The Fire

Activities of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Toward the Branch Davidians

Report House of Representatives
104th Congress, 2nd Session, Union Calendar No. 395
August 2, 1996



                             VIII. The Fire

    At 12:07 p.m., Central Standard Time, more than 6 hours after the 
FBI began to implement the plan to end the standoff, fire was detected 
inside the Branch Davidian residence. Within a period of 2 minutes, two 
additional fires were detected in two other parts of the structure. In 
less than 8 minutes the fire had spread throughout the structure. By the 
end of the afternoon, the structure was completely destroyed.
    The subcommittees received testimony from the leader of a team of 
fire experts called together by the Texas Rangers to investigate the 
origins of the fire,\601\ a fire expert retained by the Justice 
Department to join with the team assembled by the Texas Rangers,\602\ 
and an independent arson investigator.
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    \601\ U.S. Dept. of Justice, Report to the Deputy Attorney General 
on the Events at Waco, Texas 329 (1993) [hereinafter Justice Department 
Report].
    \602\ These individuals visited the scene of the fire on April 22-
24, 1993. Hearings Part 3 at 119 (statement of James Quintiere).
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    During the testimony of these witnesses, the subcommittees also 
reviewed videotape recordings of the development and spread of the fire. 
Included in this review was a videotape using ``forward looking 
infrared'' (FLIR) technology, which was taken from an FBI observation 
plane circling the Branch Davidian residence throughout the morning and 
afternoon of April 19. The FLIR type of video, also called a Thermal 
Imaging System, is a type of video photography which images thermal heat 
sources. Because of its sensitivity to changes in the quantity of heat 
given off by an object the FLIR videotape showed the beginning of the 
fires within the Branch Davidian residence prior to the point at which 
was the flames were visible to persons on the outside of the structure. 
Time lapse indicators on the video tape recordings were used by the 
witnesses to establish the times at which each fire within the Branch 
Davidian residence began.

                a. summary of the development of the fire

    During the hearings, James Quintiere, professor of Fire Protection 
Engineering at the University of Maryland and one of two fire experts 
retained by the Justice Department to join the fire review team 
assembled by the Texas Rangers, used the FLIR video tape to demonstrate 
the development of the fire on April 19. Dr. Quintiere's 
responsibilities as a part of the Review Team were to analyze the 
development of the fire and draw interpretations and conclusions from 
that analysis.\603\ In addition to reviewing the FLIR video, the fire 
investigation team reviewed television coverage of the fire by the 
Canadian Broadcasting Corp., which was also time dated, and television 
coverage of the fire by a local Waco television station. The team also 
reviewed aerial photographs and other materials. During his testimony to 
the subcommittees, Dr. Quintiere played a video tape that simultaneously 
played each of the three video tapes of the fire synchronized to the 
same time.
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    \603\ Id.
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    The videotape demonstration showed that the first fire began at 
12:07:42 p.m. As part of his testimony to the subcommittees, Dr. 
Quintiere narrated the videotape demonstration. As the first fire 
developed, Dr. Quintiere testified,

          If you look at this point here, you will see this window begin 
        to turn slightly grayish, it does right now. Nine seconds later 
        the window on the opposite side right here is going to also show 
        an illumination which is due to this temperature rise, and in my 
        opinion that is due to smoke being transported from the fire 
        started at one end of the room to the other end of the room. . . 
        . The room was a second floor room approximately 16 x 11 in 
        dimensions and about 8 feet high, which is presumed to have been 
        a bedroom. One minute later the second fire begins on the first 
        floor at the rear of the dining room.\604\
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    \604\ Hearings Part 3 at 135.

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Dr. Quintiere then described the development of the second fire.

          We are looking at the development of the fire in that bedroom 
        area, the second floor right tower. What we are going to see 
        here at 12:09:42, we will see an event known to people who 
        investigate and study fire. That event is called flashover, and 
        that is a point when we have a transition in this fire in which 
        the fire goes from a discrete object that you could discern very 
        readily burning in a room such as this to a point where flames 
        now fill the room, and that transition can occur in seconds. It 
        is known as flashover. Before that time the room might be 
        survivable.
          After that time it is definitely not, and now the fire is a 
        threat to spreading to other rooms.\605\
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    \605\ Id. at 136.

