The Attorney General's Decision to End the Standoff

Activities of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Toward the Branch Davidians

Report House of Representatives
104th Congress, 2nd Session, Union Calendar No. 395
August 2, 1996



        VII. The Attorney General's Decision to End the Stand-off

               a. overview of the plan to end the standoff

    On April 12, 1993, the FBI presented Attorney General Janet Reno 
with a plan to end the standoff with the Branch Davidians. On April 17, 
1993, the Attorney General gave her approval for the plan to be 
implemented on April 19. The stated mission of the plan was to ``secure 
the surrender/arrest of all adult occupants of the residence while 
providing the maximum possible security for the children within the 
compound.'' A key component of the plan was the decision to use CS, a 
chemical riot control agent, which would be sprayed into the Branch 
Davidian residence in an attempt to induce the Davidians to leave. The 
plan was implemented on April 19, but the Davidians did not leave their 
residence as government officials suggested. Instead, 6 hours after the 
beginning of the operations, a fire erupted inside the structure, 
ultimately consuming it and the more than 70 persons inside.

                b. the operation plan for april 19, 1993

1. Overview of the written operation plan to end the standoff
    As early as March 22, 1993 the FBI began formulating an operation 
plan to end the standoff with the Davidians.\494\ On April 12, 1993, the 
FBI presented its plan to the Attorney General for her approval.\495\ 
According to the Justice Department Report, ``Over the next several days 
the Attorney General and Senior Justice Department and FBI officials 
discussed, debated and dissected every aspect of the plan.'' \496\
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    \494\ U.S. Dept. of Justice, Report to the Attorney General on the 
Events at Waco, Texas 79 (1993) [hereinafter Justice Department Report]. 
Larry Potts, Assistant Director of the FBI in 1993, testified before the 
subcommittees that ``[I]n terms of the formation of the gas plan, I 
think that Mr. Jamar first contacted me around March 27th or sometime 
near the very end of March, to indicate that such a plan was being 
submitted [to senior FBI officials].'' Hearings Part 2 at 480.
    \495\ Justice Department Report at 263.
    \496\ Id.
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    The operations plan provided that its mission was to ``secure the 
surrender/arrest of all adult occupants of the residence while providing 
the maximum possible security for the children within the compound.'' 
The key component of the plan was the delivery of a chemical riot 
control agent, known as CS, into the Branch Davidian residence in order 
to induce the Davidians to leave. While the CS agent was being inserted, 
FBI officials planned to use a loud speaker system and the telephone to 
advise the Davidians that tear gas was being inserted into the residence 
to force them to leave, but that an attack was not underway. The plan 
also provided for a demand that all subjects leave the building and 
surrender to authorities.\497\
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    \497\ Federal Bureau of Investigation, Briefing for the Attorney 
General, at 25. [See Documents produced to the subcommittees by the 
Department of Justice 003370-003480, at Appendix [hereinafter Justice 
Documents]. The Appendix is published separately.]
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    The plan provided for the operation to last up to 48 hours or until 
all subjects had exited the residence and surrendered. The plan provided 
for the first insertion of CS agent to be made into the front/left 
portion of the residence. After a period of time, which was to be 
dependent on the Davidians' response to the initial delivery of the CS 
agent and any subsequent negotiations that were possible, an additional 
tear gas delivery was to be made into the back/right portion of the 
residence. After a third delivery of CS, into an area not specified in 
the plan, all subsequent deliveries of CS agent were to be made into the 
upper and lower windows of the residence.\498\
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    \498\ Id.
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    During the first three insertions, the CS agent was to be delivered 
into the residence by two combat engineering vehicles (CEV's), an 
armored vehicle similar to the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (Bradley), but 
which is unarmed. The CEV's at Waco were mounted with boom-like arms 
which were capable of penetrating the walls of the structure. Mounted on 
the arms of the CEV's were mechanical devices designed to spray a stream 
of CS agent into the holes made by the booms. After the third insertions 
of CS agent, the operations plan called for agents located in unarmed 
Bradley Fighting Vehicles to maneuver close enough to the residence so 
that they could fire Ferret round projectiles through the windows of the 
structure. These small non-explosive grenade-like projectiles contained 
CS agent which would rise into the air when the projectile broke open 
upon impact. The use of Ferret rounds was to be in addition to 
continuing insertions of CS by agents in the CEV's.
    The plan also provided for specific assignments for the different 
HRT and SWAT teams involved in the operation. It specified the maneuvers 
to be made by the two CEV's, the nine Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and the 
M-88 tank retrieval vehicle, and provided for miscellaneous 
administrative and logistical issues such as types of uniforms to be 
used and the appropriate manner for handling prisoners.
    Additionally, the plan provided to the Attorney General on April 12, 
1993 included details concerning where the FBI's snipers were to be 
positioned and the positioning and capabilities of SWAT team members. 
The plan contained a ``medical annex'' providing for a means to treat 
``the potentially large number of casualties which could exceed the 
current medical capabilities of any single agency present'' as well as 
procedures to be followed to arrest persons who had been exposed to CS. 
The annex also provided for locations where the injured were to be 
treated, provided a list of local and secondary hospitals (including 
address, latitude/longitude location, and estimated air travel time). 
And the medical annex provided instructions to the agents on the 
procedure to handle a mass surrender by the Davidians.
    Finally, the plan provided for the possibility that the Davidians 
might not surrender. The final contingency provision in the plan stated 
that ``if all subjects failed to surrender after 48 hours of tear gas, 
then a CEV with a modified blade will commence a systematic opening up/
disassembly of the structure until all subjects are located.''
2. Acceleration provisions of the operations plan
    While the operations plan called for the government's actions to end 
the standoff to unfold over a period of 2 days, the plan also contained 
contingency provisions that allowed for a departure from the concept of 
a methodical insertion of CS. One of these provisions was implemented on 
April 19 and resulted in a rapid acceleration of the insertion of CS 
agent.
    The first of the two contingency provisions in the plan provided 
that if the Davidians were observed in the tower during the operations, 
after having been informed not to be there, agents were permitted to 
insert CS gas into the tower by firing Ferret round projectiles into the 
tower. More importantly, however, the second contingency provision in 
the plan provided:

          If during any tear gas delivery operations, subjects open fire 
        with a weapon, then the FBI rules of engagement will apply and 
        appropriate deadly force will be used. Additionally, tear gas 
        will immediately be inserted into all windows of the compound 
        utilizing the four Bradley Vehicles as well as the CEV's.\499\
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    \499\ Id.
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                  c. the way the plan actually unfolded

