The court held that this claim was not covered by the personal injury provision because the suit was for conversion, not defamation, and damages were not sought for the allegedly defamatory remarks. Instead, the court described such allegations as a mere "recital of the facts leading up to the conversion," creating no duty to defend. Morgan, supra, 521 S.W.2d at 321-22; see also Omark Industries, Inc. v. Safeco Ins. Co., 590 F.Supp. 114 (D.Or.1984) (factual allegation of disparaging remark in context of sex discrimination suit did not create coverage).

To refute American's claim of non-coverage under the personal injury clause, the defendant Church Schools merely makes a conclusory statement that the "very essence" of the Johnsons' claims is that the defendants made defamatory or disparaging remarks to the Johnsons. Defendant fails to cite any case in support of its position, nor does it point to any specific allegations in the motion for judgment.

Even if such allegations could be found in the motion for judgment, the mere fact that the factual allegations of a complaint contain the words "libel" or "disparaging" cannot form the basis for coverage under this provision. As the cases cited by plaintiff recognize, coverage must be determined based on the claims under which relief is sought. In the instant case, the Johnsons' claims are not for injuries arising out of one of the defamation torts enumerated in II(D)(3)(a) of the Broad

In fact, at the hearing on the instant motion, Church Schools' counsel didn't raise this contention, but instead claimed for the first time that

Form provisions and are not covered thereunder.

2. Invasion of Privacy Claim

[4] At the hearing on the instant motion, defense counsel argued for the first time that the Johnsons' claims fell within the Broad Form provisions covering personal injuries arising out of the offense of utterances in violation of an individual's right of privacy. The defendants contend that the alleged statements made in the October 1, 1985, meeting between St. Catherine's personnel and the Johnsons and in the alleged October 24, 1985 sermon by Goff raised invasion of privacy claims.

While no cases have been located interpreting the invasion of privacy policy provision, it must be examined in the same light as the defamation policy provision. Thus, the Johnsons' claims may be covered under this provision if their motion or amended motion for judgment raises a substantive claim for invasion of privacy, but not if it merely alleges facts relating to an invasion of privacy as factual background to their assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. See, e.g., Morgan, supra, 521 S.W.2d at 321-22.

Neither the Johnsons' motion for judgment nor their amended motion for judgment raises allegations supporting a substantive claim for invasion of privacy. The defendants' alleged remarks in the October 15th meeting and the October 24th sermon are not claimed to have involved matters held private by the plaintiffs. The Johnsons' only contention is that the defendants' remarks humiliated and embarrassed them. The mere fact that these remarks may have involved private matters, while not alleged by defendant Church Schools, at most provides factual background to the Johnsons' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. As such, these allegations do not trigger coverage under the Broad Form personal injury provisions.

the Johnsons' claims are for utterances in violation of their right to privacy. acy Claim

on the instant moargued for the first s' claims fell within isions covering perbut of the offense of of an individual's defendants contend ements made in the ng between St. Caththe Johnsons and in 24, 1985 sermon by f privacy claims.

e been located interprivacy policy provined in the same light icy provision. Thus, may be covered under motion or amended raises a substantive privacy, but not if it elating to an invasion background to their and intentional inflicess claims. See, e.g., 3.W.2d at 321-22.

ons' motion for judgded motion for judgns supporting a subsion of privacy. The marks in the October October 24th sermon ave involved matters plaintiffs. The Johnı is that the defendated and embarrassed t that these remarks rivate matters, while idant Church Schools. ual background to the ntentional infliction of As such, these allegacoverage under the l injury provisions.

re for utterances in violaprivacy. Thus, the Johnsons' claims are not covered under the personal injury provisions of American's policy, and the Court concludes that, absent a waiver or estoppel, American has no duty to defend such claims.

II. Waiver and Estoppel

[5] The defendants assert that even if the Johnsons' claims are not covered, American is estopped from denying coverage of the Johnsons' intentional infliction of emotional distress claim concerning the assembly incident because their reservation-of-rights letter did not reserve the right to contest coverage of that incident.

American correctly, in the Court's view, cites the general rule that the defense of waiver and estoppel cannot be used to extend coverage where coverage does not exist. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of North America v. Atlantic National Ins. Co., 329 F.2d 769, 775 (4th Cir.1964). As the defendant points out, an exception does exist when the insurer "assumes and conducts the defense of an action ... without disclaiming liability and giving notice of its reservation of rights, "in which case it is then estopped from later denying coverage. Atlantic, supra, 329 F.2d at 775.

The exception only applies, however, "in the rare instance when an insurer, with knowledge of the lack of coverage, assumes and conducts a defense without either disclaiming liability or under a reservation of rights." Rowe v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 375 F.2d 215, 221 (4th Cir.1967). Thus, an insurer has been estopped from denying coverage when it has actively conducted a defense and participated in a settlement, Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 317 F.Supp. 928, 939 (W.D.Va.1970), or has attempted to disclaim coverage three days prior to trial, Aetna Life and Casualty Co. v. McCabe, 556 F.Supp. 1342, 1855 (E.D.Pa.1983).

The insurer has not been estopped, however, where it has given notice of its intent to contest coverage through "a timely reservation of rights under the policy which fairly informs the insured of the insurer's position." Aetna, supra, 556 F.Supp. at

1354. Filing of a declaratory judgment suit to have liability under the policy determined also bars application of estoppel. Allied Mutual Ins. Co. v. Hingst, 360 F.Supp. 1204, 1209 (D.N.D.1973).

In the instant case, American is not estopped from denying coverage of the Johnsons' claims. Indeed, American provided adequate notice to Church Schools of its intent to contest coverage in its reservation of rights letter and in the instant declaratory judgment action. While defendant argues that the reservation of rights letter did not expressly contest coverage of the sermon incident, such a technical reading of the letter is inappropriate. The letter adequately informed the insured that American contested its duty to defend against Johnsons' claims. It was not necessary for American to specifically enumerate each factual element of these claims. American gave timely notice of its position before any defense was begun. Trial of the Johnsons' claims is not scheduled until March 1987, and the insured can claim no prejudice when it has six months to prepare its case.

An appropriate order granting the relief sought will issue.

JUDGMENT ORDER

For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum this day filed and deeming it proper so to do, it is ADJUDGED, ORDERED and DECLARED as follows:

1. American and Foreign Insurance Company has no duty to defend Church Schools in the Diocese of Virginia, Allen W. Becker, Peggy Ross, Susan Goff and Amy Archinal against the allegations contained in Motion for Judgment and Amended Motion for Judgment filed in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia styled, Loree Anitra Johnson, an infant who sues by and through her next friend and mother, Judy Johnson, plaintiff, v. St. Catherine's School, Allen W. Becker, Peggy Ross, Susan E. Goff and Amy Archinal, under date of March 13, 1986; and September 16, 1986 respectively.

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2. American and Foreign Insurance Company has no duty to indemnify Church Schools in the Diocese of Virginia, Allen W. Becker, Peggy Ross, Susan Goff and Amy Archinal, for any sum which they might be legally obligated to pay as damages on the basis of the allegations set forth in the aforementioned Motion for Judgment or Amended Motion for Judgment.

Judgment is entered for plaintiff and against the defendants. Plaintiff is entitled to its taxable costs.



Leonard F. GAJKOWSKI, Plaintiff, v.

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant.

No. CIV-82-480C.

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

Sept. 29, 1986.

Claimant sought judicial review of the denial of disability benefits. Following a remand to the Secretary of Health and Human Services for further findings, the Secretary denied benefits without holding a new hearing. The District Court, Curtin, Chief Judge, held that the administrative law judge and the Appeals Council failed to give sufficient weight to a vocational report which indicated that the claimant was unable to work and, therefore, the denial of disability benefits was not supported by substantial evidence.

Reversed and remanded.

Social Security and Public Welfare

Neither administrative law judge nor Appeals Council gave sufficient weight to

vocational report which provided detailed analysis based on long-term, firsthand observation of claimant in various work settings, which provided evidence of claimant's actual inability to work and which concluded that claimant's back pain made him unable to perform any vocational activity and, therefore, denial of disability benefits to claimant, who was 49-year-old truck driver with sixth-grade education and who sustained injuries to his knee and back, was not supported by substantial evidence.

Joseph M. Broderick, Buffalo, N.Y., for plaintiff.

Roger P. Williams, U.S. Atty. (Kathleen M. Mehltretter, and Denise E. O'Donnell, Asst. U.S. Attys., of counsel), Buffalo, N.Y., for defendant.

CURTIN, Chief Judge.

In March of 1983, this case was remanded to the Secretary for further findings in light of the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Campbell v. Secretary, 665 F.2d 48 (1982), reversed, Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 103 S.Ct. 1952, 76 L.Ed.2d 66 (1983). On remand, the Secretary denied benefits without holding a new hearing in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Campbell. After carefully reviewing the record, I find that the Secretary's determination that plaintiff is not disabled is not supported by substantial evidence.

Mr. Gajkowski is now 49 years old and has a sixth grade education. He worked steadily for some 28 years, the last 17 as a truck driver, before injuring his knee and back (Tr., pp. 39, 70). He attempted to return to his truck driving job twice after his back injury, but testified that he was forced to stop both times because of pain (Tr., pp. 91, 95).

In her initial decision, the Administrative Law Judge [ALJ] found that Mr. Gajkowski was unable to return to his past work but retained the residual functional capacity to perform light-to-sedentary work. Af-

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88-2-00947-9

NO.

SUPPLEMENTAL

AFFIDAVIT OF

BRUCE WINCHELL

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR PIERCE COUNTY

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Pennsylvania corporation,

Plaintiff,

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife;

DONALD LEE BARNETT and BARBARA BARNETT, husband and wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a Washington corporation; JACK McDONALD and "JOANE DOE" McDONALD,

Defendants.

SS.

STATE OF WASHINGTON

COUNTY OF KING

husband and wife,

v.

Bruce Winchell, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:

I am one of the attorneys representing American 1. Casualty.

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AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE WINCHELL - 1 0002bw

ORIGINAL

LANE POWELL MOSS & MILLER 3800 RAINIER BANK TOWER 1301 FIFTH AVENUE SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101-2647 (206) 223-7000

2. Attached as Exhibit A to this affidavit is the complaint filed by Carol and Ira Gabrielson against Community Chapel and Bible Training Center and others.

Dated this 28_{th} day of December, 1988.

BRUCE WINCHELL

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 29% day of December, 1988.

NOTARY PUBLIC in and for the State of Washington residing at Amnuos My commission expires: 9/1/90

AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE WINCHELL - 2 0002bc

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife,

Plaintiffs.

vs.

NO. 86 2 02792 6

COMPLAINT FOR PERSONAL INJURIES AND DAMAGES

JACK McDONALD and "JANE DOE")
McDONALD, husband and wife;
DONALD LEE BARNETT and BARBARA)
BARNETT, husband and wife; and)
"JOHN DOES" NOS. 1-4 AND "JANE)
DOES" NOS. 1-4, husbands and)
wives; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND)
BIBLE TRAINING CENTER OF
TACOMA; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND)
BIBLE TRAINING CENTER,

Defendants.

of record, Daniel L. Hannula of Rush, Hannula & Harkins, and for cause of action against the defendants state and allege as follows:

I.

The court has jurisdiction over the subject matter herein and the parties hereto.

COMPLAINT - 1

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS
THE TACOMA MENUE SOUTH
TACOMA, WASHINGTON 18462

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EXHIBIT A

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The plaintiffs Carol Gabrielson and Ira Gabrielson are husband and wife and are residents of Pierce County, Washington.

III.

The defendants Donald Lee Barnett and Barbara Barnett are husband and wife and are residents of King County, Washington. Donald Barnett is the head pastor of Community Chapel and Bible Training Center and as such is responsible for the administration and direction of the entire congregation, including the Tacoma Chapel. All actions described of the defendants or either of them were performed on behalf of the marital community.

IV.

The defendants Jack McDonald and "Jane Doe" McDonald are husband and wife and residents of Pierce County, Washington. Jack McDonald is the pastor of Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Tacoma. All actions described of the defendants or either of them were performed on behalf of the marital community.

V.

The defendants "John Does" 1-4 and Jane Does" 1-4 are husbands and wives and are residents of the State of Washington. All actions described of the defendants or any of them were performed on behalf of the marital community.

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COMPLAINT - 2

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COMPLAINT - 3

The defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Tacoma is a corporation licensed to do business and doing business in the State of Washington.

VII.

The defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center is a corporation licensed to do business and doing business in the State of Washington and the is parent corporation of Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Tacoma.

VIII.

At all times material hereto, the defendants John Does 1 through 4 were agents, employees and representatives of Community Chapel and Bible Training Center and/or Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Tacoma and all actions complained of herein were performed in the scope of their representation employment and/or agency for the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center and the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Tacoma.

IX.

At all times material hereto, the defendants Donald Lee Barnett, Barbara Barnett, and Jack and "Jane Doe" MacDonald were principals, agents, employees, and representatives of Community Chapel and Bible Training Center and Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Tacoma and all actions complained of herein were performed in the scope of their

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representation employment and/or agency for the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center and Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Tacoma.

х.

The plaintiffs, Carol and Ira Gabrielson, regularly attended services at both the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Tacoma and the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center in Burien for a number of years. As members of the congregation, Carol and Ira Gabrielson attended numerous functions and were active participants in the congregation. In addition, the Gabrielsons tithed a portion of their income to the congregation to help sustain it.

XI.

Defendant Jack McDonald, as pastor of the Tacoma Chapel, held himself out to the Gabrielsons as a qualified counselor. In—this regard, Carol Gabrielson began counseling with defendant Jack McDonald on a regular basis.

XII.

As a result of the counseling sessions, defendant Jack McDonald became aware of the vulnerability of plaintiff Carol Gabrielson. Defendant Jack McDonald took advantage of her weakness and her need for support and manipulated her into leaving her husband, plaintiff Ira Gabrielson.

XIII.

Further, as a result of the manipulation by defendant

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COMPLAINT - 4

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COMPLAINT - 5

IIII

Jack McDonald, plaintiff Carol Gabrielson was coerced and unduly influenced into a having sexual relationship with defendant Jack McDonald. This relationship continued from September through December of 1985.

XIV.

Defendant Donald Barnett encouraged the members of his congregation, including the Tacoma Chapel, to form intimate attachments with members of the opposite sex as part of the regular services at the Chapel. Defendant Donald Barnett expressly encouraged married members of the congregation to form intimate attachments with persons other than the spouses of the members.

XV.

Defendant Donald Barnett knew or should have known that these attachments would result in seductions, infidelity and the breakup of marriages. Further, defendant Donald Barnett knew or should have known that his agent in Tacoma, defendant Jack McDonald, was involved in the seduction of female members of the congregation and was abusing the pastoral privilege.

XVI.

In January, 1986, both plaintiffs Carol and Ira Gabrielson were disfellowshiped from Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Tacoma, as a consequence of Carol Gabrielson's refusal to participate in any further sexual activities with defendant Jack McDonald.

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TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98402

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COMPLAINT - 6

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Plaintiff Carol Gabrielson, in March of 1986, requested permission to attend services at defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center in Burien, and was told that she was welcome at that congregation.