Finally, Dr. Quintiere described the inception of the third fire, which 
occurred on the first floor in the chapel area.\606\ He also noted that 
38 seconds later there emerged hot gases at a point 45 feet away from 
the point where the third fire began. He testified that this could have 
been a separately set, fourth fire, but that the development of this 
fire was consistent with someone placing a trail of gasoline or other 
liquid fuel between those two points and allowing the third fire to 
spread over that trail.\607\
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    \606\ Id.
    \607\ Id. at 136-137.
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    As Dr. Quintiere summarized his conclusions:

          If we can just pause at this point, you can see the fire here, 
        the first fire. A minute later, a fire began in the dining room 
        area, and a minute after that a fire began in this chapel. It 
        has not burned through the roof yet, but the ignition in the 
        debris area because of the wind has now propagated significantly 
        over that debris area. These are three distinct fires.
          From this information I can conclude that these three fires 
        that occurred nearly 1 minute apart were intentionally set from 
        within the compound. Also, you have the time periods involved 
        and the very discrete different locations. None of these three 
        fires could have caused any of the others because their growth 
        rates would not provide sufficient heating to cause such remote 
        ignitions.\608\
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    \608\ Id. at 138.

    The experts testified that they believed the fires were 
intentionally set by Branch Davidian members in order to destroy the 
structure.\609\ Supporting this conclusion is that fact that the fire 
review team found that a number of accelerants were present in the 
structure and on the clothing of some of the surviving Davidians, 
including gasoline, kerosene, Coleman fuel, and other accelerants.\610\ 
As Dr. Quintiere testified,
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    \609\ Id. at 138, 191 (``I don't discount that the fires were 
started inside by the people inside.'') (statement of Rick Sherrow).
    \610\ Id. at 166, 187-188 (statement of Paul Grey).

          Although normal furnishings and interior construction 
        characteristics would provide a means for fire propagation, the 
        more than usual rapid spread of these fires, especially in the 
        dining room and the chapel areas, indicates to me that some form 
        of accelerant was used to encourage to the rapid spread of these 
        fires.\611\
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    \611\ Id. at 138.
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        b. other theories concerning the development of the fire

1. Whether the methylene chloride in the CS riot control agent used by 
        the FBI caused the fire
    One of the theories forwarded to the subcommittees concerning the 
origin of the fire is that methylene chloride, a chemical used as a 
dispersant to carry the CS riot control agent injected into the Branch 
Davidian residence, may have ignited and started the fire. During the 
hearings Dr. Quintiere testified that it was his opinion that the 
methylene chloride in the CS agent neither caused nor contributed to the 
spread of the fire.
    According to Dr. Quintiere, methylene chloride, when a vapor in air, 
is flammable at ambient air levels of 12 percent or greater.\612\ This 
conclusion is supported by information provided by the manufacturers of 
methylene chloride.\613\ The subcommittees review of the evidence 
presented indicates that the levels of methylene chloride present in the 
residence on April 19 was far below this concentration.\614\ 
Additionally, a spark, flame, or other source of heat is necessary for 
methylene chloride to ignite and a fireball-like event would have 
resulted. As Dr. Quintiere testified,
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    \612\ Id. at 140.
    \613\ Letter from Peter Voytek, executive director, Halogenated 
Solvents Industry Alliance, Inc. to Glenn R. Schmitt, counsel to the 
Subcommittee on Crime (July 25, 1995). See also generally Mallinckrodt, 
Inc., Material Data Safety Sheet 1 (1989); Dow Chemical, Inc., Material 
Data Safety Sheet 1 (1988).
    \614\ See section VII F of this report.

          In other words, anything above 12 percent to approximately 20 
        percent, it would be in the flammable range, and if we had a 
        spark or a small match and if we had conditions like that, we 
        would have a fire propagating through the atmosphere much like a 
        fireball. There was no observation like that made for this 
        fire.\615\
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    \615\ Hearings Part 3 at 140.