    At approximately 5:55 a.m., Dick Rogers, commander of the FBI's 
Hostage Rescue Team, ordered the two CEV's, which were to insert the CS 
riot control agent, deployed to the compound. At 5:56 a.m., the FBI's 
chief day-to-day negotiator, Byron Sage, telephoned the residence and 
asked to speak with Davidian Steve Schneider. It took approximately 3 
minutes for someone to come to the phone.\500\ At 5:59 a.m., Sage 
informed the person answering the telephone that ``We are in the process 
of putting tear gas into the building. This is not an assault. We will 
not enter the building.'' The person on the other end of the telephone 
responded ``You are going to spray tear gas into the building?'' 
whereupon Sage replied, ``In the building . . . no, we are not entering 
the building.'' \501\ While the Justice Department Report is ambiguous 
on the person to whom Sage was speaking, Sage testified at the hearings 
before the subcommittees that the person he talked with was 
Schneider.\502\ At the conclusion of this conversation, someone threw 
the telephone outside of the building.\503\
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    \500\ Justice Department Report at 285.
    \501\ Justice Department Report at 286.
    \502\ Hearings Part 3 at 269.
    \503\ Justice Department Report at 286.
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    From 6 a.m. to approximately noon on April 19, 1993, FBI agents 
implemented the operations plan and injected a large quantity of CS riot 
control agent into the Branch Davidian residence in four distinct 
phases. The agents moved close to the Davidian residence in CEV's 
equipped with devices \504\ which could shoot a horizontal stream of CS 
agent in short bursts or continuously for up to 15 seconds.\505\ The 
device uses carbon dioxide as a disbursant to propel a stream of CS 
agent, suspended in methylene chloride, horizontally into the air. Once 
the CS stream is fired, the carbon dioxide quickly evaporates and the 
methylene chloride gas disperses the CS evenly through a room, until the 
methylene chloride itself evaporates. The CS agent, which is a fine 
powder, then slowly falls to the floor, where it remains. The capacity 
of each delivery system on the CEV's was 30 grams of CS agent.
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    \504\ The delivery systems mounted on the CEV's were Protecto-jet 
Model 5 Tear Gas Delivery Systems manufactured by ISPRA, Ltd., an 
Israeli company. The systems were sold to the FBI by Advanced Materials 
Laboratories, Inc. of Forrest Hills, NY. The Justice Department Report 
refers to the systems as Mark V systems. See Justice Department Report 
at 287. The subcommittees investigation indicates that while the Mark V 
system does exist, there is no evidence that it was used at Waco. The 
evidence indicates that only the Protecto-jet Model 5 system was mounted 
on the CEV's furnished to the FBI by the Defense Department. The 
references to the Mark V system in the Justice Department Report appear 
to be in error.
    \505\ The Protecto-jet Model 5 system consists of a cylinder 
approximately 27 inches long, 4\1/8\ inches in diameter, weighing 
approximately 16 lbs., which is connected to a hose with a nozzle. The 
device uses carbon dioxide to propel a chemical agent, such as CS, mixed 
in a suspension of methylene chloride, into the air. The range of the 
device is 15-20 yards in still air. The device can be used to shoot 13-
17 1-second bursts or a continuous burst for up to 15 seconds.
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    The insertion of CS agent into the Branch Davidian residence was 
performed in four phases. The first two phases employed two CEV's. On 
one CEV was mounted two CS delivery systems, while four systems were 
mounted on the second CEV. The CEV's were operated in tandem, each 
inserting the entire contents of the six CS agent delivery systems 
during the first two phases of the operation, at 6 a.m. and again at 
approximately 8 a.m. In each of the first two phases, a total of 180 
grams of CS was delivered. The third and fourth phases, also 2 hours 
apart, involved only one CEV, as the second CEV had experienced 
mechanical difficulties and no longer operated. Four cylinders of CS 
were delivered in each of these two phases, for a total 120 grams of CS 
inserted into the residence. Thus, over the entire 6 hours of the 
operation, a total of 600 grams of CS agent was inserted into the Branch 
Davidian residence.
    During the standoff with the Davidians, FBI agents used unarmed 
Bradley Fighting Vehicles as a means of transportation while guarding 
the perimeter of the residence. The FBI's overall operational plan for 
April 19 provided for the Bradleys to be used in a contingency plan to 
be implemented in the event the Davidians began to fire on the CEV's. If 
that occurred, agents in Bradleys who had maneuvered close to the 
building and were standing ready were to insert additional quantities of 
CS agent into all parts of the building. Agents in the Bradleys were to 
fire Ferret round projectiles into the residence. Ferret rounds \506\ 
resemble large plastic bullets, and are fired from hand-held grenade 
launchers. Each projectile carries 3.7 grams of CS agent, mixed in a 
suspension of methylene chloride.
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    \506\ Ferret Rounds are 37, 38, and 40 millimeter projectiles which 
can be fired from hand-held grenade launchers. Each projectile carries 
3.7 grams of CS riot control agent, mixed in a suspension of methylene 
chloride.
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    Once the Davidians began firing on the CEV's Rogers gave the order 
to implement the contingency plan. The agents in the Bradleys then 
maneuvered close to the Branch Davidian residence and began to fire the 
Ferret round projectiles through the windows of the building. During the 
6-hour operation, 400 Ferret round projectiles were fired at the Branch 
Davidian residence, a number of projectiles struck the side of the 
building and did not enter the building. Estimates of the number of 
projectiles that actually entered the residence range from 300 to 380. 
Had all 400 projectiles fired at the residence actually entered the 
residence, however, the total quantity of CS agent delivered by the 
Ferret round projectiles would have been 1,480 grams.