XVIII.

On March 6, 1986, plaintiff Carol Gabrielson attended services at defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Burien. During her visit to that congregation, plaintiff Carol Gabrielson was physically assaulted by defendants John Does 1 through 4 who bodily dragged her from the chapel, causing the physical injuries which are complained of herein. Plaintiff Carol Gabrielson was also handcuffed and forced into a vehicle belonging to defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Burien. The actions of John Does 1 through 4 were at the direction and under the request of defendants Jack McDonald, Donald Barnett and Barbara Barnett.

XIX.

Defendants Jack McDonald, Donald Barnett and Barbara
Barnett have further made disparaging statements regarding
Carol and Ira Gabrielson to members of the congregation
which tended to injure the Gabrielsons' reputation in the
community.

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COMPLAINT - 7

XX.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference as if set forth in full each and every allegation as set forth in paragraphs I through XIX.

XXI.

The acts of each of the defendants as stated above are so extreme as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency. The conduct of each of the above named defendants was outrageous and caused the plaintiffs to suffer severe emotional distress. Each of the above-named defendants acted intentionally or recklessly to cause severe emotional distress to the plaintiffs.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

XXII.

The plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if set forth in full each and every allegation as set forth in paragraphs I through XXI.

XXIII.

Defendant Jack McDonald did not exercise the degree of care, skill, diligence and knowledge commonly possessed and exercised by a reasonable, careful and prudent counselor in this jurisdiction by manipulating Carol Gabrielson into a sexual relationship. This intentional or reckless failure constituted the tort of counselor malpractice.

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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

XXIV.

The plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if set forth in full each and every allegation as set forth in paragraphs I through XXIII.

XXV.

Defendant Jack McDonald negligently violated his duty of care as a counselor by having sexual contact with plaintiff Carol Gabrielson with the knowledge that Carol Gabrielson was vulnerable. Defendant Jack McDonald was negligent in counseling plaintiff Carol Gabrielson and so created an unreasonable risk of physical and mental harm which caused the plaintiff Carol Gabrielson's injuries. This negligence constitute the tort of counselor malpratice.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

XXVI.

The plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if set forth in full each and every allegation as set forth in paragraphs I through XXV.

XXVII.

Defendants Jack McDonald and Donald Barnett intentionally, recklessly, or negligently failed to exercise that degree of care, skill, diligence and knowledge commonly possessed and exercised by a reasonable, careful and prudent pastor in this jurisdiction. This failure constitutes the

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COMPLAINT - 8

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tort of pastoral malpractice.

FIFTH THROUGH SEVENTH CAUSES OF ACTION

XXVIII.

The plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if set forth in full each and every allegation as set forth in paragraphs I through XXVII.

XXIX.

The acts of the defendants on March 6, 1986 which resulted in injuries to plaintiff Carol Gabrielson were negligent and/or constitute the torts of assault, battery and false imprisonment.

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION

XXX.

The plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if set forth in full each and every allegation as set forth in paragraphs I through XXIX.

XXXI.

The acts of defendants in making disparaging statements damaging the reputation of the plaintiff constitute the tort of defamation.

NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION

XXXII.

The plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if set forth in full each and every allegation as set forth in paragraphs I through XXXI.

COMPLAINT - 9

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COMPLAINT - 10

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As a further and proximate result of the acts of the defendants, plaintiff Ira Gabrielson has suffered a loss of consortium.

XXXIV.

As a direct and proximate result of the intentional, reckless and negligent wrongful acts of the defendants, and each of them, plaintiffs have been specially and generally damaged in an amount to be fully proven at the time of trial.

WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs pray for judgment against the defendants as follows:

- 1. For all general and special damages incurred by plaintiffs Ira and Carol Gabrielson in an amount to be proven at time of trial;
- 2. For plaintiffs' reasonable costs and attorneys' fees incurred in the prosecution of this action;
- 3. For such other and further relief as the court deems just and equitable.

DATED this 30 day of

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__, 1986.

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

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IN COUNTY CLERK'S OFFI

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Pennsylvania corporation,

Plaintiff,

vs.

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife; DONALD LEE BARNETT and BARBARA BARNETT, husband and wife: COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a Washington corporation, JACK McDONALD and "JANE DOE" McDONALD, husband and wife,

Defendants.

88-2-00947-9 NO.

PLAINTIFFS GABRIELSON'S REPLY TO SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF BY AMERICAN CASUALTY

INTRODUCTION I.

Plaintiff insurance company, in its supplemental brief, narrows the issue before the court to the question whether the injuries suffered by Carol Gabrielson qualify as "bodily injury" under the insurance company's policy of insurance insuring defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training

REPLY TO SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF - 1

LAW OFFICES RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

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In the concluding section of its brief, the insurance company admits "that there was bodily contact between Carol Gabrielson and Jack McDonald." Without hinting to the court that the "bodily contact" to which it refers between Carol Gabrielson and Jack McDonald has been found by a jury to have consisted of the repeated victimization of Carol Gabrielson by sexual acts into Which Jack McDonald coerced her in the guise of legitimate counseling and pastoring, the insurance company asks this court to rule, as a matter of law, that because there is as vet no evidence that the sexual acts resulted in rent flesh or the transmission of a sexually transmitted disease, there is no "bodily injury" and no coverage. The ruling sought by the insurance company would erect

artificial distinctions between injuries that have long since been debunked by medical thought and rejected by enlightened courts.

LAW AND ARGUMENT TI.

The insuring language of plaintiff insurance company's policy insuring defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center provides that:

> The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because

Bodily injury.

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REPLY TO SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF - 2

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to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence.

Coverage A--Bodily Injury Liability, Section 1, page 1 of 8.

Bodily injury is defined as:

B. [B]odily injury, sickness or disease sustained by any person which occurs during the policy period. . . .

The issue is whether Jack McDonald's repeated sexual violation of Carol Gabrielson was sufficient "bodily injury" to trigger coverage in accordance with this court's prior ruling that consequential damages as the result of bodily injury are insured under plaintiff's policy. Dr. Philip G. Lindsay has submitted an affidavit in conjunction with defendants Gabrielson's initial opposition to plaintiff's summary judgment motion and that affidavit remains the only factual material submitted on the issue raised by plaintiff:

It is my opinion that Jack McDonald, through the course of conduct that he pursued toward Carol Gabrielson maneuvered and coerced her into a position of overwhelming dependence upon him for her physical, emotional, and Carol Gabrielson became so spiritual needs. dependent upon Jack McDonald that she, for all intents and purposes, lost her free will and her will became subordinate to that of Jack McDonald. Carol Gabrielson eventually became incapable of resisting Jack McDonald's counseling, suggestion, and direction. Carol Gabrielson was in this state of dependence, she was not capable of resisting Jack McDonald's sexual advances and he took advantage of her, sexually, a great number of times while he enjoyed such a great degree of control over her.

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Carol Gabrielson has suffered extreme mental and psychological injury as a direct result of being used by Jack McDonald, and through him, the church that he represented, in this In my opinion, the mental and fashion. emotional damage from which Carol Gabrielson suffers is a direct result of the physical, as well as mental, way in which she was violated by Jack McDonald.

Affidavit of Philip G. Lindsay submitted in opposition to plaintiff's original Motion for Summary Judgment.

The only medical evidence submitted in this declaratory action is that Carol Gabrielson was physically violated by Jack McDonald and that that violation directly resulted in injury and consequential damages. The physical violation about which we are talking is sexual violation, or, as plaintiff is frank to admit in its supplemental brief, "sexual misconduct." Jack McDonald used his position of trust to control Carol Gabrielson and to coerce her into sexual acts. Carol Gabrielson's mental and emotional injuries are the direct result of the way he physically "violated" her. The cases cited to this court by the defendants Gabrielson to date demonstrate that once a physical violation is shown, coverage for bodily injury is triggered without regard to degree of physical injury.

In the New Jersey case NPS Corporation v. Insurance Company of North America, 517 A.2d 1211 (N.J. App. 1986), the court ruled that emotional and psychological injuries directly resulting from nonconsentual violation of a ////

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715 TACOMA AVENUE SOUTH

TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98402

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REPLY TO SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF - 4

plaintiff's bodily integrity, even though it involved no more than the defendant's touching parts of the plaintiff's body, was a covered "bodily injury":

We hold that the term "bodily injury" as used in the policy, includes the emotional and psychological sequelae allegedly resulting from the unauthorized invasion of the complainant's person.

715 A.2d at 1212.

In supporting its holding, the court reasoned that emotional and mental harms are real bodily injuries that may result from physical violation:

[O]ur "courts have come to recognize that mental and emotional distress is just as 'real' as physical pain, and that its valuation is no more difficult."

* * *

Within that framework, we disagree with INA's argument that bodily injury necessarily entails some physical or corporeal harm caused by the application of external violence. We are unable to separate a person's nerves and tensions from his body. Clearly, emotional trauma can be as disabling to the body as a visible physical wound. Moreover, it is common knowledge that emotional distress can and often does have a direct effect on other bodily functions.

517 A.2d 1213-14.

When mental and psychological injury directly flows from a physical violation, those injuries are "bodily injuries":

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REPLY TO SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF - 5

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RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

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Accordingly, we are convinced that the term "bodily injury," as used in the policy, encompasses claims for emotional distress caused by an assault and battery.

517 A.2d at 1214.

It is hornbook law that a "battery" need not consist of physical injury, but is present where there is the least bodily contact if that contact may be considered offensive.

Offensive contact is that contact which would be offensive to a reasonable person.

Likewise the Louisiana case, Levy v. Duclaux, 324 S.2d 1 (La.App. 1975) demonstrates that coverage exists under the "bodily injury" insuring language for mental and psychological injuries which result from even a slight degree of violation. In Levy, the plaintiff was physically restrained, without resulting physical injury, in connection with being suspected as a shoplifter. Despite the slight violation, the court held that it was sufficient "bodily injury" to trigger insurance coverage:

When this language [bodily injury] is analyzed particularly in the light of the facts of the <u>Nickens</u> case as opposed to the instant case, we reach the conclusion that the term bodily injury in the policy of our insurer does include plaintiff's injuries. In the <u>Nickens</u> case there is absence of any contact between the external force or violence and distress plaintiffs sustained over the loss of their personal effects. There the plaintiffs were not at the premises at the time of the fire. In the instant case, the plaintiff was personally exposed to

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REPLY TO SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF - 6

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some minimal physical abuse as well as the external force of being accused as a shoplifter in front of many witnesses. damage instantly from the application of that This situation is entirely different from when a hypothetical plaintiff may hear that a hypothetical defendant had some week previously said that plaintiff was a thief, because the sudden humiliation, embarrassment and mental anguish did not set in immediately upon the direct application of the Perhaps the distinction being accusation. drawn can be made clearer by framing the Nickens case in a hypothetical variation of Suppose they made their exit from its facts. the premises without any physical injury but suffered such shock that some time thereafter they experienced nightmares and deep mental anguish as the result of the experience. Would the results of the Nickens case have been the same? The facts of our case show that plaintiff's mental stress was accompanied by immediate external physical manifestations of crying and hysteria and her functions were outwardly effected for some time after the incident. Therefore, this case is distinguishable from the Nickens case and there is coverage.

324 S.2d 9-10.

The cases cited demonstrate that once a physical violation is found, there should be no inquiry into its degree. It must be borne in mind, however, that Carol Gabrielson suffered more than a slight physical contact. Counsel for the insurance company would be frank in admitting that Dr. Lurie, Carol Gabrielson's treating psychiatrist, testified at the trial of the underlying action that he diagnosed her as suffering from a major depressive episode and post-traumatic stress disorder as a

REPLY TO SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF - 7

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result of Jack McDonald's sexual violation of her.

The diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (Third Ed. Rev. 1987) recognizes both major depressive episode and post-traumatic stress disorder as separate, distinct, very real sicknesses and/or diseases:

MAJOR DEPRESSIVE EPISODE: The essential feature of a major depressive episode is either depressed mood (or possibly, in children or adolescents, an irritable mood) or a loss of interest or pleasure in all, or almost all, activities and associated symptoms, for a period at least two weeks. These symptoms represent a change from previous functioning and are relatively persistent, that is, they occur for most of the day, nearly every day, during at least a two-week period. The associated symptoms include appetite disturbance, change in weight, sleep disturbance, psychomotor agitation or retardation, decreased energy, feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt, difficulty thinking or concentrating, and recurrent thoughts of death, or suicidal ideation or attempts.

* * *

Id. at 218-19.

POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER: The essential feature of this disorder is the development of characteristic symptoms following a psychologically distressing event that is outside the range of usual human experience (i.e. outside the range of such common experiences as simple bereavement, chronic illness, business losses and marital conflict). The stressor producing this syndrome would be markedly distressing to almost anyone, and is usually experience with intense fear, terror and helplessness. The characteristic symptoms involve reexperiencing the traumatic event, avoidance of stimuli associated with the event or

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numbing of general responsiveness, and increased arousal. The diagnosis is not made if the disturbance lasts less than one month.

Id. at 247.

The New York case, Chemung v. Hartford Casualty and Insurance Company, 496 N.Y.S.2d 933, a case involving rape, dealt with the exact point at issue in this motion, construing the exact language at issue in this motion rejected the exact argument advanced by the insurance company in this motion:

> The defendant issued a comprehensive general liability insurance policy to the County of Chemung, covering the period from February 14, 1982 to February 14, 1983, during which time the underlying events took place (policy no. 07HCMA1160W). Pursuant to the terms of that policy the defendant is obligated to:

> > Pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence, and the company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured seeking damages on account of such bodily injury.

> > "Occurrence" is defined in the policy An accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.

The defendant does not contend that the conduct attributed to the county employees in the Andrus action was exempted or intended, rather it is contended that the allegations

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in the federal complaint do not seek damages for "bodily injury." Simply stated, the defendant's contention is that the term "bodily injury" does not include injuries manifested by other than physical complaints. Defendant characterizes the allegations of the federal complaint as seeking recovery for injuries of a purely mental or emotional nature.

This is the same position that the insurance company is asserting in the present motion. The New York court rejected the insurance company's argument:

> To reiterate, the defendant is obligated "to pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury to which this insurance applies caused by an If at the trial of the federal "occurrence." action the plaintiffs therein establish that Christine Andrus was indeed sodomized and sexually abused as alleged, then an occurrence will be established which requires defendant to indemnify the county and its employees for all damages flowing therefrom, including mental and emotional suffering and (citations omitted). humiliation. Moreover, by the terms of the policy the defendant must indemnify the county for damages recovered by Mr. and Mrs. Andrus for the care and loss of services of Christine.

496 N.Y.S.2d at 936.

As the cited cases demonstrate, physical violation of a person's bodily integrity is a "bodily injury." Once such a violation has been established, there is no need to show torn flesh, blood, or broken bones in order to established a "bodily injury" and consequential damages as a result of the violation qualify for indemnity under policies of insurance 1111 LAW OFFICES

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such as the plaintiff's insuring against "bodily injury."

III. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

Plaintiff insurance company's motion must be denied. The court should enter an order that the Gabrielsons' consequential damages proximately resulting from Jack McDonald's sexual violation of Carol Gabrielson are compensable damages under plaintiff's policy of insurance insuring against "bodily injury."

DATED this 4th day of January

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

Bv:

Daniel L. Hannula and Harold T. Dodge, Jr.

Attorneys for Defendants

Gabrielson

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REPLY TO SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF - 11

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> SIEHCE COUNTY BLEET DZPUTY

The Honorable J. Kelly

Arnold

SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR PIERCE COUNTY

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Pennsylvania Corporation,

Plaintiff,

No. 88-2-00947-9

v.

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife, DONALD LEE BARNETT and BARBARA BARNETT, husband and wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a Washington Corporation,

BARNETT SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT & MOTION TO STRIKE SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE WINCHELL

Defendants.

MOTION TO STRIKE I.

strike the Defendants Barnett this court to move SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE WINCHELL, and renew their motion to strike the AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE WINCHELL pursuant to CR 56 (e).

CR 56 (e) requires that "...affidavits shall be made on shall set forth such facts as would be personal knowledge, admissable in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." None of these requirements are met by either of Mr. Winchell's affidavits.

The present motion for summary judgment concerns the duty of American Casualty Company to pay a judgment entered in the underlying case to this declaratory action, Pierce County cause number 86-2-02792-6. The duty to pay, as opposed to the duty to defend, is not based upon the allegations made in the underlying

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF & MOTION TO STRIKE:

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case. Rather, it depends upon the actual determination of factual issues relating to coverage. The contrast between these two duties was discussed in <u>Western National Assur. v. Hecker</u>, 43 Wn.App. 816, 719 P.2d 954 (Div. II, 1986). The court in that case wrote at pages 820-821:

An insurer's duty to pay, in contrast to the duty to defend, depends upon the actual determination of factual issues relating to coverage.... Normally, an insurer's duty to pay arises only when the injured party ultimately, in the underlying tort action against the insured, prevails on facts that fall within the policy coverage....(citations omitted)

The issue to be determined upon the present summary judgment motion relating to coverage is whether Carol Gabrielson suffered a bodily injury. Through American Casualty's own affidavits, it is apparent that this issue was not determined in the underlying action.

Neither affidavit of Bruce Winchell affirmatively shows that Mr. Winchell is competent to testify as to the factual determinations made by the jury in the underlying case. Mr. Winchell was neither the judge nor a juror in that case. Further, he has not submitted any findings or conclusions made by the jury or judge in that case. He submits only the pretrial pleadings, and jury instructions from which he asks this court to infer such findings or conclusions.

Americans Casualty's position seems to be that this court can infer that no bodily injury was suffered since the issue was not determined in the underlying action. With no disrespect intended, this court should determine that Carol Gabrielson is in fact World Wrestling Federation wrestler "The Fabulous Moolah,"

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF & MOTION TO STRIKE: 2



technical meaning. It must be given ordinary definition.

In our opinion, the proper inquiry is not whether a learned judge or scholar can, with study, comprehend the meaning of an insurance contract, but whether the insurance policy contract would be meaningful to the layman who at his peril may be legally bound or held to understand the nature and extent of its coverage. The language of insurance policies is to be interpreted in accordance with the way it would be understood by the average man, rather than in a technical sense.

<u>Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Ward</u>, 83 Wn.2d 353, 358, 517 P.2d 966 (1974). Therefore, the term "bodily injury" must be given an ordinary definition which would be understood by an average man.

[I]f a clause can be construed in two ways, one favorable to the insured and the other favorable to the insurer, the construction favoring the insured must be adopted." McDonald Indus. v. Rollins Leasing Corp., 26 Wn.App. 376, 380, 613 P.2d 800 (Div. One, 1980), citing Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Ward, 83 Wn.2d 353, 358, 517 P.2d 966 (1974).

The policy defines bodily injury as follows:

Bodily Injury means bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by any person which occurs during the policy period, including death at any time resulting therefrom of Incidental Medical Malpractice Injury.

The definition is not prefaced with any modifier such as "serious bodily injury," or "grievous bodily injury." Therefore any bodily injury triggers coverage, no matter how slight. As this court has already ruled, any emotional distress, mental suffering, or loss of consortium which is consequential thereto is also covered.

Would an ordinary person understand improper sexual contact

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF & MOTION TO STRIKE: 4



to constitute bodily injury? Without doubt an ordinary man would consider rape a bodily injury. The question, then, is whether some technical distinction can be drawn between rape and other improper sexual contact which distinguishes it from bodily injury.

2. Bodily Injury

At common law, an action for improper sexual contact was denominated as indecent assault. The first time Washington recognized that emotional distress injuries could be recovered for such an action was in Martin v. Jansen, 113 Wash. 290, 193 Pac. 674, 198 Pac. 393 (1920). A review of this case is instructive with respect to the nature of such a claim. Many of the arguments made in that case by the defendant to attempt to avoid an award for emotional injuries are now asserted by American Casualty in its attempt to have this court distinguish the injury suffered by Carol Gabrielson from its bodily origin.

In that case, claims were made on behalf of Helen Martin against Joseph Jansen. Helen was employed as a clerk in a store operated by Jansen. On July 20, 1919, Helen and Jansen were the only persons in the store after it had closed. Thereafter, Jansen "...enticed the said Helen Martin to enter a rear room or compartment of the said store, and there attempted to and did embrace the said Helen Martin against her will and did offer to and take liberties with the said Helen Martin, and did attempt to persuade the said Helen Martin to consent to have intercourse with him, the said defendant." Martin v. Jansen, 113 Wash. 290, 291, 193 Pac. 674, 198 Pac. 393 (1920).

The court recognized that the nature of such a claim is a violation of the person, writing at page 295:

The defendant also argues that the court erred in permitting SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF & MOTION TO STRIKE: 5

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evidence of mental anguish because of the assault, and relies upon the case of <u>Corcoran v. Postal</u>, where this court held there could be no recovery for damages arising from mental anguish as a result of negligence when not accompanied by physical injury. Those were cases where there was no assault and no violation of the person. This is a case where there was a violation of the person of Miss Martin.

It noted further that there is a distinction between such a case and cases in which there is no offense against another's person.

We are of the opinion that the defendant does not distinguish between cases where there is no invasion of the person and those cases where there is an actual invasion of the person. We think there is no merit in this contention.

Instances in which another's person is violated are bodily by their very nature.

In a similar situation, the Superior Court of New Jersey discussed the availability of coverage under the bodily injury provisions of an insurance policy. In NPS Corp v. Insurance Co. of North America, 213 N.J. Super. 547, 517 A.2d 1211 (1986), claims were made by an employee against her employer for sexual harassment. The employee, Sarah Schaeffer, claimed that "... a co-employee, the plant manager, had committed repeated acts of sexual harassment by 'offensively touch[ing]' her 'rear end' and 'breasts.'" NPS Corp v. Insurance Co. of North America, 213 N.J. Super. 547, 517 A.2d 1211, 1212 (1986).

The court reasoned that the mental and emotional distress arising from sexual harassment by offensive unauthorized touching is "... just as 'real' as physical pain, and that its valuation is no more difficult." NPS Corp v. Insurance Co. of North America, 213 N.J. Super. 547, 517 A.2d 1211, 1214 (1986). Applying the standard rules applicable to construction of insurance contracts, the court wrote at page 1214:

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF & MOTION TO STRIKE: 6



Within that framework, we disagree with INA's argument that bodily injury necessarily entails some physical or corporeal harm caused by the application of external violence. We are unable to separate a person's nerves and tensions from his body. Clearly, emotional trauma can be disabling to the body as a visible physical wound. Moreover, it is common knowledge that emotional distress can and often does have a direct effect on other bodily functions.

See also, Levy v. Duclaux, 324 So.2d 1 (La.App., 1975).

At best, American Casualty can show that there exists two reasonable interpretations of the phrase "bodily injury." American Casualty cites this court to American & For. Ins. v. Church Sch., Diocese of Va., 645 F.Supp. 628 (E.D.Va., 1986) for the interpretation that improper sexual contact constitutes a bodily injury. The Barnetts cite this court to NPS Corp v. Insurance Co. of North America, 213 N.J. Super. 547, 517 A.2d 1211, 1214 (1986) for the interpretation that such does constitute a bodily injury. Both are reasonable.

Defendants Barnett recognize that there exists a split in other jurisdictions whether improper sexual contact constitutes a bodily injury. Competent courts disagree upon the meaning of the phrase. In this jurisdiction, however, the court must choose the definition most favorable to the insured. McDonald Indus. v. Rollins Leasing Corp., 26 Wn.App. 376, 380, 613 P.2d 800 (Div. One, 1980), citing Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Ward, 83 Wn.2d 353, 358, 517 P.2d 966 (1974). Consistent with the distinction noted in Martin v. Jansen, 113 Wash. 290, 291, 193 Pac. 674, 198 Pac. 393 (1920) between emotional distress which accompanies a bodily violation and isolated emotional distress, this court must adopt the reasonable interpretation of "bodily injury" noted in NPS Corp v. Insurance Co. of North America, 213 N.J. Super. 547, 517

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF & MOTION TO STRIKE: 7

Evans. Craven & Lackie, P.S.

A.2d 1211, 1214 (1986) that includes improper sexual contact and the consequences thereto.

III. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has apparently changed the nature of its renoted motion and asked this court to determine that Carol Gabrielson did not suffer a bodily injury. However, it has failed to offer adequate affidavits demonstrating such lack of injury. Instead it asks this court to infer findings which were never made in the underlying action from inadmissable documents. Defendants respectfully ask that this court strike the SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE WINCHELL and the AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE WINCHELL which are improper pursuant to CR 56 (e).

Further, defendants Barnett request that this court deny American Casualty's motion. In so denying, this court is requested to specify the factual issue which remains in dispute and declare the reasonable interpretation favorable to the insured that the American Casualty policy covers improper sexual contact as bodily injury pursuant to CR 56 (d).

DATED this 5th day of January, 1989.

EVANS CRAVEN & LACKIE, P.S.

TIM DONALDSON

TIM DONALDSON

Attorneys for Defendants Barnett

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF & MOTION TO STRIKE: 8

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since that issue also was not determined in the underlying action. The Barnetts offer such analogy only to show how the position urged by American Casualty is untenable and defies logic.

American Casualty offers pleadings in the underlying case as evidence of the factual issues which were determined. As such, the pleadings are inadmissable. "Pleadings in one action are competent evidence in another where the purpose is to contradict a party or his witness, but as evidence to prove the facts at issue they are not so." Regenvetter v. Ball. 131 Wash. 155, 162, 229 Pac. 321 (1924).

American Casualty's duty to pay for "bodily injury" depends upon the actual determination of whether a bodily injury occurred. This issue was not determined in the underlying action. Consequently, American Casualty's reliance upon other issues determined in that case is misplaced.

II. SUPPLEMENTAL OPPOSITION AUTHORITIES

On December 16, 1988, this court entered its ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY PLAINTIFF RE: BODILY INJURY wherein this court ruled that the American Casualty policy covers emotional distress, mental suffering, and loss of consortium which is consequential to bodily injury. Therefore the remaining issue is whether a bodily injury was suffered.

Carol Gabrielson and Jack McDonald engaged in a sexual relationship. See, DECLARATION OF BRUCE WINCHELL WITH EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF JACK MCDONALD filed herein on September 9, 1988. In the underlying action to this proceeding, she was awarded damages for her injuries suffered therefrom.

1. Rule of Construction

The language in an insurance contract cannot be given SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF & MOTION TO STRIKE: 3

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COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - 1 decjudg.gab

ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL

posed thereof; COMMUNITY

CHAPEL and BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a Washington corpora-

GABRIELSON, husband and wife,

and the marital community com-

tion; JACK McDONALD and "JANE DOE" McDONALD, husband and wife,)

and the marital community com-

Defendants.

Plaintiff,

corporation,

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posed thereof,

DEPUTY

COMPLAINT FOR

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

I.

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR PIERCE COUNTY

NO.

DESCRIPTION OF LITIGATION

This is a declaratory judgment action brought pursuant to the Washington Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, RCW 7.24, et seg., and CR 57, wherein the plaintiff seeks a judgment by the court that an excess insurance policy issued by the plaintiff to the defendant insured, Community Chapel and Bible Training Center, does not afford coverage to such insured or its officers, elders, employees, etc., named hereafter, for multiple claims made by

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P.O. Box 548, Bellevue, WA 98009-0548 Bellevue, WA 98004 (206) 462-4000

defendants Gabrielson in a lawsuit in Pierce County, together judgment obtained in such suit and stated more specifically hereafter in this declaratory complaint.

II.

STATUS OF THE PLAINTIFF

Plaintiff st. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company (abbreviated hereafter in this complaint as "St. Paul") is a foreign corporation in the business of selling insurance in the State of Washington, and is licensed to do so in Washington, and has paid all fees and excise taxes due and owing to the State of Washington and is qualified to bring this action.

III.

PLAINTIFF'S POLICY OF EXCESS INSURANCE

- 3.1. Plaintiff St. Paul issued an Umbrella Excess Liability Protection Policy No. 584XB2982 to the defendant insured Community Chapel and Bible Training Center (hereafter abbreviated as "CCBTC"), with a policy period of May 9, 1985, until May 9, complete copy of such Umbrella Excess Liability 1986. Protection Policy is attached to this complaint as Exhibit 1 (on yellow paper).
- 3.2. The insurance provided in such St. Paul policy is excess to the basic insurance policy issued by the American COMPLAINT FOR LAW OFFICES OF

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Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania, a division of the CNA
Insurance Companies, and which basic insurance coverage was
issued by American Casualty under Policy No. IP052144020, as well
as to automobile liability coverages issued by American Casualty
or CNA which are not relevant to the litigation herein.

3.3. The St. Paul Umbrella Excess Liability Protection Policy provides in part:

What This Agreement Covers

We'll pay amounts you and others protected under this agreement are legally required to pay as damages for covered bodily injury, property damage, personal injury, and advertising injury claims, caused by an event.

Event means an accidental event that results in bodily injury or property damage the protected person didn't expect or intend to happen. An event also means an act or a series of similar or related acts that result in personal injury or advertising injury.

Bodily injury means any harm to a person's health that happens while this agreement is in effect. Bodily injury includes any physical harm, sickness or disease. And it includes mental anguish, injury or illness, whether or not there has been physical harm or illness. If a bodily injury is covered, we'll cover damages for care, loss of services or death resulting from the injury.

<u>Property damage</u> means any damage to tangible property of others that happens while this agreement is in effect. This includes loss of use of the damaged property resulting from the damage. Property damage also includes loss of use of other's property that hasn't been physically damaged if caused by an accidental event that happens while this agreement is in effect.