The only fireball which did occur took place well after the fires had 
engulfed the building, and was most likely due to the explosion of a 
canister of propane gas.\616\ Accordingly, because there was no 
explosion prior to the beginning of the fire, there is no evidence that 
methylene chloride vapor present in the air caused the outbreak of the 
fire.
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    \616\ ``[T]he explosion happened well after the building was totally 
destroyed. It was very unlikely that that explosion was anything other 
than a propane cylinder. . . . There was, in fact, a hundred pound 
propane cylinder with a piece of the top blown out about the size of a 
football exactly where that explosion occurred, and I have no doubt that 
that is what the big explosion is. . . .'' Id. at 175-176 (statement of 
Paul Gray).
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    Dr. Quintiere also noted that methylene chloride is generally in a 
liquid state and that as the methylene chloride vapor condensed and fell 
in droplets to the floor of the structure after the CS was inserted the 
methylene chloride generally would have evaporated. In some instances, 
however, the chemical could have collected in a puddle. He testified 
that such a puddle would have been difficult to ignite due to the 
presence of chlorine in the chemical. He testified that ``in some sense 
[methylene chloride] acts like an inhibitor.'' \617\ He further 
testified that he conducted experiments using methylene chloride as a 
``wetting'' agent by depositing it on wood, paper, and other flammable 
objects that might have been found in the structure in an effort to 
determine whether the methylene chloride might have burned along with 
these items. As a result of these experiments, he concluded ``that the 
methylene chloride had no enhancement effect on the fires spread over 
the room furnishings and other things that burned in the compound.'' 
\618\
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    \617\ Id. at 140.
    \618\ Id.
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2. Whether the irritant chemical in the CS riot control agent used by 
        the FBI caused or contributed to the spread of the fire
    At the hearings Dr. Quintiere testified that he had reviewed the 
literature concerning the ignition point of the chemical irritant in CS 
agent and noted that the temperature at which that chemical would ignite 
was comparable ``to what we would find from most fuels around us.'' 
\619\ Based upon his review of the literature, Dr. Quintiere testified 
that it was his opinion that the CS powder that is an active irritant in 
the riot control agent did not enhance the spread of the fire.\620\
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    \619\ Id.
    \620\ Id.
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3. Whether the combat engineering vehicles used by the FBI on April 19 
        started the fire
    Some theories concerning the origin of the fire involve an 
explanation that one of the combat engineering vehicles used by the FBI 
to inject CS chemical agent and to demolish portions of the Branch 
Davidian residence may have actually caused the fire, either 
intentionally or unintentionally.
    At one point in the video record of the operation on April 19, a 
combat engineering vehicle is seen driving into a portion of the 
residence. The first fire begins in that same location shortly 
thereafter. Some have suggested that the CEV might have overturned a 
lighted kerosene lantern inside the residence, causing the fire to 
begin. The fire that begins in that area, however, is not discernable in 
the FLIR video until 1\621\ During the hearings, Dr. Quintiere was 
questioned on the significance of this fact.
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    \621\ Id. at 135 (statement of James Quintiere).

          Mr. Schiff: Well, if there were lanterns in use and if you 
        had, either through vibrations of tanks hitting walls or through 
        a number of people, panicking inside at what they might have 
        perceived was an assault, notwithstanding the FBI broadcast 
        going to them, couldn't either or both of those factors easily 
        overturned lanterns inside the compound?
          Dr. Quintiere: Well, the only evidence of a tank being in the 
        vicinity of one of the fires is the first fire, and that tank 
        has not left 1\1/2\ minutes after the fire has begun. If that 
        tank knocked over a lantern and the lantern were lit, we would 
        have seen it in that FLIR video because it would have been 
        sensitive enough to see that. If the tank had spilled a lantern 
        and there was no flame there to ignite it, that's possible, but 
        somebody would have to come in and put a flame in that.\622\
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    \622\ Id. at 143.
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    Some citizens have contacted the subcommittees to suggest that the 
combat engineering vehicles used by the FBI at Waco carried flame 
throwing devices which were used to intentionally set the fires inside 
the Branch Davidian residence. During the hearings, the fire experts 
were questioned about this theory.
          Mr. Schumer: Another theory we have heard mentioned is that a 
        flame thrower from the tanks started the fire. Now as I 
        understand it, we would have to have seen on the FLIR a hot 
        streak going from the tank to the building for that to happen.
          Dr. Quintiere: Absolutely.
          Mr. Schumer: And we did not; is that correct?
          Dr. Quintiere: Absolutely.
          Mr. Schumer: So you are saying a flame thrower from the tanks 
        starting the fire--is that consistent--is that theory consistent 
        with what we saw on the tape?
          Dr. Quintiere: No, indeed. There was no such thing as a flame 
        thrower on those vehicles.\623\
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    \623\ Id. at 144. See also Id. at 172 (``The flame-throwing tank 
absolutely did not happen.'') (statement of Rick Sherrow).