               d. overview of the use of cs chemical agent

1. Introduction
    Chlorobenzylidene malononitrile, commonly called CS, is one of a 
family of approximately 15 chemical compounds used to control civilian 
populations during periods of disturbance and unrest. These ``riot-
control agents'' cause acute irritation to the eyes, mouth, nose, and 
upper respiratory tract, that is relatively brief and not usually 
accompanied by permanent toxic effects. Exposure to riot-control agents 
renders the victim temporarily incapacitated, but the symptoms typically 
persist for only a few minutes after cessation of exposure.\507\
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    \507\ F.W. Beswick, Chemical Agents Used in Riot-Control and 
Warfare, 2 Hum. Toxicology 247-256.
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    The first riot control agent was developed in the early 1900's.\508\ 
In 1928, two chemists, Corson and Stoughton, developed 2-
chlorobenzylidene malononitrile, code named CS. However, CS was not 
developed as riot-control agent until the 1950's, when the British War 
Office began to search for a chemical that was more potent than either 
CA or CN.\509\ By the 1960's, CS had replaced CN as the preferred tear 
gas among police authorities around the world. Its popularity stemmed 
from the fact that it was shown to be a more potent irritant than CN, 
and appeared to cause less long-term injury, particularly to the 
eye.\510\ Military forces also saw CS as a potent weapon for particular 
operations. Large quantities of CS were used by the United States during 
the Vietnam War. CN is no longer used by the U.S. military operations, 
but it is still used by some civil authorities, and by individuals for 
self-defense. Among civilian law enforcement agencies CS is, by far, the 
most widely-used riot control agent.
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    \508\ The first riot-control agent may have been ethyl bromacetate, 
which was used by the Paris police in a hand grenade to disable criminal 
gangs. The German chemical industry that produced many lethal chemical 
weapons during World War I (e.g., nerve gases) also developed new tear 
gases. For example, xylyl bromide was packed in 150-mm artillery shells 
and used during the battle against the Russians at Bolimow in January 
1915. This early military use of a tear gas was not judged to be a 
success, owing to the failure of the chemical to vaporize in the sub-
zero temperatures on the battlefield. However, it provided an early 
indication of the importance of weather conditions to the effectiveness 
of these agents. By 1918, the French had developed bromobenzylcyanide, 
known by the military code CA, and the British and Americans had 
developed chloroacetophenone, known by the military code CN, which 
became the most effective and widely used tear gas. In the postwar 
period, the urban crime wave and emergence of gangsters in the 1920's in 
the United States spurred renewed efforts to develop riot-control 
agents. By the mid-1920's, small explosive cartridges containing CN were 
available over the counter for personal protection. CN rapidly became 
the tear gas of choice for law-enforcement authorities. Howard Hu, 
Toxicodynamics of Riot-Control Agents (Lacriminators) 271, 273 in 
Chemical Warfare Agents (Satu M. Somani ed., 1992).
    \509\ J. Cookson and J. Nottingham, A Survey of Chemical and 
Biological Warfare (1969).
    \510\ Hu, supra note 508.
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2. Concerns over use of CS
    CS has gained wide acceptance as a means of controlling and subduing 
riotous crowds. However, its widespread use has raised questions about 
its safety. Most published studies have concluded that, if used 
correctly, the irritant effects of exposure are short-lived and do not 
cause permanent damage.\511\ However, there have been isolated reports 
of fatalities from the use of riot control agents. The most common 
reports involve deaths attributed to the use of riot control agents by 
American miltary personnel in Vietnam.\512\ Additionally, other reports 
involve injury and death from the use of CS in Chile, Panama, South 
Korea, and the Gaza Strip and West Bank of Israel.\513\ It has been 
unclear from these reports, however, whether the riot control agent used 
was CS or another, more toxic, agent.\514\ Of particular concern, 
however, has been the indiscriminate use of riot control agents in 
enclosed and indoor spaces where it is feared that resulting high 
concentrations may have resulted in harmful levels of exposure. Severe 
injuries from exploding tear gas grenades as well as deaths from the 
toxicity of riot control agents used in confined, indoor spaces have 
been reported.
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    \511\ The most thorough study of the use of CS agent against humans 
is the Himsworth Report, which investigated the use of CS agent in 
Northern Ireland in 1969. It concluded that exposure to CS did not 
produce long-term injury or death in humans. Home Office, report of the 
enquiry into the Medical and Toxicological aspects of CS (Ortho-
chlorobenzylidene malononitrile), Part II: Inquiry into Toxicological 
Aspects of CS and its use for Civil Purposes (1971) [hereinafter 
Himsworth Report]. A recent study of the use of CS on 1,500 persons in a 
confined area space made the same findings. P.J. Anderson et al., Acute 
effects of the potent lacrimator o-chlorobenzylidene malonitrile (CS) 
tear gas, 15 Hum. & Experimental Toxicology 461, 464-465 (1996).
    \512\ The United States used large amounts of CS during the Vietnam 
War in both offensive and defensive military operations. The basic 
doctrine for the use of CS weapons by U.S. sources is summarized in the 
following passage taken from a 1969 Army training circular:
    The employment of riot-control agents (CS, CN) in Counter guerilla 
operations is most feasible in tactical situations characterized by 
close combat in which rapidly responding systems are essential and 
permanent effects are undesirable. Riot-control munitions can be used 
tactically to temporarily disable hostile troops, to suppress their 
fire, or to cause them to abandon their position. Offensively, riot-
control agents can be used to ``flush out'' unprotected enemy troops 
from concealed positions or to reduce their ability to maneuver or use 
their weapons. Defensively, riot-control munitions can be integrated 
into defensive perimeters to provide rapid CS delivery in case of enemy 
attack.
    CS was employed for defensive purposes such as in the event of a 
surprise attack from superior enemy forces, and to help secure 
helicopter extractions of combat units or downed airman. It was used 
extensively in area-denial operations to render terrain uninhabitable by 
the enemy. CS was also used routinely in direct engagement of the enemy 
during offensive combat operations.
    U.S. forces were issued gas masks to protect themselves against use 
of CS and other tear gases by the enemy. According to one U.S. 
evaluation, the North Vietnamese had only a limited supply of tear gas, 
but they used it to good effect. During the conflict, the general 
service respirator was replaced by a lighter mask, which went through a 
number of further modifications. The protection which it conferred was 
adequate but not complete, because dense CS aerosols can have a strong 
irritant effect on bare skin, especially in hot and humid conditions 
when the skin is moist.
    \513\ See generally, H. Jack Geiger & Robert M. Cook-Deegan, The 
Role of Physicians in Conflicts and Humanitarian Crises, Case Studies 
from the Field Missions of Physicians for Human Rights, 1988 to 1993, 
270 JAMA 616 (1993).
    \514\ In a 1989 report, the General Accounting Office noted that the 
group Physicians for Human Rights had conducted a fact-finding trip to 
investigate allegations of deaths from the use of CS in the occupied 
territories but that the members of the group could not confirm that any 
of the reported deaths were attributable to tear gas inhalation. See 
e.g., U.S. General Accounting Office, Isreal: Use of U.S.--Manufactured 
Tear Gas in the Occupied Territories 3 (1989) (citing Physicians for 
Human Rights, ``The Casualties of Conflict: Medical Care and Human 
Rights in the West Bank and Gaza Strip,'' Report of a Medical Fact 
Finding Mission by Physicians for Human Rights (1988)). The GAO report 
also noted that while Amnesty International had reported concerns over a 
``pattern of death [that] appeared to follow expose to high 
concentrations of tear gas'' they also stated that ``Amnesty 
International noted that it was in no position to verify the exact cause 
of death in every case.'' Id. at 4.
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    Critics of the use of these agents argue that the available 
toxicological data is insufficient to describe with any confidence the 
potential for long-term pulmonary, carcinogenic, and reproductive 
effects. One recently published review of the toxicological data on riot 
control agents concluded that relatively little has been published in 
the mainstream medical literature and that epidemiologic studies 
following tear gas use under actual field conditions are almost 
nonexistent. The author of this review wrote:

          There is clearly a great need for openly conducted research 
        illuminating the full health consequences of exposure to riot-
        control agents including outcomes such as tumor formation, 
        reproductive effects, and pulmonary disease. Consideration must 
        be given to the possible effects of these agents on the young, 
        the elderly, and other persons who might have increased 
        susceptibility.\515\
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    \515\ Hu, supra note 508, at 284-285.
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                 e. clinical effects and toxicity of cs

1. Common effects of exposure to CS
    All riot control agents, including CS, produce intense sensory 
irritation even in the most minute concentrations. For most of these 
agents, the eye is the most sensitive organ, with pain arising rapidly, 
accompanied by conjunctivitis, excessive tearing, and uncontrolled 
blinking. The inside of the mouth and nose experience a stinging or 
burning sensation, and there is usually excessive discharge of nasal 
mucus. Chest tightness and burning are accompanied by coughing, 
sneezing, and increased secretions from the respiratory passageways. A 
burning sensation is felt on the skin, often followed by inflammation 
and redness, and in some cases, actual burning of the skin occurs. Tear 
gas exposure may also irritate the stomach, leading to vomiting and 
possibly diarrhea. In addition to the physical symptoms, panic and 
severe agitation are common among those individuals with no prior 
experience of exposure to tear gas.\516\
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    \516\ See generally Id. at 276; Anderson, supra note 511, at 461.
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    Most of the symptoms are felt within 10 to 30 seconds after exposure 
to the agent. After cessation of exposure, however, most symptoms 
continue to persist for a period of minutes before subsiding and 
disappearing.\517\ The effects of expose vary among individuals. 
Additionally, weather conditions, such as temperature and humidity, can 
heighten the potency of these agents.\518\
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    \517\ Hu, supra note 508, at 276.
    \518\ Id. at 277.
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2. Toxicity of CS
    A review of the scientific literature concerning the use of CS 
indicates that limited conclusions as to the toxicity and lethality of 
CS are known. It seems generally accepted by the scientific community 
that the concentration of CS agent which is noticeable by humans and 
which will provoke physical responses in humans is 4 milligrams per 
cubic meter (4 mg/m\3\).\519\ While no studies on humans have been 
conducted concerning the lethality of CS, several studies have projected 
the concentrations at which CS is lethal to humans from the effects of 
studies performed on animals. Those studies estimate that the 
concentration of CS agent which would prove lethal to 50 percent of any 
given human population ranges from as low as 25,000 \520\ to as high as 
150,000 mg-min/m\3\.\521\ Recent estimates by the U.S. military, 
however, estimate that the lethal concentration for humans is 61,000 mg-
min/m\3\.\522\ That study projects that the concentrations which would 
be injurious to the health of approximately 50 percent of any human 
population range from between 10-20 mg-min/m\3\.\523\
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    \519\ Bryan Ballantyne, Riot Control Agents, Biomedical and Health 
Aspects of the Use of Chemicals in Civil Disturbances 27 (1977); Hu, 
supra note 508, at 279.
    \520\ Dow Chemical Co., Material Data Safety Sheet (1988); 
Ballantyne, supra note 519.
    \521\ Id.
    \522\ Headquarters, Departments of the Army, Navy, and the Air 
Force, Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds 59 
(1989).
    \523\ Id.
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    It is important to note, however, that there are no published 
studies which find that any human death has been caused by exposure to 
CS agent. While a number of unverified reports of human deaths can be 
found in the literature, in all of these reports it is unclear precisely 
whether CS or some other, more toxic, riot control agent was used or 
whether some other circumstance could have caused the deaths. The most 
extensive study of the use of CS agent on humans, by United Kingdom 
forces in Northern Ireland in the late 1960's, found that no deaths (and 
no long-term injuries) resulted from the widespread use of CS agent 
there.\524\ The only other documented study of the effects of CS used on 
a large number of humans confirms this finding.\525\
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    \524\ Himsworth Report, supra note 511, at 23-25.
    \525\ Anderson, supra note 511, at 464-465.
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    Some people may find curious the fact that all of these studies (and 
similar studies on the effects of chemical agents) uniformly give 
estimates of the level at which CS is lethal or injurious to 50 percent 
of a given population of humans. It appears from the literature that the 
effect of CS on humans (and on other animals) is not ``linear,'' i.e., 
that proportionately greater concentrations do not have equally 
proportionate increases in effect. While scientists can estimate the 
levels which would prove lethal to 50 percent of a given population, it 
would be incorrect to presume that half of that quantity would kill 25 
percent of that population. In fact, the most well-known study of the 
effects of CS on humans estimates that the likelihood of death after 
exposure to a dose of CS that is one-tenth the estimated lethal does is 
less than 1 in 100,000.\526\ Accordingly, any analysis of the lethality 
of the CS agent used in the concentrations that resulted on April 19 can 
only be performed in light of the 50 percent lethality estimates.
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    \526\ Himsworth Report, supra note 511, at 55-56; Ballantyne, supra 
note 519, at 30.
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    Even when the quantities of CS riot control agent used do not reach 
lethal toxic levels, there are, nevertheless, significant physical 
consequences that occur from exposure to CS, and often severe emotional 
reactions caused by the symptoms brought on from exposure to CS. As 
discussed above, one recent study of the use of large quantities of CS 
against a population unable to leave the area in which the CS was used 
indicated that first, second, and even third degree burns are possible 
when skin is exposed to CS.\527\ Additionally, some studies have shown 
that exposure to CS can cause allergic contact dermatitis.\528\ Other 
studies have shown that when CS can cause severe gastroenteritis when 
ingested, whether directly or as a result of ingesting mucus secretions 
containing CS from oral inhalation.\529\
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    \527\ Anderson, supra note 511, at 463-464.
    \528\ Hu, supra note 508, at 280.
    \529\ Id.
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    Additionally, some studies on animals have suggested that exposure 
to CS might cause cancer and genetic abnormalities.\530\ Some studies 
have stated that exposure to high concentrations of CS for prolong 
periods could result in inflammatory changes in the respiratory tract 
that might be conducive to secondary respiratory infection.\531\ And it 
is believed that CS may exacerbate existing medical conditions of 
persons with bronchitis or asthma, although no reports of death from 
these conditions exist.
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    \530\ Id.
    \531\ Ballantyne, supra note 519, at 30.
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  f. effect of the cs and methylene chloride in the quantities used on 
                               april 19th