<u>Personal injury</u> means any of the following acts of interference with an individual's rights that happens in the course of your business while this agreement is in effect:

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2	*false arrest, wrongful detention, malicious prosecution, humiliation or false imprisonment;
3	*libel, slander, defamation of character, or invasion of an individuals right of privacy. But not such acts that
4	<pre>arise from advertising activities; *wrongful entry, wrongful eviction or other invasion of</pre>
5	the right of private occupancy; or *assault or battery committed to prevent or remove a
6	danger to people or property.
7	Advertising injury means any of the following acts of

Advertising injury means any of the following acts of interference with a person's rights that happens in the course of your business while this agreement is in effect:

*libel, slander, defamation of character, or invasion of an individuals right of privacy; *infringement of any copyright, title or slogan; *piracy, unfair competition or idea misappropriation under an implied contract;

when the act is committed or alleged to have been committed in any advertisement, publicity article, broadcast or telecast and arises out of your advertising activities.

<u>Injury or damage</u>. When we say injury or damage we mean bodily injury, property damage, personal injury or advertising injury.

. . .

Defense of claims. We won't pay the cost of, or conduct the investigation, defense, or settlement of a claim if those costs are covered by your Basic Insurance. However, we do have the right to associate in the defense and control of any claim that is reasonably likely to involve us.

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If any event results in claims that use up the limits of coverage under your Basic Insurance, we'll then take over the defense of any claim resulting from the same event that has been brought against you or any other protected person. But we'll only do this if:

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*the claim is covered by this agreement; and

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*this agreement is immediately in excess of your Basic This means you don't have other excess Insurance. insurance with another company that would apply over your Insurance. Of course, you may have excess insurance that applies to claims over the limits of coverage in this agreement. Coverage When Your Basic Insurance Doesn't Apply If your Basic Insurance doesn't cover a claim which is

covered by this agreement, we'll pay damages that you or other protected persons are legally required to pay. However, you'll be responsible for the claim up to the deductible amount shown on the Coverage Summary. Of course, our payments won't exceed the limit of coverage.

Additional benefits. All of the following benefits are in addition to the limits of coverage. These benefits apply only when your Basic Insurance doesn't apply.

<u>Defending</u> lawsuits. We'll defend any suit brought against you or any other protected person for covered claims, even if the suit is groundless or fraudulent. We have the right to investigate, negotiate and settle any suit or claim if we believe that is proper. all costs of defending the suit, including interest on that part of any judgment that doesn't exceed the limit But we won't defend a suit or of coverage that applies. pay a claim after the limit of coverage has been used up in paying judgments or settlements.

(pp. 1, 2, 3, Form 43209 Insuring Agreement, Ex. 1.)

Who Is Protected Under This Agreement

Protected persons are persons and organizations protected under this agreement.

Here's а list of "protected persons" and certain limitations on their liability protection. However, the limits of coverage protected separately. shown in the Coverage Summary are shared by all protected persons.

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Who	is	Protected	For	Claims	Not	Related	To	Autos

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Corporation. If this policy is in the name of a corporation, or other type of organization, its executive officers, directors and stockholders are protected while they're acting within the scope of their duties for the named organization.

Employees. Your employees are protected while they're acting within the scope of their duties for you. (Emphasis added)

(pp. 3, 4, Form 43209 Insuring Agreement, Ex. 1.)

. .

Exclusions - Claims We Won't Cover

We won't cover or defend against claims for any of the following liabilities.

Prior acts. We won't cover advertising injury claims, nor will we cover personal injury claims for libel, slander, defamation of character or invasion of an individuals right of privacy when the claim is based on an event that happened before this agreement was in effect.

Such an event may involve a series of similar advertising material. If it does, we won't cover claims based on that event when the first act, statement, advertisement, publicity article, broadcast or telecast of the series happened before this agreement was in effect.

(p. 6, Form 43209 Insuring Agreement, Ex. 1.)

* * *

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES EXCLUSION ENDORSEMENT

This endorsement changes your Umbrella Excess Liability Protection.

How Your Coverage Is Changed

Your protection is changed by adding the following exclusion to the Exclusions - Claims We Won't Cover

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1	section. The effect of this change is to reduce your
2	coverage.
3	Professional services. We won't cover injury or damage resulting from the performance of or the failure to
4	perform any professional service in your capacity as a CHURCH.
5	(p. 1, Form PEX019 Exclusion Form, Ex. 1.)
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8	PERSONAL INJURY LIMITATION ENDORSEMENT This endorsement changes your Umbrella Excess Liability
9	Protection.
10	How Your Coverage Is Changed
11	Your protection is changed by adding the following to the Exclusions - Claims We Won't Cover section. The effect
12	of this change is to reduce your coverage.
13	Personal injury. We won't cover a claim resulting from any of the following offenses unless it's covered under
14	your Basic Insurance.
15	*False arrest, wrongful detention, malicious prosecution or false imprisonment.
16	*Libel and slander, defamation of character, or invasion of the rights of privacy.
17	*Statements made in advertising, broadcasting or telecasting activities by you or on your behalf.
18	*False statements about an organization or its products, or services made by or on behalf of any protected person
19	with knowledge that they are false. *Wrongful entry or wrongful eviction.
20	Other Terms
21	All other terms of your policy remain the same.

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(p. 1, Form PEX010-82)

LAW OFFICES OF DON M. GULLIFORD & ASSOCIATES 2200 112th Avenue N.E. P.O. Box 548, Bellevue, WA 98009-0548 Bellevue, WA 98004 (206) 462-4000

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IV.

STATUS OF DEFENDANTS

- 4.1. Defendant insured Community Chapel and Bible Training Center ("CCBTC") is believed to be a corporation licensed to do business and doing business in the state of Washington, or a non-profit corporation or other religious organization, having its principal place of business at 18635 Eighth Avenue South, Seattle, Washington.
- 4.2. Defendants Ira Gabrielson and Jane Doe Gabrielson are believed to have been residents of the state of Washington, and regardless of their residency are plaintiffs in an entitled Pierce County Cause No. 86-2-02793-6. A copy of such Pierce County Gabrielson complaint in that action is attached as Exhibit 2. In such Gabrielson complaint, the defendants Community Chapel and Bible Training Center (CCBTC), Jack McDonald and Jane Doe McDonald were named as defendants, among other defendants against whom judgment was not taken and against whom causes of action were dismissed at the close of the plaintiff Gabrielson's original case.
- 4.3. Defendants Jack McDonald and Jane Doe McDonald are believed to be a marital community, the exact status of which is uncertain and unknown to the plaintiff St. Paul at this time, but of which leave will be asked to correct at time of trial or upon the law and motion calendar and allegations as to the "defendants"

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McDonald" hereafter herein are intended to denominate Jack McDonald individually as well as the marital community, if applicable. The defendants McDonald are believed to be Washington residents and the defendant Jack McDonald is alleged to have been pastor of the Tacoma Chapel of the defendant CCBTC as the parent corporation to the Tacoma Chapel.

4.4. <u>DEFENDANTS IN THIS DECLARATORY ACTION WHO ARE</u> PLAINTIFFS OR OTHERWISE INTERESTED PARTIES IN LITIGATION.

4.4.1. "GABRIELSON LAWSUIT"

4.4.1.1. As stated previously, the defendants Gabrielson in this declaratory action were and are plaintiffs in an action against CCBTC and defendants McDonald, as well as other defendants who have been dismissed at trial, in Pierce County Cause 86-2-02793-6, and a copy of such complaint, as stated, is attached as Exhibit 2.

4.4.1.2. The <u>Gabrielson</u> complaint alleged that defendant Jack McDonald was pastor of the Tacoma Chapel of CCBTC and that McDonald "manipulated" Gabrielson "into leaving her husband" and "coerced and unduly influenced" her into having a sexual relationship. It further alleged that CCBTC, acting through its pastor or officers, "knew or should have known that McDonald was involved in the seduction of female members of the congregation." Some causes of action asserted are and were:

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- (b) Intentional church counselor malpractice;
- (c) Pastoral and other malpractice;
- (d) Assault;
- (e) Battery;
- (f) False imprisonment; and
- (g) Defamation among other claims and allegations in the <u>Gabrielson</u> complaint (Exhibit 2).

4.4.1.3. The <u>Gabrielson</u> complaint alleged that these activities and relationships continued from September through December of 1985, and that the plaintiffs Gabrielson were disfellowshipped in January, 1986, from CCBTC of Tacoma as a consequence of Carol Gabrielson's refusal to participate in any further sexual activities with the defendant Jack McDonald, and further that in March of 1986, plaintiff Carol Gabrielson was assaulted and handcuffed and dragged from the defendant CCBTC, all at the direction and at the request of defendant Jack McDonald and other officers or agents of CCBTC.

4.4.2. JUDGMENT OBTAINED

4.4.2.1. The aforesaid Gabrielson complaint and underlying litigation culminated in a jury trial in Pierce County, Washington, resulting in a jury verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff Carol Gabrielson and plaintiff Ira Gabrielson against defendants Jack McDonald, Shirley McDonald,

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and CCBTC on November 23, 1988, for a net judgment for the plaintiff (defendant herein) Carol Gabrielson of \$130,000.00, the plaintiff (defendant herein) Ira Gabrielson of \$17,000.00 and costs of \$988.91 total, and a copy of such verdict and Judgment is attached hereto as Exhibit 3.

v.

PLAINTIFF ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY CLAIMS, ALLEGATIONS AND CAUSES OF ACTION

As to the litigation plaintiffs Gabrielson named herein as defendants, and all of the named defendants, including the CCBTC, Jack McDonald, individually, and Jane Doe McDonald, his wife, and the marital community thereof, and all employees, agents, officers, elders, etc., of CCBTC, and any other persons having an interest herein, plaintiff St. Paul alleges and seeks declaratory judgment that:

- 5.1. <u>Bodily Injury</u>: None of the alleged injuries or claims of the litigation plaintiffs Gabrielson for which compensation was sought, and judgment granted, constitute a "Bodily Injury" as that term is defined in the St. Paul policy except for harm to health through mental anguish.
- 5.2. <u>Property Damage</u>: None of the alleged injuries or claims of the litigation plaintiffs Gabrielson for which

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LAW OFFICES OF DON M. GULLIFORD & ASSOCIATES compensation was sought, and judgment granted, constitute "Property Damage" as that term is defined in the St. Paul policy.

- 5.3. Event: None of the alleged injuries or claims of the litigation plaintiffs Gabrielson for which compensation was sought, and judgment granted, constitute an "Event" as that term is defined in the St. Paul policy.
- 5.4. Within The Scope Of Their Duties: None of the alleged injuries or claims of the litigation plaintiffs Gabrielson for which compensation was sought, and judgment granted, resulting from alleged acts of the defendants were "acts Within The Scope Of Their Duties" as that term is defined in the St. Paul policy.
- 5.5. Personal Injury: None of the alleged injuries or claims of the litigation plaintiffs Gabrielson for which was sought, and judgment granted, constitute compensation "Personal Injury" as that term is defined in the St. Paul policy.
- 5.6. <u>Injury or Damage</u>: None of the alleged injuries or claims of the litigation plaintiffs Gabrielson for which compensation was sought, and judgment granted, constitute "Injury or Damage" as that term is defined in the St. Paul policy.
- 5.7. <u>Defamation</u>: None of the alleged injuries or claims of the litigation plaintiffs Gabrielson for which compensation was sought, and judgment granted, constitute "Defamation" as that term is defined in the St. Paul policy, nor is coverage provided for such judgment under the definition of personal injury in the

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St. Paul policy as provided in the Personal Injury Limitation Endorsement PEX010, because such defamation was not covered under the Basic Insurance Policy provided CCBTC by its basic primary insurance company, The American Casualty Company of Reading Pennsylvania.

- 5.8. <u>Jury Verdict</u>: The judgment granted the defendants Gabrielson in Pierce County Cause No. 86-2-02792-6 (Exhibit 3) was based upon a three-page jury verdict form, including a specific finding in favor of the plaintiff, Carol Gabrielson, for defamation. Such jury verdict form is attached hereto as part of Exhibit 3.
- The Policy of the plaintiff St. Paul does not provide 5.9. coverage for personal injury from false arrest, detention, malicious prosecution or false imprisonment; libel and slander, defamation of character, or invasion of the rights of privacy; false statements about an organization or its products, or services made by or on behalf of any protected person with knowledge that they are false; wrongful entry or wrongful eviction because such are not covered under the Basic Insurance Policy with the American Casualty Company and are thus excluded under the personal injury limitation endorsement PEX010 of the St. Paul policy.
- 5.10. Certain of the litigation plaintiffs Gabrielson's alleged injuries arose from "any service or treatment related to

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health or of a professional nature" as that term is used in the policy and are thus excluded from coverage.

5.11. Certain or all of the litigation plaintiffs Gabrielson's alleged injuries arose from "performance of or failure to perform any professional service in your capacity as a

5.11. Certain or all of the litigation plaintiffs Gabrielson's alleged injuries arose from "performance of or failure to perform any professional service in your capacity as a CHURCH." as that exclusion is used in the policy (Professional Services Exclusion Endorsement PEXO19) and are thus excluded from coverage.

5.12. The plaintiff St. Paul has no duty to defend or indemnify named or unnamed defendants, CCBTC, or officers or employees of CCBTC seeking coverage now or in the future.

5.13. Certain or all of the litigation plaintiffs Gabrielson's alleged injuries arose from claims based on an event that happened before the plaintiff St. Paul's insurance policy was in effect and thus are excluded as "Prior acts." under the exclusion section of the St. Paul policy.

5.14. The judgment obtained in favor of the plaintiffs Gabrielson (Exhibit 3) totals approximately \$148,000.00, which is less than the threshold coverage provided by the plaintiff St. Paul's excess insurance policy and, thus, the policy of the plaintiff St. Paul is not applicable or available for payment of any claims or judgments asserted by the defendants Gabrielson, nor do any other duties or obligations arise in favor of the defendants Gabrielson or any other named defendants herein.

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plaintiffs Gabrielson seek compensation fall within the scope of

coverages provided under the plaintiff St. Paul Fire and Marine

has no duty to defend or indemnify the Community Chapel and Bible

Training Center (CCBTC) or the defendants McDonald, et al., or

policy herein is an excess policy, above the threshold of the

therefore, the plaintiff St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance

Company has no duty or obligations whatsoever to the litigation

plaintiffs/judgment creditors Gabrielson or any other party or

employees,

requests that the Court grant declaratory judgment declaring:

Insurance Company's Excess Liability Policy;

agents,

defendants against whom claims

litigation plaintiffs Gabrielson's

Plaintiff St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company

That none of the injuries for which the litigation

That the St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company

are

That the St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company

elders

asserted

judgment

and

by

all

other

litigation

herein and,

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6.1.

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plaintiffs.

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defendant herein.

other officers,

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COMPLAINT FOR
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P.O. Box 548, Bellevue, WA 98009-0548 Bellevue, WA 98004 (206) 462-4000

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6	.5.	Plai	ntiff	f st.	Paul	fur	ther	reg	uests	from	the	Court
such	othe	r an	d f	urther	re	lief	as	to	the	Court	may	seen
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D	ATED 1	his	5th d	lav of	Tanı	arv	1989	\				

LAW OFFICES OF

DON M. GULLIFORD & ASSOCIATES

Ву

DON M. GULLIFORD
Of Attorneys for Plaintiff
St.Paul Fire and Marine

Insurance Company

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - 16 decjudg.gab

Introduction

FRANK ASPERRY

#Straul

NOV 1 5 1988

C.I.D. MANAGER
NORTHWEST SERVICE CENTER
OTRUE AND CERTIFICENTER

4XB298

The words you, your and yours mean the insured named here:

Your palicy protects your business against a variety

of losses. It's written in plain, easy-to-understand.