On another day of the hearings, a Defense Department witness testified 
that all of the military vehicles loaned by the Defense Department to 
the Department of Justice and used at Waco were unarmed.\624\ 
Additionally, the subcommittees' interviews with other persons present 
at the Branch Davidian residence on April 19 confirms that none of these 
vehicles was armed.
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    \624\ Id. at 314 (statement of Allen Holmes, Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict).
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c. whether the davidians could have left their residence after the fire 
                                  began

    Throughout the morning of April 19, none of the Davidians left their 
residence. After the fire broke out, however, nine persons left the 
building.\625\ This indicates that at least some opportunity existed for 
the Davidians to safely leave the structure had they wanted to do so. 
One of those who escaped the fire left the residence almost 21 minutes 
after the outbreak of the first fire.\626\ Clearly, some means of escape 
from the residence existed for a significant period of time after the 
fire broke out.
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    \625\ Justice Department Report at 298. Two of these persons, Clive 
Doyle and David Thibodeau testified before the subcommittees at the 
hearings.
    \626\ Hearings Part 3 at 139 (statement of James Quintiere).
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    An important question, however, is whether the Davidians might have 
been overcome by smoke and prevented from leaving the residence. The 
autopsies of the Davidians indicate that deaths from smoke inhalation or 
asphyxiation from carbon monoxide poisoning accounted for only half of 
the Davidians who died in the residence. The other causes of death were 
gunshot wounds, burns, or other trauma. Thus, even after the fires began 
to consume the structure, at least half of the Davidians were not so 
affected by the smoke and fumes from the fire that they were physically 
unable to leave the structure.
    Additionally, the location of the bodies of the Davidians indicates 
that few of the Davidians actually attempted to escape the building. 
Many of the bodies were huddled together in locations in the center of 
the building.\627\ Few of the bodies were located at points of exit from 
the building, and autopsies indicates that the cause of death of several 
of the bodies at exit points were self-inflicted gunshot wounds or 
gunshots from very close range.
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    \627\ A chart indicating the location of the bodies found after the 
fire in the remains of residence is contained in the Appendix.
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    At the hearings before the subcommittees, Dr. Quintiere testified as 
to his opinion as to whether the Davidians could have left the 
structure. He testified,

          I've estimated . . . that the occupants would have had 
        sufficient warning in no doubt [sic] that the fire occurred, and 
        this would have enabled them to escape for up to five minutes 
        from the start of that first fire or perhaps as many as 20 
        minutes in some protected areas of the building.
          So between and interval of five minutes after the fire started 
        and maybe as much as 20 minutes, a person could have escaped 
        from some parts of the building.\628\
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    \628\ Hearings Part 3 at 139.

Paul Gray, Assistant Chief of the Houston Fire Department and leader of 
the fire review team assembled by the Texas Rangers, agreed with this 
opinion, ``I would take an educated guess of about 20 to 22 minutes from 
the inception of the fire, from the first ignition that there may have 
been some viable conditions inside the building.'' \629\ As the report 
of the team led by Gray summarized,
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    \629\ Id. at 183.

          [A] great many of the occupants could have escaped to the 
        outside of the compound even as the building burned. . . . 
        [C]onsidering the observable means of exit available, we must 
        assume that many of the occupants were either denied escape from 
        within or refused to leave until escape was not an option.\630\
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    \630\ Justice Department Report at 335.

    In light of this evidence, the subcommittees conclude that there was 
a period of time after the fires began within which the Davidians could 
have escaped the residence. The evidence presented to the subcommittees 
indicates that the Davidians did not attempt to leave the building 
during the fire. In light of the Davidians' religious beliefs that fire 
would play a part in the end of their worldly lives, the subcommittees 
conclude that most of the Davidians either did not attempt to leave 
their residence during the fire or were prevented from escaping by other 
Davidians. Had they made such an attempt and not been hindered in the 
attempt, however, conditions were such that for sufficient period of 
time after the fires broke out many of the Davidians could have 
survived.

                   d. the fbi's planning for the fire

    According to the Justice Department Report, at a meeting in early 
April, one of the government attorneys raised the possibility of fire at 
the compound and suggested to the FBI that ``fire fighting equipment be 
placed on standby on the scene.'' \631\ Additionally, the Medical Annex 
to the operations plan for April 19, which listed the locations of 
``primary'' and ``secondary'' hospitals in the area noted that local 
hospitals should not be used to treat major burns but that one of the 
secondary hospitals was ``primary for major burns.''
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    \631\ Id. at 302.
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    According to the Justice Department Report, the FBI decided to not 
have fire fighting equipment at the scene ``for fear that they would be 
fired upon by Koresh and his followers.'' \632\ Yet shortly after the 
reports of fire, the FBI command post requested fire fighting assistance 
be requested. The first fire fighting vehicles arrived in the vicinity 
20 minutes later and, at 12:41 p.m., approached the structure. In total, 
the fire crews did not reach the structure until 31 minutes after the 
fire had first been reported.\633\ The report also asserts that Jeffrey 
Jamar, the FBI's on-scene commander at Waco, stated to Justice 
Department officials during the their internal investigation of the 
incident that ``even if the fire fighters had arrived at the compound 
earlier he would not have permitted them to enter due to the great risk 
to their lives.'' \634\
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    \632\ Id.
    \633\ Id.
    \634\ Id.
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    The subcommittees do not dispute the Justice Department's position 
that at the outbreak of the fire it would have been dangerous for fire 
fighters to approach the structure. Yet, the subcommittees find it 
troubling that even though the government clearly believed there existed 
a strong possibility of fire, no provision was made for fire fighting 
units to be on hand, even as a precaution. If, as the Justice 
Department's Report implies, the government had decided in advance that 
it would not attempt to fight any fire that occurred (and thus did not 
make provision for fire fighting units to be present at the compound), 
it is difficult to understand why the FBI placed a call for fire 
fighting units to be summoned to the scene immediately upon the 
commencement of the fire.