1. Lethality of CS as used at Waco
    Testimony before the subcommittees presented contradictory evidence 
on the effects of CS riot control agent. The published literature 
described above, however, is more consistent in the conclusions drawn. 
While it cannot be concluded with certainty, it is unlikely that the CS 
riot control agent, in the quantities used by the FBI, reached lethal 
toxic levels. The evidence presented to the subcommittees does indicate, 
however, that CS insertion into the enclosed bunker at a time when women 
and children were assembled inside that enclosed space could have been a 
proximate cause of or directly resulted in some or all of the deaths 
attributed to asphyxiation in the autopsy reports.
    In order to answer the question of whether the quantities of CS 
agent inserted into the residence might have reached lethal levels, the 
subcommittees attempted to determine the concentrations that were 
present in the residence under the ``worst-case'' circumstances. To make 
this determination, a number of assumptions must be made. Many of these 
assumptions were overstated solely for the purpose of calculation in 
order to place the greatest scrutiny on the government's actions.
    In each of the first two phases of insertion into the Branch 
Davidian residence, a total of 180 grams (180,000 mgs) of CS was 
delivered.\532\ For the purposes of analysis, the subcommittees assumed 
an ``extreme case'' scenario, where all 180 grams were delivered into 
the building by the two CEV's at the same instant, and that one-quarter 
of the Ferret rounds fired at the residence were fired at the precise 
moment that the CS delivered by the CEV's entered the residence.\533\ If 
so, then during the first and second phases of the CS operation, 550 
grams (550,000 mgs) of CS were delivered to the residence.\534\ During 
the first and second phases, therefore, the total concentration of CS 
delivered into the compound was 108.92 mgs/m\3\.\535\ During the third 
and fourth phases, due to the mechanical failure of the second CEV, only 
490 grams (490,000 mgs) of CS agent was delivered into the 
residence.\536\ During each of the third and fourth phases the total 
concentration at the (assumed) moment of insertion was 97.04 mgs/
m\3\.\537\
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    \532\ CEV-1 emptied its four 30-gram cylinders while CEV-2 emptied 
the contents of its two 30-gram cylinders. The total delivered was thus 
(4 x 30) + (2 x 30) = 180 grams.
    \533\ Each Ferret round carried 3.7 grams of CS agent. A total of 
400 Ferret rounds were fired at the residence. Thus, the total quantity 
of CS agent in one quarter of the Ferret rounds used was 370 grams (3.7 
x 100).
    \534\ On each of the first two phases, 180 grams of CS agent was 
delivered by the CEV's and approximately 370 grams was delivered by 
Ferret Rounds. This totals 550 grams, or 550,000 milligrams.
    \535\ The Branch Davidian residence contained approximately 178,310 
cubic feet of living area. Converted into meters, the volume of the 
residence was 5,049.7 cubic meters. The concentration inside the 
building, therefore, was 108.92 mgs/m\3\ (550,000 mgs/5,049.7m\3\ = 
108.92 mgs/m\3\).
    \536\ The 180 grams from CEV-1 and the approximately 370 grams from 
100 of the Ferret Rounds totals 490 grams, or 490,000 milligrams.
    \537\ 490,000 mgs/5049.7 m\3\ = 97.04 mgs/m\3\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Assuming the Branch Davidian residence been air-tight, so that none 
of the CS agent escaped the building (which was not the case), the total 
amount of CS agent delivered present in the building would have been 
411.92 mgs/m\3\.\538\ This concentration is far below the 61,000 mgs/
m\3\ amount projected to be lethal to 50 percent of a given population 
of humans. Stated in another way, it would take a concentration of CS 
148 times greater than the greatest amount that could have been present 
at the Branch Davidian residence on April 19 to reach that lethal level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \538\ The concentration inside the building, therefore, was 108.92 
mgs/m\3\ + 108.92 mgs/m\3\ + 97.04 mgs/m\3\ + 97.04 mgs/m\3\ = 411.92 
mgs/m\3\).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In reality, the concentrations of CS inside the Branch Davidian 
residence did not reach even these levels. The Branch Davidian residence 
was a poorly constructed structure which allowed for air to move in and 
out of the residence continuously. The air circulation carried some of 
the CS agent out of the building. Adding to the air circulation inside 
the Davidians residence that day was the fact that the FBI began to use 
the CEV's to ram openings into the building, ostensibly to create a 
means of escape for the Davidians and, later, to ``deconstruct'' 
portions of the structure in an effort to prevent the Davidians from 
occupying those areas of the residence. These actions greatly enhanced 
the circulation into the residence and further depleted the 
concentration of CS agent inside the residence. Additionally, on April 
19th, the winds were gusting up to 25 mph.\539\ This fact greatly 
enhanced the air circulation inside the residence, adding to the 
dissipation of the concentration of CS agent in the residence. Thus, the 
actual levels of CS inside the Davidian residence were less than those 
calculated above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \539\ The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration recorded 
high winds beginning at noon on April 18, 1993. The winds continued 
through April 19. At 11:52 a.m. on April 19, winds were recorded at 25 
mph with gusts to 30 mph.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Some who have contacted the subcommittees have suggested that the 
above analysis is flawed because it does not allow for the possibility 
that some CS agent was concentrated in certain areas of the residence 
rather than being evenly distributed throughout the entire structure. 
The subcommittees believe that it is important to address that 
possibility.
    Because the largest group of bodies recovered after the fire was 
found in the area of the residence commonly known as the gun room or 
bunker \540\ consideration was given to the concentrations of CS in that 
area.\541\ The bunker was a solid concrete room inside the Davidian 
residence. It had no windows or other access to the outside of the 
building, but did open into a hallway inside the residence. It appears 
that there was little opportunity for CS to have been directly sprayed 
into the bunker and that any CS that was present in the bunker likely 
drifted into that room after it was sprayed into one or more of the 
rooms along the outside of the structure. The subcommittees note, 
however, that the videotape of the insertion of CS on April 19 indicates 
that one of the CEV's drove into the structure near the bunker during 
the fourth phase of the CS insertion. If the door to the bunker had been 
open at that time, it is possible that CS might have been injected 
directly into the bunker.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \540\ See Justice Documents at the Appendix for a diagram of the 
floorplan of the Branch Davidian residence.
    \541\ It should be noted, however, that none of the autopsies of the 
persons found in the bunker indicate the cause of death was from 
exposure to CS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Based on this possibility the subcommittees attempted to determine, 
as a worst case scenario, the concentration of CS that would have been 
present in that room had the CEV emptied the entire contents of one of 
its CS containers into the bunker. It appears, however, that even in 
that event the concentration of CS would not have reached lethal levels.
    The volume of the bunker room was approximately 44.40 cubic meters. 
Assuming that an entire cylinder (30 grams) of CS was injected into the 
room, the concentration at that moment would have been 675.67 mgs/