COMMUNITY CHAPEL & BIBLE TRAINING CENTER 18635 8TH AVENUE SOUTH SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

Which is a

co-partnership

corporation

notice:

NON-PROFIT

We, us, our and ours mean the St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company. We're a capital stock company located in St. Paul, Minnesota.

Your policy is composed of General Rules, an explanation of What To Do If You Have A Loss, and one or more Agreements explaining your coverage. It may also include one or more endorsements. Endorsements are documents that change your policy. The agreements and endorsements you have are listed below.

This policy will begin on 5-9-85 and continue until 5-9-86

Your former policy, number NEW is automatically cancelled on the date this policy begins.

In return for your premium, we'll provide the protection stated in this policy.

Your premium is \$1,000.00

Agreements And Endorsements Included In This Policy

Form number and edition date 40504(7-82 INTRODUCTION UMBRELLA EXCESS LIABILITY PROTECTION COVERAGE SUMMARY 43172(2-82) °43299(1–84) UMBRELLA EXCESS UNINSURED MOTORIST ENDORSEMENT **~43209(2-83**) LIMBRELLA EXCESS LIABILITY PROTECTION **AUTO LIABILITY LIMITATION ENDORSEMENT ~43111(2-82**) **~43121(2-82**) PROPERTY EXCLUSION ENDORSEMENT PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL SERVICE EXCLUSION ENDORSEMENT 43125(3-82) × REX019(3-82) PROFESSIONAL SERVICES EXCLUSION ENDORSEMENT ŶPEX012(5-82 UMBRELLA EXCESS ATHLETIC PARTICIPANT EXCLUSION ENDORSEMENT PERSONAL INJURY LIMITATION ENDORSEMENT **REX010(1-82)**

NON-RENEWED DESTROY DATE

RECEIVED

JUN 1 6 1988

NORTHWEST SERVICE CENTER
CLAIM DEPARTMENT

This policy is not effective unless it's signed by an authorized representative of The St. Paul.

Authorized representative

Name and address of authorized representative

JOHN F. SNAPP & SONS
314 FIRST AVENUE WEST
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98119
#460395-5

Signature date

40504 Rev. 7-82 Printed in U.S.A. /-22-85/ 1

Introduction.

Page 1 of 1

UMBRELLA EXCESS LIABILITY PROTECTION COVERAGE SUMMARY

RECEIVED

This Coverage Summary shows the limits and extent of coverage under your Umbrella Excess Liability Protection. It also describes your Basic Insurance.

110V 1 6 1988

NORTHWEST SERVICE CENTER CLAIM DEPARTMENT

Limits Of Coverage

Each event limit \$2,000,000.00

Total limit \$2,000,000.00 Deductible (Applies to each event not covered by your Basic Insurance)

\$ 10,000.00

Bodily injury

(occurrence)

(occurrence)

Property damage Each accidental event

Each accidental event

Schedule of Basic Insurance

General Liability

Insurer

CNA

Policy number IP052144020

Policy period 5-9-85 TO 5-9-86

Limits of insurance

Bodily injury and property damage com-

bined

Insurer

CNA

Each event

Total limit

(occurrence) \$ 500,000.00

(aggregate) \$ 500,000.00

Bodily injury

Property damage

Each accident

Each person

Each accident

Total limit(aggregate)

Total limit(aggregate)

Policy number BUA032144021

Policy period 5-9-85 TO 5-9-86

Automobile Liability

Limits of insurance

Employer's Liability

Bodily Injury and property damage com-

bined

Insurer

Each accident

\$ 500,000.00

Limit of insurance

Each event (occurrence)

Policy number

Policy period

If issued after the date your policy begins, these spaces must be completed

and our representative must sign below.

Authorized representative

Policy issued to

COMMUNITY CHAPEL & BIBLE TRAINING CENTER

Coverage takes effect Policy Number

5-9-85

43172 Ed.2-82 Printed in U.S.A. OSt. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. 1982 Coverage Summary

584XB2982

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UMBRELLA EXCESS UNINSURED MOTORIST ENDORSEMENT

This endorsement changes your Umbrella Excess Liability Protection.

How Your Coverage Is Changed

Your protection is changed by adding the following paragraph to the What This Agreement Covers section.

Uninsured Motorists. We'll provide Uninsured Motorists Coverage but only if the claims are covered under your Basic Insurance shown below. And then, only in accordance with the applicable provisions of your Basic Insurance.

The most we'll pay for all Uninsured Motorists claims in one policy year is the Total limit shown below under the Limit of coverage.

Other Terms

All other terms of your policy remain the same.

Limit of coverage \$ 2,000,000.00

Total Limit

Basic Uninsured Motorists Insurance

Insurer	<u>Limits of Insurar</u>	nce
CNA	Each	Each
Policy number BUA032144021	person	accident
5005214021	\$ 500,000.00	\$ 500,000.00
Policy period 5-9-85 TO 5-9-86		

If issued after the date your policy begins, these spaces must be completed and our representative must sign below. Policy issued to

COMMUNITY CHAPEL & BIBLE TRAINING CENTER

Authorized representative

Liability takes effect Policy Number 5-9-85 584XB2982

43299 Ed.1-84 Printed in U.S.A. •St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co.1984

Endorsement to Insuring Agreement 56
Page 1 of 1

4721/2883 88444

UMBRELLA EXCESS LIABILITY PROTECTION

We've designed this agreement to provide extra protection, over your basic liability insurance. Of course, there are some limitations which are explained later in this agreement.

Table of Contents	Page	injury, and advertising injury claims, caused by an event.
What This Agreement Covers	1	Event means an accidental event that re-
Coverage In Addition To Your	-	sults in bodily injury or property damage
Basic Insurance	2	the protected person didn't expect or in-
Coverage When Your Basic Insurance Doesn't Apply	3	tend to happen. An event also means an act or a series of similar or related acts that result in personal injury or advertis-
Who Is Protected Under This Agreement	3	ing injury.
Who Is Protected For Claims Not	_	Bodily injury means any harm to a per-
Related To Autos	3	son's health that happens while this
Who Is Protected For Auto-Related		agreement is in effect. Bodily injury in-
Claims	4	cludes any physical harm, sickness or disease. And it includes mental anguish,
Where We Cover	5	injury or illness, whether or not there
Where we cover	•	has been physical harm or illness. If a
Limits Of Coverage	5	bodily injury is covered, we'll cover dam-
Each Event Limit	5	ages for care, loss of services or death
Total Limit	5	resulting from the injury.
The Deductible	6	Property damage means any damage to tangible property of others that happens
Exclusions-Claims We Won't Cover	6	while this agreement is in effect. This includes loss of use of the damaged proper-
Other Rules For This Agreement	8	ty resulting from the damage. Property
Other Insurance	8	damage also includes loss of use of other's
Appealing Judgments	8	property that hasn't been physically dam-
Paying Covered Claims	9	aged if caused by an accidental event that
Keeping Your Basic Insurance In	9	happens while this agreement is in effect.
Effect	9	Personal injury means any of the following
Adjustment of premium Recovering Damages From A Third	9	acts of interference with an individual's
Party	9	rights that happens in the course of your
What To Do If You Have A Loss	10	business while this agreement is in effect:
		•false arrest, wrongful detention, mali- cious prosecution, humiliation or false im-

What This Agreement Covers

We'll pay amounts you and others protected under this agreement are legally required to pay as damages for covered bodily injury, property damage, personal

the following idividual's irse of your is in effect: ion, malior false imprisonment;

•libel, slander, defamation of character, or invasion of an individuals right of privacy. But not such acts that arise from advertising activities;

wrongful entry, wrongful eviction or other invasion of the right of private occupancy; or

•assault or battery committed to prevent or remove a danger to people or property.

Advertising injury means any of the following acts of interference with a person's rights that happens in the course of your business while this agreement is in effect:

- •libel, slander, defamation of character, or invasion of an individuals right of privacy;
- infringement of any copyright, title or slogan;
- piracy, unfair competition or idea misappropriation under an implied contract;

when the act is committed or alleged to have been committed in any advertisement, publicity article, broadcast or telecast and arises out of your advertising activities.

Injury or damage. When we say injury or damage we mean bodily injury, property damage, personal injury or advertising injury.

Coverage In Addition To Your Basic Insurance

When a claim covered by this agreement is covered by your Basic Insurance, we'll pay damages you and others protected by this agreement are legally required to pay if those damages are over the coverage limits of your Basic Insurance. But we'll only pay amounts up to the limits of coverage under this agreement. For example:

You are the owner of a store. A customer slips and falls in your store and suffers serious injury. The customer then sues you and the court awards him \$1,000,000 in damages.

You have a basic liability insurance policy with a coverage limit of \$750,000 and the limit of coverage under this agreement is \$1,000,000. We'll therefore pay \$250,000 since that's the amount by which the damages exceed the limit of your Basic Insurance; and It's also less than the limit under this agreement.

Your Basic Insurance is listed on the Schedule of Basic Insurance. It doesn't matter whether you bought the insurance from us or from other insurance companies. We refer to this insurance as your Basic Insurance in this agreement.

If the total limits of your Basic Insurance (which may be referred to in the Basic Insurance policies as aggregate limits) are reduced by the payment of claims resulting from all events that occur during our policy year and that would be covered by this agreement, we'll pay damages above those reduced limits. And if the limit of your Basic Insurance were used up altogether to pay claims that would be covered by this agreement, this agreement will then cover you as if it were your Basic Insurance.

Damages you are legally required to pay are either:

- amounts you or other protected persons must pay under a court judgment; or
- •amounts you or another protected person must pay under the terms of a settlement agreement signed by you, by us, and by the party making the claim.

But they don't include legal expenses, your office expenses or the salaries of your employees. Amounts recovered from other sources are deducted from amounts you or another protected person must pay to determine the net liability.

Defense of claims. We won't pay the cost of, or conduct the investigation, defense, or settlement of a claim if those costs are covered by your Basic Insurance. However, we do have the right to associate in the defense and control of any claim that is reasonably likely to involve us.

If any event results in claims that use up the limits of coverage under your Basic Insurance, we'll then take over the defense of any claim resulting from the same event that has been brought against you or any other protected person. But we'll only do this if:

the claim is covered by this agreement;
 and

*this agreement is immediately in excess of your Basic Insurance. This means you don't have other excess insurance with another company that would apply over your Basic Insurance. Of course, you may have excess insurance that applies to claims over the limits of coverage in this agreement.

Coverage When Your Basic Insurance Doesn't Apply

If your Basic Insurance doesn't cover a claim which is covered by this agreement, we'll pay damages that you or other protected persons are legally required to pay. However, you'll be responsible for the claim up to the deductible amount shown on the Coverage Summary. Of course, our payments won't exceed the limit of coverage.

Additional benefits. All of the following benefits are in addition to the limits of coverage. These benefits apply only when your Basic Insurance doesn't apply.

Defending lawsuits. We'll defend any suit brought against you or any other protected person for covered claims, even if the suit is groundless or fraudulent. We have the right to investigate, negotiate and settle any suit or claim if we believe that is proper. We'll pay all costs of defending the suit, including interest on that part of any judgment that doesn't exceed the limit of coverage that applies. But we won't defend a suit or pay a claim after the limit of coverage has been used up in paying judgments or settlements.

Expenses related to defense. We'll also pay all reasonable costs that you or any protected person incur at our request while helping us investigate or defend a claim or suit. This includes up to \$200.00 per day for actual loss of earnings. For example, if someone sues you, we may ask you to be a witness in a trial. If you lose earnings as a result, we'll pay up to \$200.00 per day for earnings you actually lose.

Legal bonds. We'll pay premiums for appeal bonds, or bonds to release property that's being used to secure a legal obli-

gation, that are required in a suit we defend. We'll pay premiums for bonds valued up to the limit of coverage. We'll also pay the cost of bail bonds required because of a covered auto accident, including bonds for related traffic law violations. But we have no obligation to apply for or furnish these bonds.

If the laws of a foreign country prohibit us from providing these Additional Benefits, we'll pay any similar expenses you incur with our written consent.

Who Is Protected Under This Agreement

Protected persons are people and organizations protected under this agreement.

Here's a list of "protected persons" and certain limitations on their liability protection. Each is protected separately. However, the limits of coverage shown in the Coverage Summary are shared by all protected persons.

Who Is Protected For Claims Not Related To Autos

This section describes those protected for claims not arising out of the use of autos. Persons who are protected for auto-related claims are described in the next section of this agreement.

Individual. If this policy is in your name as an individual, you and your spouse are protected against claims resulting from conducting your business as a sole proprietor.

Partnership-joint venture. If this policy is in the name of a partnership or joint venture, that organization is protected. Individual partners or co-venturers are also protected for their liability as members of the named organization. But we won't protect any person or organization for their liability resulting from membership in a partnership or joint venture which is not named as an insured in the introduction.

196712S

Corporation: If this policy is in the name of a corporation, or other type of organization, its executive officers, directors and stockholders are protected while they're acting within the scope of their duties for the named organization.

Employees. Your employees are protected while they're acting within the scope of their duties for you.

Subsidiaries. If you have subsidiaries or own or control other companies before the date this agreement takes effect, they're protected. We'll also protect other such companies that you acquire while this agreement is in effect if you notify us within 60 days after you acquire them.

Real estate manager. Any person or organization is protected while acting as a real estate manager for you.

Those protected under your Basic Insurance. We'll protect any other person or organization who is protected under your Basic Insurance, subject to the same coverage limitations as your Basic Insurance.

Those you have agreed to protect. We'll protect any person, organization, trustee or estate with whom you've entered into a written contract that requires you to provide the kind of protection offered by this agreement. However, this protection only applies in connection with:

- operations you conduct or that are conducted on your behalf; or
- •facilities you own or use.

Who Is Protected For Auto-Related Claims

The following persons are protected for auto-related claims and the extent of coverage is explained.

- 1. You.
- 2. Those protected under your Basic Insurance. We'll protect any other person or organization who is protected under your Basic Insurance, subject to the same

coverage limitations as your Basic Insurance.

- 3. Anyone while using with your permission an auto you own, rent or borrow. However, we won't protect:

 •the owner of an auto you rent or borrow if the owner is an employee of yours or a member of an employee's household, unless covered under your Basic Insurance;
- you or anyone else, if this policy is in the name of a partnership, for the use of an auto owned by or registered in the name of a partner, unless covered under your Basic Insurance;
- •anyone while working in the business of selling, servicing, repairing or parking autos, unless the business is yours;
- •anyone while moving property to or from an auto, unless he or she is one of your employees, a person who leases or borrows an auto from you, or any of that person's employees.
- 4. Anyone legally responsible for the actions of a protected person, to the extent of that responsibility. But we'll protect the owner or anyone else from whom you rent or borrow an auto only if that auto is a trailer connected to an auto you own.

Autos are cars, trucks, trailers and other land vehicles designed for travel on public roads - but not mobile equipment.