                     e. findings concerning the fire

    1. The evidence indicates that some of the Davidians intentionally 
set the fires inside the Davidian residence. While the evidence is not 
dispositive, the evidence presented to the subcommittees suggests that 
some of the Davidians set the fires that destroyed their residence. The 
evidence demonstrated that three distinct fires began in three separate 
parts of the Branch Davidian residence within a 2 minute period on April 
19. Additionally, the fire review team found that a number of 
accelerants were present in the structure, including gasoline, kerosene, 
and Coleman fuel, and that in at least one instance these accelerants 
contributed to the spread of the fire in a manner that indicates an 
intention to spread the fire.
    2. The methylene chloride in the CS riot control agent used by the 
FBI did not cause the fire. There is no evidence that methylene chloride 
vapor in the air in the residence, present as the result of its use as a 
disbursant for the CS riot control agent, caused the outbreak of the 
fire. The evidence presented to the subcommittees indicated that for the 
methylene chloride to have burned some spark must have ignited the 
methylene chloride vapor and that a fireball would have resulted. 
Because no fireball was observed until well after the fire had become 
established, the subcommittees conclude that methylene chloride did not 
cause the fire.
    3. The subcommittees conclude that Federal law enforcement agents 
did not intentionally set the fire. The evidence before the 
subcommittees clearly demonstrates that no fire began at or near the 
time when any of the combat engineering vehicles used by the FBI came 
into contact with the structure. Had a flamethrower or similar device 
been installed on one of the CEV's and used to start the fire its use 
would have been observable in the infrared videotape of the fire. No 
such use is recorded on the that videotape. Accordingly, the 
subcommittees conclude that the FBI did not use any of the CEV's 
intentionally to cause the fire.
    4. The subcommittees conclude that Federal law enforcement agents 
did not unintentionally cause the fire. The evidence presented to the 
subcommittees suggests that it is highly unlikely that Federal law 
enforcement officials unintentionally caused the fires to occur. The 
evidence demonstrates that the fires broke out at points in time when no 
vehicle used by the FBI was in contact with the structure or had been in 
contact with the structure immediately prior to those points. Because 
this would have been the case had these vehicles inadvertently caused 
the fires to break out by disturbing flammable materials inside the 
Davidian residence, the subcommittees conclude that it is highly 
unlikely that the vehicles inadvertently caused the fires to occur.
    5. The FBI should have made better preparations to fight the fire. 
While it may have been too dangerous to fight the fire when it initially 
erupted, it remains unknown as to whether it might have been safe for 
fire fighters to approach the building at some point earlier than the 
half hour later when they were allowed access. While fire fighting 
efforts might not have extinguished the fire, they could have delayed 
the spread of the fire or provided additional safe means of escape for 
some of the Davidians. It also does not appear as though the FBI 
considered obtaining armored fire-fighting vehicles from the military. 
In any event, given the government's strong belief that a fire might 
take place, and its action in summoning fire fighting units to the 
scene, the subcommittees conclude that the FBI should have made better 
provision for the presence of fire fighting equipment as part of its 
overall plan to end the standoff.
    6. The Davidians could have escaped the residence even after the 
fire began. After the fire broke out on April 19, nine persons left the 
Davidian residence. This indicates that at least some opportunity 
existed for the Davidians to safely leave the structure had they wanted 
to do so. As one person left the structure 21 minutes after the outbreak 
of the first fire, some means of escape from the residence existed for a 
significant period of time after the fire broke out. The autopsies of 
the Davidians indicate that many of the Davidians were not so affected 
by the smoke and fumes from the fire that they were physically unable to 
leave the structure. Additionally, the location of the bodies of the 
Davidians indicates that few of the Davidians actually attempted to 
escape the building. In light of this evidence, the subcommittees 
conclude that there was a period of time after the fires began within 
which the Davidians could have escaped the residence.





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