m\3\.\542\ As discussed above, the concentration level estimated to be 
lethal to humans is 61,000 mgs-min/m\3\. Even had the CEV which was 
mounted with four containers of CS inserted the contents of all four 
containers into the bunker, the resulting concentration would have been 
2,702.70 mgs/m\3\.\543\ Again, this figure is well below the 
concentration level estimated to be lethal to humans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \542\ Each cylinder of CS contained 30 grams, or 30,000 milligrams, 
of CS. 30,000 mgs/44.40 m\3\ = 675.67 mgs/m\3\.
    \543\ 120,000 mgs/44.4 m\3\ = 2,702.70 mgs/m\3\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Another worse case scenario considered by the subcommittees was the 
possibility that one of the CEV's might have delivered the entire 
contents of one of its cylinders of CS agent into one of the smallest 
rooms of the residence, and that that room was inhabited at the time. It 
still appears that the concentration of CS would not have reached lethal 
levels. The smallest rooms in the structure were the women's quarters 
located on the second floor of the residence. The smallest of these had 
a total volume of 16.17 cubic meters. Assuming that an entire cylinder 
of CS had been injected into this room, the concentration at that moment 
would have been 1855.29 mgs/m\3\.\544\ Assuming further that a number of 
Ferret rounds also happened to be fired into the room at the exact 
moment that the CS was injected by the CEV (assume an impossible event 
such as 20 rounds entering the room at the same instant), the 
concentration at that instant would have been 6,431.66 mgs/m\3\.\545\ 
Again, these figures fall far below the concentrations estimated to be 
lethal to humans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \544\ Each cylinder of CS agent contained 30 grams, or 30,000 
milligrams. 30,000 mgs/16.17 m\3\ = 185.52 mgs/m\3\.
    \545\ 30 grams of CS agent from a CEV plus 74 grams of CS agent from 
20 Ferret rounds is a total of 104 grams (30 + (3.7 x 20) = 104), or 
104,000 milligrams. 104,000 mgs/16.17 m\3\ = 6,431.66 mgs/m\3\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While concluding that it is unlikely that the CS reached toxic 
levels, the subcommittees note the level of exposure to CS experienced 
by an individual Davidian cannot be determined. It is possible that a 
person near one of the CEV's injecting the CS may have been subject to a 
level of CS that was high enough to cause death. Additionally, 10 of the 
autopsies indicate asphyxiation as the cause of death, but do not 
indicate whether CS or other factors may have lead to this. The 
subcommittees are unable to conclude that CS did not play a part in the 
deaths of these persons.
2. Lethality of methylene chloride used with CS at Waco
    During the gassing operation, each cylinder of the CS riot control 
agent introduced into the Branch Davidian residence by the CEV's was 
mixed with approximately 1,070 grams of methylene chloride. This 
suspension was then dispersed into the structure by carbon dioxide, 
which almost immediately evaporated, leaving the suspension of CS and 
methylene chloride. Additionally, each of the Ferret round projectiles 
contained 33 grams of methylene chloride as the dispersant medium for 
the CS agent.
    The four phases of insertion of CS agent into the Branch Davidian 
residence were conducted approximately 2 hours apart. During the first 
and second phases six cylinders of CS agent were inserted into the 
residence, delivering approximately 6,420 grams of methylene chloride in 
each phase.\546\ During the third and fourth insertions only four 
cylinders of CS agent were inserted, accounting for approximately 4,280 
grams of methylene chloride during each insertion. Assuming a worse case 
scenario of all of the CS insertions in one phase occurring at the same 
moment and approximately \1/4\ of the Ferret round projectiles entering 
the building at that same time, thus adding an additional 3,300 grams of 
methylene chloride in each phase,\547\ the total concentration of 
methylene chloride delivered into the building during the first and 
second insertions was 1,924.87 mgs/m\3\.\548\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \546\ Each cylinder contained 1,070 grams of methelyene chloride. 
Six cylinders totaled 9,720 grams.
    \547\ Each Ferret round contained 33 grams of methylene chloride. 
One hundred Ferret rounds thus inserted 3,300 grams of the chemical into 
the building.
    \548\ In the first two phases the total quantity of methylene 
chloride delivered was 9,720 grams ((6 x 1,070) + (100 x 33)) or 
9,720,000 milligrams. Divided by the cubic footage of the building 
(5,049.7 m\3\) the distribution of the substance throughout the building 
in these phases was 1,924.87 mgs/m\3\. In the third and fourth two 
phases the total quantity of methylene chloride delivered was 7,580 
grams ((4 x 1,070) + (100 x 33)) or 7,580,000 milligrams. Divided by the 
cubic footage of the building (5,049.7 m\3\) the distribution of the 
substance throughout the building in these phases was 1,501.08 mgs/m\3\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A review of the scientific literature concerning CS agent has 
located no estimates of the concentration of methylene chloride which 
would prove harmful or lethal to humans. The only estimates which do 
exist are with respect to mice and rats. For example, the concentration 
that would prove lethal to 50 percent of a rat population is estimated 
to be 2,640,000 mgs-min/m\3\.\549\ As can be seen from the above 
figures, therefore, the total concentrations of methylene chloride at 
the Davidian residence on that day were less than the concentrations 
that would prove lethal to even rats.\550\ It appears, therefore, that 
the methylene chloride used with the CS agent could not have caused the 
death of any of the Davidians.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \549\ See generally Mallinckrodt, Inc., Material Data Safety Sheet 2 
(1989); Dow Chemical, Inc., Material Data Safety Sheet 3 (1988).
    \550\ The total quantities from each of the four insertions of CS 
agent was only 5,356.74 mgs/m\3\. ((2 x 1,924.87) + (2 x 1,501.08) = 
5,356.74).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As in the case with CS, the subcommittees considered the possibility 
that some methylene chloride was concentrated in certain areas of the 
residence rather than being evenly distributed throughout the entire 
structure. Because the largest group of bodies recovered after the fire 
was found in the area of the residence commonly known as the gun room or 
bunker, consideration was given to the concentrations of methylene 
chloride in that area.\551\ As discussed above, the bunker was a solid 
concrete room with no windows or other access to the outside of the 
building, but did open into a hallway inside the residence. Again, it 
appears that there was little opportunity for the methylene chloride 
carrying the CS agent to have been directly sprayed into the bunker and 
that any methylene chloride that was present in the bunker likely 
drifted into that room after it was sprayed into one or more of the 
rooms along the outside of the structure. But the subcommittees again 
note that the videotape of the insertion of CS on April 19 indicates 
that one of the CEV's drove into the structure near the bunker during 
the fourth phase of the CS insertion. If the door to the bunker had been 
open at that time, it is possible that methylene chloride carrying the 
CS agent might have been injected directly into the bunker.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \551\ It should be noted, however, that none of the autopsies of the 
persons found in the bunker indicate the cause of death was from 
exposure to methylene chloride.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Based on this possibility the subcommittees attempted to determine, 