Mobile equipment means the following types of land vehicles:

- •Those that don't have to be licensed.
- •Those designed for use mainly off public roads.
- •Those kept for use only on your premises or that part of a road or other access adjacent to your premises.
- •Those used only to provide mobility for permanently attached specialized equipment. For example, these include well drilling rigs, power cranes, concrete mixers that remain on a job site and similar equipment.
- Specialized equipment like bulldozers, rollers, graders, farm machinery and similar equipment.

Where We Cover

We cover events that take place anywhere.

Limits Of Coverage

Two types of limits - an "Each event limit" and a "Total limit" - apply to the amount we'll pay. These limits are shown in the Coverage Summary.

Each Event Limit

This is the most we'll pay for all claims that result from any one event. This applies no matter how many persons protected under this agreement are involved or how many claims are made. We'll consider all bodily injury and property damage caused by continuous or repeated exposure to basically the same conditions to be the result of one event.

We'll also consider all personal injury caused by a series of similar or related acts to be the result of one event.

And we'll consider all advertising injury caused by a series of acts in which the same or similar advertising material is used to be the result of one event. Regardless of the number or kinds of media involved.

A photo used in your advertising campaign includes two men in the background. They never consented to the use of their pictures. You use the photo in different magazine ads and television commercials over a few weeks. Both men sue you for invasion of privacy. We'll consider their claims to be the result of one event.

Total Limit

The total limit is the most we'll pay for all claims involving products and completed work, that result from all accidental events that occur in a policy year. By

policy year, we mean each consecutive annual period of this agreement.

Products and completed work. The total limit applies to bodily injury and property damage that happens away from your premises and is caused by your products, your completed work, or people relying on statements or warranties you've made about your products or completed work.

Your products mean any product or its container which you or others using your name have manufactured, sold, handled or distributed, if the injury or damage occurs after you've given physical possession of the product or container to others. We won't consider a vehicle to be a container. We won't consider items rented to others to be your products. Nor will we consider your products to include an item you haven't sold but which you allow others to use - like a vending machine.

Completed work means work you've completed, had completed for you or abandoned.

When we consider work to be completed. We'll consider work to be completed at the earliest of the following, even though further service, maintenance, correction, repair or replacement is required because of a defect:

- •When all work contracted to be done by you or on your behalf has been finished.
- •When all work to be done by you or on your behalf at the site of the work which causes the injury or damage has been finished.
- •When the part of the work which causes the injury or damage has been put to its intended use by someone other than another contractor who is working for a principal on the same project.

However, we won't consider uninstalled or abandoned materials or tools to be completed work. Nor will we consider any work done in connection with transporting property - other than a condition created by the loading or unloading of a vehicle - to be completed work.

The Coverage Summary shows the amount of the deductible. The protected person will be responsible up to that amount for each event to which your Basic Insurance doesn't apply. We'll pay covered claims over the deductible amount up to the limit of coverage that applies. We may pay all or part of the deductible on your behalf. If we do, you agree to repay that amount to us promptly.

Exclusions-Claims We Won't Cover

We won't cover or defend against claims for any of the following liabilities.

Prior acts. We won't cover advertising injury claims, nor will we cover personal injury claims for libel, slander, defamation of character or invasion of an individuals right of privacy when the claim is based on an event that happened before this agreement was in effect.

Such an event may involve a series of similar or related acts, statements or the use of similar advertising material. If it does, we won't cover claims based on that event when the first act, statement, advertisement, publicity article, broadcast or telecast of the series happened before this agreement was in effect.

Advertising. We won't cover advertising injury claims that result from any of the following:

- •failure to perform your obligations under a contract;
- •infringement of trademark, service mark or trade name by using any of them as the trademark, service mark or trade name of the goods or services you sell or advertise or offer for sale (but this exclusion will not apply to infringement of someone else's titles or slogans);
- incorrect description of goods or or services; or
- •mistakes in the advertised price of goods or services.

Worker's compensation. We won't cover obligations that protected persons or their insurers have under worker's compensation, unemployment compensation, disability benefits or similar laws. But this exclusion won't apply to liability of others you've assumed under a contract or agreement.

Product recall. We won't cover losses based on the recall or withdrawal of your products from the market for any reason. Nor will we cover losses resulting from the recall or withdrawal of any work you've completed or had completed for you. Or of any item of which your products or work forms a part.

Damage to your products or work. We won't cover damage to your products caused by the product itself or by any of its parts. Nor will we cover damage to your work that's caused by the work itself or by materials or equipment connected with it. But we will cover liability claims for damage to your completed work which results from work done for you by others, such as contractors, if covered by your basic insurance.

Business risk. We won't cover loss of use of tangible property that hasn't been physically damaged when the loss of use is caused by your failure to live up to a contract or by the failure of your products or work to live up to your promises. But we will cover loss of use of tangible property of others that's caused by sudden or accidental damage or destruction of your products or work after they've been used by another person. For example:

You supply a customer with a motor that is part of a conveyor belt. You give a one-year warranty against breakdown of the motor. It breaks down after six months. Although the conveyor isn't damaged, your customer has losses due to loss of use of the belt. We won't cover this loss. However, if the motor had suddenly caught fire, we would cover your liability for the loss of use of the belt.

Pollution. We won't cover injury or damage caused by the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of:

- *smoke, vapor, soot or fumes;
- acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases; or
- waste material or other irritants or contaminants.

But this exclusion won't apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental.

Injury to fellow employees. We won't cover an employee for claims resulting from injury to or death of another employee of the same employer, that happens in the course of such employment.

But if such claims are covered by your Basic Insurance, this exclusion will not apply. We'll cover these claims subject to the same coverage limitations as your Basic Insurance.

Aircraft. We won't cover claims for injury or damage due to the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of:
•an aircraft owned, operated, rented or borrowed by any protected person; or
•any other aircraft operated by anyone in the course of his or her employment by any protected person.

But if such claims are covered by your Basic Insurance, this exclusion will not apply. We'll cover these claims subject to the same coverage limitations as your Basic Insurance.

Aircraft means only those aircraft designed to transport people or property.

Watercraft. We won't cover claims for injury or damage due to the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of any watercraft over 75 feet long unless:

*such claims are covered by your Basic Insurance; or

•you notify us within 30 days after you acquire such a watercraft.

Damage to property you own or control. We won't cover claims for property damage to:

- •property you or any other protected
 person owns;
- *property owned or rented by one protected person that is rented to, used by, or in the custody or control of another protected person;

- *aircraft or watercraft you or any other protected person rents, uses, has custody of or controls; or
- •property you or any other protected person rents, occupies, uses, has custody of or controls, to the extent you or the other protected person are required by contract to insure the property.

War. We won't cover liabilities you assume by contract if they arise out of war (declared or undeclared), invasion, civil war, rebellion, revolution, military or usurped power or confiscation or nationalization of property by a government or other public authority. But this exclusion does not apply to liabilities arising out of events that take place in the United States of America, its territories or possessions, or Canada.

Nuclear energy liability. We won't cover liability for which you or other protected persons are covered under a nuclear energy liability policy issued by a group such as one of the following:

- The American Nuclear Insurers;
- •The Mutual Atomic Energy Liability Underwriters; or
- •The Nuclear Insurance Association of Canada.

Nor will we cover a liability that would have been covered by a policy of one of those groups if its limit hadn't been used up.

We won't cover claims for property damage to a nuclear facility located in the United States or Canada when the liability arises out of services or materials you or any protected person furnished to the facility. This includes liability for all forms of radioactive contamination. And we won't cover any claims that arise out of services or materials that you or other protected persons furnish to any nuclear facility located outside the United States or Canada.

We won't cover claims resulting from radioactive, toxic, explosive or other hazardous properties of nuclear material in any of these three situations:

1. You or other protected persons are required by law to maintain financial pro-

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tection for nuclear events. Or you or they are entitled, or would have been entitled had this policy not been issued, to indemnity for nuclear events from the United States.

2. The nuclear material is located at, or at any time discharges from, any nuclear facility that is owned or operated by you or any protected person. Nor will we cover such claims if the nuclear facility owned by you or any protected person is operated by others.

3. The nuclear material is contained in spent fuel or waste that you, any protected person, or others acting for either, have at any time possessed, transported or disposed of.

Nuclear material means source material, special nuclear material or by-product material as defined under the federal Atomic Energy Act.

Nuclear facilities are any of the following:

- •Nuclear reactors.
- •Enrichment plants.
- •Fuel or spent fuel handling or processing plants.
- •A location used for handling, storing or disposing of nuclear waste.
- •A location containing more than 25 grams of plutonium or uranium 233 combined, or more than 250 grams of uranium 235.

Spent fuel is any fuel element or component, whether solid or liquid, which has been used or exposed to radiation in a nuclear reactor.

Nuclear waste is waste from any of the first three nuclear facilities named above which contains by-product material. But we won't consider waste to include tailings or other wastes from the processing of ore to extract or concentrate uranium or thorium to produce source material.

Other Rules For This Agreement

The following are general rules and conditions that apply to this agreement. You should also look at the "General Rules" page that's attached.

Other Insurance

If other insurance applies to claims covered by this agreement, the insurance under this agreement is excess and we won't make any payments until the other insurance has been used up. This won't be true, however, if the other insurance is specifically written to be excess over this agreement.

Except to the extent stated in this agreement, this insurance isn't subject to the terms, conditions, or limitations of any of your other insurance.

Appealing Judgments

We can appeal a judgment against any person protected under this agreement if:

•the judgment is for more than the amount of your deductible or the limits of coverage under your Basic Insurance, whichever applies; and

 the protected person and the Basic Insurers do not appeal it.

If we appeal the judgment, we will pay the costs of the appeal and any interest on those costs. Those payments will be in addition to the limits of coverage under this agreement.

Paying Covered Claims

If you are required to pay a covered claim either by the judgement of a court or by agreement with the person who made the claim and with us you may go ahead and pay the claim. If you then give us proof that you did so, we'll reimburse you for the amount by which your payment exceeds either the coverage limits of your Basic Insurance or the deductible, whichever applies.

Or, if you ask us to do so, we'll pay the person who made the claim.

Keeping Your Basic Insurance In Effect

You promise to keep the insurance policies listed in the Schedule of Basic Insurance in effect while this agreement is in effect. You promise not to change the terms, conditions or limits of coverage of those policies; and, if you renew or replace any of them, to make sure that the new policy is not more restrictive than the one it replaces. This insurance will remain in effect if you break any of these promises but we won't be liable for more than we would have been if you had kept your promises.

If you replace a policy listed in the Schedule with an equivalent revised standard form policy that's published by Insurance Services Office or similar rating organization, we'll treat that as a renewal or replacement without any change of terms or conditions. And we won't regard using up part or all of the limits of coverage of your Basic Insurance due to all events during one policy year as a change of terms or conditions.

If you're unable to recover from a Basic Insurer because it becomes insolvent or because you fail to comply with the terms of your contract with that insurer, this agreement will only apply to amounts over the limits shown in the Schedule of Basic Insurance.

Adjustment of premium

Ordinarily, we charge you a flat premium for this agreement. However, we may change your premium if you add new persons or property to those which are protected under your Basic Insurance. You must notify us promptly if this happens. Then, if you must pay an additional premium on your Basic Insurance because of the additional persons or property, we'll have the right to charge you an additional premium for this agreement.

Recovering Damages From A Third Party

This section replaces the section with the same title on the "General Rules" page, but only for this agreement.

Any person protected under this agreement may be able to recover all or part of a loss from someone other than us. Because of this, each protected person must do all that's possible to preserve any right of recovery available. If we make a payment under this policy, that right of recovery will belong to us.

Division of recovery. Any amount recovered will be divided as follows:

- •First, any protected person or insurer who paid amounts over the limits of coverage under this agreement will be reimbursed for the actual excess amount paid.
- •Next, we'll be reimbursed for any payments we've actually made.
- •Then if any amount remains, it will belong to any Basic Insurer or protected person who paid damages to the person who made the claim.

Expenses of recovery proceedings will be divided in the same ratio as the recovery is shared. But if we bring proceedings on our own to try to obtain a recovery and we fail to do so, we'll pay all the expenses of those proceedings ourselves.

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What To Do If You Have A Loss

The What To Do If You Have A Loss page is replaced by the following only for this agreement:

Someone is injured or something happens which can result in a liability claim. If there's an accident or incident likely to involve this agreement, you or any other protected person must:

- 1. Tell us or our agent what happened as soon as possible. Do this even though no claim has been made by you or another protected person is aware of having done something that may later result in a claim. This notice should include:
- •The time and place of the event;
- The protected person involved;
- The specific nature of the incident including the type of claim that may result;
 and

- •The name and addresses of any injured people and witnesses.
- 2. Notify the police if a law may have been broken.
- 3. Send us copies of all demands or legal documents if someone makes a claim or starts a lawsuit.
- 4. Cooperate and assist us in securing and giving evidence, attending hearings and trials, and obtaining the attendance of witnesses.
- 5. Refrain from taking on any financial obligations or paying out any money without our authorization. Doing so may result in our not making reimbursement of the payment even though the cost is covered by the policy. But this rule doesn't apply to money spent for emergency first aid to others at the time of an accident.

This endorsement changes your Umbrella Excess Liability Protection.

How Your Coverage Is Changed

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This endorsement limits your auto coverage.

We won't cover injury or damage resulting from the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of an auto unless it's covered under your basic insurance.

Other Terms

All other terms of this policy remain the same.

If issued after the date your policy begins, these spaces must be completed and our representative must sign below.

Authorized representative

Policy issued to

COMMUNITY CHAPEL & BIBLE TRAINING CENTER

Endorsement takes effect Policy Number 5-9-85 584XB2982

43111 Ed.2-82 Printed in U.S.A.

St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. 1982

Endorsement2_to Insuring Agreement 56
Page 1 of 1

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This endorsement changes your Umbrella Excess Liability Protection.

How Your Coverage Is Changed

The following exclusion is added to the Exclusions - Losses We Won't Cover section of this agreement.

Control of Property. We won't cover damage to any of the following:

- Property you or other protected persons rent, occupy or hold for sale or safekeeping;
- Property you use;
- Property any protected person physically controls; or

•Property being transported by any protected person.

However, we'll cover damage to property you use or control that you've assumed liability for under a written sidetrack agreement.

Other Terms

All other terms of this policy remain the same.

If issued after the date your policy begins, these spaces must be completed and our representative must sign below.

Authorized representative

Policy issued to

COMMUNITY CHAPEL & BIBLE TRAINING CENTER

Endorsement takes effect Policy Number

5-9-85

584XB2982

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Endorsement to Insuring Agreement 56
Page 1 of 1

PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL SERVICE EXCLUSION ENDORSEMENT

This endorsement changes your Umbrella Excess Liability Protection.

How Your Coverage Is Changed

The following paragraphs are added to the Exclusions - Losses We Won't Cover section of this agreement.

Professional Medical Service. We won't cover injury or damage due to providing or failure to provide:

Medical, surgical, dental, x-ray, nursing service or treatment, or the serving of food or beverage within these services;
any service or treatment related to health or of a professional nature;
any cosmetic or tonsorial service or treatment;

- drugs, medical or dental supplies or appliances; or
- •the handling of corpses or the performance of autopsies.

This exclusion won't apply to coverage provided by the Umbrella Excess Hospital Professional Liability Protection - Claims Made.

Other Terms

All other terms of your policy remain the

If issued after the date your policy begins, these spaces must be completed and our representative must sign below.

Authorized representative

Policy issued to

COMMINITY CUADEL & RIRLS TRAINING CENTER

Endorsement takes effect Policy Number

5-9-85

584XB2982

43125 Ed.3-82 Printed in U.S.A.
•St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. 1982

Endorsement 4 to Insuring Agreement 56 Page 1 of 1

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES EXCLUSION ENDORSEMENT

This endorsement changes your Umbrella Excess Liability Protection.

How Your Coverage Is Changed

Your protection is changed by adding the following exclusion to the Exclusions -Claims We Won't Cover section. The effect of this change is to reduce your coverage.

Professional services. We won't cover injury or damage resulting from the performance of or the failure to perform any professional service in your capacity as a CHURBH.

Other Terms

All other terms of your policy remain the same.

If we issue this form after the date your policy takes effect, we must complete these spaces and our representative must sign below.	Policy issued to COMMUNITY CHAPEL & BIBLE TRAINING CENTER
Authorized representative	Agreement takes effect 5-9-85
	Policy number 584XB2982
PEXO19 Ed.3-82 Printed in U.S.A. cSt. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co.1983	Insuring Agreement







UMBRELLA EXCESS ATHLETIC PARTICIPANT **EXCLUSION ENDORSEMENT**

This endorsement changes your Umbrella Excess Liability Protection.

How Your Coverage is Changed

Your protection is changed by adding the following exclusion to the Exclusions -Claims We Won't Cover section. The effect of this change is to reduce your coverage.

Athletic participants. We won't cover claims for bodily injury or personal injury to students resulting from practicing or taking part in physical training, a sport or athletic activity or contest.

Other Terms

All other terms of your policy remain the same.

If we issue this form after the date your policy takes effect, we must complete these spaces and our representative must sign below.	Policy issued to COMMUNITY CHAPEL & BIBLE TRAINING CENTER
Authorized representative	Agreement takes effect 5-9-85
	Policy number 584XB2982
PEX012 Ed.5-82 Printed in U.S.A. cSt. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co.	Insuring Agreement 56 1983 Endorsement number to Insuring Agreement 56







PERSONAL INJURY LIMITATION ENDORSEMENT

This endorsement changes your Umbrella Excess Liability Protection.

How Your Coverage is Changed

Your protection is changed by adding the following to the Exclusions - Claims We Won't Cover section. The effect of this change is to reduce your coverage.

Personal injury. We won't cover a claim resulting from any of the following offenses unless it's covered under your Basic Insurance.

°False arrest, wrongful detention, malicious prosecution or false imprisonment. *Libel and slander, defamation of character, or invasion of the rights of privacy.

- Statements made in advertising, broadcasting or telecasting activities by you or on your behalf.
- *False statements about an organization or its products, or services made by or on behalf of any protected person with knowledge that they are false. OWrongful entry or wrongful eviction.

Other Terms

All other terms of your policy remain the same.

If we issue this form after the date your policy takes effect, we must complete these spaces and our representative must sign below.	Policy issued to COMMUNITY CHAPEL & BIBLE TRAINING CENTER
Authorized representative	Agreement takes effect 5-9-85
	Policy number 584XB2982

The plaintiffs Carol Gabrielson and Ira Gabrielson are husband and wife and are residents of Pierce County, Washington.

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III.

The defendants Donald Lee Barnett and Barbara Barnett are husband and wife and are residents of King County, Washington. Donald Barnett is the head pastor of Community Chapel and Bible Training Center and as such is responsible for the administration and direction of the entire congregation, including the Tacoma Chapel. All actions described of the defendants or either of them were performed on behalf of the marital community.

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The defendants Jack McDonald and "Jane Doe" McDonald are husband and wife and residents of Pierce County, Washington. Jack McDonald is the pastor of Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Tacoma. All actions described of the defendants or either of them were performed on behalf of the marital community.

The defendants "John-Doss" 1-4 and Jane Does" 1-4 are husbands and wives and are residents of the State of Washington. All actions described of the defendants or any of them were performed on behalf of the marital community.

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COMPLAINT - 2

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife,

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Plaintiffs,

COMPLAINT FOR PERSONAL INJURIES AND DAMAGES

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No. 86

MCCK MCDONALD and "JANE DOE"

MCDONALD, husband and wife;

DONALD LEE BARNETT and BARBARA)

BARNETT, husband and wife; and)

"JOHN DOES" NOS. 1-4 AND "JANE)

DOES" NOS. 1-4, husbands and

Wives; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND

BIBLE TRAINING CENTER OF

TACOMA; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND

BIBLE TRAINING CENTER,

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Defendants.

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COME NOW the plaintiffs by and through their attorney of record, Daniel L. Hannula of Rush, Hannula & Harkins, and for cause of action against the defendants state and allege as follows:

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The court has jurisdiction over the subject matter herein and the parties hereto.

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COMPLAINT - 1

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EXHIBIT A

representation employment and/or agency for the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center and Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Tacoma.

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The plaintiffs, Carol and Ira Gabrielson, regularly attended services at both the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Tacoma and the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center in Burien for a number of years. As members of the congregation, Carol and Ira Gabrielson attended numerous functions and were active participants in the congregation. In addition, the Gabrielsons tithed a portion of their income to the congregation to help sustain it.

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Defendant Jack McDonald, as pastor of the Tacoma Chapel, held himself out to the Gabrielsons as a qualified counselor. In—this regard, Carol Gabrielson began counseling with defendant Jack McDonald on a regular basis.

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As a result of the counseling sessions, defendant Jack McDonald became aware of the vulnerability of plaintiff Carol Gabrielson. Defendant Jack McDonald took advantage of, her weakness and her need for support and manipulated her into leaving her husband, plaintiff Ira Gabrielson.

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Purther, as a result of the manipulation by defendant

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COMPLAINT - 4

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The defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Tacoma is a corporation licensed to do business and doing business in the State of Washington.

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VII.

The defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center is a corporation licensed to do business and doing business in the State of Washington and the is parent corporation of Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Tacoma.

VIII.

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At all times material hereto, the defendants John Does I through 4 were agents, employees and representatives of Community Chapel and Bible Training Center and/or Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Tacoma and all actions complained of herein were performed in the scope of their representation employment and/or agency for the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center and the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center and the Community Chapel and

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At all times material hereto, the defendants Donald Lee Barnett, Barbara Barnett, and Jack and "Jane Doe" MacDonald Were principals, agents, employees, and representatives of Community Chapel and Bible Training Center and Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Tacoma and all actions complained of herein were performed in the scope of their "

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COMPLAINT - 3

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Plaintiff Carol Gabrielson, in March of 1986, requested permission to attend services at defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center in Burien, and was told that she was welcome at that congregation.

XVIII.

On March 6, 1986, plaintiff Carol Gabrielson attended services at defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Burien. During her visit to that congregation, plaintiff Carol Gabrielson was physically assaulted by defendants John Does 1 through 4 who bodily dragged her from the chapel, causing the physical injuries which are complained of herein. Plaintiff Carol Gabrielson was also handcuffed and forced into a vehicle belonging to defendant Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Burien. The actions of John Does 1 through 4 were at the direction and under the request of defendants Jack McDonald, Donald Barnett and Barbara Barnett.

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XIX.

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Defendants Jack McDonald, Donald Barnett and Barbara Barnett have further made disparaging statements regarding Carol and Ira Gabrielson to members of the congregation which tended to injure the Gabrielsons' reputation in the community.

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//// COMPLAINT - 6

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Jack McDonald, plaintiff Carol Gabrielson was coerced and unduly influenced into a having sexual relationship with defendant Jack McDonald. This relationship continued from September through December of 1985.

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XIV.

Defendant Donald Barnett encouraged the members of his congregation, including the Tacoma Chapel, to form intimate attachments with members of the opposite sex as part of the regular services at the Chapel. Defendant Donald Barnett expressly encouraged married members of the congregation to form intimate attachments with persons other than the spouses of the members.

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Defendant Donald Barnett knew or should have known that these attachments would result in seductions, infidelity and the breakup of marriages. Further, defendant Donald Barnett knew or should have known that his agent in Tacoma, defendant Jack McDonald, was involved in the seduction of female members of the congregation and was abusing the pastoral privilege.

XVI.

In January, 1986, both plaintifis_Carol and Ira Gabrielsq were disfellowshiped from Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Tacoma, as a consequence of Carol Gabrielson's refusal to participate in any further sexual activities with defendant Jack McDonald.

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COMPLAINT - 5

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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

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The plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if set forth in full each and every allegation as set forth in paragraphs I through XXIII.

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Defendant Jack McDonald negligently violated his duty of care as a counselor by having sexual contact with plaintiff Carol Gabrielson was vulnerable. Defendant Jack McDonald was negligent in counseling plaintiff Carol Gabrielson and so created an unreasonable risk of physical and mental harm which caused the plaintiff Carol Gabrielson's injuries. This negligence constitute the tort of counselor malpratice.

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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

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The plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if set forth in full each and every allegation as set forth in paragraphs I through XXV.

XXII.

Defendants Jack McDonald and Donald Barnett intentionally, recklessly, or negligently failed to exercise that degree of care, skill, diligence and knowledge commonly possessed and exercised by a reasonable, careful and prudent pastor in this jurisdiction. This failure constitutes the

COMPLAINT - 8

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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

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Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference as if set forth in full each and every allegation as set forth in paragraphs I through XIX.

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The acts of each of the defendants as stated above are so extreme as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency. The conduct of each of the above named defendants was outrageous and caused the plaintiffs to suffer severe emotional distress. Each of the above-named defendants acted intentionally or recklessly to cause severe emotional distress to the plaintiffs.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

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The plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if set forth in full each and every allegation as set forth in paragraphs I through XXI.

XIII.

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Defendant Jack McDonald did not exercise the degree of care, skill, diligence and knowledge commonly possessed and exercised by a reasonable, careful and prudent counselor in this jurisdiction by manipulating Carol Gabrielson into a sexual relationship. This intentional or reckless failure constituted the tort of counselor malpractice.

COMPLAINT - 7

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STATE OF THE STATE

tort of pastoral malpractice.

FIFTH THROUGH SEVENTH CAUSES OF ACTION

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The plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if set forth in full each and every allegation as set forth in paragraphs

CXIX.

I through XXVII.

The acts of the defendants on March 6, 1986 which resulted in injuries to plaintiff Carol Gabrielson were negligent and/or constitute the torts of assault, battery and false imprisonment.

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EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION

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The plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if set forth in full each and every allegation as set forth in paragraphs I through XXIX.

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The acts of defendants in making disparaging statements damaging the reputation of the plaintiff constitute the tort of defamation.

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NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION

XXXII.

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The plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if set forth in full each and every allegation as set forth in paragraphs

I through XXXI.

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COMPLAINT - 9

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS TO EXCHA SOUTH BOOM, TEASHOOTON SHIT

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As a further and proximate result of the acts of the defendants, plaintiff Ira Gabrielson has suffered a loss of consortium.

XXXIV.

As a direct and proximate result of the intentional, reckless and negligent wrongful acts of the defendants, and each of them, plaintiffs have been specially and generally damaged in an amount to be fully proven at the time of

WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs pray for judgment against the defendants as follows:

trial.

- For all general and special damages incurred by plaintiffs Ira and Carol Gabrielson in an amount to be proven at time of trial;
- For plaintiffs' reasonable costs and attorneys' fees incurred in the prosecution of this action;
- 3. For such other and further relief as the court deems just and equitable. , β

DATED this 20 day of 1984, HANNULA & HARKINS

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By: San Shall

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COMPLAINT - 10

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR PIERCE COUNTY

ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL

GABRIELSON, husband and wife,
and the marital community composed thereof; COMMUNITY

CHAPEL and BIBLE TRAINING

CENTER, a Washington corporation; JACK McDONALD and "JANE"

DOE" McDONALD, husband and wife,)
and the marital community composed thereof,

Defendants.

NO. 88-2-00947-9

SUMMONS ON COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

> FILED IN COUNTY CLERK'S OFFICE

A.M. JAN 6 1989

PIEN RYTT COUNTY CLERK

TO: Defendants above named.

A lawsuit has been started against you in the above entitled court by St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, plaintiff. Plaintiff's claim is stated in the written complaint, a copy of which is served upon you with this summons.

In order to defend against this lawsuit, you must respond to the complaint by stating your defense in writing, and serve a copy upon the undersigned attorney for the plaintiff within twenty (20) days after the service of this summons, excluding the

SUMMONS ON COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - 1 decjudsm.gab

ORIGINAL

LAW OFFICES OF DON M. GULLIFORD & ASSOCIATES

2200 112th Avenue N.E. P.O. Box 548, Bellevue, WA 98009-0548 Bellevue, WA 98004 (206) 462-4000

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day of service, or a default judgment may be entered against you without notice. A default judgment is one where the plaintiff is entitled to what he asks for because you have not responded. If you serve a notice of appearance on the undersigned attorney, you are entitled to notice before a default judgment may be entered.

You may demand that the plaintiff file this lawsuit with the court. If you do so, the demand must be in writing and must be served upon the plaintiff. Within fourteen (14) days after you serve the demand, the plaintiff must file this lawsuit with the court, or the service on you of this summons and complaint will be void.

If you wish to seek the advice of an attorney in this matter, you should do so promptly so that your written response, if any, may be served on time.

This summons is issued pursuant to Rule 4 of the Superior Court Civil Rules of the State of Washington.

DATED this 5th day of January, 1989.

LAW OFFICES OF

DON M. GULLIFORD & ASSOCIATES

Ву

DON M. GULLIFORD

Of Attorneys for Plaintiff

SUMMONS ON COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - 2 decjudsm.gab



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IN OPEN COURT

JAN - 6 1989

Pierce County Clerk

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DEPUTY

SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR PIERCE COUNTY-

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Pennsylvania corporation,

V.

Plaintiff,

NO. 88-2-00947-9

ORDER STRIKING NOVEMBER 22, 1988 AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE WINCHELL

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife; DONALD LEE BARNETT, husband and wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a Washington corporation, JACK McDONALD and "JANE DOE" McDONALD, husband and wife,

Defendants.

THIS MATTER having come on for hearing on December 16, 1988, on the motion of defendant, Community Chapel, for an Order Striking the November 22, 1988 Affidavit of Bruce Winchell, and the court having considered the supportive documents filed by Community Chapel, together with the November 22, 1988 Affidavit of Bruce Winchell, and the court being and all things fully advised, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the November 22, 1988 Affidavit of Bruce Winchell is stricken for failure to comply with Civil Rule 56(e). See, Meadows v. Grant's Auto Brokers, 71 Wn.2d 874, 431 P.2d 216 (1967).