as a worst case scenario, the concentration of methylene chloride that 
would have been present in that room had the CEV emptied the entire 
contents of one of its CS containers into the bunker. It appears, 
however, that even in that event the concentration of CS would not have 
reached lethal levels.
    The volume of the bunker room was approximately 44.40 cubic meters. 
Assuming that an entire cylinder of CS (with 1,070 grams of methylene 
chloride as a disbursant) was injected into the room, the concentration 
at that moment would have been 24,099 mgs/m\3\.\552\ Even if the CEV 
that was mounted with four cylinders of CS inserted the contents of all 
four containers into the bunker, the resulting concentration would have 
been 96,396 mgs/m\3\.\553\ Both of these figures are well below the 
concentrations estimated to be lethal to rats.\554\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \552\ Each cylinder of CS contained 1,070 grams, or 1,070,000 
milligrams, of methylene chloride. 1,070,000 mgs/ 44.40 m\3\ = 214,099 
mgs/m\3\.
    \553\ 4,280,000 mgs/ 44.40 m\3\ = 96,396 mgs/m\3\.
    \554\ As stated, there are no studies estimating the lethal 
concentration levels to humans of exposure to methylene chloride.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Another worse case scenario considered by the subcommittees was the 
possibility that one of the CEV's might have delivered the entire 
contents of one of its cylinders of CS agent into one of the smallest 
rooms of the residence, and that that room was inhabited at the time. It 
still appears that the concentration of methylene chloride would not 
have reached lethal levels. The smallest rooms in the structure were the 
women's quarters located on the second floor of the residence. The 
smallest of these had a total volume of 16.17 cubic meters. Assuming 
that an entire cylinder of CS had been injected into this room, the 
concentration of methylene chloride at that moment would have been 
66,171.93 mgs/m\3\.\555\ Assuming further that a number of Ferret rounds 
also happened to be fired into the room at the exact moment that the CS 
was injected by the CEV (assume, for example, an event as unlikely as 20 
rounds entering the room at the same instant), the concentration at that 
instant would have been 106,988 mgs/m\3\.\556\ Again, these figures fall 
far below the concentrations estimated to be lethal to rats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \555\ Each cylinder of CS agent contained 1,070 grams of methylene 
chloride, or 1,070,000 milligrams. 1,070,000 mgs/ 16.17 m\3\ = 66,171 
mgs/m\3\.
    \556\ 1,070 grams of methylene chloride from a CEV plus 660 grams of 
methylene chloride from 20 Ferret rounds is a total of 1,730 grams 
(1,070 + (33 x 20) = 1,730), or 1,730,000 milligrams. 1,730,000 mgs/ 
16.17 m\3\ = 106,988 mgs/m\3\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Other possible effects of methylene chloride used with CS at Waco
    While the subcommittees conclude that the levels of methylene 
chloride did not reach lethal toxic levels, the subcommittees also 
considered whether the levels of methylene chloride may have affected 
the Davidians in other ways. At levels over 1,000 parts per million 
(ppm) anaesthetic effects begin to occur in humans.\557\ At levels above 
2,300 ppm, exposure to methylene chloride may cause dizziness.\558\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \557\ 2 G. Clayton & F. Clayton, Patty's Industrial Hygiene and 
Toxicology 3449-3455 (1981); R. Stewart et al., Methylene Chloride: 
Development of a Biological Standard for Industrial Workers by Breath 
Analysis (1974).
    \558\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Because methylene chloride evaporates rapidly when released into the 
air, the subcommittees considered separately the concentrations of 
methylene chloride during each of the four phases of the CS agent 
insertion. The levels of methylene chloride were greatest during the 
first two phases (because one of the CEV's was unable to inject the CS 
agent/methylene chloride mixture during the third and fourth phase).
    During the first and second phases, six cylinders of CS agent were 
inserted into the residence, delivering approximately 6,420 grams of 
methylene chloride in each phase.\559\ Assuming that all of the CS 
inserted by the CEV's during one phase was inserted at a single moment, 
and that approximately \1/4\ of the Ferret round projectiles used during 
the entire operation also entering the building at that same time (thus 
adding an additional 3,300 grams of methylene chloride in each phase 
\560\), and that the Davidian residence was airtight, the concentration 
of methylene chloride during each of the first two phases would have 
been 548 ppm.\561\ At this concentration, studies have shown no 
observable effects in humans.\562\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \559\ Each cylinder contained 1,070 grams of methylene chloride. Six 
cylinders totaled 9,720 grams.
    \560\ Each Ferret round contained 33 grams of methylene chloride. 
One hundred Ferret rounds thus inserted 3,300 grams of the chemical into 
the building.
    \561\ The molecular weight of methylene chloride gas is 85. One mole 
of methylene chloride gas is 24.2 liters. 9,720g MC/ 85 = 114 moles. 114 
moles x 24.2 liters/mole = 2758 liters of MC. There was 5,049,700 liters 
of volume in the Davidian residence (5.049.7 m\3\ x 1000 liters/m\3\ = 
5,049,700). Thus 2767.34/ 5,049,700 x 10\6\ = 548 ppm.
    \562\ U.S. Dept. Of Commerce, Agency for Toxic Substances and 
Disease Registry, Toxicological Profile for Methylene Chloride (1993).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In considering the possibility that some methylene chloride was 
concentrated in certain areas of the residence, rather than being evenly 
distributed throughout the entire structure, the subcommittees found 
that it was possible that the levels of methylene chloride reached 
concentrations that might have caused levels that produced an 
anaesthetic effects in humans.
    Again, the subcommittees considered the possible concentration in 
the bunker, as the largest group of bodies recovered after the fire was 
found there. The volume of the bunker room was approximately 44.40 cubic 
meters. Assuming that an entire cylinder of CS (with 1,070 grams of 
methylene chloride as a disbursant) was injected into the room, the 
concentration at that moment would have been 6,861 ppm.\563\ This 
concentration was sufficient to induce dizziness and other anaesthetic 
effects in humans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \563\ 1,070 g MC/ 85 = 12.59 moles. 12.59 moles x 24.2 liters/mole = 
304.63 liters of MC. There was 44,400 liters of volume in the bunker 
(44.40 m\3\ x 1000 liters/m\3\ = 44,400). Thus 304.63/ 44,400 x 10\6\ = 
6,861 ppm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As stated, however, the evidence is not determinative as to whether 
one of the CEV's did, in fact, insert CS directly into the bunker. 
Additionally, it is unknown if the bunker door was open or closed, a 
factor that would have significantly affected the concentration levels 
inside the room. Finally, the air circulation inside the building would 
have affected the levels of methylene chloride present at any one time. 
The subcommittees conclude, however, that it is possible that the levels 
of methylene chloride in the bunker were such that the chemical impaired 
the Davidians' ability to escape the room. Additionally, the possibility 
cannot be dismissed that other Davidians, in other areas of the 
residence, might have been similarly adversely affected if they were 
directly exposed to an insertion of an entire cylinder of the CS agent/
methylene chloride mixture. Thus, the levels of methylene chloride that 
were present in the Davidian residence as a result of the use of the CS 
riot control agent might have impaired the ability of some of the 
Davidians to be able to leave the residence had they otherwise wished to 
do so.