ORDER STRIKING NOVEMBER 22, 1988 AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE WINCHELL - 1

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DONE IN OPEN COURT this ____ day of December, 1989

JUDGE J. KELLEY ARNOLD

Presented by:

John S. Glassman,

Attorney for Defendant, Community Chapel and Bible Training Center IN OPEN COURT

Pierce County Clerk

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ORDER STRIKING NOVEMBER 22, 1988 AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE WINCHELL - 2

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR PIERCE COUNTY

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Pennsylvania corporation,

Plaintiff,

vs.

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife; DONALD LEE BARNETT and BARBARA BARNETT, husband and wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a Washington Corporation,

Defendants.

ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation,

Plaintiff,

vs.

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife; JACK McDONALD and JANE DOE McDONALD, husband and wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a Washington Corporation,

Defendants.

88-2-00947-9 NO.

STIPULATED ORDER OF

CONSOLIDATION AND JOINDER

IN COUNTY CLERK'S OFFICE

AM. JAN

6 1989

PIED RUTT, CO

The undersigned counsel for the parties involved stipulate

STIPULATED ORDER OF CONSOLIDATION AND JOINDER -1

LAW OFFICES OF DON M. GULLIFORD & ASSOCIATES 2200 112th Avenue N.E. P.O. Box 548, Bellevue, WA 98009-0548 Bellevue, WA 98004

(206) 462-4000

that the declaratory judgment complaint of the St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. subjoined to the existing caption of this litigation on the face of this order, may and shall be consolidated and joined with this existing Pierce County Nr. 88-2-00947-9 for discovery and trial, and that this court may enter an order without prejudice to defendant Mr. Donall right to at a for reconsideration for such consolidation Dated this 6th day of January, 1989. LANE POWELL MOSS & MILLER LAW OFFICES OF DON M. GULLIFORD & ASSQCIATES Don M. Gulliford Of Attorneys for Plaintiff Of Attorneys for Plaintiff St. Paul American Casualty RUSH, HAMNULA MHARKING Daniel L/ Manhula Of Attorneys for Defendants Of Attorneys for Defendants McDonald Gabrielson LAW OFFICES DE JOHN S. GLASSMAN By JØHN S. GLASSMAN Of Attorneys for Defendant Community Chapel & Bible Training Center ORDER OF CONSOLIDATION Pursuant to the above and foregoing stipulation, such consolidation is so ordered under cause number 88-2-00947-9 and later of the country cities may be consolidated into one booding. 6 1989 parties may be consolidated into one heading. PRED RUTT, COUNTY CLERK Dated this 6th day of January, 1989 DEPUT Presented by HON. KELLEY ARNOLD, JUDGE

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STIPULATED ORDER OF CONSOLIDATION

& JOINDER −2

LAW OFFICES OF DON M. GULLIFORD & ASSOCIATES 2200 112th Avenue N.E.

2200 112th Avenue N.E. P.O. Box 548, Bellevue, WA 98009-0548 Bellevue, WA 98004 (206) 462-4000 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife,

Plaintiffs,

NO. 86-2-02792-6

vs.

JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT

JACK McDONALD and "JANE DOE" McDONALD, husband and wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER OF TACOMA; COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER,

Defendants.

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THIS MATTER having come on regularly for trial commencing September 12, 1988 and concluding October 28,

1988, and it appearing to the court that a jury of twelve

(12) having been duly selected and impaneled, evidence and

testimony having been presented, the court having considered

motions and arguments during the course of trial, and the

court having duly and properly instructed the jury and the

jury having duly rendered its verdict by answering special

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JUDGMENT - 1

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

715 TACOMA AVENUE SOUTH
TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98402
TACOMA 383 5348

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interrogatories which are attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as if fully set forth, and the jury having returned its verdict into court and having found for plaintiff Carol Gabrielson and against defendants Jack McDonald, Shirley McDonald, the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Tacoma, and the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Burien on the issues of negligence and defamation in the sum of Two Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$200,000.00), and the jury having further decided that plaintiff Carol Gabrielson was thirty-five percent (35%) contributorily negligent, and the jury further having returned its verdict finding for plaintiff Ira Gabrielson and against defendant Jack McDonald, Shirley McDonald, Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Tacoma, and Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Burien on the issue of loss of consortium in the sum of Twenty Thousand Dollars (\$20,000.00), having further decided that plaintiff Ira Gabrielson was fifteen percent (15%) contributorily negligent, and the court having considered the records and files herein, and that no post-trial motions have heretofore been made in this matter, and the court being fully advised and considering the cost bill filed by plaintiff in the sum of \$ 988.91 , the court finds that plaintiffs are entitled to costs in the sum of \$986.91. It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment herein

JUDGMENT - 2

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RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS
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TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98402
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25 26 jury was duly regular and proper in the sum of Two Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$200,000.00), less Seventy-Thousand Dollars (\$70,000.00) for plaintiff Carol Gabrielson's contributory fault, and that the same is hereby entered and that a net judgment of the sum of One Hundred Thirty Thousand Dollars (\$130,000.00) in favor of plaintiff Carol Gabrielson be and the same is hereby entered, and it is further

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment herein

entered on behalf of the plaintiff Carol Gabrielson by the

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment herein entered on behalf of the plaintiff Ira Gabrielson by the jury was duly regular and proper in the sum of Twenty Thousand Dollars (\$20,000.00) less Three Thousand Dollars for plaintiff Ira Gabrielson's contributory fault, and that the same is hereby entered and that a net judgment of the sum of Seventeen Thousand Dollars (\$17,000.00) in favor of plaintiff Ira Gabrielson be and the same is hereby rendered and entered, and it is further,

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that costs in the amount of \$988.91 are awarded to the plaintiffs and judgment for the same be and hereby is rendered and entered.

JUDGMENT SUMMARY

Judgment for plaintiff Carol Gabrielson:

\$ 130,000,00

Judgment for plaintiff Ira Gabrielson:

\$ 17,000.00

Costs:

\$ 988 91

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JUDGMENT - 3

LAW OFFICES

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

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715 TACOMA AVENUE SOUTH
TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98402
TACOMA 183-5148
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL
GABRIELSON, husband and wife,

Plaintiffs,

VS.

COST BILL

JACK McDONALD and "JANE DOE"

McDONALD, husband and wife;
COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE

TRAINING CENTER OF TACOMA;
COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE

TRAINING CENTER,

Defendants.

STATE OF WASHINGTON)
COUNTY OF PIERCE)

DANIEL L. HANNULA, being first duly sworn, upon oath, deposes and says:

I am one of the attorneys representing the plaintiffs Carol Gabrielson and Ira Gabrielson in the above-entitled cause of action. The following is a true and accurate bill of costs and disbursements incurred herein:

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LAW OFFICES

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

715 TACOMA AVENUE SOUTH

TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98402

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COST BILL - 1

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2	Filing fee	\$	70.00
3	Service fees:		70.00
4	Jack McDonald and Shirley McDonald		27.00
5	Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Tacoma		27.00
6	Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Burien		12.00
7	of Burien		62.50
8	Jury fee		50.00
9	Statutory attorney fee		
10	Medical records submitted as exhibits at trial:		125.00
	Good Samaritan Mental Health records	;	
11	Deposition costs:		45.00
12	Dr. Cutner		
13	Dr. Wedgewood		61.05
14			37.95
15	Shirley McDonald		89.25
16	Jack McDonald	_	409.16
17	TOTAL COSTS	\$	988.91
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19	DANIEL L. HANNU	T. A	
20	SIGNED AND SWORN to before we will	УО	£
21	November, 1988.	УО	ľ
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	5/Harold	11	Pode On
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COST BILL - 2

LAW OFFICES

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

715 TACOMA AVENUE SOUTH

TACOMA, WASHINGTON 98402

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE

`• `•		COUNTY OF PIERCE
IRA GABRIELSON and GABRIELSON, husband	CAROL)
·	Plaintiffs ,) NO. 86-2-02792-6
-vs-	-	
JACK McDONALD and S McDONALD, husband a COMMUNITY CHAPEL AN TRAINING CENTER OF COMMUNITY CHAPEL AN TRAINING CENTER OF	ind wife; ID BIBLE TACOMA;))) VERDICT FORM
	Defendants.	
QUESTION NO. 1:	Was there ne McDonald, the injury to the	gligence by the defendant, Jack nat was a proximate cause of plaintiff, Carol Gabrielson?
	Answer:	es (Yes or No)
Olymon- and	If you answe question 2; "no," skip qu	red "yes" to question 1, answer if your answer to question 1 was destion 2 and answer question 3.
QUESTION NO. 2:	Were the neg McDonald, con the agent	gligent acts of defendant, Jack mmitted while he was acting as of Community Chapel and Bible eer of Burien?
	• 1	(Yes or No)

Answer Question 3.

QUESTION NO. 3: Did the defendant, Jack McDonald, defame the plaintiff, Carol Gabrielson, which was a proximate cause of injury to her?

Answer: _____ (Yes or No)

If you answered "yes" to question 3, answer

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question 4; if you answered "no" to question 3, skip to question 5.

QUESTION NO. 4:

In defaming Carol Gabrielson, was defendant, Jack McDonald, acting as an agent for the defendant corporation of Community Chapel and Bible Training Center of Burien?

Answer: <u>es</u> (Yes or No)

Answer question 5.

QUESTION NO. 5:

Did the Community Chapel and Bible Training Center assault, batter or falsely imprison plaintiff, Carol Gabrielson, proximately causing injury to her?

Answer: ______ (Yes or No)

If all answers are no, stop here and notify court. Answer question 6 only if you answered "yes" to question 1.

QUESTION NO. 6:

As a result of the injuries suffered by Carol Gabrielson, did plaintiff, Ira Gabrielson, suffer a loss of consortium?

Answer: Yes (Yes or No)

Answer question 7.

QUESTION NO. 7:

If your answer to questions 1, 3, or 5 was "yes," what is the total amount of the plaintiff, Carol Gabrielson's damages?

\$ 200,000 00

If your answer to question 6 was "yes," answer question 8.

QUESTION NO. 8:

What is the total amount of plaintiff, Ira Gabrielson's, damages?

\$ 20,000.

Answer Questions 9 and 10 only if you answered "yes" to Question 1.

QUESTION NO 9:

Was there any contributory negligence by Carol Gabrielson which was the proximate cause of injury or damage to her?

	Answer: /es (Yes or No)
	Answer question 10 only if you answered "yes" to question 9. If "no," proceed to question 11.
QUESTION NO. 10:	Using 100% as the total combined negligence of all the parties which contributed to the injury or damage to the plaintiff, Carol Gabrielson, what percentage of such contributory negligence is attributable to her?
	Answer: <u>35</u> %
	Answer Questions 11 and 12 only if you answered "yes" to Question 6.
QUESTION NO. 11:	Was there contributory negligence by Ira Gabrielson which was a proximate cause of his own damages?
	Answer: /e.5 (Yes or No)
	Answer question 12 only if you answered "yes"
QUESTION NO. 12:	Using 100% as the total combined negligence of all the parties which contributed to the injury or damage to the plaintiff, Ira Gabrielson, what percentage of such contributory negligence is attributable to him?
	Answer:

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A.M. AN 3 980 P.D. AM. PIEURITI, COUNT CLERK

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Pennsylvania corporation,

Plaintiff,

No. 88-2-00947-9

vs.

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NOTICE OF PRESENTATION

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife; DONALD LEE BARNETT and BARBARA BARNETT, husband and wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL and BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a Washington corporation,

Defendants.

TO: BRUCE WINCHELL, DANIEL HANNULA AND JOHN GLASSMAN;

YOU AND EACH OF YOU PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will present for entry in the above-entitled matter as follows:

DOCUMENT: ORDER DENYING RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY

PLAINTIFF RE: BODILY INJURY;

BEFORE HONORABLE: J. Kelley Arnold;

LOCATION: ROOM: 217 OF THE Pierce County Courthouse;

AT THE FOLLOWING DATE AND TIME: Friday, January 27, 1989 at 9:30 a.m.

DATED this 20th day of January, 1989.

EVANS, CRAVEN & LACKIE, P.S

TIM DONALDSON

Attorneys for defendants Barnett

NOTICE OF PRESENTATION: 1 als15004857.NOP

Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S.

LAWYERS

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIERCE

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING PENNSYLVANIA, a Pennsylvania corporation,

Plaintiff.

No. 88-2-00947-9

vs.

IRA GABRIELSON and CAROL GABRIELSON, husband and wife; DONALD LEE BARNETT and BARBARA BARNETT, husband and wife; COMMUNITY CHAPEL and BIBLE TRAINING CENTER, a Washington corporation,

Defendants.

ORDER DENYING RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY PLAINTIFF RE: BODILY INJURY

I. HEARING

- 1.1 Date. January 6, 1989.
- 1.2 Appearances. Plaintiff appeared through its counsel Lane, Powell, Moss & Miller by Bruce Winchell. Defendants, Ira and Carol Gabrielson, appeared through their attorneys Rush, Hannula & Harkins by Dan Hannula. Defendants, Donald Lee Barnett and Barbara Barnett, appeared through their attorneys Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S. by Tim Donaldson. Defendant, Community Chapel and Bible Training Center, appeared through its attorney John Glassman.
- 1.3 <u>Purpose.</u> To consider the renewed MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT of American Casualty Company.
- 1.4 <u>Evidence</u>. The materials originally submitted in support and in opposition to plaintiff's original motion including AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE WINCHELL filed herein on March 30, 1988. AFFIDAVIT OF

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER: 1 als15004857.53

Evans. Craven & Lackie, P.S.

LAWYERS

1.5 Authorities Considered. Authorities contained MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF AMERICAN'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT filed herein on March 30, 1988, DEFENDANT GABRIELSONS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT filed herein on April 8, 1988, DEFENDANT COMMUNITY CHAPEL AND BIBLE TRAINING CENTER'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT filed herein on April 8, 1988, DEFENDANT BARNETTS' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' COUNTERMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT filed herein on April 7, 1988, REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (BODILY INJURY) filed 1988. herein on April 13. AMERICAN CASUALTY'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, PLAINTIFFS GABRIELSON'S REPLY SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF BY AMERICAN CASUALTY, MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO RENEW MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, BRIEF IN OPPOSITION SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TO STRIKE MOTION AFFIDAVIT WINCHELL.

II. ORDER

After hearing the argument of counsel and being advised of the premises it is ordered and declared:

2.1 The court declares that sexual contact which causes emotional distress or mental suffering constitutes bodily injury SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER: 2 als15004857.53

Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S.

LAWYERS

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under American Casualty Company of Reading Pennsylvania policy number IP502144020.

2.2 The renewed MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT of American Casualty Company is denied.

DATED this _____ day of January, 1989.

HONORABLE J. KELLEY ARNOLD

Presented by

EVANS, CRAVEN & LACKIE P.S.

TIM DONALDSON

Attorneys for Barnetts

Approved as to form, and Notice of Presentation Waived:

LANE, POWELL, MOSS & MILLER

Bruce Winchell

Attorneys for American Casualty Company

RUSH, HANNULA & HARKINS

Dan Hannula Attorneys for Gabrielsons

JOHN GLASSMAN

John Glassman attorney for Community Chapel

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER: 3 als15004857.53

Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S.

LAWYERS