 g. analysis of the attorney general's decision to end the standoff on 
                             april 19, 1993

1. The decision not to storm the residence
    The subcommittees received testimony concerning the FBI's decision 
not to storm the residence in order to end the standoff. Additionally, 
the Justice Department Report on these events also discusses the factors 
that went into this decision. According to that report, FBI tactical 
experts believed that there was a substantial likelihood of significant 
casualties to FBI agents if a frontal assault on the residence was 
attempted. The FBI believed that the Davidians had fortified the 
residence and were ready to offer resistance equal to or perhaps even 
greater than that they had showed during the failed February 28 assault 
on the residence by the ATF. The FBI was also concerned about the 
possibility of suicide by the Davidians in the event of such an 
assault.\564\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \564\ Justice Department Report at 259.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Experts on tactics testified before the subcommittees that a frontal 
assault is one of the riskiest types of tactical operations.\565\ That 
risk was even greater in this situation given the large size of the 
structure and the wide-open areas around the structure with the 
resulting lack of cover for any approach to the residence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \565\ Hearings Part 2 at 315, 318 (statement of Donald A. Bassett).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The FBI's decision to pursue options other than a frontal assault in 
order to end the standoff was a wise one. It seems clear that a raid, 
even one better planned than that of the ATF of February 28, was of 
unacceptably high risk. It is likely that FBI agents would have 
sustained casualties in such an assault. Any assault on the Branch 
Davidian residence also risked the lives of the Davidians. Additionally, 
the FBI appropriately considered the possibility of suicide by the 
Davidians in the event of an assault.
2. The reasons asserted for ending the standoff on day 51
            a. The situation would not soon be resolved
    One of the key factors influencing the FBI's decision to recommend 
to the Attorney General that the standoff be ended on day 51 was the 
belief by FBI officials that continuing to negotiate with the Davidians 
would not lead to their peaceful surrender. At the hearings held by the 
subcommittees, FBI chief negotiator Byron Sage testified that he 
believed that further negotiations would not be fruitful.\566\ Tactical 
commander Jeffrey Jamar testified that he was skeptical that 
negotiations would end the stand-off, and that he became even more 
skeptical after Koresh reneged on a promise to come out on March 2.\567\ 
Documentary evidence reviewed by the subcommittees indicated, however, 
that some of the FBI's behavioral experts believed that there were 
further steps that could be taken through negotiations. Additionally, at 
the subcommittees' hearings, testimony was received from the attorneys 
for the Davidians that they believed further negotiations could have led 
to the Davidians' peaceful surrender.\568\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \566\ ``I never abandoned the concept or the hope that negotiations 
could successfully and peacefully resolve this matter. My statement to 
[Hubbell] at the time . . . was that I felt that negotiations were at an 
impasse . . . .'' Hearings Part 2 at 345 (statement of Byron Sage).
    \567\ Hearings Part 2 at 306-307.
    \568\ See section VI E of this report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Sage's view was that Koresh had broken many of the promises he had 
made throughout the standoff. After a experiencing a number of these 
broken promises, Sage and the other FBI commanders believed that they 
could not rely on Koresh's assurances.
    Another factor that may have affected the FBI commanders' view of 
the situation, but which was given little emphasis in the Justice 
Department Report, is mental and emotional fatigue affecting the FBI 
decisionmakers. Sage was one of the first FBI agents on the scene on 
February 28. He worked every day, all day, of the 51 day standoff, and 
only returned to his home in Austin for a short period of time on 1 day 
to gather more clothes. Jamar and the other senior FBI commanders were 
also on site for almost the entire time of the standoff. It seems only 
natural then, that physical and mental fatigue would begin to set in and 
that dealing with Koresh's rhetoric and disingenuousness would lead to 
emotional fatigue as well. Indeed, the Justice Department Report 
indicates that the law enforcement personnel present were tired and that 
their ``tempers were fraying.'' \569\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \569\ Justice Department Report at 271.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Nevertheless, FBI commanders to become firmly convinced that nothing 
more would come from further negotiations with Koresh. That belief was 
communicated by Sage to Associate Attorney General Webster Hubbell 
during a 2-hour telephone conversation on April 15.\570\ This belief 
played a crucial role in influencing Attorney General Reno's decision to 
end the standoff on April 19.\571\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \570\ Id. at 270.
    \571\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During the hearings, however, the subcommittees received testimony 
from the Davidians' attorneys that Koresh was hard at work writing his 
interpretation of the Seven Seals discussed in the Book of Revelation in 
the Bible. They believe that Koresh was willing to surrender when he 
finished his writing.
    The FBI's commanders knew of Koresh's desire to write this 
manuscript but did not believe he was actually working on it. It appears 
that fatigue and frustration at the lack of achieving success in 
obtaining the release of additional Davidians may have led the 
negotiators to be less than receptive to this information. That the 
negotiators were not open to this new information, and did not pass it 
on to their superiors, played a part in the Attorney General's decision 
to end the standoff on April 19 and in the manner chosen to end it.
      
        VII. The Attorney General's Decision to End the Stand-o
                    the children as shields
    Another factor that went into the FBI's recommendation to the 
Attorney General to end the standoff on day 51 was the fear that the 
Davidians might attempt to breakout of the residence using the children 
as human shields. According to the Justice Department Report, ``some 
[unnamed] experts'' had suggested this possibility and that to combat 
this possibility, the FBI had to be certain that its best trained troops 
(the Hostage Rescue Team members) would be on the scene.\572\ There was 
some doubt a
	
						 

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